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ABSTRACT 
Economic crime is complex and costly. It is costly because it harms victims, both 
directly and indirectly, as well as the broader economy. The cost is not only financial, 
but also to confidence and trust in corporate and commercial relationships in South 
Africa. Economic crime is complex because it includes offences from common-law 
fraud to statutory contraventions such as incorrect bookkeeping. 
There are several mechanisms in the South African legal justice system to 
address economic crime. The conventional legal models include adversarial criminal 
prosecution of the offender and civil compensation claims, the model of inquisitorial 
administrative investigations and sanctions like penalties and compensation orders. 
In 2001 section 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act, namely plea and sentencing 
agreements, was added as a model of negotiated justice. This mechanism allows the 
prosecution and the offender to negotiate and enter into an agreement regarding the 
charges and the sanctions, subject to approval of the court that the plea of guilty is 
proper and that the proposed sanction is a just sentence.  
This dissertation proposes that mediation be added to the existing alternative 
models to help combat economic crime. Mediation involves negotiated justice, as 
well as restorative justice. More specifically, mediation as a restorative justice 
process, constitutes a practical alternative to standard litigation as the affected 
parties themselves, with the facilitation of a third person, resolve the disputes 
between them. Mediation, a facilitative and flexible procedure, allows the voices of 
both the victim and the offender to be heard securely and meaningfully. Mediation is 
rehabilitative and allows for agreed restorative provisions for both the perpetrator 
and the victims of economic crime. 
The outcome is a proposed amendment to the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, 
namely the insertion of section 105B, “Mediated Settlement Agreements”, that will 
provide for mediation and a mediated settlement agreement to be incorporated into 
and form part of the criminal justice processes. It is envisaged that an accredited 
mediator will mediate between the parties, including the public prosecutor, the 
perpetrator, the victim and possibly members of the community. The mediated 
settlement agreement will include both compensation for the victims and a proposed 
sentence for the perpetrator. This mediated settlement agreement will then be tabled 
before the court for adjudication and approval to serve as an effective court order.  
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The proposal is a logical legal development of section 105A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act on plea and sentencing agreements, as the process of mediation 
builds on the process of negotiation established in it. To put it bluntly, if a plea and 
sentence agreement can be negotiated between the prosecutor and the offender, a 
plea and sentence agreement can be mediated between the prosecutor, the offender 
and the victim. 
Mediation can integrate and expand the constitutional principles of reparation and 
ubuntu and curb economic crime by providing an effective restorative and just 
response to it. 
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UITTREKSEL 
Ekonomiese misdaad is kompleks en kom teen ŉ prys. Hierdie prys is dikwels 
sowel direk as indirek, aangesien nie net die slagoffer nie, maar ook die breër 
ekonomie skade berokken word.  Verliese is nie net finansieel van aard nie: 
ekonomiese misdaad skaad ook die vertroue in en die geloofwaardigheid van 
korporatiewe- en kommersiële verhoudings in Suid-Afrika. Ekonomiese misdaad is 
kompleks omrede dit oortredings, vanaf gemeenregtelike bedrog tot statutêre 
oortredings, soos byvoorbeeld foutiewe boekhouding, kan insluit. 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel beskik oor verskeie meganismes om ekonomiese 
misdaad aan te spreek. Konvensionele regsmodelle behels adversersatiewe 
strafregtelike vervolging van die oortreder en siviele skadevergoedingsaksies, ‘n 
inkwisitoriese model van administratiewe ondersoek en sanksies in die vorm van 
boetes en skadevergoedingsbevele. In 2001 is pleit- en vonnisooreenkomste 
ingevolge artikel 105A van die Strafproseswet bygevoeg en is op die model van 
onderhandelde geregtigheid geskoei. Hierdie meganisme gee sowel die aanklaer as 
die oortreder die geleentheid om te onderhandel en ŉ ooreenkoms te bereik rakende 
die aanklagte en die sanksie. So ŉ ooreenkoms vereis die goedkeuring van die hof, 
wat moet vasstel of die pleit van skuldig juridies korrek en die voorgestelde vonnis 
regverdig is.   
Hierdie verhandeling stel voor dat bemiddeling bygevoeg moet word tot die 
bestaande alternatiewe metodes vir die bekamping van ekonomiese misdaad. 
Bemiddeling behels sowel onderhandelde geregtigheid as herstellende geregtigheid. 
Bemiddeling is by uitstek ŉ herstellende geregtigheidsproses en bied ŉ praktiese 
alternatief tot standaard litigasie omrede die geaffekteerde partye self, met die 
fasilitering van ŉ derde persoon, die geskille tussen hulle besleg. As ŉ fasiliterende 
en buigsame prosedure laat bemiddeling toe dat die stemme van sowel die slagoffer 
as die oortreder met veiligheid en sinvol gehoor word. Bemiddeling rehabiliteer en 
bied ruimte vir ooreengekome herstellende bepalings vir sowel die oortreder as die 
slagoffers van ekonomiese misdaad.  
Hierdie verhandeling stel voor dat die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 gewysig word, 
deur die toevoeging van artikel 105B “Gemedieërde Skikkingsooreenkomste”, wat 
voorsiening daarvoor sal maak dat bemiddeling en skikkingsooreenkomste wat as ŉ 
resultaat van sodanige bemiddeling bereik is by die bestaande strafregtelike 
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prosedures toegevoeg word. Daar word voorgestel dat ŉ geakkrediteerde 
bemiddelaar die geskille tussen die partye, insluitende die aanklaer, die oortreder, 
die slagoffer en moontlik lede van die gemeenskap, sal bemiddel. Sodanige 
skikkingsooreenkoms sal skadevergoeding vir die slagoffers asook ŉ voorstel vir ŉ 
geskikte vonnis vir die oortreder insluit. Die gemedieërde skikkingsooreenkoms sal 
vervolgens voor die hof dien vir oorweging en goedkeuring om as ŉ effektiewe 
hofbevel te kan funksioneer. 
Die voorstel is ŉ logiese prosesregtelike ontwikkeling van pleit- en 
vonnisooreenkomste ingevolge artikel 105A van die Strafproseswet aangesien die 
proses van bemiddeling voortbou op die beginsel van onderhandelde geregtigheid 
wat reeds daarin vervat is. Eenvoudig gestel, indien ŉ pleit- en vonnisooreenkoms 
onderhandel kan word tussen ŉ aanklaer en ŉ oortreder, kan ŉ pleit- en vonnis 
ooreenkoms ook bemiddel word tussen die aanklaer, die oortreder en die slagoffer. 
Bemiddeling kan die konstitusionele beginsels van regstelling en ubuntu integreer 
en verbreed, en terselfdertyd bydra om ekonomiese misdaad te bekamp deur die 
daarstelling van ŉ doeltreffend herstellende en regverdige antwoord daarop. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF ECONOMIC CRIME AND AN 
ADDITIONAL PROPOSAL TO HELP COMBAT IT 
Chapter overview 
1 1 Background and motivation for the study 1 
1 2 Definition of economic crime 5 
1 3 Objective and motivation for the research 9 
1 4 Research hypothesis: the value of mediation and restorative justice 14 
1 5 Overview of the discussion 17 
1 1 Background and motivation for the study 
“Obviously crime pays, or there’d be no crime.”1 
Economic crime does indeed seem to pay in South Africa, reportedly the country 
with the highest economic crime rate in the world.2 Billions are lost by corporations 
every year due to economic crime, which understandably has an impact on 
economic growth and development in South Africa and on its wider commercial 
international relationships.3 Economic crime is a composite concept and includes a 
number of crimes,4 and common comparable terms often used in the public 
                                            
1 G Gordon Liddy.BrainyQuote.com Xplore Inc (2017) 
https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/g/ggordonli122397.html (accessed 25-01-2017). 
2 According to the PWC Global Economic Crimes Survey 2018, 77% of South African 
respondents confirmed that they have been victims of economic crime compared to a global 
rate of 49%. PWC “The Dawn of Proactivity: Countering Threats from Inside and Out” Global 
Economic Crime Survey 2018 8 pwc <https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/gecs-2018.pdf> 
(accessed 22-07-2019). 
3 P Shuma “Corruption Costs SA’s GDP R27 Billion Annually” (29-06-2018) 
SABCNewsOnline <http://www.sabcnews.com/sabcnews/corruption-costs-sas-gdp-r27-
billion-annually/> (accessed 22-07-2019); twenty-two percent of more than 6000 
respondents in the 2016 PWC survey suffered losses between USD100,000 – USD1 Million, 
14% losses over USD1 million and 1% losses over USD100 million. PWC Global Economic 
Crimes Survey (2016) 11. The South African Police Services reported 69,917 cases of 
commercial crime in the 2015/2016 period, an increase of 3,1% from the previous 2014/2015 
period, whilst theft declined by 5,6% to 340,372 cases in the same period. See South African 
Police Services Crime Statistics Report 2015/2016 67-82. 
4 Without defining economic crime, the (PWC Global Economic Crimes Survey 2018 10) 
uses the following categories in its survey: asset misappropriation, fraud committed by 
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discourse are corruption and white-collar crime. The destructive and debilitating 
effects of corruption on the democratic values of a society have been acknowledged 
by the Constitutional Court.5 Similarly, both national6 and international legislatures7 
have recognised that specific statutes are necessary to curb economic crime. 
Corruption, part of economic crime, is not only a grave offence, but one that is 
“antithetical to the founding values of our constitutional order”;8 a harmful offence 
that undermines such constitutional order. It also weakens the values of democracy 
that promote the development of economic freedom and growth and that nurture 
ethical and moral values.  
In addition to the direct monetary losses of economic crime, it has far-reaching 
effects in society. Twenty years ago Justice Heath summed these up starkly: 
“[B]esides these direct losses…, the state’s plight is further compounded by the 
incalculable impact that economic crime has in the fields of macro-economics, 
social order morale of citizens and the general well-being of society. If the 
perception is created that the system is failing in its attempts to curb an 
avalanche of anti-social-behaviour, skilled people leave the country…, social 
values decline, society feels unsafe and the country stares civil disobedience in 
the face.”9 
 
                                            
consumer, cybercrime, corruption and bribery, procurement fraud, accounting fraud, human 
resources fraud, money laundering, IP infringement, insider trading, tax fraud, mortgage 
fraud, competition/anti-trust law infringement and espionage. Also see Heath’s discussion of 
the broad spectrum of economic crime and the perpetrators ranging from a single individual 
to organised groups in W Heath “The Plight of the State as a Victim of Economic Crime” in L 
De Koker, BAK Rider & JJ Henning Victims of Economic Crime (1999) 1 1-3. 
5 O’Regan ADCJ in Shaik v S 2008 2 SACR 165 (CC) para 72; Chaskalson P in South 
African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 1 SA 883 (CC) para 4. 
6 For example, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (POCA). 
7 For example, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, ratified by South Africa in 
2004; and the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption ratified by 
South Africa in 2005.  
8 O’Regan ADCJ in Shaik v S 2008 2 SACR 165 (CC) para 72. 
9 Heath J “The Plight of the State” in Victims of Economic Crime 3-4. Anonymous 
“Combating Corruption” The World Bank. Also see A Thomas (“A Reimagined Foreign 
Corrupted Practices Act: From Deterrence to Restoration and Beyond” (2016) 30 Temp Int'l 
& Comp LJ) 385 386-388.succinctly denoting that corruption has “a trickle-down effect of 
crippling the citizenry of a corrupt country”. 
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Further indirect losses include the cost in time and resources, both for the state 
and a victim during a criminal investigation and the prosecution process. 
Although white-collar crime and the combating of such crime were acknowledged 
as a priority more than twenty years ago by parliament and government,10 white-
collar crime seems to increase unabatedly, both in the number of instances and the 
value of losses. Moreover, it appears that many instances of economic crime go 
unreported.11 The reasons for non-reporting them vary,12 but include, particularly 
with regard to economic crime within companies, that it does not pay to report 
economic crime.13  
                                            
10 National Crime Prevention Strategy (“NCPS”) Department of Justice, Pretoria (May 1996) 
30 and 36-37, para 5.7 and 5.7.3. White-collar crime is further identified as being one of the 
crimes that need organisational prioritisation that requires coordinated and “dedicated 
capacity” by the criminal justice process. See NCPS (1996) 52 para 8, in particular para 
8.1.6 and 8.1.6.3. Furthermore, the National Programme 2.4: Corruption and Commercial 
Crime was approved by Parliament exclusively to reduce instances of “white-collar crime, 
commercial crime, large scale fraud and economic offences”. See NCPS (1996) 72-73 para 
22. 
11 Heath “The Plight of the State” in Victims of Economic Crime 1; PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Economic Crime: People, Culture & Controls: The 4th Biennial Global Economic Crime 
Survey Engineering and Construction Industry Supplement (2008) 6; D Barret “Frauds Worth 
£12bn Go Unreported, Says Report” The Telegraph (19-03-2015) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11480715/Frauds-worth-12bn-go-
unreported-says-report.html> (accessed 25-08-2017); T Reeve “Underreporting and User 
Error Key Problems in Combatting Cyber-fraud” (11-11-2016) SC Media UK 
<https://www.scmagazineuk.com/underreporting-and-user-error-key-problems-in-
combatting-cyber-fraud/article/572613/> (accessed 25-08-2017); L Lancaster “Why are 
South Africans Underreporting on Crime?” (06-03-2017) ISS <https://issafrica.org/iss-
today/why-are-south-africans-underreporting-on-crime> (accessed 25-08-2017). 
12 In an empirical study in Sao Paulo, Brazil, various factors, including the gender, age and 
wealth of a victim, as well as the violent nature of a crime (for example theft and robbery) in 
relation to underreporting of crime, including property crime, were investigated. M Justus & 
LG Scorzafave “Underreporting of Property Crimes: An Empirical Economic Analysis” (2014) 
5 EALR 271-284. 
13 Adv M Govender (DDPP, Regional Head, SCCU, Western Cape) identified non-reporting 
of fraud and theft within companies to be one of the major problems existing between 
business and the prosecution with regard to economic crime. Interview with Adv M Govender 
(16-09-2016). The hypothesis of economic rationality, which holds that victims weigh up the 
risks in reporting crime, also prevent economic crime being reported. For example, if a 
bookkeeper steals R50,000 from an employer, the employer may weigh up and calculate 
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The main consequence of economic crime is that of costs.14 The economy is 
influenced detrimentally as the cost of business increases and economic 
development and investment is hindered.15 It is also considered to undermine the 
human rights of freedom of trade and economy and equality.16 Economic crime  thus 
is not only a crime against property, but also a crime against a person and a crime of 
significant public importance and import.  
The problem of economic crime is irrefutable. Although attempts are being made 
to curb it, the problems of economic crime remain prevalent.17 Subsequently, it is 
submitted in this dissertation that an additional impetus, an alternative model in the 
form of mediation, based on the principles of restorative justice, is needed to help the 
fight against economic crime.  
                                            
that the chance of getting a conviction and the cost of time and effort spent in assisting the 
police in the investigation and the prosecutor during the prosecution process exceeds the 
loss of the theft. Consequently the employer may not report the crime but may simply 
confront the employee and compel her or him to resign. See too D Barret “Frauds Worth 
£12bn Go Unreported, Says Report” The Telegraph (19-03-2015) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/11480715/Frauds-worth-12bn-go-
unreported-says-report.html> (accessed 25-08-2017).  
14 CR Snyman Criminal Law (2014) 401 mentions several consequences of corruption, 
including loss of moral values and credibility of public authorities, undermining a free market 
economy and hindering economic development. See too J Burchell Principles of Criminal 
Law (2005) 891. This statement is omitted in the latest edition. 
15 Jeff Radebe, former Minister in the Presidency responsible for Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation as quoted by L Prince “Korrupsie Knou Diens, Vertroue en Beleggings” Die 
Burger (2015-09-21) 1. 
16 The National Anti-Corruption Forum brochure Understanding the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (2006/2009) 9; Henning “Corruption and Bribery in South 
Africa” in Combating Economic Crime 53. 
17 “Ons wen nie die oorlog nie.” These are the words of Major-General P Arendse head 
Research & Analysis of the Hawks (Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation), whilst 
reporting on organised crime to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on 15 August 2017, 
as quoted by P Essop “‘Ons Wen Nie Teen Misdaad,’ sê Valke-hoë” (15-18-2017) 
Netwerk24 <http://www.netwerk24.com/Nuus/Politiek/ons-wen-nie-teen-misdaad-se-valke-
hoe-20170815> (accessed 16-08-1017).  
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1 2 Definition of economic crime  
Economic crime is a comprehensive and complex phenomenon.18 It comprises a 
number of criminal offences.19 In creating a working definition of economic crime, 
attention is given to various forms of economic crime in the common law and 
legislation. A traditional characteristic is that economic crime involves a wrong 
against property as opposed to a person.  
A common definition of economic crime is that it is a “crime of a financial nature, 
especially involving fraudulent activity.”20 It has also been definited as: 
“Economic crimes refer to illegal acts committed by an individual or a group of 
individuals to obtain a financial or professional advantage. In such crimes, the 
offender’s principal motive is economic gain. Cyber crimes, tax evasion, robbery, 
selling of controlled substances, and abuses of economic aid are all examples of 
economic crimes.”21  
The first definition clearly includes fraud, but as the few examples in the second 
definition illustrate economic crime also includes tax evasion, various cyber-crimes, 
robbery and bribery.22 
                                            
18 Compare G Kemp (“Alternative Measures to Reduce Trial cases, Private Autonomy and 
‘Public Interest’: Some Observations with Specific Reference to Plea Bargaining and 
Economic Crimes” (2014) 2 Stell LR 425) who states that “it is not self-evident what is meant 
by economic crime”. Compare N Schell-Busey, SS Simpson, M Rorie & M Alper “What 
Works? A Systematic Review of Corporate Crime Deterrence” (2016) 15 Criminol Public Pol 
387 389.  
19 For example, the profile of economic crime in the mining sector in Southern Africa includes 
cheque fraud and theft, short delivery of bought goods, inferior quality of goods and inflated 
prices and fake spares regarding repair and maintenance contracts. See RL Robinson 
“Profile of Economic Crime in Southern Africa: Mining Industry” in JJ Henning (ed) Economic 
Crime in Southern Africa (1996) 16 17-19. 
20 English Oxford Living Dictionaries 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/economic_crime> (accessed 19-07-2017). 
21 USLegal Inc<https://definitions.uslegal.com/e/economic-crime/> (accessed 19-07-2017). 
See too Justice Heath’s discussion of the broad spectrum of economic crime and the 
perpetrators ranging from a single individual to organised groups (Heath “The Plight of the 
State as a Victim of Economic Crime” Victims of Economic Crime (1999) 1); 
<http://www.cipce.org.ar/en/what-is-economic-crime> (accessed 19-07-2017). 
22 J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5 ed (2016) 805 fn 9 describes bribery in the 
corporate arena as occurring when a briber gives a bribe to another person involved in a 
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Commentators often use corruption23 and white-collar crime24 as synonyms for 
economic crime. It is submitted that these terms are not inter-changeable. Corruption 
is a form of economic crime, which although complex and broad itself, is only a type 
of economic crime. In South Africa, corruption appears in the daily media and is the 
topic of innumerable conversations every day. It has been labelled as an enemy and 
                                            
commercial transaction, in order to gain an advantage over a competitor. Consequently the 
activities of a free market are compromised because the briber gets the deal due to the bribe 
and not due to competition or competitiveness. 
23 The English Oxford Living Dictionary defines corruption as “dishonest or fraudulent 
conduct by those in power, typically involving bribery” 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/corruption> (accessed 07-09-2017); and the 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “dishonest or illegal behavior especially by powerful people” 
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corruption> (accessed 07-09-2017). JJ 
Henning (“The Prevention and Detection of Corruption and Bribery in South Africa” in E 
Snyman & JJ Henning (eds) Transactions 33 Combating Economic Crime (2000)) 51 52 
defines corruption as “the unlawful or immoral use of office in the public or private sector for 
personal enrichment”. Corruption is defined broadly and extensively by the legislature in s 3 
of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (“PCCA Act”). The 
general definition is very broad, and applies when someone gives (or offers to give) 
someone else something in order that the recipient use his or her power, illegally and 
unfairly, to get an advantage for the payer – or for anybody else. The acceptance of any 
such offer is also considered to be a corrupt activity. G Kemp (Criminal Law in South Africa 
(2015) 442 refers to corruption as an unbundled crime in terms of the PCCA Act as it is split 
into a general crime of corruption and several specific forms of corruption. 
24 Burchell (Principles of Criminal law (2016)) 803 describes white-collar crime as “involving 
the abuse of official or corporate office for dishonest exploitation of the opportunities for profit 
in modern business, commercial and industrial practices”. The term white-collar crime was 
first coined by the sociologist Edwin Sutherland in 1939 who defined the term as “a crime 
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his 
occupation”. A list of different crimes fall under “white-collar crime”, including “antitrust 
violations, bankruptcy fraud, bribery, computer and internet fraud, counterfeiting, credit card 
fraud, economic espionage and trade secret theft, embezzlement, environmental law 
violations, financial institution fraud, government fraud, healthcare fraud, insider trading, 
insurance fraud, intellectual property theft/piracy, kickbacks, mail fraud, money laundering, 
securities fraud, tax evasion, phone and telemarketing fraud, and public corruption”. See E 
Temchenko “White-collar Crime” Cornell University Law School (June 2016) 
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/white-collar_crime> (accessed 27-01-2017).  
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the rhetoric constantly used “is to combat” or “to fight” corruption.25 In this 
dissertation economic crime has a much wider application.26  
Acquaah-Gaisle, describes “corporate crime” as a white-collar crime, and 
continues to qualify the terms by referring to corporate crime as being organisational, 
whilst white-collar crime is individualistic.27 Although it is the understanding in this 
dissertation that economic crime occurs primarily in the field of commerce, it is 
submitted that the distinction made by Acquaah-Gaisle is not very helpful.28 Also, in 
view of the terms blue-collar and white-collar being outdated, the term white-collar 
crime is also outdated and not used.  
In reaching a definition of economic crime in view of the above discussion, 
Sjögren and Skogh’s definition of economic crime is helpful: “Crime meant to gain 
profit within an otherwise legal business. The crime may damage private citizens, 
business and/or the public sector.”29 The authors add several forms of economic 
crime, including fraud and embezzlement.30 
An overview of statutory offences, principally in statutes regulating commercial 
activities, can also contribute to a working definition of economic crime. Of particular 
relevance are the offences relating to insider trading, the wrongful use of undisclosed 
                                            
25 “Corruption affects the lives of everyone in South Africa – it is our common enemy” as 
quoted from the National Anti-Corruption Forum brochure Understanding the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (2006/2009) 41. Henning (“Corruption and Bribery in 
South Africa” in Combating Economic Crime (2000)) 86 uses the word “cancer”, depicting 
malignancy when referring to corruption. 
26 For example, although many instances of economic crime may share characteristics such 
as dishonesty and immorality with corruption. Other instances such as contraventions of 
health and safety regulations which constitute economic crime may only be reckless and not 
deceitful in nature. 
27 G Acquaah-Gaisie “Fighting Public Officer and Corporate Crimes” in E Snyman & JJ 
Henning (eds) Transactions 33 Combating Economic Crime (2000) 88 89. 
28 Compare R Paternoster (“Deterring Corporate Crime: Evidence and Outlook” (2016) 15 
Criminol Public Pol) 383 385 who warns that the research into economic crime has struggled 
and will continue to struggle because of the confusion over the different terms and 
descriptions, including “corporate crime”, “white-collar crime” and workplace crime. He 
argues further that if scholars wish to add an adjective to “crime” then the adjective needs to 
be substantiated. 
29 H Sjögren and G Skogh (eds) New Perspectives on Economic Crime (2004) 1. 
30 Sjögren and Skogh New Perspectives on Economic Crime 1-2. 
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information for private gain31 in terms of the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 (“the 
Financial Markets Act”)32 which has been enacted to regulate the financial market 
sector to promote confidence and growth in the industry. 
Market abuse is similar to “insider trading”, and may include “insider trading”. It 
occurs where some person has abused non-public information to trade and has 
consequently disadvantaged other investors. Market abuse includes instances of 
price fixing, market manipulation or misleading the market.33  
The term economic crime has broad interpretation and application. In this 
research, the focus is on economic crime in the private sector, which may include 
offences such as corruption, theft, fraud, insider trading, and tenderpreneurship. 
Cases of economic crime that are being effectively dealt with by certain investigative 
bodies other than the courts are distinguished and discussed. For example, several 
cases relating to pyramid schemes have been dealt with by the Financial Advisory 
and Intermediate Services Ombudsman in terms of the Financial Advisory and 
Intermediate Services Act 37 of 2002.34  
                                            
31 Defined as “the use of privileged information for the purpose of gain (or to avoid a loss) at 
the expense of others”. Booklet JSE “Insider Trading and Other Market Abuses (Including 
the effective management of price sensitive information” (January 2015) available at 
ttps://www.jse.co.za/content/.../Insider%20Trading%20Booklet.pdf. Insider trading involves 
the trading in securities by someone who has and uses non-public information to buy or sell 
securities in order to make a profit. Also see JSE “Insider trading and other market abuse 
(2015) 6-7. 
32 Financial Markets Act s 78 makes provision for several offences, including insider trading 
for one’s own account [s 78(1)(a)]; or insider trading on behalf of another person [s 78(2)(a)]; 
or dealing by a dealer who knowingly deals for an insider [s 78(3)(a)]; or an insider who 
knowingly discloses inside information [s 78(4)(a)]; or an insider who encourages or 
discourages another to trade [s 78(5)(a)]. 
33 For example, an oil company misleads the public regarding the volume of its reserves, 
which has an impact on the market price of its shares. Also see the making of certain false, 
deceptive or misleading statements under s 81 of the Financial Markets Act. The making of 
such a statement is an offence (s 81(3)).  
34 Tenderpreneurship is a South African expression referring to persons who use their 
political connections to secure government contracts for their own benefit. The issue of the 
FAIS Ombud is discussed in para 4 2 3 193 below. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
9 
 
Attention is given to cases of economic crime where a company may be either the 
perpetrator35 or the victim.36 Economic crime involving state officials is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation which is limited to examining instances of economic crime 
related to private-sector companies.37 
A working definition of economic crime is therefore:  
“a non-violent illegal act committed by a person to gain economic profit or 
benefit”.  
A person includes both a natural and a juristic person, including a company.38 It 
also includes a representative of a company, or an officer or employee of a 
company. Therefore, the definition of economic crime includes crimes committed by 
a company and to a company. Economic crime can involve an individual or a group 
of persons, a single illegal act or a series of illegal acts. Economic crime may 
consequently include “organised crime” as defined under the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (“POCA”).39  
Economic crime is very serious. The persistent misconception that economic 
crime is not such a serious crime because it is non-violent and most often committed 
by an educated person of social standing40 is simply wrong.41 Economic crime may 
have direct or indirect costs to private persons and to the public and economy in 
general.42 In view of these considerations, it is imperative to curb economic crime 
and the objective and motivation for this research is expounded in section 1 3 below.  
                                            
35 For example, where a company, such as a bank, may be overcharging its customers 
interest. 
36 For example, where the Chief Financial Officer of a company may have defrauded the 
company of monies. 
37 Some state enterprises are registered as companies under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
(“Companies Act 2008”) and are thus covered.  
38 The word “company” as defined by s 1 of the Companies Act 2008. 
39 The mechanism of asset forfeiture in terms of POCA is discussed in ch 4, para 1 4 3, 205ff 
below. 
40 The profile of persons mostly committing economic crime is that of an educated middle- 
aged male in middle to senior management. PWC Global Economic Crimes Survey 2016 12; 
A Crossman “White-collar Crime” ThoughtCo (02-03-2017) 
<https://www.thoughtco.com/white-collar-crime-definition-3026746> (accessed 22-07-2019). 
41 See S v Sadler 2000 1 SACR 331 (SCA) paras 11 & 12 per Marais JA. 
42 Compare Kemp (2014) Stell LR 425-426.  
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1 3 Objective and motivation for the research  
The object of the research is to examine the suitability of mediation for resolving 
instances of economic crime. At present, there are several models within the civil 
and criminal justice systems of South Africa that deal with economic crime. The 
conventional process is that a complaint can be laid by a complainant, which is then 
investigated by the South African Police Services (“SAPS”). Thereafter, the so-called 
docket is handed over to the National Prosecuting Authority (“NPA”). The NPA 
decides whether a criminal charge can be laid in terms of common law or in terms of 
the provisions of various acts43 and an accused may subsequently be prosecuted in 
terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (“CPA”). The primary objects and 
outcomes of the criminal prosecution process are punitive44 as opposed to 
restorative. Only in a small number of cases is an opportunity given for reconciliation 
between the parties or restitution for the victim. The process is also adversarial and 
adjudicative. The offender and the prosecution are adversaries that battle it out 
before a presiding officer who delivers a verdict, guilty or not guilty. The focus is on 
the accused and the crime, with the objective of seeking the conviction of the 
accused for the offence, with minimal focus on and minimal assistance for the 
victim.45 The criminal trial procedure is also a time consuming process and 
sometimes charges against an offender are dropped due to technical, not 
substantive reasons.46 Moreover, the SAPS and NPA are under budgetary 
constraints and overburdened with cases and some staff lack the required skills and 
experience needed to investigate and prosecute crimes of an economic nature 
                                            
43 For example, corruption under the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 
of 2004. 
44 Kemp Criminal Law in SA (2012) 13, 20 states that “the essential purpose of criminal law 
is to provide a mechanism for punishing the offender”. Also see JM Burchell South African 
Criminal Law and Procedure (2011) 3; CR Snyman Criminal Law (2014) 13, 19. 
45 H Oosthuizen “Victims of Fraud” in L De Koker, BAK Rider & JJ Henning (eds) Victims of 
Economic Crime (1999) 58 64. 
46 For example, the accused person in the Prophet series of cases was acquitted of the initial 
charges of contravening the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 in the Magistrate’s 
Court due to a technicality regarding the evidence obtained via a search and seizure 
warrant. Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions (“NDPP”) 2006 2 SACR 525 
(CC) paras 6-7, 21, 39 & 66. 
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successfully.47 A civil claim for restitution of losses due to economic crime is usually 
dealt with separately, as a subsequent claim in the civil justice system. This is yet 
another legal procedure that is adversarial in nature and also subject to the costs 
and lengthy time periods customary to court processes in justice systems.48 
At present, there are also a number of administrative organs that are authorised to 
investigate, make determinations and issue penalties in instances of economic 
crime. For example, the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Ombud (“FAIS 
Ombud”), that operates in the financial services industry may investigate and make 
determinations relating to contraventions of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Act 37 of 2002 (“FAIS Act”), including fraud, a criminal offence.49 
Determinations of the FAIS Ombud may include restitution of monies to victims, and 
many of the Ombud’s determinations have done so in practice. 50 However, the FAIS 
Ombud is not authorised to find a person guilty of a criminal offence. The offender 
                                            
47 M Schönteich Assessing the Crime Fighters (1999) 1; Oosthuizen “Victims of Fraud” in 
Victims of Economic Crime (1999) 58; a recent Transparency International Report calls for 
more specialised training for investigators into foreign bribery. South Africa is one of the 
countries listed as having only limited enforcement. Exporting Corruption: Progress Report 
2015: Assessing enforcement of OECD Anti-bribery Convention (Aug 2015) 8, 10 (available 
at 
<http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/2015_exportingcorruption_oecdprogre/1>); 
L De Koker “The Prosecution of Economic Crime in South Africa – Some Thoughts on 
Problems and Solutions” in L De Koker, BAK Rider & JJ Henning (eds) Transactions 31 
Victims of Economic Crime (1999) 97 97; HC Nel “Why Enforce Commercial Laws?” in E 
Snyman & JJ Henning (eds) Transactions 33 Combating Economic Crime (2000) 30 30. 
48 Oosthuizen “Victims of Fraud” in Victims of Economic Crime (1999) 63; JH De Bruin 
“Enabling Victims of Economic Crime to Fight Back – A Class Action in South African Law” in 
Victims of Economic Crime (1999) 125 125. In general, it is argued that mediation is a more 
flexible and faster process and consequently parties benefit from indirect cost savings such 
as time of employees not spent in lengthy court hearings and also from the direct financial 
costs of litigation. See J Brand, F Steadman & C Todd Commercial Mediation: A User’s 
Guide to Court-Referred and Voluntary Mediation in South Africa (2015 reprinted) 26-28 
discussion on the different benefits of mediation.  
49 For example, fraudulently misrepresenting the returns on a company’s shares. 
50 GEJ Siegrist vs CJ Botha T/A CJ Botha Finansiële Dienste FAIS 00039/11-12/GP 1; MA 
Kapp vs Wanadoo 30 CC T/A Martin Holtzhausen Financial Services & MC Holtzhausen 
FAIS 05639/10-11/WC 1; PJ Wessels & JC Wessels vs CD Langley & Levator Wealth CC 
FAIS 7434/10-11/KZN 1 and FAIS 7435/10-11/KZN 1; J Bekker vs EA Carter-Smith FAIS 
06661/10-11/WC 1. 
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may of course be prosecuted for fraud or another offence in the criminal justice 
system, but there is usually a delay in the prosecution.51 Moreover, in some 
instances, the victims, having received their monies and recovered their losses, may 
be unwilling to testify as witnesses in a criminal trial. In addition, in many instances it 
is the intermediary, the financial service provider, who is required by the FAIS 
Ombud to compensate the victim and not necessarily the main perpetrator of fraud.52  
Consequently, it is submitted that the conventional legal models of criminal 
prosecution and a subsequent civil claim, or the model of administrative penalties, 
are not being fully effectual in combatting economic crime. It is submitted further that 
mediation offers a practical alternative to standard litigation as the issues in dispute 
are resolved between the affected parties themselves with the facilitation of a third 
person. Mediation is thus more of a facilitative and flexible procedure and is dynamic 
and fast. Mediation is rehabilitative and allows for restorative provisions for both the 
perpetrator and the victims of economic crime.  
The concept of restorative justice, encompassing the responsibilities and interests 
of all the parties, including the perpetrators, the victims and the community, is 
important.53 The state and commentators in South Africa have for several decades 
                                            
51 For example, in the Sharemax scheme allegations of fraud and contraventions of the 
Banks Act were under investigation in 2012, and resuscitated in 2017, yet to date no person 
has been charged with any criminal offence. R Cokayne “Sharemax: Financial Adviser 
Fingers SA Reserve Bank” Cape Times Business Report (05-09-2017) 15; R van Niekerk 
“NPA Asks Hawks to Reopen Sharemax Investigation” (10-03-2017) Moneyweb 
<https://www.moneyweb.co.za/in-depth/investigations/hawks-asked-by-npa-to-reopen-
sharemax-investigation/> (accessed 06-09-2017). 
52 For example in the Sharemax pyramid scheme (see fn 232) several cases involving the 
financial providers have been dealt with by the FAIS Ombud and she has ordered them to 
pay restitution to the victims. Yet the main role-players of the pyramid scheme, being the 
directors and officers of the companies involved, who are alleged to have committed several 
offences of economic crime, are yet to face criminal charges. See Van Niekerk “NPA Asks 
Hawks to Reopen Sharemax Investigation” (10-03-2017) Moneyweb. 
53 ZD Gabbay “Exploring the Limits of the Restorative Justice Paradigm: Restorative Justice 
and White-collar Crime” (2007) Cardozo J Conflict Resol 421 427 concludes “[i]n my opinion, 
restorative justice is a different approach to criminal justice. While the system today is 
offender-orientated and focuses on punishment, the restorative justice paradigm offers a 
more balanced view of the appropriate public response to crime. It maintains the public 
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endorsed the importance and promoted the integration of restorative justice into the 
criminal justice system.54 It is recognised that the purpose of criminal law is primarily 
retributive, with a view to punishing the offender. However it will be proposed that 
restorative and reformative resolution of economic crime may be equally effective.55 
It is not proposed that mediation should take place outside of the criminal justice 
system, but be incorporated into it. Accordingly, the proposal is that any mediated 
settlement agreement be presented to a court for confirmation. 
Mediation is also consensual and thus mostly amicable and allows for forgiveness 
and the retention of business relationships between the perpetrator and the victim.56 
In addition, it is submitted that it is a less expensive way of resolving issues arising 
from economic crimes than protracted and costly investigations and trials by the 
                                            
aspect of criminal law but introduces the victims’ perspective and the reparation of the needs 
created by the offense as an inseparable aspect of justice.”  
54Minister Ronald Lamola in his recent address on 16 July 2019 to parliament indicated that 
the CPA is due to be amended to ensure that it is in line with the Integrated Criminal Justice 
System (ICJS) (2017), including the consideration of victims of crime and witnesses as being 
main beneficiaries of the system. See L Ensor “Justice Minister to Seek More Resources for 
Cash-strapped NPA” (16-07-2019) Business Live 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-07-16-justice-minister-to-seek-more-
resources-for-cash-strapped-npa/> (accessed 17-07-2019). The ICJS (2017) approved by 
cabinet on 29 March 2017 includes as focus areas the promotion of ADRM, including 
mediation in criminal matters and collaboration with the community. See DOJ&CD “Focus 
Areas Integrated Criminal Justice System (ICJS) pmg 
<https://pmg.org.za/files/170531focusareas.ppt> (accessed 19-07-2019). See also ch 3 2 
above; South African Law Reform Commission Issue Paper 7, Project 82, Sentencing 
Restorative Justice (Compensation for Victims of Crime and Victim Empowerment) (1997); B 
Tshehla “The Restorative Justice Bug Bites the South African Criminal Justice System” 
(2004) SACJ 1, 14; A Skelton & M Batley “Restorative Justice: A Contemporary South 
African Review” (2008) 21 AJ 37 40 highlight the fact that the 2007 volume of Acta Juridica, 
which is dedicated to restorative justice, is a defining moment in the development of 
restorative justice in South Africa. 
55 Kemp Criminal Law (2012) 20-22 discusses different theories of punishment, including the 
so-called retributive, relative and combination theories of punishment. This research will join 
the conversation and lean towards the relative theory through negotiated justice and the use 
of alternative dispute resolution systems, such as mediation. See too CR Snyman Criminal 
Law (2014) 10-20. 
56 It costs less in time and money to search for and reach a settlement than to litigate: see B 
Mgayi “Why Leaders Must Forgive” USB Agenda (2013) 2 9; Brand et al Commercial 
Mediation (2015) 29. 
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state authorities, followed by similarly protracted and expensive civil suits. This may 
enhance access to justice for victims. 
It should be emphasised that a model using mediation within the criminal justice 
system is not a replacement for the present civil and criminal procedures regarding 
economic crime, but that it presents a viable appropriate alternative mechanism that 
can contribute to combatting economic crime more effectively in some instances. 
1 4 Research hypothesis: the value of mediation and restorative justice  
The research proceeds from the hypothesis that mediation, incorporated into the 
criminal justice system, rather than the conventional adversarial criminal 
prosecutorial trial can be used to resolve some instances of economic crime more 
effectively. The hypothesis is based on the principles of restorative justice. Models of 
restorative justice are being used increasingly in the South African criminal justice 
system. This is illustrated by the use of diversion57 in the Child Justice Act 75 of 
2008.58 However, it will be argued that restorative justice needs to be fully integrated 
into the system.59 In addition, the extension of the use of ADR mechanisms, 
including mediation, in various fields of law, both criminal and civil, is important. 
Examples of such extension are the new possibilities and alternatives provided for in 
chapter 7 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and the expansion of the use of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, including mediation, to contraventions of the 
Companies Act.60 The application of mediation to economic crime and 
                                            
57 Diversion entails diverting a child away from the formal court procedures to other 
procedures prescribed in the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 (“Child Justice Act”). The 
objectives of diversion provided in s 51 of the Child Justice Act echo restorative justice 
principles, and include ensuring that the child understands her or his accountability for the 
harm caused, which helps the child’s reintegration into her or his family or community and 
promotes reconciliation between the victim and child perpetrator. Examples of diversion 
options include: “a compulsory school attendance order” in s 53(1)(a) of the Child Justice Act 
and “a supervision and guidance order” in s 53(1)(f) of the Child Justice Act. 
58 Ch 8, including the processes of family group conferences in s 61 and victim-offender 
mediation in s 62 of the Child Justice Act. 
59 See fn 53. 
60 See Companies Act 2008, specifically s 166 read with s 156. 
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contraventions of the Companies Act has to date received little attention.61 This 
research will show that mediation is a possible complementary alternative that may 
offer realistic and practical possibilities in combating economic crime.62 
Mediation is chosen as the most appropriate ADR process primarily because it is 
based on and driven by the interests of the parties as opposed to their rights. In 
addition, mediation is based on restorative justice as opposed to punitive justice. It is 
submitted that this approach not only encourages a change of behaviour by the 
perpetrators of economic crime but also grants a voice and possible pecuniary 
compensation to victims, whose only usual role in conventional criminal prosecutions 
is that of witness.63 The restorative approach focuses more on the potential 
rehabilitation of the perpetrator and the perpetrator’s responsibility to right the wrong 
against the victims. It is submitted that this better serves not only the interests of the 
victim and offender, but also the interests of justice and the public interest. It is 
acknowledged that the public interest needs to be protected in cases of economic 
crime, which is a crime against the public welfare. Consequently, it is proposed that 
the mediated settlement agreement64 be made an order of the court. This will ensure 
that the public not only has knowledge of it, but also that the mediated settlement 
agreement in the form of a court order will serve as a general and individual 
                                            
61 In the SALRC Discussion Papers 94 and 100 plea negotiation agreements and out of 
court settlements in criminal matters were respectively discussed. SALRC Issue Paper 8, 
Project 94 Alternative Dispute Resolution (1997); SALRC Discussion Paper 100, Project 73, 
Simplification of Criminal Procedure (Out-of-Court Settlements in Criminal Cases) (2001). 
However, no specific reference has been made to the use of formal mediation in instances of 
economic crime or with regard to contraventions of the Companies Act 2008.  
62 Recognition is given to the concerns raised by Kemp that benefits such as pragmatism 
and time and cost saving issues should not determine the process to be followed, but rather 
that the overriding element of justice should prevail. G Kemp “Alternative Measures to 
Reduce Trial cases, Private Autonomy and ‘Public Interest’: Some Observations with 
Specific Reference to Plea Bargaining and Economic Crimes” (2014) 2 Stell LR 425-436. 
63 It must, however, be noted that the CPA s 105A(1)(a)(ii)(dd), read with s 300, makes 
provision for a compensation order to be made by the court to a victim who has suffered 
economic loss as part of a plea and sentencing agreement. 
64 The term “mediation agreement” is best used to refer to the agreement entered by the 
parties before mediation setting out the terms and conditions for the process of mediation. In 
this dissertation the term “mediated settlement agreement” is used for the agreement agreed 
and settled between the parties after mediation.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
16 
 
deterrence. It is submitted that the proposal will not only uphold the so-called Zinn 
triad factors which need to be considered when imposing a sentence, namely the 
crime, the offender and the interests of society,65 but also give more consideration to 
the interests of the victim.66 
It is predicted that the research will result in proposing an integrated model. In this 
model various forms of mediation will be incorporated into the existing judicial 
system. It is envisaged that an accredited mediator67 will mediate between the 
parties, including the public prosecutor, the perpetrator, the victim and possibly 
members of the community. It is further envisaged that the mediated settlement 
agreement will entail provisions regarding both compensation for the victims and a 
proposed sentence for the perpetrator. Subsequently this mediated settlement 
agreement will be tabled before a magistrate or a judge for adjudication and 
approval,68 to serve as an effective court order. The hypothesis entails the 
integration and expansion of existing principles and statutory provisions in the 
criminal justice system, namely the further integration of restorative justice and ADR 
mechanisms with the insertion of section 105B into the CPA, with the heading 
“Mediated Settlement Agreements”. It is submitted that the proposal is a logical legal 
development of section 105A of the CPA, as the process of mediation builds upon 
the process of negotiation already established in section 105A. Frankly put, if a plea 
and sentence agreement can be negotiated between the prosecutor and the 
offender, a plea and sentence agreement can be mediated between the prosecutor, 
the offender and the victim! 
It is foreseen that the mediation model will be a mixed model, incorporating both 
voluntary and court-directed mediation. The mediation will also be court-annexed, 
                                            
65 S v Zinn 1969 2 SA 537 (A) 540. Also see the discussion by CR Snyman, Criminal Law 
Casebook (2013) 1. 
66 Burchell Criminal Law and Procedure (2011) 4, 6 supports the development that the rights 
and interests of the victim are gaining more attention and the increased recognition of 
restorative justice. Also see KD Müller and IA van der Merwe “Squaring the Triad: The Story 
of the Victim in Sentencing” (2004) 6 Sexual Offences Bull 17-24. 
67 Either a private mediator or a court-connected mediator. 
68 Similar to the provision in s 105A(7) of the CPA in plea and sentence agreements where 
the judge is obliged to assess that the sentence in terms of the sentence agreement is just 
and appropriate.  
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meaning that the process will be attached to the judicial system, thereby ensuring 
the protection of the public interest in criminal matters. Public interest remains a 
matter of paramount importance in cases of serious economic crime. Therefore, 
although the mediation process would have proceeded in private as opposed to in an 
open court, the final settlement agreement needs to be made public. This will ensure 
that the settlement agreement will adhere to the principles of a just legal system and 
protect the interests of the public.69  
The projected outcome will be a proposed amendment to the CPA that will provide 
for mediation and a consequent mediated settlement agreement to be incorporated 
into and form part of the criminal court processes.70 A possible further outcome is to 
expand the scope of court-annexed mediation to both mandatory court ordered 
mediation and voluntary mediation in instances of economic crime.  
1 5 Overview of the discussion 
The discussion in the dissertation comprises five chapters. A brief outline of the 
succeeding chapters is now given. 
In view of the context of the problem of economic crime and the underscoring of 
restorative justice, the proposed ADR mechanism, namely mediation, is described in 
chapter two. Attention is given to various definitions of mediation and a working 
definition is proposed. There is no generally accepted definition of ADR71 or of 
mediation. Indeed, the definitions themselves are dynamic and ever evolving as is 
                                            
69 At present, ADRM agreements do not form part of court proceedings; and charges are 
withdrawn if an agreement is reached. ADRM, a diversion mechanism is discussed in ch 2, 
para 2 4 1. Also see fn 61. 
70 The proposed amendment is described in ch 5, para 5 3, 356ff below. For example, in the 
case of the bookkeeper stealing R50,000 from her employer, the company may now choose 
to opt for mediation. A possible mediation settlement could include restitution for the 
company and a suspended sentence for the bookkeeper. This would be a more effective 
outcome than the company opting not to report the economic crime.  
71 C Wallgren defines ADR as “processes aimed at resolution of a difference or a dispute 
through a voluntary settlement agreement reached with the assistance of (a) third 
person(s)”. See C Wallgren “ADR and Business” in Goldsmith J-C, Ingen-Housz A & Pointon 
GH (eds) ADR in Business Practice and Issues Across Countries and Cultures (2006) 6 3-
19. 
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the process.72 Accordingly, the characteristics of mediation, including its flexibility 
and informality, confidentiality and voluntariness, are discussed. The role of the 
mediator as mediator and the requirements of impartiality and neutrality are also 
addressed. To promote the understanding of mediation as a process it is helpful to 
examine the different styles of mediation and these will be discussed based on the 
Mediation Meta-Model of Alexander.73 
Mediation is a voluntary process that involves the parties in dispute agreeing to 
mediate in an attempt to resolve the dispute. In the context of commercial and 
corporate disputes relating to economic crime the perpetrators and victims of the 
economic crime will be the parties in voluntary mediation, and may include court 
officials in instances of mandatory court-ordered mediation. The process is thus 
participatory and consensual and it is argued that the participatory and consensual 
nature of the process is more likely to change behaviour and result in a more 
satisfactory outcome than a criminal or civil case that is adversarial and adjudicative, 
imposing a decision upon the parties concerned. It may in some instances be 
necessary for the mediator not only to take the interests of the parties in the dispute 
into account but also those of the other persons affected and even those of the 
community.74 
It is important to show that mediation is not a new concept but can be traced back 
to ancient ways of resolving disputes in Africa and other cultures. Accordingly, 
attention is also briefly given to the origin, development and rebirth of contemporary 
                                            
72 Some contend that ADR is outdated and opt for EDR “Early Dispute Resolution”. See E 
Villareal “ADR in the United States – A Practical Guide” in Goldsmith J-C, Ingen-Housz A & 
Pointon GH (eds) ADR in Business Practice and Issues Across Countries and Cultures 
(2006) 145 137-146. In England certain commentators consider ADR to be synonymous with 
mediation. See M Kallipetis and S Ruttle “Better Dispute Resolution – The Development and 
Practice of Mediation in the United Kingdom Between 1995 and 2005” (2006) in Goldsmith J-
C, Ingen-Housz A & Pointon GH (eds) ADR in Business Practice and Issues Across 
Countries and Cultures (2006)191 191-248. 
73 N Alexander “The Mediation Meta-Model – the Realities of Mediation Practice” (09-2011) 
12 no 6 Article 5 ADR Bulletin <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/adr/vol12/iss6/5> (accessed 
13-07-2019). 
74 See M Palmer & S Roberts Dispute Processes ADR (1998) 110ff. An example of such an 
instance would be the bursar of a nursery school in a small town defrauding the school of 
monies paid as school fees by the parents. The interests of the whole community are 
affected.  
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mediation in South Africa. Roebuck75 shows that mediation is not as modern or new 
as generally understood in more formal justice systems in Europe. The twin-track 
development of mediation in South Africa is sketched with particular focus on the 
significance of the development of another alternative dispute resolution model in 
contrast to the adversarial formal court mechanism. The development of 
contemporary mediation in South Africa is clearly linked to the political and socio-
economic history of South Africa. Brief reference is also made to the recognition of 
mediation by the legislature and the courts. 
The discussion in chapter two describes the development of mediation into 
various fields of law, especially in criminal law. The contribution mediation can make 
to the criminal justice system will be examined, including benefits such as promoting 
the rehabilitation of the offender and the restoration of the victim. Reference is made 
to informal mediation in the criminal justice system in South Africa. Some problems 
encountered with such informal mediation such as lack of transparency and the risks 
of privatisation of criminal matters and of inconsistent sentences are highlighted.76 
Chapter two concludes with the proposal that mediation, as a formal mechanism, 
be introduced into the criminal justice system in South Africa to use in some 
instances of economic crime. 
A core principle of this dissertation is the restorative nature of mediation. The 
overlap and inter-linking of the characteristics of mediation and restorative justice are 
introduced in chapter two, and explored in more detail in chapter three. Mediation 
allows the inclusion of the victims or representatives of the victims and brings about 
a “restorative justice intervention”.77 It enables the offender and victims to meet, to 
face one another, to share the consequences of the criminal activity and to 
participate in resolving the dispute, while respecting the public interest in a dispute 
involving criminal liability.78 Restorative justice also emphasises values of 
                                            
75 D Roebuck “The Myth of Modern Mediation” (2007) Arbitration 105 105-116. 
76 A Anderson “Disposal of Criminal Disputes by Informal Mediation: A Critical Analysis” 
(2017) 30 SAJCJ 162 170-172. 
77 Gabbay (2007) Cardozo J Conflict Resol 421. Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-28(1) 
states that retributive justice looks back, whilst restorative justice looks forward and 
emphasises reconciliation, restitution and responsibility.  
78 Gabbay (2007) Cardozo J Conflict Resol 427 concludes “In my opinion, restorative justice 
is a different approach to criminal justice. While the system today is offender-orientated and 
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restoration, including compensation, restitution and community work. In her 
mediation meta-model, Alexander79 finds that transformative and tradition-based 
mediation, which follow a style of dialogue- based mediation, tend to be restorative.  
Chapter 3 explores the principles of restorative justice. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission recognised the values of restorative justice and laid the 
foundations for the integration of restorative justice into the formal criminal justice 
system in South Africa. It is submitted that the application and integration of 
restorative justice in South Africa cannot be fully appreciated without recognising the 
connexion between restorative justice and ubuntu. For this reason this connexion is 
briefly referred to.80 The difficulty in defining restorative justice, itself a rather porous 
concept, is touched upon. The working description used describes restorative justice 
as a set of values, principles and practices to be used in response to crime.81  
Characteristics of restorative justice are examined, with an emphasis on the 
elements of responsibility, restoration and reintegration.82 The roles and nature of the 
participation of different stakeholders in an integrated restorative justice system, 
namely the state, the offender, the victim and the community, are discussed next. 
The characteristic of responsibility includes the need for the offender to acknowledge 
accountability, and consequently also touches upon the reformation of the offender, 
which in turn leads to the prevention of further criminal activity by the perpetrator.83 
Restoration, includes not only possible monetary restitution of the loss suffered as a 
result of economic crime, but also the restoration of relationships, including possible 
reconciliation between parties. This is linked to the element of reintegration of both 
the perpetrator and the victim back into the community. The significance of the role 
                                            
focuses on punishment, the restorative justice paradigm offers a more balanced view of the 
appropriate public response to crime. It maintains the public aspect of criminal law but 
introduces the victims’ perspective and the reparation of the needs created by the offense as 
an inseparable aspect of justice.”  
79 Alexander “The Mediation Meta-Model” ADR Bulletin (2011) 127,129-130. 
80 Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) para 114; Van Vuren v Minister of Correctional 
Services 2012 1 SACR 103 (CC) para 51. 
81 FF Rosenblatt The Role of Community in Restorative Justice (2015) 11. 
82 D Mekonnen “Indigenous Legal Tradition as a Supplement to African Transitional Justice 
Initiatives” (2010) 3 Afr Jnl on Conflict Resolution 5. 
83 And, of course, more general prevention as well, as the value of prevention learned by an 
individual will impact upon others too. 
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of the community is also explored, as no crime occurs in isolation, and instances of 
economic crime necessarily have an impact on the community.84 Consequently it is 
also necessary to define the community and the public voice. Restorative justice is 
victim-orientated85 and this characteristic is heavily relied on to emphasise not only 
possible restitution to the victim, but also the importance of the victim’s voice in 
instances of economic crime. A victim-orientated approach is compatible with the 
process of mediation and will inevitably impact upon the sentencing process. 
The reception of restorative justice in South Africa, particularly by the courts is 
illustrated by referring to the voice of the judiciary in a number of cases.86 An 
exploration of a number of criminal cases in which restorative justice was explicitly 
mentioned is made to illustrate the development and recognition of restorative justice 
in the South African formal criminal justice system.87 Special attention is paid to the 
call to integrate restorative justice fully into the criminal justice system and not 
merely to refer to it as if it were an alternative to the more formal, well known 
adversarial system of prosecution or a sentencing option. 
Chapter three concludes by drawing together the lines that overlap and inter-link 
mediation and restorative justice to promote a restorative and participatory criminal 
justice system. The mainstreaming and greater integration of restorative justice into 
the criminal justice system in South Africa is underscored.  
Chapter four will comprises three major parts, and attention will be given to 
existing models used in both civil and criminal justice systems in South Africa and 
                                            
84 The second pillar of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (“NCPS”) focuses on 
community participation and education to help prevent crime. Department of Justice National 
Crime Prevention Strategy (May 1996); available at <http://www.gov.za/documents/national-
CRIME-prevention-strategy-summary> (accessed 26-08-2017). 
85 The NCPS highlights the status of the victim throughout the document, particularly in para 
4.10 and specifically in para 17 which states: “In particular, an emphasis on a state centred 
system should give way to a greater emphasis on a victim centred, restorative justice 
system.” SALRC Issue Paper 7, Project 82, Sentencing Restorative Justice (Compensation 
for Victims of Crime and Victim Empowerment) (1997).  
86 For example, S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC); City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 
SA 417 (SCA). 
87 For example, S v Matyiti 2011 1 SACR 40 (SCA); Director of Public Prosecutions, North 
Gauteng v Thabethe 2011 2 SACR 567 (SCA); S v Seedat 2017 1 SACR 141 (SCA). 
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other countries to combat economic crime. Reference is also made to a hybrid 
model, comprising principles from both civil and criminal law, namely asset forfeiture. 
The structure to frame the discussion of the different mechanisms across the civil 
and criminal justice systems in chapter four is an adapted model of Ayres and 
Braithwaite’s pyramid of responsive regulation88 and resolution.  
In the first part covering mechanisms in the civil justice system, the influential 
model for corporate self-governance, the King Codes of Good Governance, is 
discussed.89 Reference is made to King III promoting the use of ADR90 and the 
emphasis of stakeholder inter-dependency based on ubuntu in King IV.91 
The de-criminalisation of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“Companies Act 2008”)92 
is referred to, with an emphasis on the development of alternative dispute 
mechanisms under chapter 7 of the Companies Act 2008. Reference is also made to 
the current version of section 166 within Chapter 7 of the Companies Act 2008. 
Particular attention is given to the mechanism of a public compliance and 
enforcement regulator, namely the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission 
(“CIPC”).93  
In addition, the mechanism of an ombud office is briefly discussed as illustrated 
through the office the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (“FAIS”) 
Ombud.94 This is because of the influential role which the FAIS Ombud plays in the 
                                            
88 The concept responsive regulation originates from a work by Ayres and Braithwaite in the 
early 1990s and has since been refined and expanded by Braithwaite. See I Ayres & J 
Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (1992). 
89 Codes introduced by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (“IoDSA”) since 1994.  
90 King III (revised) 2012 13-14. 
91 King IV 2016 6. 
92 D Davis (ed) Companies and Other Business Structures in South Africa (2013) 291ff. JJ 
Henning & S Du Toit “Corporate Law Reform in South Africa: Empowering the Victims of 
Economic Crime” in L De Koker, BAK Rider & JJ Henning Victims of Economic Crime (1999) 
134 145 & 149. 
93 An independent administrative body created in terms of s 185(1) of the Companies Act 
2008 which replaces the Registrar of Companies under the Companies Act 1973. 
94 The FAIS Ombud was established in terms of s 20 of the Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002. 
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financial sector in South Africa, especially as an entity that addresses financial 
wrongdoing.95  
In the second part of chapter four, a hybrid mechanism, namely asset forfeiture, is 
discussed. This shows that various jurisdictions have had to create special 
mechanisms in their fight against crime, including asset forfeiture.96 Asset forfeiture 
is a particularly powerful and intrusive, yet indisputably necessary, instrument in the 
hands of a state to address serious crime.97 In this dissertation, the importance of 
asset forfeiture is the opportunity it presents for restitution to victims of economic 
crime. The inference is that assets that have been forfeited could be a matter to 
discuss during the mediation, and the realisation of such assets could go towards 
compensating the victims for their loss arising from the economic crime. 
It is submitted that the constitutional principles that have crystallised out of a 
number of cases arising from the practice of asset forfeiture will assist in the 
composition of the mediation model in the criminal justice system.98 It is important to 
note that the forfeiture of assets in terms of chapter 6 of POCA does not require a 
criminal conviction99 and this could be an influential factor in the mediation process. 
The possibility of restitution from the forfeiture of assets is emphasised.100 The 
                                            
95 The South African Rand value of cases settled or determined by the FAIS Ombud at the 
end of the 2016/2017 year exceeded R58 million. See FAIS Ombud Annual Report 
2016/2017 18. 
96 The South African legislature passed the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 
(“POCA) making provision for confiscation orders under ch 5 and forfeiture orders under ch 
6. 
97 In Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions (“NDPP”) 2006 2 SACR 525 (CC) 
para 46 Nkabinde J held: “Asset forfeiture orders as envisaged under Chapter 6 of the 
POCA are inherently intrusive in that they may carry dire consequences for the owners or 
possessors of properties particularly residential properties.” 
98 For example, the constitutionality of asset forfeiture and the judicial development of the 
“proportionality test” in Prophet v NDPP 2006 2 SACR 525 (CC); Mohunram v NDPP 2007 4 
SA 222 (CC); that asset forfeiture is applicable to individual crimes as the provisions of 
POCA stretch beyond “organised crime” as decided in Mohunram v NDPP 2007 4 SA 222 
(CC) paras 21-34, 56. 
99 Prophet v NDPP 2006 2 SACR 525 (CC) para 42. 
100 R94,4 million specifically related to commercial crime in the 2015/2016 year, and R51,3 
million in the previous year. The total amount of assets forfeited in terms of POCA was 
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philosophy of sentencing and whether the confiscation or forfeiture under POCA is 
deemed to be penal or not is also important. Primarily, it has been held that the 
purpose of the confiscation and forfeiture under POCA is to prevent persons from 
benefiting from the proceeds of crime, though such confiscation or forfeiture could 
have penal consequences.101 
In the third part of chapter four, various models currently used as alternatives to 
the usual adversarial trial in the criminal justice system of South Africa and other 
jurisdictions are examined. The evolution of the use of Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements (“DPAs”) in the United States and England are discussed. It is another 
innovative mechanism especially designed to deal with instances of serious and 
complex corporate crime. The mechanism illustrates that instances of economic 
crime can be investigated and a resolution negotiated outside the parameters of a 
public court room. However, the risks accompanying such an external mechanism, 
such as possible abuse of power by either the prosecutor or the corporate entity are 
matters of concern, as is the alleged overreach of the prosecutor into the private 
corporate governance of a company. The lack of transparency of the process is also 
a matter of concern. These issues and other ancillary issues are discussed in light of 
the distinctive use of DPAs in the United States and the more formally and 
specifically regulated use of DPAs in England. The purpose is not only to illustrate 
the development of additional mechanisms within or close to the criminal justice 
system, but also to portray the complexity of the nature of economic crime and of 
such processes. DPAs also demonstrate the need to recognise risks that arise from 
deviating from the formal adversarial and adjudicative criminal trial process. 
Critical to the development of the proposal in this dissertation is the nature of plea 
and sentencing agreements. As plea and sentencing agreements are the primary 
mechanism through which crime is dealt with in the United States, pertinent issues of 
plea and sentencing agreements encountered in the United States are discussed. 
Section 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 introduced plea and 
                                            
R444,2 million of which R390,2 million was paid to victims. See the NDPP Annual Report 
2015/2016 22 51 and the NPA Annual Report 2014/2015 71.  
101 Shaik v S 2008 2 SACR 165 (CC) paras 51 and 57. The Asset Forfeiture Unit’s (AFU’s) 
motto is “taking the profit out of crime”. 
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sentencing agreements into the South African criminal justice system.102 
Significantly, plea and sentencing agreements are based on negotiation, a concept 
that may appear strange to advocates accustomed to criminal trials. However, it will 
be submitted that the attainment of justice is not compromised through such 
alternative dispute resolution processes and that like plea and sentencing 
agreements, mediation is also based upon a negotiation model. 
Special reference will be made to the waiver of rights by the offender during the 
plea and sentencing agreement process.103 The authority and extraordinary power of 
the public prosecutor will be highlighted.104 The sentencing of economic crime will be 
discussed, as well as the disparities arising in sentencing persons that elect to enter 
into a plea and sentencing agreement, as opposed to those who opt to proceed to 
trial.105 Particular attention will be given to the opportunities that arise from the use of 
section 105A plea and sentencing agreements, together with section 297 and 
section 300 of the CPA, as these reflect important restorative justice solutions.106  
                                            
102 Incorporated on 14 December 2001 by s 2 of the Criminal Procedure Second 
Amendment Act 62 of 2001. 
103 For example, the waiver of the constitutional right to remain silent and the constitutional 
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. S 35(3) of the 
Constitution grants an accused a right to a fair trial; S v De Goede WCC (30-12-2012) case 
no. 121151; ME Bennun “Negotiated Pleas: Policy and Purposes” (2007) 20 SAJCJ 17-45. 
104 The public prosecutor remains dominus litus, but has special responsibilities in plea and 
sentencing agreements. The public prosecutor also has much power, as she or he can 
decide with whom to enter into plea and sentencing agreements, what charges to bring or to 
drop and what sentences to propose. See LE Dervan “Plea Bargaining’s Survival: Financial 
Crimes Plea Bargaining, a Continued Triumph in a Post-Enron World” (2007) 60 Okla L Rev 
451-489. 
105 For example, the Dynegy scandal and the different sentences imposed for the same 
charges upon the persons who entered into plea and sentencing agreements, in comparison 
to Jamie Olis who chose to go to trial. Olis’ final sentence was six years, compared to the 
other offenders, who received 15 months and 30 days respectively. See Podgor ES “White 
Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game” (2010) 85 Chicago-Kent L Rev 
77-88 (accessed 24-05-2017). 
106 For example in S v Sassin 2003 4 All SA 506 (NC) (paras 15.11 and 15.12) where the 
first accused entered into a plea and sentencing agreement in terms of s 105A. The first 
accused ran a financial pyramid scheme and pleaded guilty, inter alia, to 1,527 counts of 
fraud involving more than R29 million. Most of the assets were recovered through the AFU 
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Chapter four concludes by summarising the principles drawn from the various 
models discussed, as these are used as the building blocks for the proposed 
additional model of mediation. These principles will include the increased use of 
alternative dispute resolution in both civil and criminal law processes, the integration 
of restorative justice into the criminal justice system, particularly with regard to the 
role and rights of the victim, and the sentencing of the offender. 
In chapter five, the mechanism of mediation, as an evolution of a section 105A 
plea and sentencing agreement, is described. Gabbay proposed that mediation be 
introduced to address white-collar crime in the United States.107 Reference is 
particularly made to white-collar crime by top executives of companies. The use of 
mediation to address serious white-collar crime has also received academic support 
in South Africa.108 This proposal is explored and will be developed from the 
provisions of section 105A of the CPA relating to plea and sentencing 
agreements.109 It is suggested that expanding the negotiation process beyond two 
parties to include other parties, including victims of economic crime, will present an 
effective alternative for resolving disputes regarding economic crime.110 It is foreseen 
that the mediated settlement agreement will have to be affirmed by a court order, 
                                            
and through agreements and consequently most of the investors would recover some of 
their losses.  
107 Gabbay (2007) Cardozo J Conflict Resol 475ff. The preamble to Recommendation No R 
(99) 19 concerning mediation in penal matters adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 15 
September 1999 at the 679th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies is most persuasive and 
emphasises the role mediation can play in allowing the participation of the voices of the 
victim, the offender and the community; as well as acknowledging the enhanced 
rehabilitation possibilities in focusing on the offender’s responsibilities and those of the 
community in which the offender may be rehabilitated.  
108 D Butler, unpublished paper The Potential of ADR, Particularly Mediation, for Resolving 
Issues of Illegality Relating to Corporate White-collar Crime: A South African Perspective 
delivered at the 9th International Arbitration and ADR in Africa Workshop in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia (2012)(copy on file with the writer). 
109 In terms of s 105A the prosecutor and a represented accused may, before the accused 
pleads to the charge, enter into an agreement in respect of a plea of guilty by the accused to 
the offence charged or to an offence of which she or he may be convicted in the charge and 
with respect to an appropriate sentence.  
110 See Butler The Potential of ADR. 
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thereby sustaining one of the pillars of justice, namely accountability in the public 
interest.  
The mediation model is envisaged as a mixed model, incorporating both voluntary 
(or private) mediation and court-directed or court-assisted mediation. The mediation 
will be court-annexed, meaning that the process will be attached to the judicial 
system, thereby ensuring the protection of the public interest in criminal matters. The 
public interest in cases of serious economic crime remains paramount and thus, 
although the mediation process would have proceeded privately as opposed to in 
open court, the final settlement agreement needs to be judicially approved and made 
public.  
Special attention is given to the role of the public prosecutor in the proposed 
model as the role of the public prosecutor as dominus litis is pivotal. In addition, it is 
submitted that collaboration with public and civil organisations is important to ensure 
that the model succeeds.111 
This research concludes with Annexure A, the provisions of the proposed section 
105B of the CPA. This serves to illustrate the submission of this dissertation: that 
mediation, as an alternative appropriate dispute resolution mechanism, be formally 
introduced into the criminal justice system to address instances of economic crime 
and so contribute to combating economic crime. 
 
                                            
111 For example, that mediators be specially trained to act as mediators in cases of economic 
crime and that prosecutors also receive special training on the issues. The training and 
accreditation cannot be the responsibility of the state alone and collaboration with the private 
sector and mediation organisations is vital.  
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2 1 Introduction 
“Litigation could never end a suit; only compromise could.”1 
Litigation has become the conventional way in which to resolve disputes. 
However, as far back as medieval times disputants were granted an opportunity to 
resolve their disputes by themselves, with the assistance of a third party, rather than 
litigating their dispute and having it adjudicated by a third party and a decision 
imposed upon them. Mediation is thus not modern or a process introduced in a post-
litigation era. Legal historians show that the process, commonly known today as 
mediation, was the preferred and encouraged manner to resolve disputes in earlier 
times. This is illustrated by the practice of lovedays which were first recorded in 
England in the Anglo-Saxon era.2 In short, a loveday (dies amoris) was a period in 
                                            
1 C Carpenter (ed) The Armburgh Papers: The Brokholes Inheritance in Warwickshire, 
Hertfordshire and Essex c1417-c1453 (1998) 51. 
2 For examples and detailed discussion of the practice of lovedays see D Roebuck Mediation 
and Arbitration in the Middle Ages: England 1154 to 1558 (2013) 29-52. Laws emphasising 
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which disputants were given an opportunity to negotiate and settle a matter between 
themselves, with or without the assistance of a third party, but usually with the 
assistance of a third party who acted as a mediator. Lovedays could be before or 
during litigation. They could be at the parties’ own request, at the request of friends 
or at the request of the courts.3 Lovedays is thus not only a charming reference to an 
old practice but also a reminder of an old dispute resolution practice, similar to what 
today is known as mediation. Significantly, lovedays were integrated into the early 
legal systems, both civil and criminal.4  
In this chapter the characteristics of mediation, as well as its development and 
integration as a dispute resolution process into contemporary civil and criminal 
justice systems are discussed. 
Reference is made to the definition of contemporary mediation and to different 
styles of mediation. The two different historical roots of the practice of mediation in 
South Africa are briefly described, as are recent developments regarding the 
integration of mediation into the court systems. The aim is to illustrate that mediation 
is a dispute resolution process with merit and credibility that should be more fully 
integrated into the judicial systems in South Africa, and specifically into the criminal 
justice system. The focus is on characteristics of mediation that highlight principles of 
restorative justice. Whilst mediation is the proposed additional dispute resolution 
mechanism through which to address economic crime, restorative justice is one of 
the primary building blocks of this proposal. Consequently, the close links between 
and overlaps of the characteristics of mediation and restorative justice are critical to 
this dissertation.5  
                                            
love, encompassing compromise and reconciliation in contrast to law, were highlighted. For 
example, a c1008 law of Aethelstan provided: “At the holy festivals, as is right, there shall be 
conciliation and reconciliation, som and sib, for all Christian men, and every dispute settled.” 
Another example from 1277, regarding a debt: “At the request of the parties a date was set 
for a loveday, dies amoris, between Isaac Bishop, claimant, and Margery of St Martin.” 
Roebuck Mediation and Arbitration in the Middle Ages 30, 32.  
3 Roebuck Mediation and Arbitration in the Middle Ages 39. 
4 Lovedays remind us of the contemporary temporal practices of a “mediation week” or 
“settlement week” in various jurisdictions that grant litigants an opportunity to resolve their 
differences through mediation. 
5 In this dissertation mediation is specifically defined as a process that promotes restorative 
justice. Mediation is a distinct process, but characteristics of mediation echo and are akin to 
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In the third part of this chapter specific attention will be given to the application of 
mediation in conventional court processes, with particular attention to criminal-court 
matters, so-called “criminal mediation”.6 This part will constitute one of the primary 
building blocks of the proposal of section 105B, namely mediation settlement 
agreements, being introduced into the CPA. The origin and development of the 
phenomenon of mediation in court processes will be briefly discussed, including the 
practice of judicial mediation, or the multi-tasking judge.  
The chapter concludes by summarising the benefits and concerns of formally 
introducing mediation, alongside plea and sentencing negotiation, as another 
alternative mechanism to the formal adversarial trial for resolving instances of 
economic crime. 
2 2 Definition and description of mediation 
2 2 1 Definition of mediation 
Mediation is an Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”)7 process. There is no 
generally accepted definition of ADR, which commonly refers to mechanisms and 
                                            
characteristics of restorative justice. As mediation encompasses and integrates 
characteristics of restorative justice, for the purposes of this dissertation, mediation is also 
described as a restorative justice process. The close links between and overlaps of 
characteristics of restorative justice and mediation are discussed independently in ch 3 para 
3 5 at 120 below. 
6 Although this is the term which is commonly used to discuss mediation in criminal matters, 
the phrase “mediation in the criminal justice system” will be preferred, to avoid any negative 
connotations that may arise, as with the term “plea bargaining” referred to below in ch 4 para 
4 4 2 fn 700. 
7 Some academics and jurists who aim to normalise the use of mediation, prefer the 
acronym ADR to mean “Appropriate Dispute Resolution” or “Another Dispute Resolution”; 
whilst those who claim the originality and authenticity of mediation prefer “Authentic Dispute 
Resolution”. Others aver that ADR is outdated and opt for the acronym EDR, for “Early 
Dispute Resolution”. See E Villareal “ADR in the United States – A Practical Guide” in 
Goldsmith J-C, Ingen-Housz A & Pointon GH (eds) ADR in Business Practice and Issues 
Across Countries and Cultures (2006) 145 137-146; WLR de Vos & T Broodryk “Managerial 
Judging and Alternative Dispute Resolution in Australia: An Example for South Africa to 
Emulate? (Part 1)” (2017) 4 TSAR 683 702. 
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practices that focus on resolving legal disputes outside the formal courts.8 ADR is a 
generic term which includes a number of different processes, including conciliation, 
facilitation, evaluation and mediation. These terms are closely related to one another 
and often used interchangeably.9 None of these processes has an entrenched 
delineation, they are all species of ADR.10 In addition, the term conciliation overlaps 
                                            
8 G Cox “The Appropriate Arena for ADA Disputes: Arbitration or Mediation” (1995) 10 St. 
John’s J Legal Comment 591 591 fn 1. (“ADA” is the acronym for Americans with Disabilities 
Act.) Notably, the SA Rules Board for Courts of Law recognises the development of ADR 
and its consequent connection to courts in the amendments to the Rules Regulating the 
Conduct of the Proceedings of the Magistrates’ Courts of South Africa in GN R183 in GG 
37448 of 18 March 2014, which added a new chapter 2 on court-annexed mediation. The 
new R 73 defines ADR as: “a process, in which an independent and impartial person assists 
parties to attempt to resolve the dispute before them, either before or after commencement 
of litigation”. See also, the definition of C Wallgren in “ADR and Business” in Goldsmith J-C, 
Ingen-Housz A & Pointon GH (eds) ADR in Business Practice and Issues Across Countries 
and Cultures (2006) 6 3-19 whose definition does not include a requirement of 
independence or impartiality with regard to the third party: “processes aimed at resolution of 
a difference or a dispute through a voluntary settlement agreement reached with the 
assistance of (a) third person(s)”. 
9 Compare Alexander, who refers to UNCITRAL’s Working Group on the Model Law on 
International Commercial Conciliation (MLICC) in 2002 choosing conciliation as a generic 
term including mediation, but who distinguishes mediation from negotiation and arbitration. 
See N Alexander International and Comparative Mediation Legal Perspectives (2009) 16-17, 
25-38. Notably, in revising its 2002 model law on conciliation in 2018, UNCITRAL switched 
to the term mediation in preference to conciliation, but states that the two terms are 
interchangeable. See the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 2018 (“UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Mediation 2018”) which was previously known as the 
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, 2002. The texts of the model laws and 
an explanatory note are available at 
<https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/mediation/modellaw/commercial_conciliation> (accessed 01-
6-2019). Arbitration, conciliation and mediation are listed separately in s 166 of the 
Companies Act 2008 indicating that each is considered to be a distinct process. However, 
there is no clear distinction between conciliation and mediation. 
10 Whilst in England ADR is considered to be synonymous with mediation. See M Kallipetis 
and S Ruttle “Better Dispute Resolution – The Development and Practice of Mediation in the 
United Kingdom Between 1995 and 2005” (2006) in Goldsmith J-C, Ingen-Housz A & 
Pointon GH (eds) ADR in Business Practice and Issues Across Countries and Cultures 
(2006)191 191-248. 
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with the definition of mediation.11 For the purposes of this dissertation, no clear 
distinction will be made between mediation, conciliation or facilitation and reference 
to mediation may include any of these processes. Consequently, “mediation” is used 
as a generic term.12 
Although arbitration is often excluded from a definition of ADR, it is also 
sometimes identified as an ADR process, as it is an alternative process to formal 
litigation in the courts. Arbitration, however, is distinct from mediation.13 A helpful 
distinction, illustrating the core difference between arbitration and mediation and 
conciliation is given by Fisher J: 
                                            
11 The conventional difference between a conciliator and a mediator for some commentators 
is that a conciliator plays a more direct and purposeful role in conciliation and is primarily 
responsible for proposing solutions and directing the parties into a solution. In contrast, a 
conventional mediator maintains a neutral stance and is responsible for managing a process 
whilst the parties participate more actively and directly in the process and in finding a 
solution. See Sgubini et al “Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation: differences and 
similarities from an International and Italian business perspective” mediate.com (accessed 
29-05-2019). Roebuck identifies conciliation as a synonym for mediation but does add that 
conciliation is sometimes distinguished from mediation in the sense that a conciliator is 
asked to give an opinion or recommendation regarding the merits. A Connerty in “The Role 
of ADR in the Resolution of International Disputes” (1996) 12 Arb Int’l 47 50 distinguishes 
mediation from conciliation and says the opposite namely that it is a mediator who may play 
a more directive role. Notably, in s 1 of the International Arbitration Act 15 of 2017, 
conciliation is simply stated to include mediation and further reference is made in ss 12 and 
13 to the possibility of agreeing to a conciliation process under the UNCITRAL Conciliation 
Rules in Schedule 2.  
12 It is appreciated that others believe that these processes are best understood if kept 
distinct. However as will be described below, attention will be given to different styles of 
mediation, such as “facilitative mediation” and “evaluative mediation”. See LP Love & KK 
Kovach “ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes, Rather than One Eclectic Process” (2000) J 
Disp Resol 295 298-299, 306. R Birke “Evaluation and Facilitation: Moving Past Either/Or” 
(2000) J Disp Resol 309 314-315, 318-319 on the other hand calls for the dichotomous 
debate to end regarding mediation of legal disputes, and emphasises that mediation is both 
evaluative and facilitative.  
13 Simply, the core difference between arbitration and mediation is that in arbitration the 
arbitrator adjudicates and makes a final and binding determination, while in mediation the 
outcome is determined by the parties themselves and not a third party. The third party 
assists the parties and facilitates the process. A mediator can evaluate and articulate but 
does not adjudicate. See Sgubini et al “Arbitration, Mediation and Conciliation: Differences 
and Similarities from an International and Italian Business Perspective” mediate.com. 
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“At their heart, mediation and conciliation are designed to facilitate agreement 
without any associated power for the neutral third party to impose a solution on 
the parties. Arbitration, on the other hand, is the resolution of a difference or 
dispute by a neutral third party who makes a binding determination after 
considering the relevant evidence and argument.”14  
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss arbitration. Arbitration is 
consequently distinguished from mediation in this dissertation. A clear distinction 
between certain ADR processes, such as negotiation, arbitration, mediation and 
litigation is made by Cox: 
“In negotiation, the parties control the process and the outcome. In mediation, 
the mediator controls the process, the parties control the outcome. In arbitration, 
the parties control the design of the process and the arbitrator controls the 
outcome. In litigation, the court controls the process and the outcome.” 15 
It is acknowledged that contemporary ADR includes processes like med-arb16 and 
arb-med17 but it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss any such 
combinations. Accordingly, mediation is presented as a distinct process.18 
                                            
14 Acorn Farms Limited v Schnuriger [2003] 3 NZLR 121 para 17. This is supported by the 
definition of mediation in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation 
2018 in art 1.3, which specifically states that “the mediator does not have the authority to 
impose upon the parties a solution to the dispute”. The same definition of mediation is in art 
1.2 of the Draft UNCITRAL Mediation Rules (2019). Also see Connerty “ADR as a “Filter” 
Mechanism: The Use of ADR in the Context of International Disputes” (2013) 79 Arb 120 
121, 123.  
15 G Cox (1995) St. John’s J Legal Comment 593-595. For a discussion on and diagram of 
the different dispute resolution processes see Brand et al Commercial Mediation (2015) 19-
21. 
16 Abbreviation for mediation-arbitration. This is a process, agreed to in advance by the 
parties, which commences as mediation, but in the absence of a settlement by the parties 
the third party makes a binding decision. The point is that the same person fulfils both roles, 
if resort is made to arbitration. It is commonly referred to as “mediation with muscle” or 
“mediation with a bite”, as the parties agree that should mediation fail a final binding 
resolution will be made by the mediator/arbitrator. See USLegal.com 
<https://definitions.uslegal.com/m/med-arb/> (accessed 15-12-2017); DJ Maclean & S-P 
Wilson “Compelling Mediation in the Context of Med-arb Agreements” (2008) 63 DRJ 1 2 
(reprinted at <http://www.cedires.be/index_files/McLean_and_Wilson_Med-
Arb_Dispute%20Resolution%20Journal.pdf> (accessed 15-12-2017). However, the med-arb 
process can raise several thorny issues should the same person act as both “mediator” and 
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Neither is there a uniform definition of mediation. Indeed, the definitions of 
mediation are dynamic and ever evolving.19 Consequently, a standard definition of 
mediation is elusive and different definitions have been developed in recent years. 
As mediation has also grown to encompass more fields of law the understanding of 
the nature of mediation has broadened. In South Africa, mediation in labour disputes 
became common towards the end of the twentieth century.20 Subsequently, its use 
was extended to private commercial disputes, as well as in public community and 
political disputes.21 Mediation also plays a significant role in international commercial 
                                            
“arbitrator”, particularly with regard to due process matters. For example, confidential 
information may be given to the person in a caucus session during the mediation process 
which may influence the arbitration decision. In a New Zealand case Acorn Farms Limited v 
Schnuriger [2003] 3 NZLR 121, the court sets out precautions to be taken, particularly with 
regard to disclosure of information during the mediation process and the need to explain the 
possible consequences to the parties should the matter proceed to arbitration. Also, 
Australia has introduced legislation dealing with med-arb and the manner in which the 
process should proceed. For example, s 27D of the New South Wales Commercial 
Arbitration Act 61 of 2010. For general discussion on these issues see R Hindle “Is med/arb 
an Oxymoron?” (2013) International trade/adr in the South Pacific 225-235 available at 
<https://www.victoria.ac.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/920116/Hindle.pdf> (accessed 01-
06-2019). Comparable too, is the con-arb process under s 191(5) of the (South African) 
Labour Relations Act (“LRA”) 66 of 1995. For a discussion on con-arb under the LRA see 
Vettori (2015) SAHRJ 370-372. 
17 Abbreviation for arbitration-mediation. This process starts with arbitration but the arbitrator 
does not disclose the award. She or he continues to assist the parties as mediator to resolve 
the dispute, but if this is unsuccessful, the arbitral award is published and is final and 
binding. See DW Butler & E Finsen Arbitration in South Africa: Law and Practice (1993) 203. 
18 Connerty (2013) Arb 120-123, 133 identifies mediation as a distinct process that can be 
mixed with either litigation or arbitration, and further identifies mediation as a filter 
mechanism through which issues in dispute can be filtered and to only resort to adjudicative 
processes, such as litigation or arbitration, in the event of failure of settlement through 
mediation.  
19 This is illustrated in the recent publication of draft R 41A of the Uniform Rules of Superior 
Courts, South Africa, that has more than one definition of both mediation and mediator. 
20 This was probably with the establishment of Independent Mediation Service of South 
Africa (“IMSSA”) in 1984. Nupen (2013) AJOL 88-89; Brand et al Commercial Mediation 
(2015) 2-3. Also see the discussion below in para 2 2. 
21 Birke (2000) J Disp Resol 309 310-312. Compare too Brand et al Commercial Mediation 
(2015) 2-3 regarding the development of mediation in South Africa.  
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matters.22 In exploring mediation, reference will be made to some statutory 
definitions, as well as to some definitions offered by academia. Particular attention is 
given to the core characteristics of mediation.  
At present, there is no general or generic statute regulating mediation in South 
Africa.23 Provision is, however, made for the process of mediation in certain 
statutes;24 of which the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration 
(“CCMA”) established in terms of the Labour Relations Act25 is probably the best 
known. Arguably, the most significant definition of mediation in South Africa is that of 
the recent Magistrates’ Courts Rules:26  
                                            
22 Brand et al Commercial Mediation (2015) 4-6. See also the website of UNCITRAL and 
specifically the Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International 
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 2018 available at www.uncitral.org. 
23 Unlike arbitration that has for the past fifty years been governed in South Africa by uniform 
national legislation through the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 and subsequently the International 
Arbitration Act 15 of 2017. South Africa also lags behind several foreign jurisdictions. In the 
United States, the Uniform Mediation Act, 2001 (revised 2003) by the Uniform Law 
Commission and the American Bar Association's Section on Dispute Resolution has been 
adopted by several states. See the Uniform Law Commission’s website: 
<http://www.uniformlaws.org/> (accessed 01-06-2019). The Mediation Act 1 of 2017 of 
Singapore came into operation on 1 November 2017. See Government of Singapore 
“Mediation Act to Commence 1 November 2017” (01-11-2017) Ministry of Law 
<https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/minlaw/en/news/press-releases/mediation-act-to-
commence-from-1-november-2017.html> (accessed 19-12-2017). 
24 Brand et al Commercial Mediation (2015) 22-23 and Appendix A identify 49 South African 
statutes that provide for mediation as an ADR process to be used. See also A Rycroft 
“Settlement and the Law” 2013 SALJ 187 197 fn 51.  
25 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 Chapter 7, s 112. Interestingly, mediation is not defined 
in the Labour Relations Act, although it is incorporated into the name of the CCMA. The 
Labour Relations Act uses the word conciliation throughout the Act. Mediation is only 
referred to in the title of the commission, in the preamble of the act and in s 135. S 135(2) 
prescribes that a commissioner of the CCMA must attempt to resolve a dispute through 
conciliation within a certain time period; whilst 135(3)(a) prescribes a commissioner must 
prescribe a process through which the dispute may be resolved, which may include 
“mediating the dispute”. However, the process of conciliation is also not defined. It is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation to discuss the operations of the Labour Relations Act and the 
CCMA. See further the CCMA’s website at <www.ccma.org.za> (accessed 01-06-2019).  
26 Rules Regulating the Conduct of Proceedings of the Magistrates’ Courts of South as 
amended by R183 GG 37448 of 18-03-2014 (“Magistrates’ Court Rules (2014)”). 
Subsequently, mediation was introduced in pilot projects as a court-affiliated process into the 
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“[T]he process by which a mediator assists the parties in actual or potential 
litigation to resolve the dispute between them by facilitating discussions between 
the parties, assisting them identifying issues, clarifying priorities, exploring areas 
of compromise and generating options in an attempt to resolve the dispute.”27  
This definition illustrates the role of the mediator and potential outcome of the 
mediation process. Another recent definition in South African legislation is given in 
the Regulations on Mediation Rules in terms of the Protection of Investment Act 22 
of 2015. In this act, mediation means a “process in which parties to a dispute, with 
the assistance of a neutral third party (‘the mediator’) identify the issue or issues in 
dispute, develop options, consider alternatives and endeavour to reach an 
agreement.”28 This definition, although brief, goes further than simply describing the 
process, but also emphasises the spirit of mediation, in highlighting the parties’ 
endeavour to attempt to end the dispute, find solutions and reach agreement. The 
definition in the United States’ Uniform Mediation Act simply states that mediation 
means a “process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation 
between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their 
dispute.”29  
                                            
South African court system. See also GN 508 in GG 42344 of 28-03-2019 for the 
designation of additional courts with effect from 1 July 2019.  
27 Rule 73. This definition is very similar to the longer definition in the draft R 41(A)(1) of the 
SA Uniform Rules of Court, which however includes the requirement that a mediator is “a 
neutral and independent person”. It is also similar to the descriptive definition in s 3(1) of the 
Mediation Act 1 of 2017 of Singapore in which mediation “means a process comprising one 
or more sessions in which one or more mediators assist the parties to a dispute to do all or 
any of the following with a view to facilitating the resolution of the whole or part of the 
dispute: (a) identify the issues in dispute; (b) explore and generate options; (c) communicate 
with one another; (d) voluntarily reach an agreement” (writer’s emphasis). Interestingly this 
definition breaks down the mediation process into sessions [a term comprehensively defined 
in the Act in s 3(2), including a meeting held by electronic means] and also recognises that 
mediation may be any one or all of the stages in the mediation process. For example, simply 
the stage of facilitating communication between the parties falls under the definition of 
mediation. Securing an agreement is thus not necessary for the process to fall within the 
definition of mediation. 
28 Regulations on Mediation Rules reg 1 promulgated in GG 41767 of 13-07-2018. 
29 United States, Uniform Mediation Act s 2. A similar definition is found in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Rules of Evidence R 507 available at <https://isc.idaho.gov/ire507> 
(accessed 01-06-2019).  
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The Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution’s (“CEDR”) current definition portrays 
the basic characteristics of mediation: “mediation is a flexible process conducted 
confidentially in which a neutral person actively assists parties in working towards a 
negotiated agreement of a dispute or difference, with the parties in ultimate control of 
the decision to settle and the terms of resolution.”30  
Interestingly, definitions given by academics and experts in ADR, for example 
Boulle,31 have changed over the years. In an earlier work in 1997, Boulle and 
Rycroft32 identified the core features of mediation as follows: “Mediation is a 
decision-making process in which the parties are assisted by a third party, the 
mediator; the mediator attempts to improve the process of decision-making and to 
assist the parties reach an outcome to which each of them can assent.”33 However, 
almost two decades later Boulle, in another work with a different co-author, declines 
to attempt to define mediation.34  
It is apparent from the above that defining mediation is not a simple exercise and 
there is little commonality.35 Consequently, considering the above, a simple and 
concise working definition will be given, followed by a discussion of the nature and 
characteristics of mediation. For the purposes of this dissertation “mediation” will be 
defined as: 
                                            
30 The definition was adopted at the end of 2004. CEDR News “CEDR Revises Definition of 
Mediation” (01-11-2004) cedr (accessed 31-05-2019). See also E Carroll & K Mackie 
International Mediation – the Art of Business Diplomacy (2006) 3; Brand et al Commercial 
Mediation (2015) 19.  
31 Laurence Boulle is an eminent ADR and mediation expert, currently professor in law, 
Australian Catholic University, Sydney, Australia. 
32 L Boulle & A Rycroft Mediation: Principles Process Practice (1997) 4ff. Boulle’s co-author, 
Alan Rycroft, until his recent retirement, held the chair in commercial law at the University of 
Cape Town. They also examine the many dimensions of mediation and state that it can be 
described descriptively by defining the philosophy behind mediation or conceptually defining 
the operational aspects within mediation. 
33 Boulle & Rycroft Mediation (1997) 1, 7. Boulle & Rycroft Mediation (1997) 10 also offer a 
very helpful mediation abacus that illustrates the flexible and dynamic character of 
mediation. 
34 L Boulle & M Nesic Mediator Skills and Techniques: Triangle of Influence (2010) 
Mediation: Principles Process Practice (2010) 8.  
35 MC Laubscher Confidentiality in Mediation: A Legal Analysis Masters of Law Dissertation, 
North West University (2018) 5.  
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“a process in which parties to a dispute, with the assistance of a mediator,36 who 
facilitates communication and negotiation between the parties, endeavour to 
reach a voluntary resolution regarding their dispute.”37 
This working definition intentionally excludes any specific reference to the nature 
and characteristics of mediation, including voluntariness, flexibility, informality, 
confidentiality and the impartiality and neutrality of the mediator. This is not because 
these characteristics are unimportant but because of the consequent ever-growing 
jurisprudence regarding such characteristics.38 Also the dynamic development of 
mediation into different legal fields can affect the relevance of some of these 
characteristics in a particular field.39 Hence, some of these usual characteristics are 
not appropriate for a working definition to be used in this dissertation where the focus 
is on the use of mediation as a mechanism for resolving economic crime.40 In view of 
these considerations, it is submitted that a concise definition which highlights 
mediation as a dispute resolving process that includes a third party who assists the 
disputants to reach a resolution, but does not impose a resolution, is preferable. 
The terms “mediation agreement” and “mediated settlement agreement” used in 
this dissertation also need clarification. The term “mediation agreement” refers to the 
agreement entered into by the disputants before the mediation process that sets out 
the parties’ choice of mediation as their dispute resolution process and usually 
commits them to initial participation in the process.41 A further agreement, also 
                                            
36 “Mediator” includes a “co-mediator” and means an individual or two individuals who 
conduct a mediation or a co-mediation. 
37 This definition is strongly influenced by the short definition in Idaho Rules of Evidence 
Rule 507, together with the definition in the Protection of Investment Act 2015, which 
captures the spirit of commitment to compromise. See ch 2 fns 28 & 29 above.  
38 These characteristics are discussed in para 2 2 2, 40ff.  
39 See the discussion of mediation in criminal law in para 2 4 below, in which there may be 
procedural requirements affecting the informality of the process. See also ch 5, Annex B. 
40 For example, in both investment disputes and disputes regarding economic crime, the 
public interest trumps the parties’ interest in confidentiality regarding the outcome. See the 
discussion below in paras 2 2 2 and 2 4. 
41 Compare the very comprehensive definition of a mediation agreement in s 4(1) read with s 
1 of the (Singapore) Mediation Act 1 of 2017: “In this Act, ‘mediation agreement’ means an 
agreement by two or more persons to refer the whole or part of a dispute which has arisen, 
or which may arise, between them for mediation. (2) A mediation agreement may be in the 
form of a clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. (3) A mediation 
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generally referred to as a “mediation agreement” is also usually entered into by the 
parties setting out the terms of the actual process.42 The mediator is usually a party 
to this agreement.43 Yet another agreement, is the “mediated settlement agreement” 
which refers to the agreement44 reached by the parties in the mediation.45 
Having provided a working definition of mediation, it is helpful to highlight certain 
core characteristics and different styles of mediation to better describe the 
mechanism. Accordingly, in the two next sections some characteristics and styles of 
mediation are discussed. 
                                            
agreement must be in writing. (4) A mediation agreement is in writing if its content is 
recorded in any form, whether or not the mediation agreement has been concluded orally, by 
conduct or by other means. (5) A reference in a contract to any document containing a 
mediation clause constitutes a mediation agreement in writing if the reference is such as to 
make that clause part of the contract. (6) A reference in a bill of lading to a charterparty or 
any other document containing a mediation clause constitutes a mediation agreement in 
writing if the reference is such as to make that clause part of the bill of lading.” Interestingly 
this definition of “mediation agreement” is very similar in content to that of an “arbitration 
agreement” in s 2A of the (Singapore) International Arbitration Act (chapter 143A), formerly 
Act 23 of 1994, as amended, with “mediation” substituted for “arbitration”.  
42 These terms can be provided by the mediator or by the relevant legislation. For example, 
(SA) Magistrates’ Courts Rules, Form MED-6 Agreement to Mediate, including details 
required by R 77(4). 
43 Also known as a “mediator’s contract”, analogous to an “arbitrator’s contract”. See GB 
Born International Commercial Arbitration 2ed (2014) 1975. 
44 This may include the mediator’s report. The (South African) Magistrates’ Courts Rules, in 
R 82 distinguish between a “settlement agreement” and a “mediator’s report” in the event of 
there being no settlement, both of which need to be filed at the court. R 82(1) prescribes that 
a mediator has to assist the parties in drafting the settlement agreement.  
45 The definition of a “mediated settlement agreement” in the (Singapore) Mediation Act 1 of 
2017, s 1 provides that a mediated settlement agreement, in relation to a mediation, means 
“an agreement by some or all of the parties to the mediation settling the whole or part of the 
dispute to which the mediation relates”. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Mediation 2018, in art 16 contains an elaborate definition of an “international 
settlement agreement” for purposes of the enforcement and reliance on a settlement 
agreement of a cross-border commercial dispute achieved through mediation for purposes of 
Sec 3 of the Model Law. A discussion of these definitions is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
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2 2 2 Characteristics of mediation 
Mediation is a process which has the attraction of being dynamic in nature. The 
dynamic and informal nature of mediation also allows for innovative and creative 
resolutions to disputes. Mediation is a process conducted by a third party and is 
flexible, unlike a court process which operates under fixed rules of procedure and 
evidence.46 This informality and flexibility of mediation allow disputes between 
parties to be identified, clarified and discussed with the intention of reaching 
agreement in a less impersonal and detached environment. Mediation allows the 
issues, which the parties may not necessarily have been aware of before the 
process commenced to be identified.47 The role of the mediator is consequently 
pivotal and this is apparent in the discussion below concerning the characteristics 
and styles of mediation.  
Mediation is primarily voluntary in nature and involves the parties in dispute 
agreeing to participate in mediation in an attempt to resolve the dispute. As both 
mediation and other non-adversarial practices to dispute resolution have developed, 
the use of mediation may be compulsory in terms of a contract existing between the 
parties. Moreover, parties agreeing to enter into mediation, usually do so in terms of 
a mediation agreement and this agreement also imposes contractual obligations 
upon the parties.48 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the 
                                            
46 A Woolford & RS Ratner Informal Reckonings: Conflict Resolution in Mediation, 
Restorative Justice and Reparations (2008) 8-9; 39-65 caution that the dichotomy between 
formal and informal cannot be over-emphasised, as the informal has become corrupt. With 
the development of mediation as an ADR mechanism it has grown far beyond the 
community based mediations run by lay persons to a highly professional dispute resolution 
process, often court-connected under procedural rules.  
47 Mediation enables parties to enquire deeper into the surface issues. For example, the 
reluctance of a party in a divorce matter to agree to give the other party property may be due 
to a fear of that party enjoying the property with someone else, not because she or he 
cannot afford to give such property. 
48 South Africa, Magistrates’ Courts Rules (2014), Form MED-6, the “Agreement to Mediate” 
is an example of such a mediation agreement. The pro-forma mediation agreement provides 
for agreement on the appointment of an identified mediator (cl 3), joint and several liability 
for the mediator’s fees (cl 4), the nature of mediation (cls 7 & 8), mediator impartiality (cl 9) 
and indemnity (cl 10), disclosure of information and documents (cl 11) and confidentiality (cl 
12), and to refrain from litigation, unless necessary (cl 13). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
41 
 
contractual obligations and the remedies that may arise in terms of the law of 
contract and delict in the event of a breach of either the original contract or the 
mediation agreement between the parties.49 
The voluntary nature of mediation is ostensibly challenged when mediation is 
mandated by legislation or a court ruling.50. Mandatory mediation legislation may 
also include opt-out provisions that enable a party to apply to the court for exemption 
from mediation, and is consequently also discretionary.51 The voluntary nature of 
mediation may also be said to be compromised if the courts take into account 
whether mediation has been attempted in the settlement of a dispute between 
litigants or when the failure to mediate may influence a ruling52 or a costs order.53  
                                            
49 South Africa Magistrates’ Courts Rules (2014), Form MED-6, cl 16 is a model breach of 
agreement clause. 
50 D Quek “Mandatory Mediation: An Oxymoron? Examining the Feasibility of Implementing 
a Court-Mandated Mediation Program” (2010) 11 CJCR 479 480-481 differentiates between 
“categorical” and “discretionary” forms of mandatory mediation. Categorical mediation refers 
to mediation prescribed in legislation, whilst discretionary mediation includes mediation 
which grants a court the discretion to order mediation or not. 
51 For examples of different mandatory mediation schemes, see Quek (2010) CJCR 500-
507. 
52 For example, in the Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) 
(“Port Elizabeth Municipality“) paras 47 & 61, Sachs J stated that a factor to be taken into 
account to determine if it would be just and equitable for an eviction order to be granted or 
not, may be whether the parties have attempted mediation. See also Vettori (2015) AHRLJ 
359. 
53 In South Africa, the case MB v NB 2010 3 SA 220 (SGJ) paras 59-60 clearly shows the 
intolerance of the court for parties who intransigently persist in litigation despite the costs of 
such litigation being disproportionate to the nature and value of the issues in dispute. In 
England, the Court of Appeal, in Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA 
Civ 576 gave guidance to the objective in the Civil Procedure Rules to encourage ADR and 
provide for cost sanctions against persons who unreasonably refuse to participate in ADR. 
The importance of ADR, particularly mediation, is underscored in the Halsey judgment 
(paras 6-8) and judges may “robustly” encourage ADR (para 11), yet compelling unwilling 
parties would be an “unacceptable obstruction to the right of access to the court” under Art 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (paras 9-10). Notably, the judge Lord Dyson 
in a lecture: “A Word on Halsey v Milton Keynes” (2011) 77 Arb 337 338, subsequently 
confirmed that parties may be cajoled and encouraged by a court to mediate, but not 
compelled. But Lord Dyson added he does not believe that an order by a court to mediate 
would be an infringement of their rights under art 6 of the European Convention. The court in 
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Mandatory mediation has been said to be an oxymoron,54 an antithesis, as 
compelling a party to participate in a process runs counter to the essence of 
mediation, which entails voluntary participation and voluntary settlement.55 This 
contention is based on the premise that settlement is the primary focus of mediation, 
and that the primary focus of court procedures is to attain justice.56 However, it is 
submitted that this interpretation of the purpose and nature of mediation and litigation 
is too narrow as the nature and focus of both mediation and litigation are broader 
than attaining settlement and justice, respectively. Each are complex mechanisms 
through which resolution of a dispute can be sought. Each can succeed or fail in 
attaining resolution or justice.  
Quek gives helpful insight to the complexity of mandatory mediation, suggesting 
that there is a continuum of mandatoriness.57 On the one end mandatory mediation 
may be either discretionary or categorical, but refusal or failure to participate in 
                                            
Halsey v Milton Keynes (para 16) also outlined some factors to be taken into consideration 
when determining if a party had unreasonably refused or was uncooperative, including the 
nature of the dispute, the merits of the case, other attempted settlement methods, 
disproportionately high costs of mediation, delays and whether mediation would have had a 
reasonable prospect of success. For discussion on this case and associated issues see 
Quek (2010) CJCR 502-504; A Rycroft “What Should the Consequences be of an 
Unreasonable Refusal to Participate in ADR?” (2014) SALJ 778-786; WLR de Vos & T 
Broodryk “Managerial Judging and Alternative Dispute Resolution in Australia: An Example 
for South Africa to Emulate? (Part 2)” (2018) 1 TSAR 18 22-23. The new South African High 
Court Uniform R 37A (16) GN R842 in GG 42497 of 31-05-2019, and which took effect on 1 
July 2019, makes provision for an adverse costs order in the event of failure to comply with 
R 37A relating to judicial case management, which includes the consideration of mediation. 
54 Quek (2010) CJCR 479-509 discusses this issue in detail. See also S Vettori “Mandatory 
Mediation: An Obstacle to Access to Justice?” (2015) 15 AHRLJ 355 357. 
55 Vettori (2015) AHRLJ 356-357. A primary characteristic of mediation is voluntariness, and 
compelling a party to participate in mediation may compromise such a process. However, 
the high costs or time delay in court proceedings may coerce a party into a settlement she or 
he may not want, or a settlement that is not just. In short, the arguments raised about 
mediation are likewise applicable to the court litigation process. Compare De Vos & 
Broodryk (2018) TSAR 22-23 who argue for voluntary mediation, but against mandatory 
mediation, averring that a party may only have sufficient funds for one process, and a party 
has a fundamental right to choose her or his own dispute resolution process. 
56 Vettori (2015) AHRLJ 356-357, 360. 
57 For a graphic presentation and discussion of the continuum see Quek (2010) CJCR 488-
490. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
43 
 
mediation has no consequential sanctions; whilst on the opposite end failure or 
refusal incurs sanctions. The latter end is consequently more coercive and less 
voluntary than the former. The voluntariness of mediation is thus challenged by the 
degree of coercion or compulsion, which in turn is determined by the severity of 
sanctions for non-compliance. Quek argues, it is submitted correctly, that any 
sanction should be appropriate and proportionate,58 and suggests further that any 
sanctions should be limited to mainly monetary sanctions.59 
It has been stated that although the requirement to enter into mediation may be 
mandatory, the process and the outcome of the process remain consensual, and 
either party may at any time elect to withdraw from the mediation.60 Others have, 
however, argued that in light of the complexity of the process of mediation, making a 
distinction between coercion into mediation and coercion within mediation is 
unfounded.61 It is submitted that the debate regarding the voluntariness of mediation 
being compromised by the compulsion to enter the process is complex. Inevitably, 
some parties may need to be encouraged to participate in mediation and may 
subsequently benefit from the ADR mechanism, but categorical compulsion, without 
any opportunity to opt out, may result in an unjustifiable delay or denial of access to 
the court. As aptly put by the Court of Appeal in England: “The court’s role is to 
encourage, not to compel”.62 It is further submitted that Quek’s proposal that 
mandatory mediation be temporary and discretionary and that any obligatory 
provisions should be clear and allow parties autonomy as far as possible63 with an 
opt-out opportunity.64 In addition, consequential sanctions for non-compliance should 
not destroy or reduce the voluntary nature of a settlement through mediation, but 
only strongly encourage participation in the mediation process. 
                                            
58 Quek (2010) CJDR 496-497. 
59 Quek (2010) CJDR 497. 
60 The court in Port Elizabeth Municipality para 40 recognised the tension in compulsory 
mediation, yet emphasised that the settlement of the dispute remains in the control of the 
parties.  
61 Quek (2010) CJDR 486-498 discusses this issue in detail. 
62 Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576 para 11. 
63 For example, the right to choose the mediator and if applicable, private or court-annexed 
mediation. 
64 See Quek’s (2010) CJDR 479-480 recommendations for mandatory mediation.  
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The possibility of satellite litigation arising from the obligation to mediate is also a 
matter of concern.65 Notably, the (Singapore) Mediation Act 1 of 2017 specifically 
provides that a party to a mediation agreement may apply to a court to stay legal 
proceedings should another party breach the agreement by commencing litigation 
without first resorting to mediation.66 In addition, parties may resort to litigation to 
appeal or review a sanction order by the courts for non-compliance.67 
Once the parties have concluded a mediation agreement, it will usually impose an 
obligation on the parties to be honest and to disclose all relevant information and 
documents.68 It can be noted, that in South Africa the Magistrates’ Courts Rules 
                                            
65 This may arise between the parties themselves, or if the court seeks to impose sanctions 
on a party for failure to comply with an obligation to mediate. See also C Sim “The 
International Reach of the Singapore Mediation Act) (17-12-2017) Kluwer Mediation Blog 
<http://mediationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/12/17/international-reach-singapore-
mediation-act/> (accessed 19-12-2017); C To “Singapore’s New Mediation Act – Raising the 
Bar to New Heights in the Dispute Resolution Arena” (07-06-2017) CIArb News 
<http://www.ciarb.org/news/ciarb-news/news-detail/features/2017/06/07/singapore-s-new-
mediation-act-raising-the-bar-to-new-heights-in-the-dispute-resolution-arena> (accessed 19-
12-2017). See also L Love & E Waldman “The Hopes and Fears of All the Years: 30 Years 
Behind and the Road Ahead for the Widespread Use of Mediation” (2016) 31 Ohio St J on 
Disp Resol 123 142-143 referring to the concern of growing litigation about mediation, mostly 
based on fraud, coercion, mistake and duress. See also, K Kovach “Good Faith in Mediation 
– Requested, Recommended or Required – A New Ethic (1997) 38 S Tex L Rev 575 603-
605 and I Roper “Mediate: Good Faith, Bad faith” (2015) 40 Alt LJ 50-52 discussing litigation 
arising from the principle of good faith in mediation.  
66 S 8. Compare the UK Civil Procedure Rules R 26.4(1) which provides that a litigant may 
apply to have proceedings stayed while parties try to settle through ADR.  
67 As was the case in Halsey v Milton Keyes [2004] EWCA (Civ) 576. See also Quek (2010) 
CJCR 499. 
68 In addition to disclosure by the parties participating in mediation, there is the issue of 
disclosure by their legal representatives. In Australia an attorney and advocate were each 
found guilty of professional misconduct by their regulating bodies, who after an inquiry found 
that the omission to disclose certain information during a mediation process constituted 
misconduct by the legal representatives. Both cases involved the same mediation, which 
involved their client, Mr White, claiming damages for being rendered a quadriplegic arising in 
a motor vehicle accident. Part of the documents disclosed were medical reports relating to 
the life expectancy of Mr White. Neither Mr White nor his legal representatives disclosed 
during the mediation that Mr White had since been diagnosed with cancer shorty before the 
mediation, but after the reports were written. The cancer was likely to significantly reduce his 
life expectancy. For a discussion on this issue see S De la Harpe (2016) Full Disclosure in 
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grant discretionary authority to the mediator to decide what is relevant or not to a 
mediation.69 The provision stipulates that parties are to disclose all relevant 
information as requested by the mediator or determined to be relevant to the 
mediation by the mediator, if requested by the other party. This provision grants 
power to the mediator who is consequently placed in an adjudicatory role, which in 
turn challenges party autonomy and the voluntary nature of mediation.70 Such 
adjudicative authority is also contrary to the facilitative, non-adjudicative nature of 
mediation.71  
The importance placed on full disclosure by the parties is probably because of the 
understanding that mediation is based on the principles of good faith.72 However, it is 
difficult to define or interpret good faith.73 A helpful description is that good faith 
“simply requires that the parties make a genuine push towards a solution”.74 
Mediation asks for collaboration, creativity and cooperation.75 Core elements of good 
                                            
Mediation 1-9; Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins (2006) LPT 012; Legal Services 
Commissioner v Garrett (2009) LPT 12. 
69 Magistrates’ Courts Rules, Form Med-6, Agreement to Mediate, cl 11 reads “(e)ach of the 
Parties agrees to fully and honestly disclose all relevant information and documents, as 
requested by the mediator, and all information requested by any other party to the mediation, 
if the mediator determines that the disclosure is relevant to the mediation discussions” 
(writer’s emphasis). For a discussion on this issue see De la Harpe Full Disclosure in 
Mediation (2016) 1-11. 
70 It appears self-evident: if a party does not want to disclose a certain document or 
information, she or he can simply terminate the mediation process. The immediate question 
which then arises is whether she or he will be in breach of the mediation agreement? For 
example, if a party in a dispute involving fraud is requested to furnish certain documents can 
the party refuse, and if she or he refuses, will this amount to breach of the mediation 
agreement?  
71 De la Harpe (2016) Full Disclosure in Mediation 6. 
72 Compare UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International 
Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 2018 art 2.1 which reads: “In the 
interpretation of this Law, regard is to be had to its international origin and to the need to 
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith” (writer’s emphasis). 
73 Compare Roper (2015) 40 Alt LJ 50. 
74 Kovach S Tex L Rev 622. Compare Jafta J in Makate v Vodacom Ltd 2016 4 SA 121 (CC) 
para 102 which stated that although it is undesirable to lay down an objective standard of 
good faith, “both sides must enter into negotiations with serious intent to reach consensus.” 
75 K Kovach (1997) S Tex L Rev 580. 
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faith are attendance and disclosure and exchange of information.76 In Aiton Australia 
Pty Ltd v Transfield Pty Ltd77 the court found good faith has to be considered with 
regard to the conduct of the parties.78 After reviewing many definitions of good faith it 
concluded that good faith with regard to negotiation or mediation meant one had to 
have an open mind and be willing to consider options proposed by the other party 
and to be willing to make proposals oneself.79 Good faith was initially presumed to be 
present in mediation, but it may also be requested, recommended or required.80 It is 
critical to inform and educate participants about the characteristic of good faith as it 
cannot be presumed.81 Participants need to understand the nature of mediation as a 
process that takes the participants on an empowering journey to seek their own 
resolution to their dispute.  
A further characteristic of mediation is that the third party who facilitates the 
mediation is neutral or independent and impartial. Although it has been argued that a 
totally impartial or neutral mediator is rare,82 the role of the third party or parties is 
                                            
76 Kovach (1997) S Tex L Rev 583ff continues to discuss a number of issues that can be 
considered to be part of good faith, including self-determination, fairness as well as 
discussing what would amount to bad faith such as coercion by either party or the mediator. 
Kovach 622-623 also proposes a model rule for good-faith participation in the mediation 
process. 
77 153 FLR 236 (“Aiton Australia”). 
78 Aiton Australia para 92. 
79 Aiton Australia para 156. The court nevertheless held that good faith does not mean that a 
party had to act for and on behalf of the other party. Compare Roper Alt LJ 50 who 
comments that the court’s definition, is “unworkably vague and lacking in legal certainty”. 
80 Kovach (1997) S Tex L Rev 596ff discusses these issues and suggests that a request can 
be made by either party, or a mediator and is usually done at the beginning and forms part of 
the mediation agreement. A recommendation is in stronger terms and may originate from a 
court, whilst a requirement would probably be in the form of a legal rule for regulated court-
annexed mediation, or an express obligation imposed by a mediation agreement. See ch 2 
fns 41 & 42 above. 
81 Kovach (1997) S Tex L Rev 619. 
82 The frequently quoted description by Richard Fisher that a neutral mediator is a “eunuch 
from Mars, totally powerless (and totally neutral)” illustrates the unlikely existence of a 
neutral mediator. See H Hung “Neutrality and Impartiality in Mediation” (2002) 5 ADR 
Bulletin 45 45; S De la Harpe Impartiality in the Mediation of Commercial Disputes (2016) 9. 
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non-partisan.83 Mediators originate from different professions, generally from legal, 
mental health or counselling professions and thus the professional make-up of a 
mediator may strongly influence the role of the mediator and her or his intervention in 
the process, including the degree of evaluation and direction she or he may give or 
be able to give in the process. Nevertheless, a mediator is obliged to remain neutral 
and not to take sides with either party.84 Notably, a distinction in South Africa is 
drawn between the norms of impartiality under modern Western based mediation 
and those applying to traditional indigenous based mediation.85 It is contended that 
the former is based on the principles of impartiality and independence which are 
founded upon the entrenched laws of impartiality and independence under 
adjudicative procedural law which in turn are heavily influenced by English 
procedural laws.86 This approach is echoed in the South-African Magistrates’ Courts 
Rules (2014) that describe ADR as a process, in which “an independent and 
impartial person assists parties to attempt to resolve the dispute between them, 
either before or after commencement of litigation” (writer’s emphasis).87  
                                            
83 See M Palmer & S Roberts Dispute Processes ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision 
Making (1998) 107-108, 110. Also see J Bercovitch Studies in International Mediation (2002) 
6-7. A Rycroft “The Mediation of Human Rights Disputes” (2002) SACHR 287 288-289 
includes the following factors under neutrality: no direct interest in the outcome of the 
dispute, no prior knowledge or involvement in the dispute or with the parties, not to be 
judgmental or biased and an assurance of even-handed treatment. See also Feehily (2015) 
SALJ 389-392 who distinguishes between impartiality and neutrality, and contends that 
impartiality is indispensable, whilst neutrality is not. He describes impartiality as a mediator 
being open to any outcome, and not focusing on a preconceived or particular outcome. 
Neutrality concerns the possible bias of a mediator, for example a material personal or 
professional relationship with any one or both the parties. 
84 Expert mediators are also common in the construction and medical professions. 
85 De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 4-5. 
86 De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 4. 
87 R 73. Also paras 7(a) and 9.4 and 9.8 of Magistrates’ Courts Rules, Schedule 2 in terms of 
R 86 published in GN 854 in GG 38163 of 31-10-2014. This is similar to the definition of 
mediation in the draft (South African) High Court Uniform R 41A which refers to an “impartial 
third person”. Compare too arts 6.4 and 6.5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Mediation, 2018 that provide for the appointment of an independent and 
impartial mediator and for the requirement that any nominated mediator disclose any 
circumstance that may cast doubt on her or his impartiality or independence. Notably, 
independence or impartiality is not an absolute requirement, but art 6.5 requires that parties 
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On the other hand traditional mediation, usually conducted by elders in a social 
context with a focus on the restoration of social equilibrium in a spirit of ubuntu and 
social cohesion, does not require independence and impartiality as understood by 
the western adjudicative system.88 A fair outcome is dependent upon the mediator 
and her or his wisdom and experience.89 In addition, family members, more likely to 
be biased, assist the elder in reaching a consensual outcome.90 This approach 
resonates with the medieval system of mediation where neutrality was not a 
requirement and mediators were often friends of the disputants and knew something 
of the dispute.91 In resolving disputes undergoing traditional mediation, reconciliation 
and maintenance of relationships remain important.92 Consequently, it is natural that 
in some instances it may be necessary for the mediator to take not only the interests 
of the parties to the dispute into account, but also those of other persons directly 
affected and even those of the community.93  
A more developed analysis of the impartiality and neutrality of mediation entails 
the following characteristics: non-partisan fairness, the degree of mediator 
intervention, role limitation and objectivity.94 Non-partisan fairness entails impartiality 
                                            
need to be able to make an informed decision regarding the independence and impartiality 
of the mediator. Nevertheless, under art 6.4, an institution recommending or appointing a 
mediator must have regard to considerations relating to the independence and impartiality of 
the mediator. However, there is no provision for challenging the appointment of a mediator, 
unlike arts 12 & 13 of UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 
(as amended). Also see De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 5. 
88 De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 4. 
89 De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 4; A Aiyedun & A Ordor “Integrating the 
Traditional with the Contemporary in Dispute Resolution in Africa” (2016) 20 LDD 154 157. 
90 De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 4; Aiyedun & Ordor (2016) LDD 157. 
91 Mediators could also be the local councillor or royal representative. 
92 Roebuck (2013) Mediation and Arbitration in the Middle Ages 394-395.  
93 See M Palmer & S Roberts Dispute Processes ADR (1998) 110ff. An example of such an 
instance would be the bursar of a nursery school in a small town defrauding the school of 
monies paid as school fees by the parents. The interests of the broader community are 
affected, as the parents experience an indirect loss of their fees and uncertainty regarding 
the school, whilst the school suffers a direct pecuniary loss of the paid fees as well as 
possible damage to its reputation and this has an impact upon the public and town. 
94 Hung (2002) ADR Bulletin 45. De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 6-7 discusses 
the issue of impartiality under different, yet sometimes overlapping captions, namely, 
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but not indifference. The mediator needs to be unbiased, not uncaring.95 Bias may 
occur if the mediator has any interest in the outcome of the mediation, knows either 
one or both the parties, or is more drawn to one party than another during 
mediation.96 It is important that a party should not feel that a mediator is being partial 
or biased. It is essential that each of the parties feels they are able to trust the 
mediator.97 A further characteristic of impartiality is that of equality or even-
handedness, the need to treat the parties equally.98 Significantly, equal treatment of 
the parties may not result in an equal outcome. On the contrary, equal treatment of 
parties may culminate in an unequal outcome. Parties entering the mediation may be 
in an unequal relationship. The imbalance could be due to education, cultural or 
religious beliefs, personalities, money or education.99 This raises the issue of the 
degree of the mediator’s intervention and the role limitation. There is no agreement 
amongst mediators whether mediators should in such instances treat the parties 
equally, or try and even out the imbalance by empowering the weaker party, thus in 
effect treating the parties unequally. Some mediators emphasise party self-
autonomy, even if the outcome is deemed by the mediator to be unfair.100  
Yet another alternative is for the mediator to terminate the mediation and inform 
the parties that she or he believes the mediation process to be tainted by the 
                                            
impartiality, even-handedness, impartiality as to the content and outcome, and party self-
determination.  
95 Hung (2002) ADR Bulletin 45-46; De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 6. 
96 De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 6. 
97 Rycroft (2002) SAJHR 289. 
98 Compare the obligation of mediators under the (South African) Magistrates’ Courts Rules 
(2014) Schedule 2, para 7(b) to conduct themselves in a manner that is “fair to all the parties 
and must not be swayed by fear, favour or self-interest”; and para 9.2 that “every mediator 
must respect the right to equality before the law and the right of equal protection and benefit 
of the law”. 
99 De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 6. 
100 Rycroft (2002) SAJHR 292-292 suggests that the principles of ubuntu and restorative 
justice, and particularly the need for compliance with constitutional values, place a 
responsibility upon all the parties and the mediator to ensure that a resolution at least meets 
the requirements of the Constitution, failing which the settlement will in any event be subject 
to review. 
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imbalance between the parties or that the outcome is unfair.101 It is submitted in the 
proposed model that the mediated settlement will need to be fair and at least meet 
the requirements of the Constitution, as not only will it be subject to the approval of 
the criminal court but also subject to review under the values of the Constitution. In 
order to achieve such an outcome it may be necessary for the mediator to treat the 
parties differently.102 
A further element of the characteristic of impartiality is the role of the mediator with 
regard to the control of the mediation process. The mediator’s task is to elicit 
information, facilitate dialogue and maintain a safe and respected space. The very 
nature of mediation, being a process between various parties, including the 
mediator, means that the mediator necessarily has an influence not only on the 
process, but also on the direction of the discussion, on the other parties, and 
ultimately on the outcome. The extent of such influence, directly or indirectly, 
depends upon many factors including the nature of the dispute, the personality of the 
mediator and the skills and expertise of the mediator.103 The variance in these 
characteristics of impartiality illustrate the complexity of the process and the need for 
caution when calling for independent and impartial mediation. Several practices have 
been identified to help curb partiality and ensure neutrality, namely self-awareness, 
openness, valuing and evaluating, maximising party control and the overarching 
principle of justice and fairness.104 Mediators need to be aware of their own ethical 
values and sensitive to the ethical values of the parties. In addition, the role of a 
mediator needs to be limited in instances of a possible conflict of interests.105  
                                            
101 See the discussion by Hung (2002) ADR Bulletin 45-45 about the different approaches of 
various rules of conduct in different fields and jurisdictions, some limiting intervention whilst 
others allowing intervention by the mediator.  
102 For example, a mediator may advise either the accused or the prosecutor in a side-
meeting of the risks involved in continuing with the prosecution: the accused may risk 
receiving a heavier sentence, or the prosecutor may risk a non-conviction regarding the 
offence. 
103 The dynamics between the parties are discussed below in para 2 2 3 in the discussion of 
different mediation styles. Also see De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 6-7. 
104 De la Harpe Impartiality in Mediation (2016) 7-8. 
105 For example, a person acting as a mediator while simultaneously acting as a legal 
representative of one of the parties to the mediation in an unrelated matter.  
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A further characteristic of mediation is that the process is private and 
confidential.106 This is an important characteristic and is inter-linked with the 
characteristics of flexibility and informality of mediation. It is submitted that privacy 
and confidentiality allow persons to participate more freely, spontaneously and 
innovatively than the more rigid and formal rules of procedure and evidence in a 
court process permit. Consequently, it is important that the process of mediation 
remain private and confidential.107 However, it will be submitted in this dissertation 
that the outcome of the successful mediation of economic crime, namely the 
mediated settlement agreement must be made an order of the court, unusual as 
                                            
106 Feehily discusses the complexities of mediation confidentiality and privilege in the light of 
the case law in different jurisdictions in two articles: R Feehily “Confidentiality in Commercial 
Mediation: A Fine Balance (Part 1)” (2015) TSAR 516-536 and R Feehily “Confidentiality in 
Commercial Mediation: A Fine Balance (Part 2)”(2015) TSAR 719-737. Feehily (2015) TSAR 
734 concludes: “Clearly, the law on confidentiality in mediation is complex, partially unclear 
and seemingly incomplete.” Feehily (2015) TSAR 518 identifies three types of confidentiality: 
side-meeting confidentiality; mediation process confidentiality imposing an obligation upon 
all parties not to disclose any information obtained during the mediation and thirdly the 
duty/right not to disclose any information in subsequent proceedings. A distinction also 
needs to be made between mediation confidentiality and mediation privilege. A further 
distinction is the duty of confidentiality attributed to various persons, including the actual 
parties to the disputes, the mediator, experts, and third parties. The source of confidentiality 
and privilege are also important, including common law, statutory law, contract and 
professional institutional rules. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the 
complexity of mediation confidentiality and privilege. For a detailed discussion of 
confidentiality in SA, with comparative discussion of the positions in California, and Australia 
see the thesis of Laubscher Confidentiality in Mediation 19-160.  
107 This principle is, however, compromised in various ways, particularly if one party turns to 
the court and claims duress, breach of the mediation agreement, mistake or 
misrepresentation. In such instances the court is tasked with finding out what happened 
during the mediation process. Also, the principle of full disclosure could be in tension with 
the principle of confidentiality. See Feehily (2015) TSAR 516-536 and 719-737 for a 
discussion of these issues. Compare too (South African) Draft Uniform R 41A(6) which 
reads: “Except as provided by law, discoverable in terms of the rules or agreed between the 
parties, all communications and disclosures, whether oral or written, made at mediation 
proceedings shall be confidential and inadmissible in evidence.” Compare too the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation, 2018 arts 10 and 11 that 
respectively make provision for the confidentiality of mediation proceedings and 
inadmissibility of evidence in other proceedings.  
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such a requirement may be in mediation.108 This is necessary due to the criminal 
nature of the offence and the public interest in the issues connected to economic 
crime. Notably, too the characteristic of confidentiality may be affected by statutory 
obligatory reporting, like provisions under the South African Financial Intelligence 
Centre Act 38 of 2001 (“FICA”).109 As will be shown below in chapter 4, transparency 
is an important and integral concept in plea and sentencing agreements and 
DPAs.110 This is equally true of the proposed mechanism of mediation. Moreover, 
the court will retain the discretion to protect information which it deems necessary to 
protect.111 
An order of the court is subject to public scrutiny and comment. It is submitted that 
public scrutiny and comment of mediated settlements relating to criminal offences is 
required to ensure credibility and validation of the mediation process. An order of 
court also contributes to legal certainty through the precedent system, which 
                                            
108 Notably, the (Singapore) Mediation Act 1 of 2017 makes provision in s 12 for the 
mediated settlement agreement to be made an order of the court subject to certain 
conditions. In addition, the authority of the court is maintained as s 12(4) sets out grounds 
upon which the court may refuse to make such an order. Ss 9-11 contain detailed provisions 
regarding the disclosure of any information relating to a mediation under the Act. See too 
Sim “The International Reach of the Singapore Mediation Act” Kluwer Mediation Blog; To 
“Singapore’s New Mediation Act – Raising the Bar to New Heights in the Dispute Resolution 
Arena” CIArb News. Compare too UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Mediation, 2018 art 19 regarding the grounds on which a court may refuse to permit a party 
to rely on an international settlement agreement. See also Laubscher (Confidentiality in 
Mediation 6-9), who whilst endorsing the critical element of confidentiality in mediation that 
builds trust and promotes disclosure of information, also points out that confidentiality is not 
absolute and there may be occasions that it is necessary for information to be made public. 
See, for example, the draft UNCITRAL Mediation Rules, 2019 art 8.2, which provides that a 
settlement agreement, may upon signature, be used as evidence that it resulted from 
mediation. 
109 Ss 29 prescribes reporting duties upon persons who suspect or have knowledge of 
unlawful activities as prescribed in FICA. The purpose of the act is to establish the Financial 
Intelligence Centre with the aim to identify unlawful and money laundering activities and 
respond appropriately. Such a statutory obligation may compromise the confidentiality of the 
mediation process. See also Feehily (2015) TSAR 531-532.  
110 See below chs 4 4 1 and 4 4 2. 
111 See fn 108 above relating to provisions in the Singapore Mediation Act 1 of 2017; and the 
discussion in ch 4 para 4 4 1 below relating to DPAs, in particular the Tesco-matter. 
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reinforces public norms and values.112 In addition, a public order of court 
underscores the courts being institutes of governance and enables the continuing 
expansion of the common law through the reception and application of court 
judgments by succeeding courts and commentators.113 In addition, providing that a 
mediated settlement agreement must be made an order of the court will ensure that 
the court retains supervision of the terms of the mediated settlement agreement.114  
The essentially restorative nature of mediation also needs to be emphasised. 
During mediation, opposing parties meet in a structured process and with the 
assistance of a third party learn to see issues anew and to find creative solutions. 
Restoring and sustaining relationships is one of the natural benefits of mediation. 
This is illustrated too in the traditional African mediation built upon the principles of 
ubuntu, and the underlying values of reciprocal human dignity and respect that focus 
more on restoration of the balance of relationships that have gone askew than on 
redress and retribution.115 
A principle that is emphasised in this dissertation is the African principle of 
ubuntu.116 Ubuntu was and remains a strong underlying factor of dispute resolution 
under customary law, and the values of the humanist ubuntu form the basis of 
traditional African mediation.117 Ubuntu is recognised as a core principle of 
indigenous knowledge systems and indigenous legal traditions that value 
communality and inter-dependence. The rights of the individual are interpreted 
                                            
112 Vettori (2015) AHRLJ 360. 
113 De Vos & Broodryk (2017) TSAR 703. 
114 Such a provision would also be in line with provisions regarding plea and sentence 
agreements and DPA agreements that need to be confirmed by the court. These issues are 
discussed in ch 4, paras 4 4 1, 245ff and 4 4 2, 293ff. 
115 D Mekonnen “Indigenous Legal Tradition as a Supplement to African Transitional Justice 
Initiatives” (2010) 3 AJCR 1 6. 
116 Ubuntu is understood in the expression umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu and can be loosely 
translated as “a human being is a human being through other human beings”. In a single 
word it may be translated as “humaneness” and encompasses both the personhood and 
morality of humaneness. It reflects group solidarity and consequently underscores 
interrelatedness and harmony. See Malan (1997) Conflict Resolution: Wisdom from Africa 
88. The principle of Ubuntu has been recognised by the courts. Also see S v Makwanyane 
1995 3 SA 391 (CC) discussed in ch 3, para 3 2 2, 105ff. 
117 Aiyedun & Ordor (2016) 157; De la Harpe (2016) Mediation in South Africa 2; Brand 
Commercial Mediation (2015) 1-2. 
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against the broader context of reciprocal enjoyment of rights of all persons and 
cooperation of each member of the community.118 Indigenous legal traditions make 
provision for “mechanisms for acknowledgement, truth-telling, accountability, healing 
and reparation”119 within the broader society to promote the social cohesion of the 
group. 
In addition, mediation allows the inclusion of the victims or representatives of the 
victims and brings about a “restorative justice intervention”.120 It enables the offender 
and victims to meet, to face one another, to discuss the consequences of the offence 
and to participate in resolving the dispute, while respecting the public interest in a 
dispute involving criminal liability.121 Consequently, on the basis of the characteristics 
discussed above, mediation in this dissertation is considered to be a restorative 
justice process.122  
Some characteristics of mediation have been discussed to emphasise the nature 
of mediation as a dispute resolution process. The description of mediation is clearly 
complex. To better understand the process and dynamics of mediation, a number of 
mediation styles have been identified that reflect the interaction between the role of 
the mediator, party autonomy and the nature of the dispute.  
2 2 3 Styles of mediation 
As mediation is such a dynamic process, involving mediators from different 
professional backgrounds and used in various fields, a number of mediation styles 
                                            
118 Mekonnen (2010) AJCR 4. 
119 Mekonnen (2010) AJCR 5. 
120 Gabbay (2007) CJRC 421ff. Hiemstra states that retributive justice looks back, whilst 
restorative justice looks forward and emphasises reconciliation, restitution and responsibility. 
Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure 28-28(1). 
121 Gabbay (2007) CJRC 427 concludes “In my opinion, restorative justice is a different 
approach to criminal justice. While the system today is offender-orientated and focuses on 
punishment, the restorative justice paradigm offers a more balanced view of the appropriate 
public response to crime. It maintains the public aspect of criminal law but introduces the 
victims’ perspective and the reparation of the needs created by the offense as an 
inseparable aspect of justice.” 
122 This aspect is further motivated in ch 3, para 3 5, 146ff2.  
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have emerged. Alexander123 developed a helpful matrix, the Mediation Meta-Model, 
which incorporates the overlapping of the different styles along the horizontal 
interaction and vertical intervention axes.124  
                                            
123 N Alexander “The Mediation Meta-Model – the Realities of Mediation Practice” (2011) 12 
no 6 Article 5 ADR Bulletin 126 127 (available at 
<http://epublications.bond.edu.au/adr/vol12/iss6/5>)(accessed 09-01-2017). 
124 Another influential model is the Riskin grid. It was first proposed by Professor Riskin in 
1996 and has greatly influenced and shaped the discussion and understanding of mediation 
in the United States. The original Riskin grid had two axes: the horizontal grid was the 
problem-definition axis and moved from narrow to broad, west to east. The vertical axis 
focused on the role of the mediator and moved south to north, from facilitative to evaluative. 
The lower, south-side, referred to higher party autonomy, whilst an evaluative approach 
referred to a more directive approach by the mediator. The terms and design of the Riskin 
grid led to much discussion and particularly the terms facilitative and evaluative were 
criticised. This led to Prof Riskin reviewing the grid and renaming the point at the bottom of 
the vertical grid “elicitive”, formerly “facilitative”; and the top point “directive” instead of 
“evaluative”. (He named the modified grid the “new old grid”). At the same time, recognising 
the difficulty in constructing a model for a dynamic and complex process with many 
variables, Prof Riskin developed a new model (the “new new grid”), encompassing a series 
of grids, based on the types of decision making: “substantive decisionmaking, procedural 
decisionmaking” and “meta-procedural decisionmaking”. Substantive decision making 
focuses on defining the substantive issues, and incorporates the standard problem-definition 
process. Procedural decision making embraces the dynamic procedural complexities of the 
mediation process, including the interplay between the different participants, namely the 
mediator, the parties and their legal representatives. Procedural decision making thus 
includes the decision on what procedures will be adopted to resolve the substantive issues. 
The meta-procedural decision making refers to subsequent procedural decisions. The 
horizontal axis represents a particular issue, whilst the vertical axis illustrates the influence 
and participation of the different participants with the mediator plotted at the top of the axis 
and the parties and their lawyers at the bottom. Simply put, a more northern position 
represents the traditional evaluative or directive style of mediation; whilst a position towards 
the bottom of the vertical axis would represent a more facilitative or elicitive style of 
mediation, meaning increased participation by and autonomy for the parties themselves. For 
a detailed description of the Riskin grids, see LL Riskin “Decisionmaking in Mediation: The 
New Old Grid and the New New Grid System” 79 (2003) Notre Dame L Rev 1-53. 
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Figure 1 The Mediation Meta-Model 
 
Although none of the styles are concretely defined, the matrix helps the 
recognition of different styles of mediation. The vertical axis illustrates the approach 
and role of the mediator and her or his level of intervention; whilst the horizontal 
dimension portrays the extent of interactions of the parties between each other in the 
process. The different models portray which communication style is used during the 
mediation process and whether the mediator and parties are focused more on 
solving the problem or concentrating on the interests of the parties. 
Expert advisory mediation positioned at the bottom left corner of the matrix has a 
high level of mediator intervention on the vertical intervention dimension and a high 
interaction between the parties. Expert advisory mediation is focused on the problem 
and on solving it quickly, fairly and justly. Emphasis is on the parties’ rights and 
positions, and therefore the horizontal interaction dimension leans towards positional 
bargaining. The parties interact from their individual positions and focus on their 
rights, while broader issues and parties’ interests may not necessarily be addressed 
or raised. Evaluative or directive mediation is a form of expert advisory mediation, in 
which the mediator plays a more direct participatory role in the mediation process. 
The mediator may weigh up and evaluate each party’s case, and give advice or an 
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expert opinion.125 As this style of mediation focuses more on a party’s legal rights 
and the risks of continuing with the dispute, the mediator usually meets with each 
party separately to discuss the issues.126 Evaluative mediation may be used in 
disputes that are highly technical127 and parties need expert advice regarding the 
issues and their rights and obligations. In South Africa, this style of mediation is 
applied widely in the building and construction industry.128 It is also an appropriate 
style in mediation if matters are imbalanced129 or when mediation is mandatory,130 
and it is necessary for the mediator to use a high level of intervention to help balance 
the power between the parties or to motivate the parties to interact with the purpose 
of reaching a settlement. 
Alongside the expert advisory mediation style on the horizontal interaction 
continuum is wise counsel mediation.131 This style involves mediators assisting the 
parties in identifying and exploring their interests, whist keeping their rights in mind, 
and the parties focus on negotiating the issues in dispute. Consequently, along the 
vertical axis, the intervention and participation of the mediator remains strong and 
the mediator may give strong suggestions regarding draft proposals of settlement, 
although the final settlement remains in the control of the parties. Wise counsel 
mediation is usually used in instances where parties are reluctant to propose and 
engage actively in finding settlements.132 It is also used in cases where there are 
                                            
125 L Love & E Waldman “The Hopes and Fears of All the Years: 30 Years Behind and the 
Road Ahead for the Widespread Use of Mediation” (2016) 31 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 123 
137-138 are very critical of evaluative mediation and contend that the Riskin grid blurred the 
essential distinctions between different ADR processes and that core characteristics of 
mediation such as party self-autonomy and self-determination have been reduced. Love & 
Waldman (2016) Ohio St J on Disp Resol 143-144 are equally critical of mediation in 
separate parallel sessions (caucusing) and support the movement for saving the joint 
session. 
126 Commonly known as caucusing or side-meetings. See Brand et al (2015) Commercial 
Mediation 38, 39. 
127 For example, dispute relating to medical negligence.  
128 Brand Commercial Mediation (2015) 22.  
129 For example, one party may have legal representation and the other not. 
130 For example, in terms of a contract or court order. 
131 Alexander (2011) ADR Bulletin 129. 
132 For example, the Chief Operating Officer of an organisation may want to save face in a 
dispute with an employee that went awry. 
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compound issues that need resolution and mediators were appointed on the basis of 
their expertise and reputation for fairness and understanding.133 
Tradition-based mediation also has a high intervention level from the mediator and 
as the name suggests, originates from communities that acknowledge strong 
traditional leaders.134 This occurs where disputes in the community are referred to 
the leader, and the interests of the community weigh heavily and consequently the 
mediation may be multi-party and involve the voice of the community. Consequently, 
the confidentiality of the mediation may be compromised,135 but any communication 
is in the interest of the broader public. In this style of mediation the rights of the 
individual may be out-weighed by the interests of the community. An accentuated 
factor of tradition-based mediation is restorative justice and the restoration of 
harmony in the community, in light of the values and norms of the community.136 The 
communication style is that of dialogue, and yet more dialogue, with the mediators 
encouraging open-dialogue between the parties and in the presence of the 
community. The process may also contain certain rituals.137 The mediation process 
is important as it incorporates both a high level of intervention from the mediators 
and a high level of interaction between all the parties, including possible 
representatives of the community. Traditional mediation echoes the characteristics of 
traditional dispute resolution. It also underscores the core principle of lovedays in the 
middle-ages and echoes the common phrase recorded in medieval dispute 
resolutions: “by the mediation of their friends amicably intervening between them.”138  
Transformative mediation focuses on the relationship between the parties, with 
the purpose of transforming, reconciling, improving or at least sustaining a 
                                            
133 For example, in a complex divorce situation where there are multiple assets or multi-
cultural parties. 
134 For example, chiefs and elders in a rural social group or elders in a religious group. 
135 Alexander (2011) ADR Bulletin 129 and 130. 
136 Alexander (2011) ADR Bulletin 130. 
137 For example, in a religious dispute the mediation may involve the parties participating in a 
cleansing ritual, or taking communion together. 
138 The community interests and involvement both originated from and evolved into the 
involvement of the king presiding over disputes. The king was subsequently represented by 
a royal representative, such as a lord or knight, and later a council, parliament, or chamber 
representative and today law courts. Roebuck (2013) Mediation and Arbitration in the Middle 
Ages 49, 140-161. 
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relationship between the disputants.139 The mediator focuses on communication and 
uses various skills to persuade the parties to communicate with one another and 
consequently transform perspectives and promote recognition and understanding of 
the other party’s position. The parties remain in control of any solution that may be 
reached, and, in addition to retaining control of the outcome, they also control the 
process to a greater extent.140 This style of mediation emphasises the process and 
the mediator‘s role is to create a safe space within which the parties can 
communicate and also to empower the parties to communicate. Transformative 
mediation is thus on the upper vertical axis, emphasising the process and not the 
problem.141 On the horizontal axis, the emphasis is on dialogue and communication, 
and the mediator’s role is to assist the parties to understand one another.142 
Transformative mediation is used in victim and offender programmes143 and also in 
cases where the relationship between the parties needs to be restored. Narrative 
mediation is akin to transformative mediation, in that the mediator focuses on 
creating a new narrative, through which understanding and a sustainable outcome 
may be achieved between the parties. Therapeutic mediation is also a style of 
transformative mediation144 and emphasises the healing of the parties, 
notwithstanding whether there may be reconciliation or not, although focus is also 
given to the reconciliation and restoration of the relationships. In her mediation meta-
model, Alexander145 finds that transformative and tradition-based mediation, which 
follow a style of dialogue-based mediation, tend to be more restorative than expert 
advisory or settlement mediation which, in contrast, is more focused on finding 
settlements from the perspective of strong positional bargaining. 
Facilitative mediation is the more classic form of mediation and focuses on the 
process: the mediator concentrates on asking questions, validating each party’s 
                                            
139 Brand Commercial Mediation (2015) 21-22. 
140 Z Zumeta “Styles of Mediation: Facilitative, Evaluative and Transformative Mediation” (14-
07-2015) mediate.com <www.mediate.com/arteicles/zumeta/cfm (accessed 06-01-2017). 
141 Alexander (2011) ADR Bulletin 130. 
142 For example, a rape victim may want to know why the offender raped her or him. 
143 In sexual offences it may be years before transformative mediation may be appropriate as 
it may take time before the victim may be ready to talk to the offender. 
144 Alexander (2011) ADR Bulletin 130. 
145 Alexander (2011) ADR Bulletin 127,129-130. 
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responses and facilitating discussion, whilst control of the solution is maintained by 
the parties.146 Focus is on the parties’ interests as opposed to concentrating strictly 
on their rights. The mediator controls the mediation process, whilst the parties retain 
control of the outcome.147 
Settlement mediation focuses on the need to reach a solution and parties are 
encouraged to settle. In settlement mediation, the mediator focuses on the process 
and encourages the parties to seek a solution quickly and justly. Like expert advisory 
mediation, the negotiation is strongly based on parties’ rights and positions and thus 
the communication style is positional bargaining. Settlement mediation often involves 
shuttle mediation,148 which occurs when the mediator separates the parties and 
shuttles between them, discussing settlement offers and counter-offers.149 The 
separate meetings enable the mediator and each party to be frank with one another 
and play their cards so to speak. The mediator only shares such information that she 
or he has been authorised by the one party to share with the other party. The 
mediator is often an expert in the field and can thus also give an expert opinion on 
each party’s rights.150 In settlement mediation the parties usually have legal 
representation and thus proposals and final settlements can be evaluated and 
validated and confirmed during the mediation process. 
Most mediators use one or more styles and this is sometimes referred to as a 
toolbox approach151 or roaming the Riskin grid.152 None of the styles are strongly 
                                            
146 The process of facilitation needs to be distinguished from facilitative mediation. 
Facilitation is a term commonly used by FAMAC and the courts in South Africa and usually 
refers to post-divorce dispute resolution. For example, parties may have a dispute regarding 
the increase of maintenance or visitation rights referred to facilitation. Often reference to 
facilitation is part of a divorce order by the court. The major difference is that a facilitator may 
give directives regarding the issues, and thus acts more as an adjudicator, than as an 
archetypal mediator. See Anonymous “Facilitation” FAMAC 
<http://www.famac.co.za/facilitation> (accessed 15-12-2017). 
147 Zumeta “Styles of Mediation: Facilitative, Evaluative and Transformative Mediation” 
mediate.com; Alexander (2011) ADR Bulletin 127. 
148 Also known as caucusing mediation. 
149 Alexander (2011) ADR Bulletin 128. 
150 For example, in a dispute over water rights between a farmer and a miner, the mediator, 
an expert on water rights jurisprudence, can be frank regarding each party’s rights with 
regard to complex water rights. 
151 Also see Feehily (2015) SALJ 378 who refers to a “mixed process”. 
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delineated and thus it is more appropriate to refer to a continuum of mediation styles, 
and any style or blend of styles that may be followed is dependent upon not only the 
mediator, but also upon the parties and the nature of the dispute.153 Indeed, as 
Riskin emphasised, various models simply serve to draw attention to the different 
styles and interplay between participants involved in a complex process, covering 
diverse issues.154 Models create awareness and an enhanced understanding of the 
dynamics of the multifaceted process known as mediation, but different styles of 
mediation cannot and should not be cast in stone. It is helpful to summarise the 
different styles with reference to the so-called “big three” namely “evaluative 
mediation”, “facilitative mediation” and “transformative mediation”.155 This 
categorisation reflects the two poles of the original Riskin grid, evaluative mediation 
involving a strong directory role played by the mediator assessing the issues and 
making predictions of the outcomes, whilst facilitative mediation illustrates the more 
conventional style of the mediator facilitating the process, encouraging 
communication and settlement between the parties. Transformative mediation was 
added as a third dominant style, arising from the more recent developments in 
mediation where a mediator leads the parties to empowerment and recognition.156  
Boulle reckons that mediation has developed to such an extent that it is no longer 
possible to speak of classical or facilitative mediation and that there is no single 
                                            
152 M Keet “Informed Decision-Making in Judicial Mediation and the Assessment of Litigation 
Risk” (2018) 33 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 65 78-80 (including footnote 45). 
153 See Birke (2000) J Disp Resol 315. Also see too (2015) SALJ 375 who states: “Since 
every dispute is different, and every mediator is different, every mediation is to some extent 
different from another mediation.”  
154 Riskin (2003) Notre Dame L Rev 47, 51-53 uses the metaphor of a journey. The mediator 
is the guide and although the travellers (the participants) may have thought they were 
embarking on an agreed package tour, events and developments along the way, such as 
bad weather, could result in a detour being taken. In other words the discovery of different 
insights during the mediation process could lead to new issues and paths being explored. 
See too Feehily (2015) SALJ 378 who likens the mediator to a mid-wife. Although she will 
not herself produce a child, the creative solution, she will “nevertheless take every care to 
bring about its birth”. 
155 R Rubinson “Of Grids and Gatekeepers: The Socioeconomics of Mediation” (2016) 17 
Cardozo J Conflict Resol 873. Feehily (2015) SALJ 374 adds a fourth, settlement mediation.  
156 Rubinson (2016) Cardozo J Conflict Resol 878-881. 
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analytical model to describe mediation.157 Boulle holds that the development of non-
adversarial justice has changed the traditional role of the law courts. The courts have 
moved from being primarily adversarial with opposing litigants, to forums 
encompassing a number of dispute resolution mechanisms, including court-annexed 
mediation.158 In addition, as referred to above, mediation is evolving to include med-
arb and arb-med and these mechanisms are becoming increasingly more relevant 
and consequently combinations of the processes of mediation and arbitration are 
becoming more prevalent. Notwithstanding these developments, it is submitted that 
mediation, including mediation across a continuum or matrix of different styles 
remains a distinct process in which a third person assists disputants to resolve 
disputes between them.  
The contextualisation of mediation is important.159 Accordingly, the location and 
type of mediation is important. In particular, a distinction needs to be made between 
private mediation and court-annexed mediation.160 The costs of mediation are also 
important as they sometimes determine the type of mediation. For example, in the 
United States, the costs of court-annexed mediation are borne by the state.161 This 
                                            
157 L Boulle “From Mediation to Non-adversarial Justice” unpublished presentation presented 
at a conference on Court-Annexed Mediation hosted by the Mandela Institute, at the 
University of Witwatersrand (“Wits”), Johannesburg 2016 (copy on file with author); Feehily 
(2015) SALJ 375. 
158 For example, pre-trial evaluation of a case by a judge, improved case management, 
fewer adversarial trials, and even judicial dispute resolution other than by adjudication. 
Judges are thus likely to become more multi-tasked and their roles will become more diverse 
in managing courts as dispute resolution sites. Boulle (2016) From Mediation to Non-
adversarial Justice. 
159 Rubinson (2016) CJCR 907. 
160 Brand et al Commercial Mediation (2015) 44. For a discussion of the distinction between 
private and court-annexed mediation in the United States, see Rubinson (2016) CJCR 882-
873. 
161 The assumption is that private mediation is mediation that is available to parties that can 
afford it and is very much the typical text-book description of mediation. In contrast, court-
annexed mediation is a process also available to litigants who are unable to afford private 
mediation. See Rubinson (2016) CJCR 882-873. With regard to court-annexed mediation in 
South Africa, the Magistrates’ Courts Rules (2014) Rule 84 provides that the fees of the 
mediator are to be borne equally by the parties and that the prescribed tariff for mediator 
fees has been published by the state. See GN 854 in GG 38163 of 31-10-2014. See also 
Brand et al Commercial Mediation (2015) 46. 
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impacts upon the style of mediation. Court-annexed mediation, administered and 
operated by the courts, is likely to be restricted by time, limited resources and 
inexperienced mediators. Consequently, the latter context may reduce mediation to a 
mere docket clearing exercise.162  
Notwithstanding these developments and the expansion of classical mediation it is 
submitted that mediation, with its fluid and dynamic form and nature, remains a 
highly effective dispute resolution mechanism. It is submitted further that mediation 
can be used effectively in the criminal justice system. The proposed hypothesis is 
that mediation can be used to resolve instances of economic crime. The underlying 
assumption is that it is not the style of mediation that is important, but the 
characteristics of mediation. In particular restoration, regarding both relationships 
and restitution, including compensation, is essential in the proposal. Transformative 
and therapeutic narratives and the opportunity to be heard and to be able to tell 
one’s side of the story are fundamental, as they contribute to the rehabilitation of the 
offender and the complainant. It is envisioned that a sui generis style of mediation 
will be necessary to deal with instances of economic crime, incorporating strong 
strands of expert and settlement styles, meaning that the mediator will need to be an 
expert in criminal law and economic crime as well as directive in conducting a 
mediation focused on reaching a settlement.163 Equally so, elements of facilitative 
and transformative mediation will be important to ensure that the stories of the 
offender and victim are told and heard. It is also important for the offender to have 
the opportunity to express regret and make restitution, and the victim to have a 
chance to accept these and to convey forgiveness should she or he wish to do so. 
When appropriate, an opportunity for the community’s voice to be heard is also 
important. It is suggested that co-mediators, at least one of which is an expert in the 
field of economic crime, will best serve the proposed sui generis style of mediation 
for criminal matters and so achieve the envisaged restorative resolutions.  
                                            
162 Rubinson (2016) CJCR 884, 886-887. 
163 See by way of comparison Rycroft’s (2002) SAJHR 296-297 proposal for an appropriate 
sui generis model of mediation to resolve human rights disputes. The model will need to 
account for the principles of criminal law and restorative justice. Rycroft (2002) SAJHR 295 
also provides helpful factors in determining when a matter may be appropriate for mediation 
or rather an adversarial process. 
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2 3 The development of mediation in South Africa 
The roots of mediation can not only be found in medieval processes such as 
lovedays, but also in traditional or customary law.164 This is particularly true of South 
Africa where traditional dispute resolution has existed for a long time.165 Mediation in 
South Africa may consequently be said to have a two-track history that has ran 
parallel for many years in line with the political history of the country.166 The one 
track is traditional dispute resolution which resolves disputes through a type of group 
mediation within the community. Disputes in the traditional African culture were and 
still are considered and resolved from a community perspective. This would involve 
the direct parties to the dispute and other persons indirectly involved in the dispute, 
like family members, elders of the community and members of the community. The 
objectives are restoration of relationships and the social equilibrium and, at times, 
                                            
164 In this paragraph “customary law” is used as a general term. The term “traditional dispute 
resolution” is preferred to “customary dispute resolution”. It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to discuss the origin and development of traditional dispute resolution in South 
Africa. The premise is that the existence, past and present, of traditional dispute resolution 
has been validated. See, for example, Aiyedun & Ordor (2016) LDD 154 154-155. 
165 R Feehily “The Role of the Commercial Mediator in the Mediation Process: A Critical 
Analysis of the Legal and Regulatory Issues” (2015) SALJ 372. 
166 The modern legal history of South Africa is interwoven with its modern political history. 
The Dutch settlement in the mid-seventeenth century established Roman-Dutch law, 
followed by the partial introduction of English law in the beginning of the nineteenth century 
with British colonial rule and the coming of British settlers in 1820. When the Union of South 
Africa came into being in 1910, South African law was built on a strong foundation of 
integrated Roman-Dutch and English law. The rise of Afrikaner nationalism in the mid-
twentieth century brought apartheid and the legislation of apartheid laws. In the following fifty 
years, the growing divisions between the people of South Africa, particularly between white 
and black, led to a mistrust in the legal system and the courts by many; particularly persons 
seeking equal justice for all South Africans. During these 300 years, the Western legal 
system based on adjudication was primarily used to resolve disputes in the formal justice 
system. In 1994, the new Republic of South Africa with free national elections was 
celebrated and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) was published on 18 
December 1996 as a welcome national gift. Since then alternative dispute resolution 
methods such as conciliation and mediation have been increasingly used, both formally and 
informally, throughout South Africa. See too Aiyedun & Ordor (2016) LDD 155-159 who 
describe legal pluralism in Africa and the development of traditional laws alongside Western 
laws of colonial origin. See also Laubscher Confidentiality in Mediation 11. 
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restitution for injury. The issue of a dispute and its resolution is a social event in a 
society which values each person’s humanness, the inter-relatedness of human 
relations167 and the sustenance of harmony. A dispute disrupts social harmony and 
accordingly the resolution of the dispute is aimed at restoring harmony and the social 
equilibrium. Consequently, African dispute resolution can be called a harmony 
model.168 The focus is thus on restoration as opposed to retribution or 
punishment.169 In the light of the emphasis on restoration of relationships, traditional 
mediation practices are future-orientated.170 The wrong is acknowledged, yet the 
future and communal relationships weigh heavily in the mediation process and in 
reaching a resolution. 
The other track of mediation evolved within the so-called Western legal system 
based on adversarial and adjudicative forms of dispute resolution. In this system, the 
common way of resolving disputes was adjudicative, primarily through the courts or 
sometimes through arbitration. The resolving of disputes concentrated on the rights 
of the parties and what was legally right or wrong. Civil law and the adjudicative 
courts created winners and losers with little attention given to the interests of parties 
and the maintenance of relationships. In turn, the criminal law was focused on the 
crime and the offender and subsequently upon punishment and retribution; as 
opposed to focusing on the victim and restoration of the victim or rehabilitation of the 
offender. Mediation is thus seen as an alternative way to resolve disputes, a way in 
contrast to the conventional adjudicative and adversarial way.  
Yet, it is submitted that contemporary South Africa’s legal and political systems 
are built on strong mediation principles. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, 
because of the political climate, the formal courts were not trusted by all role players. 
This led to the formation of the Independent Mediation Service of South Africa 
(“IMSSA”) in 1984 by various concerned persons, including lawyers, academics and 
                                            
167 Malan (1997) Conflict Resolution 87 uses the metaphor of being interwoven, describing 
persons in conflict are like criss-cross threads that although they run in different directions 
create the same piece of woven cloth.  
168 R Choudree “Traditions of Conflict Resolution in South Africa” (1999) AJCR 1, 2-3. 
169 De la Harpe Mediation in SA 3; Choudree (1999) 1 AJCR 1, 2. 
170 De la Harpe Mediation in SA 2. 
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labour representatives.171 IMSSA initially served to resolve labour disputes through 
mediation and arbitration between companies and unions. Together with IMSSA, the 
establishment of the National Peace Accord made an immeasurable contribution to a 
culture of ADR in South Africa.172 The work and broad exposure and effectiveness of 
IMSSA contributed to mediation being acknowledged beyond the formal court 
system and the recognition of traditional African dispute settlement processes, as 
being an effective alternative way in which to resolve disputes.173 As politics and law 
were closely interwoven in this tumultuous period, the multi-party negotiation forum 
further presented a link in the chain of the developing national ethos of alternative 
dispute resolution through consensual facilitation and mediation.174 In addition, the 
mediatory role played by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in terms of the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, between victims and 
perpetrators of the former political regime, cannot be ignored. Indeed, in a sense 
contemporary South Africa was born through alternative dispute resolution, 
                                            
171 Nupen (2013) AJOL 88-89; Brand et al Commercial Mediation (2015) 2-3.  
172 The National Peace Accord (“NP Accord”) established in 1991 primarily consisted of five 
working groups, and though it was finally signed by 27 different organisations, the working 
groups mainly had representatives from the African National Congress (ANC), the National 
Party (NP), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and included business and religious leaders. 
IMSSA and the NP Accord mediated diverse and numerous disputes in communities, 
including labour, political and socio-economic disputes. Nupen (2013) AJOL 93-94. 
173 Nupen (2013) AJOL 93-94; AA Okharedia The Emergence of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution in South Africa: A Lesson for Other African Countries (2011) an unpublished 
paper presented at a conference on Emerging Trends in Employment Relations in Africa: 
National and International Perspectives hosted by the 6th IIRA African Regional Congress of 
Industrial Relations, Lagos Nigeria 24-28-01-2011 (copy on file with the writer) 5. 
174 The NP Accord was strongly supported by the Consultative Business Movement (CBM). 
In 1993, it rekindled the 1992 negotiations of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa 
(CODESA) and worked together to draft various agreements that formed the basis of new 
draft laws. The most significant of these was the draft interim constitution for the new political 
structure for South Africa. The process also included mediation by the Kenyan mediator, 
Prof Washington Okumu, to mediate the agreement for reconciliation and peace between 
the IFP, the ANC and the NP. For further details, see T Eloff “Multi-party Negotiation 
Process Leading to Constitution” (09-01-1994) Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory 
<https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv02039/04lv02046/05lv02097/
06lv02099.htm> (accessed 01-07-2019). 
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particularly facilitation and mediation, and consequently it is submitted that ADR 
forms part of the DNA of the justice systems in South Africa. 
On the eve of the new era of constitutionalism and a reformed jurisprudence, 
mediation was recognised as a dispute resolution mechanism by both traditional 
African and Western legal traditions. In addition, although traditional African 
mediation continues to be practised, the respective parallel histories of mediation, 
began to run closer together and merge in the new legal era. This can particularly be 
seen in the legislation that has been passed in South Africa since 1994 and in the 
interpretation and development of the law in the Constitutional Court.  
The prominent role mediation had already played in labour disputes was 
formalised in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 which established the Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”). The CCMA has over the past 
quarter of a century become an international frontrunner in the resolution of labour 
disputes through mediation.175 Mediation also became a statutory alternative in 
family law disputes with the promulgation of Mediation in Certain Divorce Matters Act 
24 of 1977 and subsequently the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. At present, there are at 
least fifty statutes in South Africa that make provision for mediation.176  
Significantly, court-annexed mediation was introduced into the civil procedure 
system in South Africa in 2014 with the promulgation of the amendment of Rules 
Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Magistrates’ Courts of South 
Africa177 (“Magistrates’ Court Rules, 2014”). The Magistrates’ Court Rules, 2014 
were promulgated as a consequence of a national Access to Justice Conference 
held in mid-2011,178 and a pilot scheme was introduced in certain magisterial 
                                            
175 Notably, the LRA uses the term “conciliation” in preference to “mediation”. See discussion 
in ch 2, para 2 2 1, 30ff regarding the use of these terms. 
176 For a list see Brand, et al Commercial Mediation (2015), Appendix A 97-103; Rycroft 2-13 
SALJ 197 fn 51. 
177 GN R 183 in GG 37448 of 18-03-2014. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
discuss these rules in detail. For a discussion on these rules see Brand et al Commercial 
Mediation (2015) 45-48. 
178 From 8-10 July 2011, a large conference titled Towards Delivering Accessible and Quality 
Justice for All, was initiated by the Chief Justice, Sandile Ngcobo, with a view to 
fundamentally review the access and effectiveness of the South African judicial system. 
Notably, all three arms of government, the judiciary, the executive and the legislature were 
invited, as were national and international legal experts and policy makers, to confer on the 
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districts.179 Several calls have since been made throughout South Africa the past 
number of years to extend these rules to the High Court as well.180  
Recent developments include the publication of proposed rules for voluntary 
mediation in the High Court.181 These propose rules are not intended to be court-
annexed or pre-litigation mediation.182 It is doubted that the draft Rule 41A in its 
                                            
access to and administration of justice. ADR processes, such as court-annexed mediation 
were specifically on the agenda and discussed. Office of the Chief Justice Media Statement. 
<www.justice.gov.za/m_statements/2011/20110701-media-statement-ajc.pdf> (accessed 
26-12-2016). Also see R 70(2) of the Magistrate Court Rules. 
179 It was officially launched in Mahikeng on 16 February 2015. Manyathi-Jele N “Court-
annexed Mediation Officially Launched” (2015) Issue 551 DR 11 11. The project was further 
extended in 2018 to regional courts in Gauteng, Mpumalanga, Limpopo and North-West. 
The scheme is to be extended to a substantial number of magistrates’ courts in the other 
provinces from 1 July 2019 (see GN 508 in GG 42344 of 28-03-2019). Compare De Vos & 
Broodryk (2018) TSAR 34 who aver that voluntary court-annexed mediation is now 
entrenched in lower court practice in South Africa. It is submitted that the reality and the 
recent extension of the court-annexed mediation does not demonstrate such an 
entrenchment.  
180 Brand et al Commercial Mediation 45; J Brand A Critique of the South African Court 
Annexed Mediation Rules: What are the Successes of the Rules and What Could We Do 
Better in the Future? unpublished presentation presented at conference on Court Annexed 
Mediation: Successes, Challenges and Possibilities hosted by the Mandela Institute at Wits 
University, 20-21 July 2016 
<http://www.conflictdynamics.co.za/Resources/Library?sort=Title)> (accessed 11-01-2017). 
181 The Rules Board published a proposed Uniform Rule 41A: Mediation as a Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism for comment in December 2018. 
182 The Rules Board Covering Letter (18-12-2018). R 41A(2)(a) proposes that a plaintiff 
deliver, together with a summons, a notice indicating whether the plaintiff agrees or opposes 
referral of the dispute to mediation; and in terms of R 41A(2)(b) the defendant shall do 
likewise with the delivery of a plea or defence. However, draft R 41A does not provide for a 
defendant to consent to mediation without filing a plea and is silent as to the consequences 
in the event of a plaintiff or the defendant failing to submit the notice regarding the mediation. 
Neither does the draft rule contain procedural provisions, like the appointment of mediators, 
the conclusion of a mediation agreement or the commencement of the process. For 
comment on the operation and shortcomings of R 41A see J Joubert “Mediation Alternatives 
and Rule 41A” (2019) Legalbrief 1-2. Notably, there are other existing Uniform Rules for 
litigants to consider settlements or offer settlement. For example, R 34 provides that a party 
may lodge a without prejudice settlement offer with the court which may only be made 
known to the court after judgment. Such an offer illustrates that a party had considered 
settlement and that may have an influence on the order of costs. R 37(6)(c) also requires 
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present form will encourage prospective litigants to consent to mediation and 
accordingly Joubert calls for a stronger mechanism, being a pre-mediation meeting 
controlled by a mediation judge or a mediator appointed by the mediation judge.183 
This proposal is in line with the provisions of the recently published Rule 37A, 
Judicial Case Management of the Uniform Rules of Court.184 The possibility of 
mediation is now directly accommodated under Rule 37A(11)(a) of the Uniform 
Rules.185 This is not mandatory mediation, but can possibly be seen as coercive 
mediation as the possibility of adverse cost orders against a party may coerce a 
litigant into voluntary mediation.186 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to 
discuss these rules in detail.187 However, the paradoxes and concerns that emerge 
from these developments in civil procedure are significant. The further evolution of 
the role of a judge from a passive adjudicator to an engaged participant with powers 
to control and direct the trial process leads to less litigant autonomy. It also impacts 
on the fundamental rights of parties to conduct their cases before a court as they 
                                            
that parties at a pre-trial conference minute that “every party claiming relief” has requested 
the opposing party to make a settlement and that the opponent has reacted. Implied in these 
provisions is that parties considered settlement and offered it to the opposing party. See 
Brand et al Commercial Mediation (2015) 44; De Vos & Broodryk (2018) TSAR 24, 32. 
183 Joubert Legalbrief (2019) 1-2. 
184 See R 842 in GG 42497 of 31-05-2019 scheduled to have come into operation on 1 July 
2019. Its forerunner was the previous R 37A which was applied as a pilot project in the Cape 
High Court. It became effective 1 December 1997 through GN R1352 of 10-10-1997 and 
was repealed by GN 373 of 30-04-2001. For a discussion on this mechanism, known as 
differentiated case management, see H Erasmus “Case Management Moves Ahead: New r 
37A in Force in Cape High Court” (1998) DR 27-29; B Griesel “The Next Step Towards 
Differential Case Management: The New Cape Rule 37 A” (1998) Consultus 47-48; De Vos 
& Broodryk (2018) TSAR 25. 
185 R 37A(11) reads: “Without limiting the scope of judicial engagement at a case 
management conference, the case management judge shall- (a) explore settlement, on all or 
some of the issues, including, if appropriate, enquiring whether the parties have considered 
voluntary mediation” (writer’s emphasis). 
186 R 37A(16) makes provision for adverse costs orders in the case of non-adherence to the 
principles and requirements of R 37A. 
187 The purpose of the reform in civil procedure is to address the high cost, delays and 
complexity of cases which led to the court rolls becoming overburdened and litigants 
experiencing costs and delays disproportionate to the disputes. See De Vos & Broodryk 
(2017) 4 TSAR 683ff and De Vos & Broodryk (2018) TSAR 26-31 discussing practice 
directives which regulated the pilot project of case management in South Africa. 
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would freely choose to do.188 At the same time, parallel to the changing role of the 
judge, was the emerging role of ADR, and the potential of particularly mediation to 
resolve disputes. This led to managing judges in Australia referring matters to 
mediation and the advent of mandatory or coercive mediation.189 Ironically, 
mediation is described as a process that gives the control back to the parties who 
can settle the dispute on their own terms, yet an order to mediate and not litigate 
removes the parties control with regard to their choice of resolution process. This 
creates a paradox with regard to the autonomy of disputants. 
Another concern is the public nature of courts and court judgments. It is agreed 
that not only the parties have an interest in bringing their dispute before the courts, 
but the public do as well, and especially so if parties abuse the courts.190 The 
valuable role that judgments play in the evolution of jurisprudence is also important. 
The concern is that the more matters are referred to mediation and consequently 
resolved through private resolution, the less expansion and evolution of the law will 
occur through court judgments.191 The broader public interest is an important 
concern. Consequently, this dissertation’s proposal is that the mediated settlement 
agreement must be presented before the court to ensure the continuing evolution of 
the common law through public debate and academic commentary on judgments. In 
addition, such public judgments confirm consistency in sanctioning economic crime. 
The objective of the Magistrates’ Court Rules, 2014 is the introduction of ADR 
mechanisms into the court-system to promote accessibility and quality justice for all 
in South Africa.192 Rule 71 sets forth the purposes of mediation: primarily to promote 
                                            
188 De Vos & Broodryk (2017) TSAR 684, 693; De Vos & Broodryk (2018) TSAR 18-20, 23-
24. 
189 Consequently, it can be said that the issues of case management and ADR are 
intertwined. See De Vos & Broodryk (2017) TSAR 694-702. See also TF Bathurst “The Role 
of the Courts in the Changing Dispute Resolution Landscape (2012) 35 UNSWLJ 870 873-
879. 
190 Litigants should not be permitted to unduly and disproportionately inflate and delay trials 
at the expense of other litigants and the general public. See De Vos & Broodryk (2017) 
TSAR 693-694. 
191 De Vos & Broodryk (2017) TSAR 684, 702-703 argue that the court is an important 
institution of governance and that this identity needs to be protected to ensure the continuing 
development of the law. 
192 See R 70(1) and (2) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules, 2014. 
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access to justice193 and to promote restorative justice.194 The preservation of the 
relationship between parties is also specifically mentioned195 and this echoes the 
core value and purpose of traditional African mediation and resorts under the ambit 
and the spirit of ubuntu.  
Several challenges, however, remain regarding the introduction of mediation in 
the court system. Although, the use of the Magistrates’ Court Rule 14 has now been 
extended to other magisterial districts throughout South Africa, the new procedure is 
still in its infancy.196 In other African countries, Namibia and Uganda, court-annexed 
mediation was first introduced in the higher courts.197 The introduction of ADR in the 
higher courts, and subsequent expansion to other courts, is strongly supported by 
the judiciary and has been robustly implemented by the office of the Chief Justice in 
several African countries.198 The new draft Rule 41A falls well short of this.199 
                                            
193 R 71(a) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules, 2014. 
194 R 71(b) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules, 2014. A number of more utilitarian reasons, 
including expeditious and cost effective resolution of disputes (R 71(d)), and evaluation of 
the strength of a party’s case are also enumerated (R 71(e)). 
195 R 71(c) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules (2014). 
196 Compare De Vos & Broodryk (2018) TSAR 34 who aver that voluntary court-annexed 
mediation is now entrenched in lower court practice in South Africa. It is submitted that the 
reality and the recent extension of the court-annexed mediation beyond the pilot project does 
not demonstrate such an entrenchment.  
197 Rules of the High Court of Namibia: High Court Act 1990 GN 5392 (17-01-2014) which 
came into effect on 16 April 2014. Mediation was first introduced in Uganda in the 
Commercial Court Division in 2007 in terms of the Judicature (Commercial Court 
Division)(Mediation) Rules 2007 Statutory Instrument 2007 No 55. 
198 PT Damaseb, Deputy CJ & JP of the High Court of Namibia “The Introduction of Court-
connected Mediation in the High Court of Namibia: Successes and Challenges” unpublished 
presentation presented at conference on Court Annexed Mediation: Successes, Challenges 
and Possibilities hosted by the Mandela Institute at Wits University, 20-21 July 2016 (copy 
on file with author); Justice Geoffrey Kiryabwire, Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court of 
Uganda “The Ugandan Mediation Model” unpublished presentation presented at conference 
on Court Annexed Mediation: Successes, Challenges and Possibilities hosted by the 
Mandela Institute at WITS University, 20-21 July 2016 (copy on file with author); Press 
release by The Judiciary, The Republic of Uganda, “Mediation Rolled Out to All Courts” (18-
03-2015) 
<http://www.judiciary.go.ug/data/news/164/3671/Mediation%20Rolled%20Out%20to%20All
%20Courts.html> (accessed 11-01-2017). 
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Another concern which has been raised is whether mediation may contravene a 
defendant’s rights under section 35 of the Constitution of South Africa.200  
Rule 72 of the Magistrates’ Court Rules (2014) specifically provides that the rules 
are only applicable to “voluntary submission” by the parties themselves to mediation 
before certain courts; before201 or after202 the commencement of litigation; but before 
judgment of a matter.203 A judicial officer is limited simply to an inquiry into the 
possibility of mediation before judgment and may not order it;204 except after a 
request by one or all the parties after the commencement of litigation, in which case 
mediation is mandatory.205 This is different from other jurisdictions, such as 
Namibia,206 where courts may order the parties to mediate, by using so-called court-
                                            
199 Joubert (2019) Legalbrief 2 observes that in its present form, the draft R 41A does not 
even get the parties through the front door of mediation, unless they are coerced through an 
adverse costs order. Joubert contends that mediation leadership is necessary and proposes 
that judges be trained in mediation and appointed as Mediation Judges and that R 41A be 
reformed to provide for pre-mediation meetings before Mediation Judges.  
200 S 35 of the Constitution of South Africa makes provision for the rights of arrested, 
detained and accused persons, including the right to remain silent. See the discussion above 
under para 2 2 2, especially fn 53 regarding voluntariness and the discussion under para 4 4 
2 at regarding a defendant’s waiver of rights under plea negotiation. 
201 R 74(1)(a) and 75(1)(a) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules, 2014. 
202 R 74(1)(b) and 75(1)(b) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules, 2014. 
203 See too R 74 and R 75 of the Magistrates’ Court Rules, 2014. The reading of R 78(2) and 
R 78(3) together is not clear. These rules provide that after the commencement of a trial any 
one of the parties may apply to the court for an order to refer the matter for mediation. The 
inference is that the referral to mediation becomes an issue for the discretion of the court 
and no longer a voluntary decision for each party. However, such a reading is not in accord 
with the purpose of the rules of voluntariness in R 72, or, for example, with the wording of R 
83.  
204 R 75(2) and R 79(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules (2014). 
205 R 78(2) and 79(2) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules (2014). 
206 R 38(1) of the Rules of the High Court of Namibia provides that “[t]he managing judge 
may, at any time in terms of practice directions issued by the Judge President, either of his 
or her own initiative or at the request of a party refer any part of the proceeding or any issue 
to an to an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process” (writer’s emphasis). Rs 8, 9 and 10 
of the Commercial Court Division Mediation Rules of Uganda operate on the premise of 
mandatory mediation and that parties consequently have to apply to court to be exempted 
from the mediation process. The possibility of introducing mandatory mediation with regard 
to claims against the state was mentioned by the DOJ at the conference Court Annexed 
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mandatory mediation without the conditions imposed by Rule 78 of the South African 
Magistrates’ Court Rules.  
Mediation in South Africa has also received support from the judiciary in several 
cases, notably with regard to eviction proceedings. In Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers207 Sachs J discussed the issue of mediation and some of the 
objectives and advantages of mediation.208 It is significant that he noted that in 
managing litigation the courts should “encourage and require”209 parties to seek 
alternative dispute resolution, namely mediation, and order it in “appropriate 
circumstances”.210 Moreover, Sachs J declared that mediation “promotes respect for 
human dignity and underlines the fact that we all live in a shared society”;211 and that 
mediation can promote good neighbourliness and contribute to bring hostile parties 
closer to one another.212 
Regarding mandatory court-ordered mediation, Sachs J emphasised “that the 
compulsion lies in participating in the process, not in reaching a settlement.”213 
Importantly, Sachs J found that the factual question whether mediation has been 
attempted by parties involved in an eviction dispute would be an important factor to 
consider in determining whether it is just and equitable to grant an eviction order.214 
A number of academics215 and practitioners216 also believe that mandatory mediation 
                                            
Mediation: Successes, Challenges and Possibilities hosted by the Mandela Institute at Wits 
University, 20-21 July 2016. See too Brand et al Commercial Mediation (2015) 47 regarding 
challenges of court-mandated mediation.  
207 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) (“Port Elizabeth Municipality”). 
208 Port Elizabeth Municipality paras 39-47. Some advantages mentioned are the reduction 
of litigation costs, the avoidance of aggravating tension between parties and finding solutions 
to impasses and moving forward (para 42). 
209 Port Elizabeth Municipality para 39. 
210 Port Elizabeth Municipality para 45. 
211 Port Elizabeth Municipality para 42. 
212 Port Elizabeth Municipality para 43. 
213 Port Elizabeth Municipality para 40. 
214 Port Elizabeth Municipality paras 47 and 61. 
215 MA Chicktay in his presentation Court Annexed Mediation: What We Have Learnt 
(unpublished presentation made at the conference on Court Annexed Mediation: Successes, 
Challenges and Possibilities hosted by the Mandela Institute at WITS University, 20-21 July 
2016 [copy on file with author]) summarises Laurence Boulle’s viewpoints on the 
constitutionality of mandatory mediation. 
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is not a threat to section 34 of the Constitution and will not affect the constitutional 
rights of a party ordered to participate in an ADR process.  
Particularly pertinent are the comments made by Brassey AJ217 in recognising the 
unique ability of mediation to resolve disputes: “Mediation can produce remarkable 
results in the most unpropitious of circumstances.” The court also emphasised the 
benefits mediation gives to parties, including more speedy and less costly resolution 
of matters and bringing an air of reality to negotiations facilitated by a third party, 
benefits which are usually absent between sparring opponents.218 
In this part it has been shown that although mediation in South Africa has two 
parallel histories, the development of the two tracks have nevertheless been brought 
closer together since the promulgation of the Constitution and the change in political 
order during the last decade of the twentieth century. Recent legislation does not 
expressly differentiate between the two tracks, although practitioners of and 
participants in the two types may have different interpretations and understandings 
of mediation.  
Primarily, the differences between the two tracks of mediation are that African 
dispute resolution aims to reconcile and maintain social relationships; and in this 
process group mediation is generally used with the participation of various persons 
in the social group. This results in mediation in traditional African cultures having a 
dominant public nature. Western mediation, in contrast, is more focused on 
individuals reaching a solution and on mediation being private and confidential. On 
the basis of this parallelism and overlap, calls for a better linkage and integration 
between the so-called traditional and modern systems have been made.219 Points of 
intersection between the two dispute resolution systems include the aim of 
                                            
216 Brand et al Commercial Mediation 2 ed (2016) 46-47; Brand A Critique of the South 
African Court Annexed Mediation Rules: What are the Successes of the Rules and What 
Could We Do Better in the Future? 
217 MB v NB 2010 3 SA 220 (GSJ) (“MB v NB”) para 50. 
218 MB v NB para 51. 
219 Aiyedun & Ordor (2016) LDD 154, 155 & 172; A Skelton “Tapping Indigenous Knowledge: 
Traditional Conflict Resolution, Restorative Justice and the Denunciation of Crime in South 
Africa” (2007) AJ 228 229-231. 
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reconciliation and restoration of peace and harmony.220 The communitarian 
approach built upon dialogue and negotiation between the offender, the victim, their 
families and friends and representatives from the community is another shared 
characteristic.221 This endorses the value of the voice of the public and the concept 
of community participation, which is a strong principle in the criminal mediation 
model proposed in this dissertation. 
The procedures of traditional and modern mediation are similar in that they are 
flexible and informal, and parties are given an opportunity to tell their stories and to 
seek and reach creative and innovative solutions.222 The process also empowers the 
parties. This results in the parties taking ownership of the outcome, but essentially 
also in taking responsibility for the consequences of their acts, past and future.223 
Accordingly, both processes may play a transformative role.224 
Moreover, links exist not only between traditional and modern mediation, but also 
between these basically restorative dispute resolution processes and the Western 
more adversarial trial process. At present, South Africa and other African countries 
have multiple legal systems that operate alongside one another and subsequently 
create a landscape of procedural pluralism.225 This pluralism includes two seemingly 
divergent procedures, namely mediation and the formal adjudicative court procedure. 
As explained below, it is submitted that the differences in procedures tend to be 
over-emphasised and that certain shared characteristics between the procedures 
illustrate a convergence of legal processes. Furthermore, Skelton contends that this 
pluralism leads to communities in South Africa more readily accepting alternative 
ways of doing justice and leads to greater enthusiasm for community participation in 
the processes.226  
                                            
220 Skelton (2007) AJ 231 adds that although “community” is more difficult to define in urban 
areas than in traditional rural communities, the reality is that persons are relational beings 
and micro-communities do exist in urban areas. 
221 Skelton (2007) AJ 232-233. 
222 Skelton (2007) AJ 234. 
223 Skelton (2007) AJ 235-236. 
224 Skelton (2007) AJ 236. 
225 Aiyedun & Ordor (2016) LDD 159. 
226 Skelton (2007) AJ 230. 
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In particular, the voice of the public, representing an integral part of the 
participation by the community in traditional mediation, is echoed by the voice of 
amicus curiae in formal court proceedings.227 Accordingly, the voice of concerned 
public representatives can be heard in both procedures, thus endorsing the 
communitarian approach discussed above. It also underscores the values of ubuntu 
and our inter-dependence upon one another.228 In addition, the emphasis on 
consensual settlement, found in both traditional and Western mediation,229 and 
recognised in the plea and sentencing negotiation process of section 105A of the 
CPA, is another value that can be developed and further integrated into the formal 
adversarial winner/loser court system. An agreed outcome is a core characteristic of 
the proposed criminal mediation model.  
Another commonality, which appears in both systems, is the opportunity for each 
party to state their case and tell their story.230 The opportunity to tell one’s story and 
to be heard relatively unconstrained is important to the proposed model of mediation 
in the criminal justice system. In addition, the constitutional values of dignity and 
respect for the other participants are integral to both dispute resolution systems. 
These values are concretised in the validation of the victim’s position and her or his 
narrative.231 Equally the story of the offender is heard with respect and dignity.232 
The issue of restitution is also shared by the different dispute resolution processes. 
Restoration, including compensation, is a fundamental principle in both traditional 
and Western mediation systems where harm has occurred. Restitution has, 
                                            
227 Aiyedun & Ordor (2016) LDD 171-172.  
228 Skelton (2007) AJ 231-232. 
229 Aiyedun & Ordor (2016) LDD 172-173. 
230 Aiyedun & Ordor (2016) LDD 172-173; Simms (2007) Ohio St J on Disp Resol 820. It is 
suggested, that the giving of evidence in a formal adversarial system is more constrained 
compared to a more informal mediation process. 
231 Skelton (2007) AJ 233. It is recognised that the validation of a person’s dignity and 
respect is not readily realised in an adversarial trial court with the accused questioned 
harshly and the victim reduced to a witness, answering questions put by strangers; but this 
should not necessarily be the case. Also, the validation and role of the victim in the more 
formal criminal court procedure has been statutorily endorsed in recent amendments such 
as s 105A(1)(b)(iii) of the CPA. This is discussed in ch 4, para 4 4 2 2, 327ff . 
232 The presumption is that the offender has waived her or his right to remain silent. 
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however, also long been provided for in the adversarial criminal trial system through, 
for example, sections 297 and 300 of the CPA.233 
The commonality and intersection of values and principles in the different dispute 
resolution mechanisms illustrate that much is in fact shared between them. It is 
further submitted that this recognition of multi-faceted procedures now needs to be 
affirmed and further integrated into both the civil and criminal justice systems. A 
cohesive integrated system endorses the right of disputants to choose an 
appropriate resolution process to resolve any dispute, civil or criminal, in a fair 
hearing, whether it be a before a court, or where appropriate another independent 
and impartial tribunal or forum.234 It is also submitted that mediation, as the 
predominant non-adjudicative dispute resolution mechanism, should be included and 
integrated into the justice systems.  
In the next section these and other characteristics of mediation in the criminal 
justice system are discussed to illustrate that mediation already plays a significant 
role in the resolution of criminal offences.235 Reference is made to the model of 
informal mediation in the South African criminal justice system. This chapter 
concludes with the submission in paragraph 2 4 2 2 below for the integration of 
formal mediation into the South African criminal justice system. 
2 4 Mediation in the criminal justice system 
2 4 1 Introduction 
“Establishing mediation as an integral part of our system of criminal justice has 
benefits for all participants in the criminal justice process.”236 
Mediation in the criminal justice system has been mooted for several decades and 
has been introduced in various ways into several national systems. Palmer,237 
                                            
233 Also see CPA s 105A(1)(a)(ii)(cc)-(dd). These sections are discussed in ch 4, para 4 4 3, 
346ff. 
234 In accordance with ss 34 and 35 of the South African Constitution. 
235 For example, the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008, s 62 which provides for victim-offender 
mediation.  
236 R Palmer “Justice in Whose Interests? A Proposal for Institutionalized Mediation in the 
Criminal Justice System” (1997) 10 SACJ 33 44. 
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Macnab and Khan238 called for mediation to be an integral part of the South African 
criminal justice system several decades ago, whilst Rice proposed this in the United 
States half a century ago.239 Although the criminal justice system is generally known 
to be an adversarial system, governed by rules of procedure and evidence, forms of 
mediation have been part of the criminal justice system for some time. However, 
recently these mediation practices are now being formally identified, described and 
in some instances prescribed. In this section, the development of mediation in the 
criminal justice system over the past 50 years is traced and the formal incorporation 
of this ADR mechanism into the criminal justice system discussed. 
Laflin identifies two models of mediation in the criminal justice system, namely the 
restorative justice model and the case management model.240 The restorative justice 
model includes a number of restorative dispute resolution practices. The first is 
mediation programmes between the victim and offender.241 These programmes were 
                                            
237 Palmer (1997) SACJ 34 44. Robin Palmer was an advocate of the Supreme Court of 
South Africa with significant experience regarding the criminal justice system in Durban, 
Kwazulu-Natal as a special prosecutor with the NPA; and also as a professor in criminal law 
at the University of Kwazulu-Natal (formerly the University of Natal) and the University of 
Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. <https://www.linkedin.com/in/robin-palmer-
29a101b/> (accessed 06-7-2017). 
238 D Scott-Macnab & MS Khan “Mediation and Arbitration as Forms of Dispute Settlement in 
the South African Criminal Law” (1985) 9 SACC 103-128 called for arbitration and mediation 
to be established in the South African criminal justice system. It is acknowledged that the 
proposal was for minor offences and the decriminalisation of such offences. In addition a 
primary reason for the proposal was the decongestion of the courts’ caseloads. 
Nevertheless, the recognition of the difficulties experienced in the adversarial court based 
criminal system and the call to address these through alternative dispute mechanisms, such 
as mediation is endorsed in this dissertation. 
239 P Rice “Mediation and Arbitration as a Civil Alternative to the Criminal Justice System” 
(1979) 29 Am UL Rev 17. 
240 ME Laflin “Remarks on Case-management Criminal Mediation” (2004) 40 Idaho L Rev 
571 579-580. The case-management model is also referred to as voluntary settlement 
conferencing. Compare too L Simms “Criminal Mediation is the BASF of the Criminal Justice 
System: Not Replacing Traditional Criminal Adjudication, Just Making It Better” (2007) 22 
Ohio St Jnl on Disp Resol 797 798 who distinguishes between “party autonomy and judicial 
autonomy” which categorisation entails similar features of differentiation.  
241 For example, VOM (Victim-Offender-Mediation) or VORP (Victim-Offender-Restoration-
Programme) in the United States. See MW Bakker “Repairing the Breach and Reconciling 
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initiated, and are still being run by church organisations, community-based 
organisations or the local prosecution offices.242 Similarly, community dispute 
resolution practices involve the resolution of disputes outside the traditional 
adversarial criminal justice system. The former focuses on the needs of the victim 
and the offender, the facilitation of a face to face mediation meeting between them 
with the purpose of understanding and healing through their respective narratives, 
consequent restoration, the possibility of restitution, including compensation for the 
victim and possible reconciliation. Community dispute settlement centres arose from 
the dissatisfaction with the adversarial court processes and the need for community-
centred problems to be resolved by the community in a more informal manner.243 In 
addition, these mediation systems are run alongside conventional criminal justice 
systems, sometimes in close liaison with or complementary to the judicial process.244  
The use of mediation in criminal processes is believed to have its origins in a 
number of causes, namely, a response to disillusionment with the formal criminal 
justice system and the concern for overcrowded prisons, a growing awareness of the 
neglected position of the victim and the need for restitution within the criminal justice 
system.245 These concerns developed into the victims’ rights movement and the 
                                            
the Discordant: Mediation in the Criminal Justice System” (1994) 72 NCL Rev 1479 1483-
1485; Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 580-585.  
242 In South Africa, mention can be made of the instrumental role played by the National 
Institute for Crime Prevention and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO), a non-profit 
organisation that has for more than a century assisted with the reintegration of former 
prisoners, victim-offender dispute resolution and reconciliation. NICRO also contributed to 
the reformation of the criminal justice system with the introduction of correctional and 
restorative justice practices, like probation, diversion and community service. For more 
information, see <https://www.nicro.org.za/>; A Skelton & M Batley Charting Progress, 
Mapping the Future: Restorative Justice in South Africa (2006) 109-111; S Maimane 
Restorative Justice for Adult Offenders in South Africa: A Comparative Study with Canada, 
New Zealand, England and Wales LLM thesis, University of Pretoria (2017) 7-11.  
243 For example, landlord and tenant problems that may have resulted in offences such as 
damage to property. See Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1486-1487. 
244 The mediation sessions can take place at different stages of the criminal trial process. For 
example, as part of pre-trial diversion programmes or as part of sentencing procedures. 
Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1485. 
245 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1500. Compare Hanan (2016) NML Rev 138-144) who attributes 
the development of restorative programmes, like mediation, in the criminal justice system to 
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reparation movement, which together with the incarceration reform movement 
resulted in a number of models of mediation being developed alongside or within the 
criminal justice system.246 The significance of these developments echo the 
development of restorative justice and the increased focus on the victim and 
restoration, including both the rehabilitation of the offender and restitution for the 
victim. These issues, victim-orientation and restoration are fundamental principles for 
this dissertation, as demonstrated in chapter 3. In addition, the importance of 
participation by the public is underscored by the public interest in serious economic 
crime and the role sectors of the public can play as stakeholders to combat 
economic crime in collaboration with the state.247  
The second model, case-management mediation, developed organically from the 
interventions of a neutral third party, usually a judge, in the negotiations between the 
prosecutor and the defendant when plea negotiations failed.248 The model focuses 
on reaching settlement between the prosecutor and the defendant, with little 
attention given to the victim and is said to be still primarily based on retributive 
values, in contrast to the restorative model which emphasises restoration and 
healing.249 This model was driven by the need to address the explosion of cases and 
the burden upon the courts.250 Judges play a central role in this model as it concerns 
case-management and clearing dockets.251  
                                            
the therapeutic response to harm arising from a crime which is based on assumption of guilt 
and acceptance of the offence by the offender; and secondly the need for out-of-court 
settlements for such harm through informal dispute resolution mechanisms. 
246 For example, victim-offender-mediation (“VOM”), circle conferencing, Victim Offender 
Reconciliation Programme (“VORP”), and community-based mediation programmess. It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the different mediation programmes 
available in different jurisdictions. For the United States, see Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1491-
500; Hanan (2016) NML Rev 138-144; and in South Africa Maimane Restorative Justice 11-
13. It is acknowledged that the number of models of mediation that are used in these 
jurisdictions are diverse. Accordingly, it is difficult to make specific conclusions. However, it 
is submitted that certain conclusions regarding the nature and benefits of mediation as a 
restorative justice practice are proven and common across these diverse models.  
247 See ch 3 para 3 3 4 at 98 below and the proposals in ch 5 3 at 328 below. 
248 Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 594, 595. 
249 Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 587. 
250 Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 586. See also the discussion by LP Love “From the Chair” 
(2008) Disp Resol Mag 2-8, 29 on the development of mediation in the criminal justice 
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Although judges are usually described as being adjudicators, there is no doubt 
that in reality judges sometimes act as dispute resolvers and as mediators. In 
criminal courts comparatively few cases are determined by trial. In several 
jurisdictions, like the United States, and increasingly in South Africa criminal matters 
are resolved by plea and sentence agreements, negotiated by the parties. Recent 
research has highlighted the evolving role of judges in the resolution of criminal 
cases, outside of the classic trial court context, especially where plea and sentencing 
negotiations have reached an impasse.252 Brief reference will be made to the role of 
the multi-tasking judge, as well as to some of the concerns and benefits related to 
judicial involvement in the negotiation and settlement of disputes.253  
Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure of the United States 
prohibits the participation of the court in plea negotiation discussions.254 However, a 
survey of the 50 states in the United States shows another reality. The survey 
indicates that some states allow judicial participation in plea negotiations in differing 
degrees.255 The pertinent fact is that statutory rules,256 case law257 and practices258 
                                            
system in the United States, particularly the Mediation in Criminal Matters Enterprise Project 
in 2008 and the program in Maricopa County, Arizona. Compare RN Koman “Balancing the 
Force in Criminal Mediation” (2016) 7 Beijing L Rev 171-172 describing a similar judicial 
case-management process which focuses on reducing caseloads in Singapore and aptly 
calling the outcome based model “judicial economy”. See too fn 240 above for reference 
where Simms uses the same term. 
251 Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 587; Simms (2007) Ohio St Jnl on Disp Resol 809-812. 
252 See also fn 255 below. Compare too the discussion by M Alberstein & N Zimmerman 
“Constructive Plea Bargaining: Towards Judicial Conflict Resolution” (2017) 32 Ohio St Jnl 
on Disp Resol 279 288-292 discussing the role of judges in the plea and sentencing 
negotiations. They contend that judges can by being more active, in contrast to being 
passive, play a more constructive role in the plea negotiation process. They call this judicial 
role: judicial conflict resolution, otherwise known as criminal mediation in Israel. 
253 M Alberstein “Judicial Conflict Resolution (JCR): A New Jurisprudence for an Emerging 
Judicial Practice” (2014) 16 CJCR 879 895-896 prefers the term “conflict” contending that it 
is broader and more nuanced than dispute. Alberstein also works on the correct premise that 
legal conflicts are always complex, multi-dimensional and polycentric.  
254 CPA s 105A(3) has a similar prohibition. 
255 RR Batra “Judicial Participation in Plea Bargaining: A Dispute Resolution Perspective 
(2015) 76 Ohio St L J 565 572-579 undertook a study of the participation of judges in the 
plea negotiation process in all the states by examining the procedural rules and judgments. 
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allow and even encourage judicial participation in plea negotiation and settlement of 
criminal proceedings. 
Consequently, judges have become multi-taskers, and their roles have developed 
to include the management of cases, involvement in the settlement of cases, and 
evaluation of cases. Unfortunately, this has led to ambiguity in the description of the 
tasks judges perform and has added to skewed perceptions and expectations of 
disputants and their lawyers. A managerial judge is said to be involved in managing 
case development, advising disputants what appropriate dispute processes to follow, 
and encouraging and participating in the settlement of issues.259 Long recognised 
too, is the role that judges play in the settling of cases at the court threshold, often at 
a pre-trial conference or in chambers. This practice is referred to as an evaluation, 
settlement or circle conference. In some jurisdictions these functions of a judge have 
been formalised, to a greater or lesser extent.260 Another reality is that dispute 
resolution in a courtroom is a hybrid, a combination of judicial authority and 
                                            
Batra categorises the participation from it being expressly disallowed by statute to 
participation being procedurally allowed and encouraged by the courts.  
256 For example, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 17.4 (a)(2): “Judicial Participation. 
At either party's request or on its own, a court may order counsel with settlement authority to 
participate in good faith discussions to resolve the case in a manner that serves the interests 
of justice. The assigned trial judge may participate in this discussion only if the parties 
consent. In all other cases, the discussion must be before another judge. If settlement 
discussions do not result in an agreement, the case must be returned to the trial judge.” For 
a full list see Batra (2015) Ohio St L J 578-579, particularly fns 92-98.  
257 For example, McMahon v Hodges 382 F 3d 284 (2d Cir 2004), particularly para 25 and fn 
5. Also see Batra (2015) Ohio St L J 578-579, particularly fns 92-98. 
258 New York state has a flexible system and leaves the procedure to the discretion of the 
judge. See too Batra (2015) Ohio St L J 578-579, particularly fn 92; McMahon v Hodges 382 
F 3d 284 (2d Cir 2004) fn 5. Also see fn 250 above. 
259 Alberstein (2014) CJCR 879 884; Deason (2017) 79-89. In this dissertation it is 
contended that the term “managerial” and “managing” are unfortunate as they detract from a 
judge’s core office of being a member of the judiciary, one of the pillars of a democracy. 
However, it cannot be denied that a judge is necessarily involved in the administration and 
supervision of cases and caseloads and the managerial role enables them to perform their 
core function more efficiently. For example, R 37A, headed “Judicial Case Management”, of 
the Uniform Rules of the High Court of South Africa, introduced by GN R 842 in GG 42497 of 
31-05-2019 which came into operation 1 July 2019. See discussion above in para 2 3, 64ff. 
260 Detailed analysis of relevant federal and state rules is provided by EE Deason “Beyond 
Managerial Judges: Appropriates Roles in Settlement” (2017) 78 Ohio St L J 73-144. 
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consensual practices.261 This means that agreements are made under the shadow of 
judicial authority and are necessarily in tension with it.262 More emphasis has 
recently been given to the role of judges in these processes and judges are identified 
as not only being adjudicators, but also negotiators, arbitrators, mediators and 
agents of therapeutic and restorative justice.263 Subsequently, the indisputable fact is 
that judges are not only impartial and non-participative adjudicators in a dispute 
resolution process, but also act as mediators, sometimes knowingly, sometimes 
unconsciously.264  
There have been some concerns about these undefined, even invisible roles of 
judges and the diminishment of the role of the adjudicative neutral in the criminal 
justice system, particularly with regard to plea negotiation. Concerns primarily relate 
to the coercive nature and procedural correctness of such judicial involvement in the 
dispute resolution process.265  
Coercion is a major concern regarding the practice of judges acting as 
mediators.266 This encompasses the inherently coercive nature of the office of a 
judge. Some commentators argue that the coercion implied in the authority of the 
position diminishes the autonomy of the parties.267 Moreover, the coercion is 
increased in the event that the same judge is assigned to preside over the 
subsequent trial.268 However, it is submitted that party autonomy in criminal matters 
                                            
261 Alberstein (2014) CJCR 881. 
262 Alberstein (2014) CJCR 881. 
263 Alberstein (2014) CJCR 879 881, 882, 886,905-907 advocates a new jurisprudence in 
Judicial Conflict Resolution (JCR) as is evident from the title of his article (see fn 294).  
264 Deason (2017) Ohio St L J 97 contends this could happen when mediation training which 
judges may undergo subtly influences their manner of presiding over a particular case. 
265 Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 606-608. 
266 Compare the discussion on the power of prosecutors in ch 4, para 4 4 2, 268ff and 324ff 
and ch 5, para 5 2, 3370ff.  
267 Deason (2017) Ohio St L J 76, 108-109. 
268 Deason (2017) Ohio St L J 7 109-110. This would be in the event of the case not being 
settled, or only partly settled. Some rules make provision for another judge, other than the 
case management judge, to further preside over the matter. For example, South Africa 
Uniform Rules of the High Court R 37A(15). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
84 
 
is in any event diminished because of the greater emphasis on the public interest in 
criminal matters.269 
A further critique concerns procedural issues. Primarily it concerns the status and 
nature of information. The nature of information shared by parties during mediation is 
different to that divulged during a trial, which is generally more limited through rules 
of evidence and procedure.270 Mediators, in comparison, hear personal information, 
inadmissible information, privileged information, and in the case of caucusing, private 
information. This is important, as a judge may become privy to information that may 
influence her or him and it could be argued that the judge may lose impartiality if 
assigned to preside over a subsequent trial.271 It is agreed that procedural protection 
should thus be given in cases where mediation fails. Any succeeding trial or other 
process needs to be before another judge.272 Also, the protection of privilege needs 
to be granted to information obtained during mediation which would usually be 
inadmissible in a criminal trial.273  
A further consideration regarding the nature of information is the change in 
direction of the flow of information. Commonly, during settlement conferences or 
evaluation proceedings a judge passes information down, regarding the merits or 
weaknesses of a case; whilst during mediation the information flows up from the 
                                            
269 CA Ogbuabor, EO Nwosu & EO Ezike “Mainstreaming ADR in Nigeria’s Criminal Justice 
System” (2014) 45 Eur J Soc Sci 32 34 identify four usual distinctions between the context of 
civil and criminal mediation: In the civil context the dispute involves the parties only, whilst in 
the criminal context the state and public are also involved; there is no public blame 
apportioned in the civil context, whilst blame is usually attributed to the offender; civil 
disputes involve only private interests, whilst criminal disputes involve public interests; and 
no admission of guilt is required in civil disputes whilst an admission or assumption of 
wrongdoing is required in the criminal context. 
270 This issue is touched upon elswhere in this dissertation where reference is made to 
different kinds of truth, Ch 3 para 3 3 5, 131ff.  
271 Deason (2017) Ohio St LJ 112-118; 121-126 speaks of “mental contamination”. See 
Deason.  
272 See for example, the (South African) Uniform Rules of the High Court R 37A(15). 
Compare CPA ss 105A(6)(c) and 105A(9)(d) with regard to plea and sentencing 
agreements. See too Deason (2017) Ohio St LJ 128. Such a process would be similar to 
med-arb or con-arb as practiced by the CCMA in LRA s 191(5) referred to in fn 16 above. 
273 Provision is made for this in the context of plea and sentencing agreements, like CPA, s 
105A(10); and in judicial case management rules, such as the (South African) Uniform Rules 
of the High Court R 37A(13). 
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parties.274 Because of its authoritative nature, the former carries a great deal of 
weight and is likely to influence parties in their decision-making. Hence the 
participation of a presiding officer in a mediation needs to be done with due caution 
and any possible prejudice avoided by careful phrasing by the judge during a 
settlement conference.275 On the other hand it can be argued that a judge can 
validate the information and clarify the advice given to the offender and victim, who 
may not necessarily understand the legal process, the consequences or the 
information given by their legal representatives.276  
Accordingly, it is submitted that any participation by a presiding officer in the 
mediation process should be formalised. In clarifying the role of a presiding officer, 
and establishing procedural safeguards, the benefits of presiding officers acting as 
mediators can be fully obtained. Such procedural safeguards could include 
prohibiting a judge who acts as a mediator from presiding over a subsequent trial 
regarding that matter.277 Also, only the litigants should be able to waive such 
prescribed prohibition and consent to the judge, who acted as mediator, also 
presiding over the trial.278 In addition to prescribed safeguards, a party to a mediation 
should be cautioned that participating in mediation amounts to a waiver of a number 
of rights, and this may include a limited waiver of confidentiality.279 This is similar to 
the waiver of rights by a defendant in the case of plea and sentencing negotiations 
and agreements.280  
                                            
274 Deason (2017) Ohio St LJ 114-116;  
275 Judge Fogel speaks of judicial mindfulness and a judge needing to be mindful of their role 
and what they are doing and saying. J Fogel & SI Strong “Judicial Education, Dispute 
Resolution and the Life of a Judge: A Conversation with Judge Jeremy Fogel, Director of the 
Federal Judicial Center” (2016) J Disp Resol 259 275 and 279. 
276 Batra (2015) Ohio St LJ 595-596. 
277 Batra (2015) Ohio St LJ 587-588 s 105A(6)(c) and the proposed s 105B(7) of the CPA. 
278 These safeguards are present in plea and sentencing agreements under ss 105A(6)(c) 
and 105A(9)(d) of the CPA. See fn 272 above. Also IRE 507 (2)(b)(3). This would in effect 
be a form of med-arb. Compare the practice of the CCMA under LRA s 191(5).  
279 In this dissertation it is proposed that this should happen at the pre-mediation meeting. 
See Ch 5, Annexure B, Principle 3. 
280 See the discussion on waiver of rights in ch 4 para 4 3 2. Also see Hanan (2016) NML 
Rev 165; Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 608-612. 
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Another matter that complicates the issue of the role of judges is the 
nomenclature, and the different understanding and different meanings attributed to 
words such as case management, judgment, adjudication, ADR, and mediation.281 
Lawyers and their clients have varying expectations of a court and a judge, 
depending on their own understanding and their own experience. This is true for 
judges too, who understand and enact their roles differently.282 In addition, the 
hybridity of the processes and integrated activities of judges compound the issue.283 
There is no objection to the more holistic and evolving role of judges and it is 
submitted that this role could be promoted and integrated further.284 However, it is 
also necessary to clarify the roles played by judges, as well as to identify and name 
the processes judges are involved in; and, where necessary, to formally prescribe 
procedural protection. 
There are benefits to be gained from judges participating in the resolution of 
disputes, in contrast to simply adjudicating between two adversaries. An evident 
benefit is the experience and expertise of a presiding officer involved in the 
resolution process.285 It is submitted such experience and expertise could contribute 
to the efficacy of the process and ensure a just settlement. Also, the involvement of a 
judge could help counter any imbalances caused by excessive prosecutorial power 
or an inadequately represented defendant.286  
                                            
281 For example, the A in ADR is an acronym for “alternative”, “appropriate”, or “additional”. 
Some prefer “conflict” to “dispute” as conflict is said to be broader, and includes interests 
and rights. See Alberstein (2014) Cardozo J Conflict Resol 889-890. 
282 Judge Fogel refers to the confusion amongst judges, both in terminology and activity. 
Fogel & Strong (2016) J Disp Resol 259 264. 
283 Deason (2017) Ohio St LJ 74-104 discusses the evolution of the conflation of judicial 
activities in the United States by describing the activities of judges under Rule 16 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for various options including case 
management, settlement and mediation. Moreover, the comingling is aggravated by the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 which runs parallel to Rule 16. For example, a 
judge conducting a settlement conference and directing parties towards a certain settlement 
is considered by some to be a form of ADR or “muscle mediation”, whilst others deem it 
wrong and anything but mediation. Also see Fogel & Strong (2016) J Disp Resol 264. 
284 Fogel & Strong (2016) J Disp Resol 264-266. 
285 Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 604. 
286 Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 614-615. Batra (2015) Ohio St JL 568-572 contends that 
defence counsel are under great pressure and consequently sometimes unprepared, and 
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The contemporary role of a judge is undoubtedly hybrid and complex. It is 
submitted that there is no need to deny or unduly confine this reality. Proper 
recognition and identification, together with prudent formalisation of the roles that 
judges could play, should protect the parties and enhance the development of the 
present legal culture regarding dispute resolution under the shadow of the court.287 
Consequently, it is submitted in this dissertation that the court, and judges may be 
involved in the mediation of instances of economic crime as proposed in chapter 5. It 
is further submitted that such participation may help to curb the largely unfettered 
discretion of the public prosecutor in the plea and sentence negotiation of the 
mediated settlement agreement.288  
It has been shown that mediation in the criminal justice system entails a number 
of different forms, each of which may have lesser or greater restorative or retributive 
characteristics. The two basic models, namely the restorative justice model and the 
case management model, are acknowledged: such categorisation helps to 
understand the different characteristics found in each. The proposal in this 
dissertation proposes to build on both and incorporate characteristics from each of 
the models. Accordingly, it is submitted that it is more correct to speak of a 
continuum of mediation in the criminal justice system that stretches from restorative 
to retributive justice.289  
It has also been shown that mediation in the criminal justice system in a number 
of jurisdictions has developed beyond minor misdemeanours to cover instances of 
                                            
that in plea negotiations the defendants are usually absent. Consequently, these 
negotiations take place between the prosecutor and an inadequately prepared defence 
counsel.  
287 Batra (2015) Ohio St LJ 587 makes the following recommendations to ensure procedural 
safeguards in judicial participation in the plea process, which it is submitted are equally 
applicable to a mediation process: (a) different judges to manage the mediation; (b) a record 
of the proceedings to be kept; (c) a facilitative as opposed to a directive style; (d) inclusion of 
the defendant; (e) an informal setting. Also see the proposal in Ch 5 and Annexure A. For a 
discussion on the different styles, see para 2 2 3 at 28 above and the conclusion reached 
that co-mediation with an expert in economic crime and a facilitative style would be best 
suited for the proposal in this dissertation.  
288 Batra (2015) Ohio St LJ 568-571. 
289 Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 580. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
88 
 
serious crime which affect life and liberty.290 A number of the benefits and concerns 
attributed to using mediation in the criminal justice system have also been discussed 
above and the following are underscored.  
Mediation, as a restorative justice process,291 deals with a criminal offence in a 
constructive manner and offers “a starting point for ushering in a new paradigm of 
criminal justice”.292 Mediation creates an opportunity for the victim and offender to 
meet one another in a space less threatening than a stark and impersonal 
courtroom, but in a setting that is less formal and intimidating and under the control 
of a professional independent and impartial mediator.293 In addition, the nature of the 
meeting is more personal and opportunity is granted for the parties to express 
themselves under the guidance of a professional facilitator.294 The integration of the 
philosophy and principles of restorative justice through mediation into the criminal 
justice system brings significant benefits. These include benefits for all the role 
players and stakeholders: the offender, the victim, the state and the public. 
Mediation can or should positively influence the attitude of offenders both with 
regard to their wrongdoing and the justice system.295 In mediation, offenders are 
                                            
290 Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 586; L Simms “Criminal Mediation is the BASF of the Criminal 
Justice System: Not Replacing Traditional Criminal Adjudication, Just Making It Better” 
(2007) 22 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 797 798-799. Also see the ABA, Criminal Justice 
Section’s Report to the House of Delegates 101B (2008) recommending the expansion of 
the use of mediation in various programmes in the criminal justice system.  
291 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1500, 1519 refers to “mediation programs as tangible examples 
of restorative justice in action”; and further to a natural development of stepping from 
restitution programmes to mediation programmes in the light of the benefits of restitution 
which is a core element of restorative justice. This is a comprehensive view of restorative 
justice. Although Hanan (2016) NML Rev 138-149 contrasts restorative justice to mediation, 
the submission in this dissertation remains that mediation is a restorative justice process. 
See ch 3, para 3 5, 146ff. 
292 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1483, 1500. In short, mediation serves to empower the victim, 
compensate the victim, impress upon the offender the consequences of her or his actions 
and consequently to promote accountability. In addition, the utilitarian benefits include 
reducing backlogs and bringing relief for overburdened human resources in court systems.  
293 Laflin (2004) Idaho L Rev 582; Love (2008) Disp Res Mag 5. 
294 The victim can ask questions, receive answers, express hurt and anger. Equally an 
offender can explain, express remorse and regret. See Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1500-1501. 
295 For discussion and illustration of research on benefits of mediation for an offender see 
Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1502-1503; Hanan (2016) NML Rev 136-137. 
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empowered: they are not simply relegated to the role of the accused and the subject 
of criminal prosecution, but are enabled to directly participate in the resolution of the 
issues arising from the criminal matter. Offenders are said to acknowledge 
accountability more readily through mediation. Consequently, the sense of 
responsibility with regard to restitution for the victim is higher and directly linked to 
the offence.296 Restitution by an offender may also be therapeutic to the offender as 
her or his self-esteem is boosted by active involvement in the determining and 
execution of appropriate sanctions, instead of simply passively receiving her or his 
punishment.297 Research has also shown that cases which have been mediated 
reduce recidivism.298 The participation of the offenders in community based 
restorative programmes have also had positive effects. Mediation as a restorative 
justice process consequently contributes constructively to the restoration of the 
offender personally, as well as her or his re-integration into the community.  
Mediation is particularly beneficial for the victim.299 Mediation grants an 
opportunity for victims to confront the offender, ask questions, receive answers. This 
supports their personal healing. In addition, victims are granted an opportunity to 
participate in the criminal justice process, particularly with regard to restitution of 
their loss, including the possibility of compensation by the offender. Such 
participation increases the victims’ understanding of the criminal justice process and 
positively influences their perceptions of the justice system.300 
It is submitted throughout this dissertation that serious economic crime affects the 
community. A community needs to be responsive, express their condemnation of 
crime, but also to acknowledge their co-responsibility in combating it. Mediation 
creates an opportunity for a community to not only demand justice, but to participate 
in the exercise of justice. This could be through a number of educational and 
correctional programmes operated in the community.301 Likewise, participation in the 
                                            
296 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1498. 
297 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1499. 
298 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1498 and fn 144. 
299 For discussion and illustration of research on effects of mediation on a victim, see Bakker 
(1994) NCL Rev 1500-1502; Hanan (2016) NML Rev 136. 
300 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1500. 
301 For example, education programmes could include accounting courses; while correctional 
programmes could include appropriate community service. 
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criminal justice process increases the understanding and experience of the 
community of the criminal justice system as being fair, which leads to increased trust 
in and support of the system.302  
The state also benefits from mediation.303 The utilitarian benefits of cost-saving 
outcomes, in time, money, human and physical resources are generally accepted. 
The need for the state under the criminal justice system to intervene and combat 
crime is not denied, but it is submitted that the duration and nature of the contact 
with the formal institutional structures can be respectively reduced and improved.304 
Restorative justice practices, like mediation are more likely to result in sentences 
with reduced incarceration time and this would lessen the burden on prisons and the 
correctional services.305 As mentioned, the direct and constructive participation of the 
                                            
302 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1503. 
303 For discussion and illustration of research on benefits of mediation for the state see 
Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1503-1504; 
304 For example, the number of postponements of a case and duration of a trial with the 
formal structures of a criminal trial will be reduced if the matter, of part of it, is mediated. In 
addition, the nature of the contact of the offender and the victim with the court and court 
official will be more positive as the contact in the formal court will comprise the court 
approval of a mediated settlement agreement, in contrast to hostile questioning and cross-
examination. Consequently, the offender and the victim feel more satisfied with their 
experiences of formal court structures.  
305 The cost of imprisonment is infamously high, reaching R133, 805 per prisoner for a year 
in South Africa in 2016/2017. See G Makou, I Skosana & R Hopkins “Fact Sheet: The State 
of South Africa’s prisons” (18-07-2017) Daily Maverick 
<https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-07-18-fact-sheet-the-state-of-south-africas-
prisons/> (accessed 03-06-2019). Otherwise put, in 2015/2016 it cost the state R350 per day 
for each incarcerated prisoner and R167 per day, less than half, to have a prisoner released 
with a monitoring device. News24 “How much each prisoner costs SA taxpayers to stay 
behind bars” (19-11-2015) Businesstech 
<https://businesstech.co.za/news/general/104579/how-much-each-prisoner-costs-sa-
taxpayers-every-day/> (accessed 03-06-2019). In addition, the Department of Correctional 
Services (“DCS”), SA faces several challenges, including budget deficits and cuts. For more 
detail see PMG NCOP Security & Justice “Correctional Services and Judicial Inspectorate: 
Deputy Minister Policy overview” (13-06-2018) pmg <pmg.org.za/committee-
meeting/26647/> (accessed 03-06-2019). Overcrowding in South African prisons remains a 
serious problem, with the recent DCS Annual Report 2017/2018 27 showing that the 
average number of inmates was 160,583 whilst the approved bed space was 118,723, an 
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offender, the victim and public in the criminal justice process validates the criminal 
justice system and consequently contributes to the prevention of crime and ultimately 
a more just society. 
There are a number of concerns regarding the use of mediation in the criminal 
justice system, including coercion, rhetoric, and formalisation. It has been argued 
that mediation, particularly mandatory mediation, is coercive as it forces persons to 
not only enter and participate in a process, but also to negotiate and accept an 
outcome they may not want.306 Similarly, criminal mediation is said to be coercive, as 
the threat of prosecution in the event of failed mediation may coerce an offender to 
admit an offence she or he may not have committed. Likewise, mediation can be 
coercive towards a victim, who may be forced into facing an offender she or he does 
not wish to see. Also, in victim-offender mediation, based upon restorative and 
therapeutic principles, the premise is the guilt of the offender, and the goals are 
accountability and rehabilitation of the offender, and restitution for and reconciliation 
with the victim, none of which may be appropriate in a particular case.307 Even the 
terms “victim” and “offender” can be perceived coercive in themselves and 
jeopardise the integrity of the mediation process; and more neutral terms such as 
“complainant” and “defendant” have been suggested.308  
2 4 2 Mediation in the criminal justice system in South Africa 
“What has been will be again, what has been done will be done again; there is 
nothing new under the sun.”309 
                                            
overcrowding of 35%. Remand sections are, however, known to be overcrowded by 150% or 
more. R Hopkins “Why Government Should Focus More on Keeping People Out of Prison” 
(07-05-2018) City Press <https://city-press.news24.com/News/why-government-should-
focus-more-on-keeping-people-out-of-prison-20180507> (accessed 03-06-2019). 
306 Vettori (2015) AHRLJ 358. 
307 Hanan (2016) NML Rev 145-146 raises these concerns with regard to restorative justice 
practices, in contrast to mediation, but in light of the definition of mediation in this 
dissertation as a restorative justice practice these concerns may also be applicable to 
mediation. 
308 Hanan (2016) NML Rev 158. 
309 Ecclesiastes 1:9 New International Version. 
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Mediation is irrevocably part of civil and criminal procedural law. The ambience 
lies in the formal recognition, nomenclature and formal regulation of mediation as a 
procedure. Roebuck’s research has shown that the phenomena of processes, now 
known as mediation and arbitration, were an integral part of the resolution of 
disputes in the middle ages. At that time there was a symbiosis between mediation, 
arbitration and litigation; and mediation and arbitration were not considered to be 
alternatives, but rather preferred processes.310 The court or forum to which the 
dispute was brought, first attempted mediation prior to adjudication.311 Accordingly, 
instances of resolving criminal matters, including fraud, through mediation and 
arbitration, have been recorded since the middle ages.312  
In this dissertation it is submitted that adversarial and adjudicative processes, in 
comparison to ADR processes, are not mutually exclusive. In reality they are 
ancillary to one another, and co-exist alongside one another. Indeed, preference is 
given to more prudent distinction and improved integration with each another. In the 
criminal justice system numerous processes exist, each with its own emphasis and 
the challenge is to select the most appropriate for any given situation. In this 
dissertation, it is submitted that mediation should be integrated into the criminal 
justice system as an additional procedure available for the resolution of economic 
crime.  
Acknowledgment needs to be given to the principles of traditional dispute 
resolution and the principles of ubuntu, but they do not trump the so-called Western 
model of justice. Principles in both systems are important and care needs to be 
taken in the description and appropriation of such principles. Again, it is submitted in 
this dissertation that efforts need to be made to prudently define, expand and 
integrate the different procedural mechanisms available in the criminal justice 
system. The Constitution not only grants the opportunity to do so, but also compels 
that this be done.313  
In the light of the discussion and submissions in this chapter regarding the use of 
mediation, especially in the criminal justice system, it is proposed that mediation be 
                                            
310 Roebuck (2013) Mediation and Arbitration in the Middle Ages 52, 350-351, 394. 
311 Roebuck (2013) Mediation and Arbitration in the Middle Ages 159-161, 395. 
312 Roebuck (2013) Mediation and Arbitration in the Middle Ages 96-103. 
313 Constitution ss 8(3), 39(2) and 211(3). 
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formally introduced through legislation into the South African criminal justice system. 
At present, mediation already exists in the South African criminal justice system 
through the model of out-of-court, informal mediation. This practice will now be 
briefly discussed, with an emphasis on the concerns raised about such an informal, 
off the radar, process. 
2 4 2 1 Informal mediation in the criminal justice system in South Africa 
Diversion was introduced as one of the national programmes in the National 
Crime Prevention Strategy (“NCPS”) in 1996.314 The NCPS attempted to introduce a 
new way to approach crime, to shift from crime control to crime prevention.315 It 
acknowledged that the crime levels in South Africa were abnormally high and 
needed exceptional action. The NCPS emphasised that crime is not only an issue for 
the state and police and prosecution, but called on broader society to participate in 
the prevention of crime.316 Diversion had until the promulgation of the Child Justice 
Act 75 of 2008,317 which specifically provides for diversion for minors in certain 
circumstances, been done without formal regulation.318 However, apart from numeric 
statistics it is difficult to trace any further details regarding cases of pre-trial diversion, 
especially adult pre-trial diversion.319 Cautious deductions that can be made are that 
                                            
314 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) Department of Justice, Pretoria (May 1996) 
para 14 NCPS (1996) 60-62.  
315 NCPS (1996) 5; A Singh “'Changing the Soul of the Nation'? South Africa's National 
Crime Prevention Strategy” (1999) The British Criminology Conferences: Selected 
Proceedings. Vol 2. Papers from the British Criminology Conference, Queens University, 
Belfast, (15-19 July 1997) 5.  
316 NCPS (1996) 6; Singh (1999) 6. 
317 The Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 came into operation on 1 April 2010. 
318 Matters were diverted by the prosecutors within their power to prosecute an accused or 
withdraw the charges against her or him as guided by prosecutorial policies and directives. 
See C Wood Diversion in South Africa: A Review of Policy and Practices 1990-2003 ISS 
Paper 79 (2003) 1-2; Maimane Restorative Justice 3-4; 43. 
319 Recent statistics by the DOJ & CD state that 166, 942 cases were resolved by ADRM in 
the 2015/2016 reporting year; of which 2% were in the regional courts and 98% in the district 
courts. Of these 37,516 cases were diverted after enrolment and 5,528 before enrolment in 
terms of the Child Justice Act, whilst the bulk 74% (123,908) were resolved through informal 
mediation. Of the 5,528 diverted in terms of the CJA, 2,593 were diverted from the criminal 
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prosecutors are applying Alternate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (“ADRM”) in 
cases before the courts.320 Indeed, 32% of criminal cases were resolved through 
ADRM in 2017/2018, of which 108,562 cases were finalised through informal 
mediation.321 The simple statistics show that 22% of cases were finalised through 
informal mediation. This is both significant and concerning. It is significant as it 
confirms that alternative mechanisms, beyond the conventional adversarial trial 
mechanism, are necessary to resolve criminal disputes.322 It is, however, also 
concerning for a number of reasons.323  
A criminal matter brings various stakeholders’ interests into relationship with one 
another. 324 As a crime is a public wrong, the state acting as the representative of the 
public secures and protects the public interest. So too, the interest of the offender 
                                            
courts. See Department of Justice and Constitutional Development Annual Report for 
2015/16 Financial Year 21 9, 17 & 96-97. 
320 ADRM is a category used by the DPP and forms part of its annual reporting obligations. It 
is not entirely certain what different forms of ADRM there are but they primarily comprise of 
informal mediation and diversion. The NDPP reports in the Annual Report for 2017/18 44 
that the ADRM system is being refined and that draft legislation is being looked at to further 
regulate the ADRM process. Informal mediation is reported as one of the forms of ADRM. 
For example, cases finalised by regional courts show that out of the 2409 cases resolved 
through ADRM, 2176 were finalised through informal mediation and the balance of 233 
through diversion. 
321 NDPP Annual Report 2017/2018 65-66, 67. This is less than the 115,986 cases resolved 
through informal mediation in the 2016/2017 year. Cases resolved by informal mediation 
represent 68% of the 159,654 cases resolved through ADRM, and a significant 22% of the 
total number of 494,815 criminal cases resolved by the NDPP in the period. See also A 
Anderson “Disposal of Criminal Disputes by Informal Mediation: A Critical Analysis” (2017) 
30 SACJ 162 163. 
322 Anderson (2017) SACJ 163. Additional mechanisms in South Africa include the system of 
admission of guilt fines, diversion programmes and plea and sentencing agreements. See 
also, SALRC (Project 73) 6th and Final Report on Simplification of Criminal Procedure (Out-
of-court Settlements in Criminal Cases) (2002) 5-17. 
323 Anderson (2017) SACJ 170-172 discusses a number of pertinent concerns. These 
include: the secrecy of the process, the compromised position of the prosecutor, the risk of 
coercion and abuse by the prosecutor, the elevated position of the victim and the risk of 
revenge-seeking victims, the privatisation of punishment, the risk of inconsistency of 
sentences, the risk of power imbalances, the risk of the unpresented accused, the absence 
of court supervision and the absence of public validation. 
324 Anderson (2017) SACJ 162-163, 165. Also see ch 3, para 3 3, 112ff on restorative 
justice.  
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has long been recognised and acknowledged. In addition, as submitted in this 
dissertation, the interests of the victim also need to be central. It is a matter of 
concern that there is no provision for the mechanism of informal mediation in the 
CPA and that the operation of this system is not general public knowledge.325 
Moreover, although the discretion of the public prosecutor is acknowledged, informal 
mediation outside the court room, seemingly a form of diversion, decriminalises the 
offence.326 Consequently, although it is the primary submission of this dissertation 
that mediation be integrated into the criminal justice system, the proposal is that it 
should be integrated through formal legislation. It is submitted that formal regulated 
mediation will address a number of concerns, including those raised by Anderson, 
with regard to informal mediation.327  
2 4 2 2 Introducing formal mediation into the criminal justice system in South Africa 
The main submission of this dissertation concerns the incorporation of mediation 
as an ADR mechanism to address instances of economic crime. The proposal is to 
modify the dispute resolution design of the criminal justice system, to include 
mediation. In addition to the adversarial trial option, a guilty plea under section 112 of 
the CPA, plea and sentencing agreements under section 105A of the CPA are 
another alternative,328 a mediated settlement agreement could be included. This 
process is similar to, yet distinct from the process of informal mediation as an ADRM 
process as the proposal is for a regulated process with procedural safeguards. The 
design of mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism is discussed in chapter 5.  
                                            
325 Anderson (2017) SACJ 165 fn 21, 178 points out that the Prosecution Policy Directive of 
2014, section F of part 7 is not publicly available and the NPA avers that informal mediation 
is confidential. Anderson further correctly cautions that the Prosecution Policy Directive is 
substituting legislation; and it is submitted this is untenable.  
326 Out-of-court procedures that divert charges before a charge is formally made before a 
court in effect decriminalise the offence. See Hanan (2016) NML Rev 129-131.  
327 As illustrated above in fn 323. 
328 The term “alternative” does not necessarily mean in contrast to or in substitution of, but in 
addition to, as an alternate or ancillary process. 
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Significantly, mediation has statutorily and formally been incorporated into some 
criminal justice systems.329 The scope of application of Idaho Supreme Court’s 
Rules, for example, is very broad, providing for mediation to take place in “any 
criminal proceeding”330 (writer’s emphasis). The primary qualification is that 
mediation “is voluntary and will take place only on agreement of the parties.”331 
Mediation may be requested by any party or suggested by the court itself.332 
Restrictions are placed upon the mediator: the mediator does not have the authority 
to make decisions, or accept a plea or sentence any defendant.333 Positive 
prescriptions are that the mediator is to facilitate a voluntary settlement between the 
parties, to assist the parties in identifying issues, to reduce misunderstandings, and 
to explore options and areas of agreement that could expedite the trial or resolution 
of a case.334 This may include the possibility of reduced charges,335 entering plea or 
sentencing agreements,336 restitution terms337 and reconciliation.338 The rule also 
prescribes the scope of the communication between the mediator and the court 
providing that the mediator may have no contact or communication with the court 
except to report that the parties are at an impasse, or have reached an agreement or 
that meaningful mediation is continuing, or that the mediator is withdrawing.339 
Mediators, generally senior or sitting judges, may not preside over a future aspect of 
                                            
329 For example, in Idaho in terms of the Supreme Court of Idaho Court Rules (“ICR”) 
effective 1 July 2017.  
330 ICR 18.1. The nature of criminal proceedings is further prescribed in para (b) as “all 
misdemeanour and felony cases” (writer’s emphasis). 
331 ICR 18.1 read with paras (a) and (e). Parties primarily comprise the prosecuting attorney 
and the defendant, but may include more persons, as may be determined by the attorneys 
and the mediator. Interestingly, not all defendants in a multi-defendant case need participate 
in the mediation for it to be valid. 
332 ICR 18.1. 
333 ICR 18.1 read with para (d). 
334 ICR 18.1 read with para (d). This may also include the admissibility of evidence and any 
issue that will facilitate the resolution of the case. 
335 ICR 18.1 read with para (b)(1). 
336 ICR 18.1 read with para (b)(2). 
337 ICR 18.1 read with para (b)(3). 
338 ICR 18.1 read with para (b)(4), which refers to a “continuing relationship with any victim”. 
339 ICR 18.1 read with para (h). 
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a particular case.340 Mediator privilege is prescribed in terms of the Idaho Supreme 
Court Rules of Evidence.341 
The mediation proceedings are confidential and may not be recorded or 
reported.342 The mediation settlement agreement may be reduced to writing signed 
by the parties and presented to the court for approval.343 
It is submitted that South Africa should follow jurisdictions such as Idaho and 
formally integrate mediation into the criminal justice system and a proposal for this is 
set out in chapter 5 below. 
“[C]riminal mediation does not replace traditional adjudication within the criminal 
justice system, it just makes the criminal justice system better.”344 
                                            
340 ICR 18.1 read with para (c). The court keeps a roster of mediators, who are generally 
judges that have undergone a minimum of 12 hours of criminal mediation training.  
341 ICR 18.1 read with para (g) must be read together with the Idaho Rules of Evidence 
(“IRE”) 507 that prescribe the Conduct of Mediations in the justice system. 
342 ICR 18.1 read with para (f). The only exception is prescribed disclosure of child abuse 
under the Child Protection Act Idaho Code 16-1605. 
343 ICR 18.1 read with para (h)(2). 
344 Simms (2007) Ohio St J on Disp Resol 797 fn 1. 
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3 1 Introduction 
“These can now be addressed on the basis that there is 
a need for understanding but not for vengeance, 
a need for reparation but not for retaliation, 
a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation.”1 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)2 was a watershed moment in 
restorative justice in South Africa. Firmly entrenched in the retributive and penal 
practices of Roman-Dutch law, the approach of a commission to hear both the 
stories of the crimes from perpetrators and the stories of victims, often face to face, 
was a strange, yet significant happening in South Africa’s legal history. The TRC 
                                            
1 Epilogue of the Interim Constitution of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, para 50, with 
reference to the atrocities of the past. 
2 Established in terms of The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995.  
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highlighted the possibility of and the need for focusing on the victim’s experience and 
not only on the crime and the perpetrator. Moving beyond a solely retributive justice 
system, the opportunities for reparation and restoration that a more participatory and 
reconciliatory approach such as the TRC introduced contributed to the initiatives to 
transform the South African justice system. Accountability was also underscored by 
the TRC. Perpetrators who participated in the TRC came forward and identified 
themselves and revealed the atrocities they had committed, had been involved in, or 
knew of and so taking responsibility for the role they had played.3 Importantly, truths 
and stories were heard which may have remained unknown had it not been for the 
voluntary disclosure by the perpetrators, albeit that they did so to strengthen the 
possibility of being granted amnesty.4 Such truths also brought the possibility of 
restoration and reconciliation which led to the fulfilling of the objectives of the Interim 
Constitution: helping to cross the bridge from an unjust and divided past to the 
pursuit of a unified and more just future; seeking reparation rather than retribution; 
achieving ubuntu and not victimisation. As these objectives are essential 
characteristics of restorative justice, it is submitted that the TRC in a sense served, 
and still serves as a foundation for restorative justice in the constitutional era in 
South Africa.5  
The purpose of this chapter is to establish restorative justice as one of the pillars 
on which to build the proposal to introduce mediation more comprehensively into the 
criminal justice system in South Africa. Accordingly, the characteristics of restorative 
justice with the focus on the role of the various stakeholders, the state, the offender, 
the victim and the community are discussed. Particular attention is given to the 
relationship between restorative justice and traditional justice, especially with regard 
to ubuntu. Also, the reception of restoration justice by the courts and the intersection 
between restorative justice and sentencing are discussed with an emphasis on the 
position of the victim and restitution. Finally, the links and overlaps between the 
                                            
3 Many persons and organisations also took responsibility for their omissions and failure to 
take any action during the period of oppression.  
4 Amnesty was not automatic, but subject to the discretion of a commission of the TRC. 
Epilogue of Interim Constitution of South Africa, para 55. 
5 A Skelton (“Face to Face: Sachs on Restorative Justice” [2010] 25 SAPL 94 96) states that 
although the TRC may have been “an imperfect model of restorative justice” it nevertheless 
“represents restorative justice ‘writ large’”. 
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principles of restorative justice and mediation introduced in chapter 2 are re-affirmed 
to demonstrate that mediation can be construed as a restorative justice process.  
3 2 Description and development of restorative justice  
Restorative justice is defined and described in various ways. In South Africa a 
widely used definition is that it is a particular approach to justice that “aims to involve 
the child offender, the victim, the families concerned and community members to 
collectively identify and address harms, needs and obligations through accepting 
responsibility, making restitution, taking measures to prevent a recurrence of the 
incident and promoting reconciliation.”6 The definition includes participation by the 
affected parties and the elements of accountability, restitution, prevention and 
reconciliation.7 
A helpful judicial description of restorative justice, borrowed from Canada, is: 
“Restorative justice is an approach to justice that focuses on repairing the harm 
caused by crime while holding the offender responsible for his or her actions, by 
providing an opportunity for the parties directly affected by the crime – victim (s), 
offender and community - to identify and address their needs in the aftermath of 
the crime, and seek a resolution that affords healing, reparation and 
reintegration, and prevents further harm” (writer’s emphasis).8 
Restorative justice defies finite definition and remains a porous concept.9 
However, it is evident that the elements of “encounter, reparation, reintegration and 
                                            
6 Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 s 1. For a discussion of this definition see A van der Merwe “A 
New Role for Crime Victims? An Evaluation of Restorative Justice Procedures in the Child 
Justice Act 2008” (2013) DJ 1022 1023. This definition is very similar to the definition of 
restorative justice used by the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
(DOJ&CD) (2011) Restorative Justice: The Road to Healing” 3-4. 
7 The definition does not make reference to the state. However, the involvement of the state 
is presumed by the Child Justice Act preamble as the purpose is to establish a criminal 
justice system for children within the existing criminal justice system. 
8 S v Maluleke 2008 1 SACR 49 (T) para 28. 
9 For a discussion on a number of definitions, see B Tshehla “The Restorative Justice Bug 
Bites the South African Criminal Justice System” (2004) SACJ 1 6-8; A Skelton & M Batley 
“Restorative Justice: A Contemporary South African Review” (2008) 21 AJ 37 38; A Skelton 
& M Batley Charting Progress, Mapping the Future: Restorative Justice in South Africa 
(2006) 5-10; JD Mujuzi “The Prospect of Rehabilitation as a ‘Substantial and Compelling’ 
Circumstance to Avoid Imposing Life Imprisonment in South Africa: A Comment on S v 
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participation” occur in these definitions.10 Notably, restorative justice is seen and 
defined as a process,11 whilst others see and define it as a value.12 As a process 
restorative justice brings together all the various stakeholders (the state, offender, 
victim and community) harmed by the offence to discuss the issues and to seek 
agreement on restitution for the harm suffered. Conceptualising restorative justice as 
a value, means focusing on the principles of healing and restoring, as opposed to 
punishing.13 Braithwaite and Strang see “restorative justice as involving a 
commitment to both restorative processes and restorative values”.14 Similarly, the 
                                            
Nkomo” (2008) SACJ 1 7-7, fn 22. Notably, J Dignan Understanding Victims and Restorative 
Justice (2005) 1-10 declines to define restorative justice due to the difficulty in defining a 
process and its outcomes in a single definition. Instead he uses a comparative analytical 
model to describe a variety of criteria against which restorative justice models are compared 
to other criminal justice models.  
10 Sachs J identifies these elements in Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC) (“Dikoko v 
Mokhatla“) para 114. Also see, Skelton (2010) SAPL 96-97. Compare, the “five R’s”: facing 
reality, accepting responsibility, expressing repentance, knowing reconciliation and making 
restitution discussed in M Batley “Restorative Justice in the South African Context” in T 
Maepa (ed) Beyond Retribution: Prospects for Restorative Justice in South Africa (2005) 21 
21-22. 
11 For example, the definition of the United Nations, ECOSOC Resolution 2002/12 Annex, 
Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters, para I.1, 
40: “Restorative process” means any process in which the victim and the offender, and, 
where appropriate, any other individuals or community members affected by a crime, 
participate together actively in the resolution of matters arising from the crime, generally with 
the help of a facilitator.”  
12 For example, the definition above by the Canadian courts. 
13 Skelton & Batley (2008) AJ 39 discuss three categories of values of restorative justice 
identified by Braithwaite: “constraining values” including procedural safeguards like 
respectful listening, equal concern for all the stakeholders and accountability; “maximizing 
values” which promote healing and restoration; and “emergent values” like remorse, 
apology, mercy and forgiveness which may emerge from the restorative justice process, but 
may not necessarily do so. Compare the use of similar concepts in fn 85 below by the 
authors, “constraining standards”, “maximizing standards”;’ and “emergent standards” as 
criteria for the setting of standards.  
14 J Braithwaite & H Strang “Introduction: Restorative Justice and Civil Society” in H Strang & 
J Braithwaite Restorative Justice and Civil Society (2001) 1 2. Also see A Woolford & RS 
Ratner Informal Reckonings: Conflict Resolution in Mediation, Restorative Justice and 
Reparations (2008) 65-66 who understand restorative justice as an intertwinement of 
processes, goals, values, spiritual beliefs, social justice and a lifestyle. 
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different approaches to restorative justice see restorative justice either as an 
alternative to the criminal justice system or as a complement to it.15 As an alternative 
system, restorative justice is contrasted to the classical retributive criminal justice 
system and seen as a replacement to it; whilst as a complementary system it 
operates parallel to the criminal justice system. A third way, the way this dissertation 
supports, is to see restorative justice as both a process and a value system that can 
be integrated into and be interdependent of the formal criminal justice system, an 
approach known as “mainstreaming”.16 
A helpful description of restorative justice encapsulating the above and used for 
purposes of this dissertation was formulated by Rosenblatt: “restorative justice is a 
set of values, principles and practices to be used in response to crime”.17 This 
description not only covers the different expressions of restorative justice, but also 
captures the significant feature that it is a seen as a response to crime.18 
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the different origins and the 
development of restorative justice. Reference is therefore, limited to the development 
                                            
15 Other terms used are “separatist” for alternative and “reformist” for complementary. For a 
discussion on these divergent approaches, see Dignan Understanding Victims 106-107; 
Tshehla (2004) SACJ 8-9; Skelton & Batley (2008) AJ 39-40.  
16 Dignan Understanding Victims 107. Compare too, Tshehla (2004) SACJ 8-9. Skelton & 
Batley (2008) AJ 45 see restorative justice as both a parallel and inter-linked system with the 
conventional criminal justice system. Also A Skelton “Tapping Indigenous Knowledge: 
Traditional Conflict Resolution, Restorative Justice and the Denunciation of Crime in South 
Africa” (2007) AJ 228. Also compare FF Rosenblatt The Role of Community in Restorative 
Justice (2015) 13-14 who elects the approach of integration. He further compares the 
integration of restorative justice into the criminal justice system to Braithwaite’s regulatory 
pyramid explaining that restorative justice represents the broad-based bottom part of the 
pyramid and should be applied to most criminal cases: punitive measures should only be 
used where restorative justice is not applicable or does not work.  
17 Rosenblatt The Role of Community 11. The emphasis on justice is that of the author 
Rosenblatt. This dissertation supports this: it not only affirms that restorative justice is a 
response to crime, but also that it enriches the understanding of justice as part of a legal 
system. 
18 Restorative justice, as a set of values, principles and practices can be used far more 
widely than as a response to crime. For example, there may be restorative justice 
programmes in schools or certain communities that are based on the values of restorative 
justice but are separate from and independent of the criminal justice system. Also see, 
Rosenblatt The Role of Community 10-11. 
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of restorative justice in South Africa, especially its connection with traditional justice 
and ubuntu.19 
3 2 1 Development of restorative justice in South Africa 
There have been several calls for South Africa to integrate restorative justice in 
the criminal justice system.20 In addition to several research projects by the South 
African Law Reform Commission (“SALRC”)21 and calls by academics for the 
integration of restorative justice, there is a growing call to change South Africa’s 
retributive criminal justice system by incorporating indigenous African legal 
practices.22 It is submitted that restorative justice in South Africa cannot be fully 
understood or described without reference to and incorporation of restorative justice 
principles developed from traditional justice systems.23  
From the outset mention needs to be made that legal pluralism exists and, 
therefore, attempting to clearly delineate different forms of law, like contemporary 
                                            
19 The origins of restorative justice in the Western legal systems are considered to be partly 
due to the rise of social movements as a reaction to the dissatisfaction with the level of 
efficacy of the classical criminal justice system. The rise of victim-orientated movements is 
also seen to have contributed to the development of restorative justice. Dignan, in his book 
Understanding Victims 6-7, gives a table of victim-focused reforms in the United Kingdom. 
For discussion on the general origins and emergence of restorative justice see: Braithwaite 
& Strang “Introduction: Restorative Justice” in Restorative Justice 2-5; Skelton & Batley 
(2008) AJ 37-40. 
20 Tshehla (2004) SACJ 2, 14; Skelton & Batley (2008) AJ 40 highlight the fact that the 2007 
volume of Acta Juridica, which is dedicated to restorative justice, as a definitive moment in 
the development of restorative justice in South Africa.  
21 Formerly known as the South African Law Commission (“SALC”). See projects listed in fn 
129 below. 
22 D Velthuizen “Why South Africa’s Tentative Moves Towards Restorative Justice Need 
Support” (14-01-2016) The Conversation <https://theconversation.com/why-south-africas-
tentative-moves-toward-restorative-justice-need-support-51286> (accessed 25-06-2019). 
Also see the discussion by Hargovan (“Doing Justice Differently: A Community-based 
Restorative Justice Initiative in Kwazulu-Natal” (2009) 22 AC 63-68) of the DOJCD’s various 
policies, including, Medium Term Strategy Framework, 2007-2013; Tshehla (2004) SACJ 2, 
12-14. Also compare Skelton (2007) AJ 229-230 advocating that much can be learned from 
the indigenous systems. 
23 Hargovan (2009) AC 64; DOJ&CD Restorative Justice: The Road to Healing (2011) para 2 
3; Skelton & Batley Charting Progress 8, 19.  
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Western law or traditional justice is difficult. Equally complex is the use of common 
criteria to distinguish the different forms of law, like formal or informal.24 Also, Obarrio 
cautions not to overstate or idealise traditional justice, or to overemphasise certain 
characteristics of traditional justice, like claiming that the community is superior to 
the individual or that reconciliation needs to be placed before retribution. 25  
Obarrio further points out that the complexity of generic terms such as “traditional 
justice” or “customary law”. 26 Behind each concept lies an intricate and involved set 
of principles, rules and practices developed over a length of time in different 
communities which vary from community to community. The historical context of any 
traditional justice practice is critical to understanding it and care needs to be taken 
not to simply renew or reinvent any traditional justice practice for contemporary 
application.27 
Notwithstanding the complex, fluid and dynamic nature of traditional justice certain 
characteristics of traditional justice dispute resolution processes, that are common 
across such processes can be identified: individual disputes affect the community 
and consequently any resolution also involves the community; role players like family 
members are guarantors of the agreed solution; a community ethos requires that a 
dispute resolution be based on reconciliation; and the process is flexible and fairly 
informal.28  
Skelton identifies nine similarities between customary law conflict resolutions and 
contemporary restorative justice processes. Three connections are value based: 
                                            
24 Traditional justice or customary law is usually referred to as informal, in contrast to 
Western law which is described as formal. However, these categories become blurred as 
much of customary law in Africa was codified under colonial rule and not all Western laws 
are formal. So too, the distinction between civil and criminal law in traditional law is neither 
easy, nor absolute. J Obarrio “Traditional Justice as Rule of Law in Africa: An 
Anthropological Perspective” in CL Sriram, O Martin-Ortega & J Herman (eds) Peacebuilding 
and Rule of Law in Africa: Just Peace? (2011) 23 25-27. 
25 Obarrio “Traditional Justice” in Peacebuilding and Rule of Law 24. 
26 Obarrio “Traditional Justice” in Peacebuilding and Rule of Law 25. 
27 Obarrio “Traditional Justice” in Peacebuilding and Rule of Law 37-38 warns that such 
renewal and application denies the complexity of traditional justice laws and may be used for 
political power and gain. 
28 Obarrio “Traditional Justice” in Peacebuilding and Rule of Law 32; D Mekonnen 
“Indigenous Legal Tradition as a Supplement to African Transitional Justice Initiatives” 
(2010) AJCR 1 2. 
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each process has the aim of reconciliation and restoring harmony in the community; 
both processes emphasise not only the rights of the individual and community but 
also the obligations of the individual and community; and each of the processes are 
victim-orientated and underscore the values of respect and dignity of each party. In 
addition, there are a number of procedural comparisons: neither of the processes 
makes a clear distinction between the civil and criminal justice systems; the 
procedures in each are flexible and simple; the outcomes are agreed settlements 
and not subject to the stare decisis rule; both processes encourage community 
participation; the processes are inherently transformative and each process 
underlines the importance of restoration and restitution.29 In the light of these 
overlapping characteristics, it is submitted that it would be more correct in South 
Africa to identify how the different values, principles and practices in the respective 
dispute resolution processes intersect and influence one another. Also restorative 
justice, both traditional and contemporary, needs to be further developed and 
integrated into the conventional justice systems. 
In addition, in South Africa restorative justice has been specifically linked not 
only to traditional justice systems30 but also to ubuntu.  
3 2 2 Restorative justice and ubuntu 
“The key elements of restorative justice have been identified as encounter, 
reparation, reintegration and participation.
 
Encounter (dialogue) enables the 
victims and offenders to talk about the hurt caused and how the parties are to get 
on in future. Reparation focuses on repairing the harm that has been done rather 
than on doling out punishment. Reintegration into the community depends upon 
the achievement of mutual respect for and mutual commitment to one another. 
And participation presupposes a less formal encounter between the parties that 
allows other people close to them to participate. These concepts harmonise well 
with processes well-known to traditional forms of dispute resolution in our 
                                            
29 For a discussion of these similarities see Skelton (2007) DJ 231-238; Skelton & Batley 
Charting Progress 8-9. 
30 For example, in S v Maluleke 2008 1 SACR 49 (T) paras 30, 38-40 Bertelsmann J links 
restorative justice in the criminal justice system with customary law, “African heritage” and 
the principles of traditional African legal principles. Also see a discussion of this case by JC 
Bekker & A van der Merwe “Indigenous Legal Systems and Sentencing: S v Maluleke 2008 
1 SACR 49 (T)” (2009) DJ 239-250. 
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country, processes that have long been, and continue to be, underpinned by the 
philosophy of ubuntu-botho.”31 
In South Africa restorative justice is considered to be closely linked with principles 
of traditional or customary law. A specific link between restorative justice and ubuntu 
has also been made by the courts and commentators and this will be briefly 
discussed in this dissertation. Regarding the intimate relationship between 
restorative justice and ubuntu, it is necessary to acknowledge that ubuntu, like 
restorative justice, is a porous concept and thus difficult to define.32 Foundational is 
the description of ubuntu in S v Makwanyane:  
“Generally, ubuntu translates as humaneness. In its most fundamental sense, it 
translates as personhood and morality. Metaphorically, it expresses itself in 
umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the significance of group solidarity on 
survival issues so central to the survival of communities. While it envelops the 
key values of group solidarity, compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to 
basic norms and collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity 
and morality. Its spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a shift 
from confrontation to conciliation.
 
In South Africa ubuntu has become a notion 
with particular resonance in the building of a democracy. It is part of our 
                                            
31 Dikoko v Mokhatla para 114. See also Van Vuren v Minister of Correctional Services 2012 
1 SACR 103 (CC) para 51.  
32 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the understanding of ubuntu or the 
discussion of its profound introduction into the considerations of the Constitutional Court in S 
v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC). Also City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 
and Others 2006 2 All SA 240 (W). Also see commentators who support ubuntu being part of 
the constitutional jurisprudence: D Cornell and N Bohler-Muller “Some Thoughts on the 
uBuntu Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) Ubuntu 
and the Law: African Ideals and Postapartheid Jurisprudence (2012) 367-376; D Cornell & K 
van Merle “Exploring uBuntu: Tentative Reflections” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) 
uBuntu and the Law: African Ideals and Postapartheid Jurisprudence (2012) 341-366. Y 
Mokgoro & S Woolman (“Where Dignity Ends and uBuntu Begins: A Response by Yvonne 
Mokgoro and Stu Woolman” in D Cornell Law and Revolution in South Africa: uBuntu, 
Dignity, and the Struggle for Constitutional Transformation (2014) 169 170-171) warn that: 
“we ignore uBuntu at our own peril”. Also compare authors who are critical of ubuntu being 
applied in the interpretation of legal principles: IJ Kroeze “Doing Things with Values: The 
Case of uBuntu” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the Law: African Ideals and 
Postapartheid Jurisprudence (2012) 333-343; T Bekker “The re-emergence of uBuntu: A 
Critical Analysis” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the Law: African Ideals and 
Postapartheid Jurisprudence (2012) 377-387. 
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“rainbow” heritage, though it might have operated and still operates differently in 
diverse community settings. In the Western cultural heritage, respect and the 
value for life, manifested in the all-embracing concepts of humanity and 
menswaardigheid are also highly priced. It is values like these that Section 35 
requires to be promoted. They give meaning and texture to the principles of a 
society based on freedom and equality.”33 
It is important to recall the phrase “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” meaning “a 
person is a person by or through other people”.34 The concept of ubuntu, although 
strongly ethical, implies social cohesion and communitarianism.35 It means that a 
person is born into a community and that each person who is born is consequently 
obligated to others, and in turn these others are obligated to each individual, that is, 
each one born into the community is obligated to each other.36 Moreover, ubuntu 
asks that each person makes a difference to the community she or he lives in. This 
imposes an obligation upon each individual but also upon the community as a 
collective.37 Doing justice means that a community needs to get self-interested 
individuals back in touch with themselves and the community whilst always 
remembering that ubuntu demands respect for each individual, regardless of her or 
his circumstances.38  
                                            
33 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 308. J Donne (“Introduction: The Re-Cognition of uBuntu” in 
uBuntu and the Law: African Ideals and Postapartheid Jurisprudence (2012) 7-8) considers 
that Mokgoro J highlights both the ethical and the political-ideological dimensions of ubuntu 
in her definition in this judgment. Mokgoro (“uBuntu and the Law in South Africa” in Cornell D 
and Muvangua N uBuntu and the Law: African Ideals and Postapartheid Jurisprudence 
[2012] 117-118) however, maintains that ubuntu cannot easily be defined and that to define 
it with precision is unattainable.  
34 Donne “Introduction” in uBuntu and the Law 5. 
35 Ubuntu practised in a community portrays key social values of ubuntu such as group 
solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity, humanist orientation and 
collective unity. 
36 Donne “Introduction” in uBuntu and the Law 3. 
37 Donne “Introduction” in uBuntu and the Law 5. 
38 Donne “Introduction” in uBuntu and the Law 5-6. See also City of Johannesburg v Rand 
Properties (Pty) Ltd para 63 in which the influence of ubuntu on our inter-connectedness, 
common humanity and responsibility to one another is described by Jajhbay J. Also, 
Tshabala-Msimang v Makhanya 2008 3 BCLR 338 (W) para 2. 
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Importantly, a paradigm shift was established in the interpretation of the law 
through the application of ubuntu by the courts.39 This is known as the conversion 
principle which “converts the way we understand the past, and converts or translates 
any current practice of interpretation as we attempt to realize it in the reconstruction 
of law and legal principle”.40 Cornell understands the use of ubuntu by Mokgoro J 
and other judges as an application of the conversion principle, meaning that an ideal 
is recollected and re-imagined in the interpretation of the law and consequently 
projected and formed into future jurisprudence.41 Sachs J also advocates that the 
Constitutional Court was, and still is, tasked to tread and adjudicate new territories.42  
The move to a constitutional democracy necessitated a change in the manner 
courts interpret legislation. Formerly, during the authoritarian era, when parliament 
was sovereign, a court had to interpret what the intention of the legislature was. At 
                                            
39 S v Makwanyane paras 300, 302, 3047, 310-313. Mokgoro held (para 300) that “when our 
courts promote the underlying values of an open and democratic society in terms of Section 
35 when considering the constitutionality of laws, they should recognise that indigenous 
South African values are not always irrelevant nor unrelated to this task. In my view, these 
values are embodied in the Constitution” (writer’s emphasis).  
40 D Cornell “A Call for a Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence: South Africa, uBuntu, 
Dignity, and Reconciliation” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) uBuntu and the Law: African 
Ideals and Postapartheid Jurisprudence (2012) 324 328; Mokgoro & Woolman “Where 
Dignity Ends and uBuntu Begins” in Law and Revolution in South Africa 170-171. 
41 Cornell “Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence” in Ubuntu and the Law 326-329. See also 
S v Makwanyane paras 300-313.  
42 Sachs J’s description in Strange Alchemy of Life and Law (2009) 204-208 of the role and 
objective of the Constitutional Court is insightful, as is his observation that constitutionality 
heralded three necessary changes to the role of the court: the court had to move from 
“preoccupation with classification and strict adherence to formal rules to focussing on 
principled modes of weighing up and competing interests as triggered by the facts of a case 
and assessed in light of the values of an open and democratic society”. The issue is to move 
from interpreting legislation and attempting to determine the intention of the then sovereign 
Parliament to determining whether the issue was consistent with the Constitution and its 
objectives and keeping the law alive. Secondly, a totally new matter of proportionality is now 
key in respect of the Constitutional Court needing to weigh up different constitutional rights 
and having to test whether a limitation of a right was justifiable or not. The third shift was 
regarding remedies and the need for the Constitutional Court to read the purpose of the 
Constitution into legislation. It is submitted that these observations help to understand the 
reasoning of the Constitutional Court’s majority decision, written by Sachs J, in M v S 
discussed in para ch 3, 3 4, 137ff. 
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present, however, in the Constitutional era, a court needs to determine if the law is 
constitutional and in line with the rights protected in the Constitution. A court also has 
to determine if any protected right is limited and whether such limitation is justifiable 
in an open and democratic society, bearing in mind the constitutional pillars of 
human dignity, equality and freedom. This, in turn, necessitates a court to consider 
matters, case by case, balancing different interests. Sachs J describes this balancing 
act in the word “proportionality”, being the balancing of various interests, or making 
value judgements based on values clearly spelt out.43 To understand the use of 
ubuntu by the courts, the principle of proportionality needs to be borne in mind.  
It is submitted that for Sachs J ubuntu is one of the primary values with which the 
Constitution is infused and through the lens of which he, and other judges, balance 
the different interests and rights before them. Cornell understands Sachs J’s 
jurisprudence as trying to harmonise, or synchronise three ideals: dignity, equality 
and ubuntu and that the “spirit of ubuntu pervades” Sachs J’s attempt to harmonise 
such ideals.44 Sachs J, she argues, recognises that judicial interpretation is not a 
dualistic exercise, adjudicating between one interest and another, but acknowledging 
the “both-and” principle and attempting to harmonise them. 45 Furthermore, Sachs J 
believes we are compelled to seek the harmonising of legal principles as an act of 
respect for the principles of reconciliation, social harmony and democracy.46 This 
interpretation resonates with Sachs himself in stating that the judicial interpretation is 
a balancing act, using dignity and proportionality, to reach a fair and equitable 
balance.47 These judgments and theses on ubuntu demonstrate that ubuntu is 
inextricably linked with the interpretation of the law, but also with restorative justice.  
                                            
43 Sachs The Strange Alchemy 202-209. 
44 Cornell “Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence” in Ubuntu and the Law 326-329. 
45 Cornell (“Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence” in Ubuntu and the Law) 331 describes 
this as “as an ontic orientation in the world that is sometimes difficult for Westerners to 
comprehend;” and illustrates this by explaining that, for example, both belief in ancestral 
worship and the Constitution can exist together coherently from an ubuntu perspective, but 
not necessarily from a Western perspective.  
46 Cornell “Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence” in Ubuntu and the Law 329-331. 
47 Sachs The Strange Alchemy 202-209.  
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This conclusion is undeniably proven in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers48 (“Port Elizabeth Municipality”) through profound statements regarding 
ubuntu, restorative justice and mediation made by Sachs J. Regarding ubuntu, 
Sachs J stated: “The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority 
of the population, suffuses the whole constitutional order” (writer’s emphasis).49 In 
addition, Sachs J speaks of the infusion of the “elements of grace and compassion 
into the formal structures of the law” in the same breath that he speaks of ubuntu; 
particularly when attempting to resolve contradictory rights and interests.50 Sachs J 
continues to discuss elements common in ubuntu, restorative justice and mediation 
such as: promoting reconciliation through face to face engagement;51 the dignity of 
each person; persons being the bearers of rights;52 the bringing of divided parties 
together and “respectful good neighbourliness”;53 and the recognition of “the need for 
human interdependence respect and concern” in our evolving new society (writer’s 
emphasis).54  
Bohler-Müller55 commends the judgments of Mokgoro J and Sachs J,56 believing 
that they are revolutionary and written against conventional legal decisions and that 
                                            
48 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). This case dealt with the question of whether the eviction of nine 
households and three single persons, in terms of legislation, the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from an Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) was constitutional or not. 
49 Port Elizabeth Municipality para 37 and fn 36. Sachs J based his use of ubuntu on 
Mokgoro J’s definition of ubuntu in the Makwanyane case para 308. 
50 Port Elizabeth Municipality paras 37 and 38. 
51 Para 39: “Thus one potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving sustainable 
reconciliations of the different interests involved is to encourage and require the parties to 
engage with each other in a proactive and honest endeavour to find mutually acceptable 
solutions. Wherever possible, respectful face-to-face engagement or mediation through a 
third party should replace arm’s-length combat by intransigent opponents.”  
52 Port Elizabeth Municipality para 41. 
53 Para 43. 
54 Para 37. Bekker (“The Re-emergence of uBuntu “ in Ubuntu and the Law 380) is critical of 
this reference to ubuntu by Sachs J, which he argues has no substance and does not 
contribute to developing ubuntu as a constitutional value, but rather only raises the 
postulation that ubuntu is a catchphrase appropriated by some Constitutional Court Judges 
to strengthen an argument.  
55 N Bohler-Müller “Some Thoughts on the uBuntu Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court” 
in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) Ubuntu and the Law: African Ideals and Postapartheid 
Jurisprudence (2012) 367 374-375.  
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they have given direction to how ubuntu-botho and restorative justice may be 
incorporated into a new constitutional jurisprudence and have consequently 
illustrated what a new legal and ethical South African community should look like. It 
is submitted that these cases illustrate the call by Justices Mokgoro and Sachs and 
other judicial voices to develop ubuntu, an indigenous, historically sustainable value 
in South Africa’s jurisprudence, also in criminal jurisprudence.  
It is further submitted that if properly defined, ubuntu, as a constitutional value, 
can and should form a fundamental part of the judicial interpretation and 
jurisprudence of the law. In recollecting, reimagining and reinterpreting through the 
lens of ubuntu, the courts contribute to establishing and promoting a constitutional 
democratic community of human-interdependence, of restorative justice. So too, 
different interests, particularly those of Western and customary law are linked and 
the law is enriched.57  
It is evident that the concepts of communitarianism, conciliation and human dignity 
under ubuntu overlap with the elements of restorative justice, especially the 
participatory role of the community, the rehabilitation and reintegration of the 
offender and the victim which are discussed in more detail below.58  
Like ubuntu, restorative justice also has a more extensive reach, in that the key 
role-players are not only the state and the offender. Instead the offender, the victim 
                                            
56 In the Port Elizabeth Municipality and Dikoko v Mokhatla matters. 
57 Cornell “A Call for a Nuanced Constitutional Jurisprudence” in Ubuntu and the Law 332. 
Compare F Mnyongani (“De-linking Ubuntu: Towards a Unique South African Jurisprudence” 
(2010) 31 Obiter134-145) who in contrast calls for ubuntu to be de-linked from the dominant 
Western legal paradigm so that it may be understood properly. 
58 This is illustrated by T Murithi “Practical Peacemaking Wisdom from Africa: Reflections on 
Ubuntu” (2006) 1 JPAS 25 34, in which lessons from ubuntu include public participation, the 
support of victims and perpetrators in the process; the value of accountability that is linked 
with remorsefulness and forgiveness and the unity and interdependence of humanity in the 
community. The five stages of dispute resolution in “Ubuntu societies” Murithi discusses (30-
31) also reflect the characteristics of restorative justice. The first stage entails evidence 
being heard and the offender being encouraged to accept responsibility; in the second 
stage, the perpetrator is encouraged to repent and demonstrate remorse; the third stage 
involves forgiveness in that the perpetrator is encouraged to seek forgiveness and the victim 
is encouraged to grant mercy and to forgive; the fourth stage involves restitution and 
reconciliation between the parties.  
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and the community are all actively involved in the process.59 This illustrates the 
perception of restorative justice as a democratic, deliberative, participatory process. 
A process that brings all the affected parties together to deliberate the dispute 
themselves and agree upon a solution that each takes responsibility for honouring.60 
However, it is submitted in this dissertation that restorative justice is more than 
simply a democratic deliberative process. The values that underpin the 
characteristics of restorative justice are equally important and critical to a proper 
description and understanding of restorative justice. These include the recognition of 
the inherent human dignity of each party, the social worth of community, the value of 
ubuntu, the restorative justice aims of responsibility, reparation and reintegration. 
Consequently, as submitted above, restorative justice is a set of values, principles 
and practices to be used in response to crime.61 
3 3 Characteristics of restorative justice  
The principles of responsibility, restoration and reintegration are central to 
restorative justice.62 Under the principle of responsibility the purpose is engagement 
with the offenders. The offenders are challenged to explore the nature of the offence 
and realise the consequences of their actions, including the impact they had and 
may still have on the victims and the community.63  
Restoration involves restitution and reparation, in a number of ways, for the loss 
suffered by the victims and the community.64 Reparation65 is one of the primary 
                                            
59 Mekonnen (2010) AJCR 6; Walgrave et al (2013) RJIJ 160; Batley “Restorative Justice” in 
Beyond Retribution 21. 
60 Braithwaite & Strang “Introduction” in Restorative Justice and Civil Society 1. 
61 Rosenblatt The Role of Community 11. 
62 These principles are akin to the principles of so-called transitional justice based on 
restorative justice, namely truth, accountability, reparation and reconciliation. See Mekonnen 
(2010) AJCR 9. 
63 Mekonnen (2010) AJCR 6. 
64 Mekonnen (2010) AJCR 7. 
65 The SALRC in Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) (Project 82) (2000) para 
3.3.37, 70 defines reparation broadly as including both restitution and compensation: 
“Restitution, in its narrowest sense, means the restoration of an item of property to its lawful 
owner. Compensation goes further and encompasses the making good of damage resulting 
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characteristics of restorative justice.66 Restitution is also the chief and crucial goal 
argued for in this dissertation regarding the loss suffered in instances of economic 
crime. Restitution need not always be pecuniary payment to the victim, although it 
usually is some form of monetary recompense. Restitution may involve community 
work or payment to a public organisation.67  
Reintegration emphasises the reconciliation of the parties through the restoration 
of relationships, or at least the reintegration into the community of both the victims 
and the offenders, albeit separately from one another. Restorative justice thus 
highlights looking forward, to the future and not only to the past.68 It looks at the 
offence, but also beyond the offence, to a new narrative. Importantly restorative 
justice involves more pertinently the voice of the victim, as well as the accent of the 
community. These key characteristics of restorative justice are in contrast to typical 
retributive justice characteristics that focus more on the offence and the offender and 
consequently are limited to the past and past deeds. The aims of restorative justice 
are also more far reaching than the punitive and utilitarian outcomes of a classical 
criminal retributive system which generally focus on the offender and punishing the 
offender according to the severity of the crime. To illustrate the meaning of these 
core characteristics of restorative justice and the resultant benefits of integrating 
them into the criminal justice system, the focus below is on the various stakeholders 
involved in a typical criminal offence: the state, the offender, the victim and the 
community. 
                                            
from the commission of a crime.” In this dissertation the phrases, reparation, restitution, 
restoration and compensation are used interchangeably.  
66 SALRC Sentencing Restorative Justice (Compensation for Victims of Crime and Victim 
Empowerment) (Project 82) Paper 7 (1997) Ch 2, para 2.2, 8; Ch 4, paras 8 & 9, 37. 
67 Two years of an eight-year sentence given to the renowned tennis player Bob Hewitt for 
rape was suspended for two years on condition that he pay R100,000 to the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development to use in campaigns against abuse of women and 
children. S v Hewitt 2016 JDR 1079 (SCA) 1.  
68 Skelton & Batley (2008) AJ 47, 49. 
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3 3 1 The state as governing stakeholder 
Although restorative justice is said to return the conflict to the persons most 
affected by the crime, namely the victim and the offender,69 the state remains one of 
the major stakeholders in the criminal justice system. An important attribute of 
restorative justice is the more direct personal involvement of the victims and the 
community, in addition to the offender in the criminal justice process. However, 
notwithstanding this inclusivity, the state remains the governing stakeholder and 
consequently the conventional criminal justice notion that an offence is committed 
against the state remains valid. 70  
It is the submission of this dissertation that collaboration is important and 
partnerships between different stakeholders in the state and the community are 
necessary to successfully address economic crime.71 Partnerships operate on 
different levels:72 at the primary level are partnerships that involve resident groups 
within the particular community.73 Another level is partnerships between different 
criminal justice agencies with the purpose of improving efficiency and efficacy of the 
                                            
69 Rosenblatt The Role of Community 16-17. The return of the dispute is associated with the 
profound statement of Christie that the dispute had been stolen by the state from the victim 
and the community. Also see Skelton & Batley Charting Progress 125-126. 
70 The relationship between the role of the state and civil society regarding the 
implementation of restorative justice has been considered in a number of ways, including the 
state having maximum involvement or minimum involvement. See Skelton & Batley Charting 
Progress 123-124. 
71 See fn 101 below regarding the NCPS’ emphasis on collaboration and partnerships; The 
Foreword of the Department of Correctional Services (2005) White Paper on Correctional 
Services (“White Paper (2005)”) 4 by the then Minister of Correctional Services stated: 
“South African society must be embraced as our overall partner”. See also the White Paper 
(2005) 7 for emphasis on societal partnerships. Many of the proposals in the NCPS also 
echo the principles of restorative justice; such as rehabilitation of the offender, 
acknowledgment of the victim, involvement of the community and organisations, other than 
government. These are encapsulated by an extract from the vision statement NCPS (1996) 
para 1.2.1.4.1, 5 “South Africa shall be a society where its inhabitants can pursue their daily 
lives in peace and safety free from undue fear of crime and violence. It shall be a society in 
which the fundamental rights of the individual are effectively protected with the support and 
co-operation of fellow citizens” (writer’s emphasis). See also, Clear et al Community Justice 
99; Skelton (2007) AJ 228-229, 243. 
72 Clear et al Community Justice 135. 
73 For example, neighbourhood councils and groups and citizen volunteer groups. 
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government’s efforts to address crime.74 Yet another level may be collaboration 
between different government agencies within and outside the justice system, for 
example a department within the ministry of education invoking members from the 
prosecution in an education programme about crime in schools.75 Another level of 
partnership involves collaboration between government departments and private 
organisations. 76  
In describing the partnership between the government and civil society the state is 
said to be responsible for the steering, whilst civil society does the rowing. 77 The 
state needs to direct and give guidance. A number of specific roles that the state can 
fulfil have been identified, including that of enabler, resourcer, implementer and 
guarantor of good practice.78 As enabler the state needs to provide the necessary 
legal framework within which restorative justice practices can happen.79 As 
resourcer, the state needs to provide the necessary resources, financial, human and 
otherwise for the implementation of restorative practices.80 At present, the state is 
                                            
74 For example, the NDPP Annual Report 2017/2018 18 19 emphasises the close 
collaboration between the NPA and the Anti-Corruption Task Team, the Special Investigating 
Unit, the South African Revenue Service and several other government stakeholders and 
reports entering into memoranda of understanding with some entities.  
75 White Paper (2005) para 4.4.4, 37. 
76 For example, the collaboration between SAPS, the NPA and Business Against Crime to 
establish the Specialised Commercial Crime Unit (“SCCU”). For a detailed discussion on the 
SCCU see A Altbeker Justice Through Specialisation? The Case of the Specialised 
Commercial Crime Court: Institute for Security Studies Monographs 76 (2003).  
77 Skelton & Batley Charting Progress 128; Skelton (2007) AJ 243. 
78 Skelton & Batley Charting Progress 124; Skelton (2007) AJ 243. 
79 There are already a number of enabling restorative justice frameworks in South Africa, 
principally the policy document, the White Paper (2005). Consequent to this was the 
promulgation of the Correctional Services Amendment Act 25 of 2008, as well as 
Correctional Services Amendment Act 5 of 2011. The state further fulfils its role as enabler 
by, for example, regular progress reports by the DCS before the PMG.  
80 The lack of resources is one of the most challenging issues hampering the implementation 
of restorative justice practices, like rehabilitation and reintegration programmes in South 
Africa. See DCS Annual Report 2017/2018 34 reporting the effect which a reduction in staff 
due to budget constraints had on its operations, including rehabilitation programmes. The 
JCIS Annual Report 2017/2018 27 states that only 6 out of the 16 sites inspected had 
educators to support the rehabilitation programmes. See also DH Bayley “Security and 
Justice for All” in H Strang & J Braithwaite (eds) Restorative Justice and Civil Society (2001) 
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the primary implementer of restorative justice practices in South Africa through the 
Department of Correctional Services (“DCS”).81 As the guarantor of good practice, 
the state has the responsibility of ensuring that restorative justice practices are of a 
good standard. This can be done by imposing a minimum set of standards or 
qualifications that are required before a person can act as service providers.82  
It is the submission of this dissertation that collaboration is key to an effective and 
sustainable implementation of restorative justice practices and that the state should 
partner with civil society in such implementation.83 The extent of crime in South 
Africa is extraordinarily high and the capacity of the state is stretched. Collaboration 
between the state and civil society can help overcome the lack of resources and 
capacity that may exist in government or civil society.84 Although the flexibility and 
informality of restorative justice processes need to be safeguarded, it is 
acknowledged that procedural safeguards and protection through training and 
                                            
214-218 who describes the challenges for the state as resourcer including economic 
challenges that involve either an increase in budget or a re-allocation of budget; political 
challenges that fear delegating authority; and social challenges in the light of the diversity of 
the communities and the difficulties of getting agreement and cooperation in such 
communities.  
81 Significantly one of the opening statements of the Minister of the Department of Justice 
and Correctional Serves in the DCS Annual Report 2017/2018 8 is that 82% of sentenced 
offenders had been placed on correctional programmes. See also the report on the 
rehabilitation (63-70) and community reintegration programmes (75-80). The impression 
from the JCIS Annual Report 2017/2018 27, 31 seems less favourable, but it is difficult to 
compare the information in the two reports.  
82 Skelton & Batley Charting Progress 119-121. For example, the standards set for the 
accreditation of mediators provided for by R 86 Magistrates’ Courts Rules 2014 (GN 854 of 
31 October 2014). See also Scott-Macnab & Khan (1985) SACC 127, who propose that 
statutory regulation is necessary to regulate dispute centres and processes and to ensure 
control, uniformity and consistency. 
83 This is also the proposal of Skelton & Batley Charting Progress 125, 136. The White 
Paper (2005) paras 3.1.3, 3.3.3-3.3.6, 35 places societal responsibility central to its strategic 
framework on correction and the corrective approach to addressing crime.  
84 The DCS Annual Report 2017/2018 8, 13, 15 highlights the importance of prevailing 
partnerships and network of collaborators, which is encouraging. However, Tshehla (2004) 
SACJ 10-11 warns that we should not be blind to the operational and administrative 
challenges confronting the different state departments.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
117 
 
standards need to be established.85 The submission is that the state-based criminal 
justice system be reformed by the integration of restorative justice principles and 
practices through collaboration with civil society, including appropriate community 
models.  
It is envisaged that the proposed mediation of economic crime offences could 
involve the participation of a private dispute resolution centre with the NPA. 
Partnerships, being collective efforts, should result in collective efficacy. Moreover, 
collaboration between government and the private sector should promote the 
credibility of the criminal justice system and enhance the understanding of its 
operations in civil society.  
3 3 2 The offender as responsible participating stakeholder 
Rehabilitation of the offender is a common aim of both the conventional criminal 
justice system,86 as well as of restorative justice; although the conception of and 
approaches to rehabilitation may vary across the different spheres. The South 
African state’s understanding of rehabilitation is significant here: “Rehabilitation is the 
result of a process that combines the correction of offending behaviour, human 
development and the promotion of social responsibility and values” (writer’s 
emphasis).87 A fundamental policy document88 defining rehabilitation, both as a 
                                            
85 Skelton (2007) AJ 243-244. Skelton & Batley Charting Progress 120 also discuss 
Braithwaite’s three types of standards: “constraining standards” are minimal procedural 
safeguards like empowerment, respectful listening, and respect for human rights; 
“maximizing standards” are standards that need to be encouraged like restoration and 
prevention; and “emergent standards” are standards that naturally evolve from the 
restorative process, like remorse, forgiveness and mercy and should not be actively 
encouraged. Compare fn 13 above where these categories are used by the authors with 
reference to “values”. It is submitted that there is a difference between values and standards, 
but that the types are appropriate to both values and standards. 
86 The main objectives of punishment are: retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation. See JD 
Mujuzi “Don’t Send Them to Prison Because They Can’t Rehabilitate Them: The South 
African Judiciary Doubts the Executive’s Ability to Rehabilitate Offenders: A Note on S v 
Shilubane 2008 (1) SACR 295 (T)” (2008) SAJHR 330 336; Mujuzi (2008) SACJ 11-12. See 
also Masiloane & Marais (2009) SACJ 400-401 regarding the difficulties encountered in the 
rehabilitation of offenders in the South African system and the high recidivism rates.  
87 The White Paper (2005) para 4.2.1, 37 
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policy and practice, is the Department of Correctional Services (2005) White Paper 
on Correctional Services (“White Paper (2005)”).89 It is clear from the White Paper 
(2005) that the rehabilitation of the offender through corrective and restorative 
principles and practices is fundamental to its policy to prevent crime, correct 
offenders and promote societal responsibility.90 
This corrective and restorative approach by the state underscores the core value 
of rehabilitation in restorative justice. Rehabilitation is a practice which aims to 
correct the offenders’ criminal behaviour, to change their personality, outlooks, habits 
and opportunities.91 The description of rehabilitation in the White Paper (2005) is 
fundamental to the understanding of restorative justice and to the participation of the 
different stakeholders as described in this dissertation: “every human being is 
capable of change and transformation if offered the opportunity and the necessary 
resources.”92 
All three arms of the state, the executive,93 the legislature94 and the judiciary95 
have acknowledged that rehabilitation is challenging. Some of the difficulties are 
over-crowded prisons, limited resources in the department of correctional services 
                                            
88 For example, the DCS acknowledges that the White Paper (2005) is one of the strategic 
documents that guides its operations and mandates it to: “develop the DCS into an institution 
of rehabilitation and social reintegration and promote corrections as a societal responsibility.” 
Also see JICS Report 2017/2018 15; DCS Annual Report 2017/2018 24.  
89 The White Paper (2005) para 4.2.2, 37 views rehabilitation as a strategy to prevent crime, 
and as a holistic phenomenon incorporating and encouraging: social responsibility, social 
justice, empowerment of and a contribution to making South Africa a better place to live in. 
90 This is the fundamental principle underlying the White Paper (2005) which sets out 
restoration as a managerial objective of the DCS in ch 5, para 5.2. 
91 Mujuzi (2008) SAJHR 337; Mujuzi (2008) SACJ 15-17. 
92 The White Paper (2005) Executive Summary para 17, 12. 
93 For example, DCS acknowledges that it has challenges, like misaligned organisational 
structures, to fulfil its rehabilitation mandate. See DCS Annual Report 2017/2018 35. 
94 See reports by PMG “Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programme Challenges 
Correctional Services” briefing by Justice and Correctional Services (17-09-2014) 
<https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/17574/> (accessed 30-06-2019). 
95 S v Shilubane 2008 1 SACR 295 (T) paras 5-6; Kelly v Minister of Correctional Services 
2016 2 SACR 351 (GJ) paras 21, 24-25, 45. 
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and scarcity of rehabilitation programmes.96 These difficulties clearly have an impact 
upon the rehabilitation of offenders and also on their rights. 
Responsibility or offender accountability is one of the fundamental aims of 
rehabilitation. The acceptance of responsibility for their actions is necessary for 
offenders’ rehabilitation, which in turn encourages them to desist from criminal 
activity and results in the prevention of recidivism. In a conventional adversarial 
court-based process offenders are alienated by the stark professional environment 
which they experience as strange and detached. In addition, the control and 
autonomy of their defences are taken away through the rules and formalities of 
criminal procedure and rules of evidence. A sanction is also imposed on offenders. It 
is submitted that a restorative justice process such as mediation will encourage the 
rehabilitation of offenders. Offenders are given an opportunity to participate in a 
process in a more conducive and friendly environment. Offenders are able to tell 
their stories in a more relaxed and informal manner. The underlying reason for the 
crime may unfold and be received more sympathetically.97 Importantly, the offenders’ 
participation in the determination of their sanction and agreement to make restitution 
is likely to strengthen their commitment to fulfil the terms of the sanction and 
restitution agreement. Mediation thus offers a more humane approach and process 
to resolving the dispute. It is submitted that it will help offenders to accept 
responsibility for their actions, and to make good the harm they have caused.98 In 
addition, rehabilitation under a restorative process has proven to bring healing and 
restoration to not only the offender but also the victim and other affected parties. 
3 3 3 The victim as respected participating stakeholder 
A further characteristic of restorative justice processes is that they are victim 
aware.99 A stronger emphasis on a victim-aware approach was identified more than 
                                            
96 Masiloane & Marais (2009) SACJ 400-401. 
97 For example, the theft of monies may be due to the need to cover costs of medical 
treatment or due to a gambling addiction. Although this may be disclosed as part of evidence 
during a conventional trial it is submitted that the environment of a mediation will be more 
sympathetic.  
98 See the discussion in ch 2, para 2 4 1, 77ff. 
99 Rosenblatt’s (The Role of Community 26, 29) term “victim aware” is preferred to the more 
commonly used victim-centric. This is because restorative justice promotes the participation 
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20 years ago by the South African justice system.100 In the first National Crime 
Prevention Strategy (“NCPS”) a call was made for a new approach to crime, to move 
from a reactionary model to a preventative model, and this new paradigm, in turn, 
called for a reframing of the traditional criminal justice system; including the call for 
                                            
of all the parties, and the offender is also a stakeholder. Victim-aware includes a victim’s 
right to participate and be present in the criminal justice process, the right to obtain 
information and to services, the right to protection from harassment and victimisation and the 
right to compensation and reparation. For a discussion of these aspects see: Garkawe 
(2001) SACJ 134135, 143-151; KL de Klerk The Role of the Victim in the Criminal Justice 
System: A Specific Focus on Victim Offender Mediation and Victim Impact Statements LLM 
Thesis, University of Pretoria (2012) 5-6. Also compare the SALRC, Sentencing (A 
Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime) (Project 82) (2004) paras 9.100-9.107, 35-39 
which concluded that victims have been neglected by the South African criminal justice 
system and that the system needs to be more victim-orientated.  
100 The National Crime Prevention Strategy, approved by Parliament and released in May 
1996 (“NCPS”). Detailed discussion or evaluation of the NCPS is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. In brief, the NCPS paras 1.2.1.2 & 1.3 5, 6-7 propose moving from a “crime 
control” to a “crime prevention” strategy and focusing on prevention of crime rather than 
reacting to crime. The new approach and strategy are based on developing programmes for 
the following four pillars: (i) improving the efficiency and efficacy of the criminal justice 
process, including for example, victim empowerment programmes; (ii) reducing the 
opportunity for crime by developing various systems for prevention and earlier detection, 
including for example, joining with private enterprises by developing codes of conduct to 
combat economic crime; (iii) promoting public values and changing the public’s perspectives 
on crime through various initiatives, including school programmes; and (iv) programmes that 
reduce trans-national crimes, including better collaboration and shared programmes 
between various state departments. A summary of the NCPS can be found at 
<http://www.gov.za/documents/national-CRIME-prevention-strategy-summary> (accessed 6-
04-2017). The status of the victim is discussed throughout the document, in particular the 
inadequate support for the victim (NCPS para 4.10 20-21) and the national programme for 
victim empowerment and support (NCPS para 17 65-67). Significantly NCPS para 1.3.1.3 6 
describes the paradigm shift as follows: “In particular, an emphasis on a state centred 
system should give way to a greater emphasis on a victim-centred, restorative justice 
system. A victim centred criminal justice system is one which is concerned to address the 
direct effects of crime and place emphasis on those victims least able to protect themselves. 
A restorative justice system is one which seeks to encourage full rehabilitation.” See also S 
Garkawe “Enhancing the Role and Rights of Crime Victims in the South Africa Justice 
System – An Australian Perspective” (2001) SACJ 131, fns 1 and 2. Also compare 
Rosenblatt The Role of the Community 26-30. 
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the active participation of the community,101 and new perspectives on the offender 
and victim.  
A significant contribution restorative justice makes is the normalising of the 
perceptions of crime, criminals, victims and the combating of crime.102 Conventional 
criminal justice systems and criminologists focus on the “criminology of the other”. 
The focus is on particular risks groups, like youth or drug addicts and research is 
focused on better control of such groups to ensure less crime. Restorative justice, in 
comparison, looks at “criminology of the self”, which includes normalising the 
offender and the victim. This entails seeing each as ordinary, reasonably responsible 
persons with particular strengths and weaknesses, who due to their respective 
contexts, commit crimes or become victims.103 For instance, with regard to the 
victim, restorative justice takes the victim seriously and affords her or him an 
opportunity to be engaged with and participate in the criminal justice procedure.104 It 
is asserted that this is not a naïve trust, but an approach that brings a wider and 
more nuanced understanding of crime and the actual offender and victim.105  
The participation of victims in the criminal justice process is complex.106 The 
recognition of victims is multifaceted and there are also a number of different 
                                            
101 The NCPS (paras 1.2.1.8, 1.2.1.10 & 1.3 6-7; para 3.2.2 10; para 6.7 47) emphasises 
that the new approach to crime calls for integration on various levels, including integration 
and co-operation between government departments; and partners in the non-government 
sector, including social welfare organisations and business enterprises as crime is regarded 
as being a “social issue” and opposed to a mere “security issue”. This is reflected through 
the various pillars (NCPS para 7 49-52) and national programmes (NCPS para 28 52-80).  
102 L Walgrave, I Aertsen, S Parmentier, I Vanfraechem & E Zinsstag “Why Restorative 
Justice Matters for Criminology” (2013) 1 RJIJ 159 161. 
103 Walgrave et al (2013) RJIJ 161-162. 
104 Likewise, the offenders are considered in their personal context and not as a stereotype 
of a particular group.  
105 Walgrave et al (2013) RJIJ 161-162, 163. It is a trust that includes the belief that ordinary 
persons can, through meaningful participation, find solutions to the crime and its 
consequences.  
106 The nature and role of the victims could vary, for example, from being an informant to a 
witness, or a direct victim; and participation could take place at different stages, including 
pre-trial, during the trial, during the sentencing and post-sentencing. 
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victims.107 Burchell has a fairly narrow understanding of a victim: “the sufferer of the 
harm or his or her relative”.108 The focus is on the victim who has suffered direct 
harm, against whom the offence was committed.109 However, it may also be an eye-
witness, dependents or relatives.110 There are also secondary and indirect victims.111 
In the context of economic crime, there may be direct and indirect victims, primary 
and secondary victims and even unidentifiable victims, but victims nevertheless.112 
The socio-economic and socio-political impact on a broader community has also 
been recognised by the courts and commentators.113 
Natural victims have different personalities, different needs and different motives 
for participating in the process.114 One of the concerns raised with regard to greater 
participation by victims in the criminal justice process, especially in the stage of the 
sanctioning of the offender, is that this will lead to more retributive justice, as the 
victim is said to want the offender to receive her or his “just deserts”. However this 
has not been empirically supported.115 Also, it is submitted that a vengeful victim’s 
                                            
107 For a discussion of the different categories of victims, see Dignan Understanding Victims 
20-23. 
108 J Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (4ed) (2013) 3. 
109 For example, in a case of theft, the direct victim is the party (a person or a corporate 
body) from whom money was stolen.  
110 KD Muller & IA van der Merwe “Recognising the Victim in the Sentencing Phase: The Use 
of Victim Impact Statements in Court” (2006) SAJHR 647 650-651. 
111 For example, in the case of theft by a mother, children of the offender are secondary 
victims that have clearly been affected by the crime and the consequent prosecution of the 
mother. 
112 For example, in a Ponzi scheme direct and primary victims may be direct investors, 
secondary victims may be dependents of the investors, whilst creditors of both types of 
victims may also be victims.  
113 Shaik v S 2008 2 SACR 165 (CC) para 72. See ch 1, para 1, 2-4 for discussion. 
114 Clear et al Community Justice 68 aptly describe the complexity of victims’ differing needs 
as follows: “Some want a kind of revenge, while others are more interested in restitution. 
Some want to meet and confront the offender; others do not. Some want to understand why 
the crime happened, and these victims often look for a way for the offender to be 
rehabilitated so that future criminality will not occur. Others care little about what is in the 
offender’s head or heart. They just want a meaningful punishment to be imposed by the 
court.” 
115 See, for example, J Doak & D O’Mahony “The Vengeful Victim? Assessing the Attitudes 
of Victim Participating in Restorative Youth Conferencing” (2006) 13 Int Rev Vic 157-177. 
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attitude and demands are likely to be relativised and changed during a mediation 
process because the process itself is transformative and leads to change in 
perceptions and positions of participants.116 
It has been acknowledged that in the past victims were marginalised in primarily 
three different ways:117 the denial of their status as persons who have personally and 
directly suffered harm; the neglect of attributing to victims a formal role in the criminal 
justice system and not simply reducing them to witnesses;118 and the failure to grant 
victims redress through material restitution or otherwise. It is further acknowledged 
that a number of restorative justice mechanisms endorsing the status and role of the 
victim have since been introduced and integrated into the criminal justice system.119 
Victim-impact statements are now commonly recognised and used in the criminal 
justice system.120 Particularly important for this dissertation is the development of 
formal victim participation provided for under 105A(1)(b)(iii) of the CPA.121 However, 
the South African criminal justice system is still primarily punitive and retributive.122 
Accordingly, it is submitted that a more direct and greater role should be made 
possible for victims to participate in the criminal justice process more effectively. The 
status, role and redress of victims could be further expanded on and formally 
integrated into the criminal justice system through a restorative justice process like 
                                            
116 See the discussion on transformative mediation in ch 2, para 2 2 3, 57-58. 
117 Dignan Understanding Victims 62-65. Also see the various research projects by the 
SALRC referred to in fn 129 below and various policy documents, including the NCPS 
referred to in fn 100 above. 
118 In the past, courts did not see victims as a central participant in a criminal trial and a 
victim was “equated as simply another witness with no independent right of audience”. The 
experience in court can also be insensitive like a victim having to sit beside an accused; or 
confrontational through aggressive cross-examination Also see Burchell Criminal Law 3. 
119 For example, the acknowledgment by the courts of the important status and role of 
victims (discussed in para 3 4, 133ff); and provision for formal victim participation in s 276 
(correctional supervision) of the CPA. Burchell Criminal Law 4 acknowledges that victims’ 
rights are gaining more prominence in the South African criminal justice system and affirm 
that victims have basic human rights. See also, NDPP Annual Report 2017/2018 17 stating 
that the NPA ensures that everything it does is in the interests of the victim, “thereby 
confidently claiming its position in society as the ‘People’s Lawyer’”. 
120 Burchell Criminal Law 3-4; Müller & Van der Merwe (2006) SAJHR 647-663. 
121 This issue is discussed in ch 4, para 4 4 2 2, 327ff. 
122 Burchell Criminal Law 3-4; Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing para 11.6. 
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mediation.123 In a mediation, the victim will have equal status to the other participants 
including the offender, and in certain instances, the prosecutor. The victim’s role will 
also be more direct and personal and the victim will be recognised and 
acknowledged as a victim, as somebody who has suffered harm, which can be 
primary or secondary, direct or indirect. A victim will also be able to be directly 
involved in the determining of the sanction, which is likely to include some form of 
restitution. As shown above, mediation will afford victims an opportunity to tell their 
stories in a non-threatening, non-confrontational and neutral space. This will result in 
the outcome of restoration, restitution and other benefits discussed above.124 
3 3 4 The community as active and caring participating stake-holder125 
Crime also harms the community. It impairs the mutual and reciprocal trust 
underlying the nature of the community.126 In South African terms, crime erodes 
ubuntu. It weakens the communitarianism of a particular group.127 Economic crime 
also has a significant impact on the socio-political policies of a country and impedes 
economic growth.128 The effect and role of crime on the various stakeholders, 
                                            
123 The integration of mediation would fall under the category of “mainstreaming” restorative 
justice initiatives into the criminal justice system. Compare Dignan Understanding Victims 
106-17, 138-139 
124 See ch 2, para 2 4 1, 86ff. 
125 Dignan Understanding Victims 99-101 identifies the community as a direct, indirect or 
vicarious stakeholder. For example, in the case of corruption, the community might be a 
direct stakeholder if it suffered the loss directly and its communitarianism or ubuntu was 
impaired. It would be an indirect stakeholder when corruption has an indirect effect on a 
community’s socio-economic status; and it would be a vicarious stakeholder when its interest 
in the outcome extends beyond that of the direct victims, or if it is acting as a representative 
of the direct victims. An example of this is Corruption Watch acting as amicus curiae in a 
corruption case. 
126 TR Clear, JR Hamilton Jr & E Cadora Community Justice 2 ed (2011) 117. 
127 Ubuntu means interdependence and that each member of the community is linked to 
each of the disputing parties, the victim and the offender. An offender, who breaks the law, 
consequently transforms her or his community into a law-breaking group; and conversely if a 
victim is wronged the whole group is wronged. Consequently, any resolution is aimed at not 
only repairing the harm to the victim, but also the harm to the community. Murithi (2006) 
JPAS 29-30. Also see Cornell (2005) AHRLJ 206-207. 
128 See the discussion in ch 1, para 1 1, 2-3. 
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including the community, have been considered by the SALRC.129 The increased 
engagement of both the community and the victim and the broader focus on 
correctional supervision of the offender, core characteristics of restorative justice, 
have been deliberated on and proposed several decades ago.130  
The participation of the community in the criminal justice process is both a 
strategy and a philosophy.131 As a strategy, the responsibility of addressing crime is 
broadened and partnerships are formed by the state with community groups to help 
share the obligations of dealing with crime. As a philosophy, the participation of the 
community is measured as the community’s response to crime and its acceptance of 
a co-responsibility to address crime. It constitutes communitarianism, the building of 
corporate capital, of collective action to ensure a better community which has less 
crime and more good.132  
The community and the role the community can play in the criminal justice system 
are central to restorative justice processes.133 The community not only has an 
interest, but also an obligation in crime control and addressing the consequences of 
crime.134 The role of the community is not only in preventing crime, but also in 
                                            
129 Several projects regarding the role of the community, the position of victims and 
sentencing were initiated in 1991, including the following reports: Sentencing Restorative 
Justice (Compensation for Victims of Crime and Victim Empowerment) (Project 82) Paper 7 
(1997); Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) (Project 82) (2000); Sentencing (A 
Compensation Fund for Victims of Crime) (Project 82) (2004). 
130 Also see the SALRC Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) (Project 82) (2000) part 
II, para 2.4, 24 and paras 2.13-2.15, 28-29 regarding proposal for a new sentencing 
framework partnership for sentencing, including the victim and community, and the view that 
specific attention should be given to the victim’s interests and right to restitution and 
compensation.  
131 Clear et al Community Justice 2.  
132 Clear et al Community Justice 2-7; Skelton & Batley Charting Progress 127. 
133 This is clearly the understanding of the White Paper (2005) ch 13, 85-89 and its 
emphasis on external partnerships, including local, regional and international. Sachs J in M v 
S para 62 highlights the role of the community in correctional supervision and restorative 
justice and holds: “Central to the notion of restorative justice is the recognition of the 
community rather than the criminal-justice agencies as the prime site of crime control”. See 
too SALRC Sentencing Restorative Justice (Compensation for Victims of Crime and Victim 
Empowerment) (Project 82) Paper 7 (1997) Ch 2, paras 2.1, 2.4, 7. 
134 Clear et al Community Justice 118. Also compare the White Paper’s (2005) chs 3 and 4 
emphasis on societal responsibility. Also see references in fns 71 & 100 above. 
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assisting to address the harm done by a crime that was committed. With regard to 
the former, the community is involved in community building programmes.135 The 
community, usually the care community or micro-community, comprised of persons 
close to the parties, also has a role in supporting the rehabilitation and reintegration 
of the offender and the victim into the community. This is based, on the premise that 
persons close to the offender are more suitable and likely to convince the offender of 
her or his accountability.136 The community can also help in repairing the trust in the 
community.137 Accordingly, the involvement of the community includes, voicing 
concern about crime, reporting crime, identifying offenders, testifying in court, 
participating in the reintegration of offenders and victims into the community.138  
The importance of the role of the community, and their participation in the fight 
against crime, including the resolution and prevention of crime, is acknowledged in 
the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS). The involvement of the community 
is also one of the core characteristics of ubuntu. The participation and voice of the 
community also form part of traditional mediation practices. Accordingly, a critical 
issue is the definition or understanding of “community”, a concept which remains 
elusive.139  
Community may be defined by factors such as geographical place,140 ethnic 
culture, language, socio-economic class, gender, age and duration of stay in a 
                                            
135 Clear et al Community Justice 117. For example, teaching ethics and accounting at 
schools and for the public. 
136 Rosenblatt The Role of Community 46. 
137 Clear et al Community Justice 118. For example, the community can, after the damages 
and loss caused by a Ponzi scheme assist in repairing the trust in financial investment 
schemes through financial guidance of investors. 
138 DT Masiloane & CW Marais “Community involvement in the criminal justice system” 
(2009) SACJ 391. Compare Rosenblatt The Role of the Community 47-52 who identifies a 
number of community roles, including acting as mediators; victim and offender networks, and 
local residents shaping and monitoring restoration plans.  
139 A Edwards & G Hughes “Introduction: the Community Governance of Crime Control” in A 
Edwards & G Hughes (eds) Crime Control and Community (2002) 1 5. Community is a 
phrase which is overused and little understood and has many meanings. See J Foster 
“’People Pieces”: The Neglected but Essential Elements of Community Crime Prevention” in 
A Edwards & G Hughes (eds) Crime Control and Community (2002) 167 173. 
140 Clear et al Community Justice 7-31 discusses in detail the importance of “place” in 
defining a community’s role in the criminal justice system. 
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place.141 A descriptive definition comprising a number of the above factors is given 
by the SALRC: 
“A collection of individuals who maintain homogeneous interests and customs in 
a distinctive social structure, in a limited territorial area and who show a strong 
inclination toward group identification.”142 
In Seedat v S the definition of the public is interestingly described by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (“SCA”) as including persons “close to the accused and those 
distressed by the audacity and horror of the crime”.143 
Although community is “a ‘feelgood’ word”,144 caution needs to be taken of the 
dark side of the community demonstrated by vigilantism, which itself “presents a 
picture of bewildering volatility and complexity”.145 Although complex, one of the 
causes of vigilantism in South Africa is reportedly that it is a response to the 
“ineffectiveness, unresponsiveness and ultimately failure of the police and justice 
                                            
141 For example, in Stellenbosch there may be different communities in Kayamandi and 
Paradyskloof, two suburbs in the same town whose residents comprise persons from 
different socio-economic and ethnic groups respectively. Also see Foster “’People Pieces” in 
Crime Control and Community 173. 
142 SALRC Sentencing Restorative Justice (Compensation for Victims of Crime and Victim 
Empowerment) (Project 82) Paper 7 (1997) Ch 1, para 1.7, 7. 
143 [2016] ZASCA 153 para 39. 
144 J Foster “’People Pieces” in Crime Control and Community 173; FF Rosenblatt The Role 
of Community in Restorative Justice (2015) 1. Compare G Pavlich “The Force of 
Community” in H Strang & J Braithwaite (eds) Restorative Justice and Civil Society (2001) 
56 58-59, who warns against the dark side of the community and the tendency of the 
community to exclude “the other” and “the stranger”.  
145 TG Kirsch & T Grätz “Vigilantism, State Ontologies & Encompassment: An Introductory 
Essay” in TG Kirsch & T Grätz (eds) Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa (2010) 1 4. It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss this issue. However, reference is made to it 
to illustrate that the community are involved in some instances of economic crime, albeit 
brutally and ruthlessly so. For more on this, see M Nel Crime as Punishment: A Legal 
Perspective on Vigilantism in South Africa LLD dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2016), 
available at <http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/100325>. See, for example, S 
Majangaza “Vigilante WSU Students Kill Fellow Student Accused of Theft” (14-04-2019) 
Herald Live <https://www.heraldlive.co.za/news/2019-04-14-vigilante-wsu-students-kill-
fellow-student-accused-of-theft/> (accessed 30-06-2019). 
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system”.146 Another reaction to the dissatisfaction with the formal justice system is 
the establishment of formal non-governmental counterparts, such as the People’s 
Tribunal on Economic Crime in South Africa, a private organisation that investigates 
corruption.147 Important too is the recognition of both formal institutionalised 
groups148 and more customary informal social groups149 representing a community.  
Not only is the description of community complex, but so too the determination of 
the “public interest”, “public opinion”, “public moral vision” and “public culture”. What 
is the public culture or the expression of the lifeblood and identity of a particular 
group of people? What and who determines the moral and cultural values of a 
certain community? There is a plurality, a diversity and ambiguity in the notion 
“public”.150 It is difficult to name the present, the contemporary society.151 This is 
                                            
146 L Buur “Domesticating Sovereigns: The Changing Nature of Vigilante Groups in South 
Africa” in TG Kirsch & T Grätz (eds) Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa (2010) 26 28. 
147 An organisation which identifies itself as being formed by civil society to investigate 
corruption and state capture in response to government’s failure to do so. For more details 
see the website <https://corruptiontribunal.org.za/> (accessed 25-06-2019). 
148 Corruption Watch, an organisation linked as a chapter of Transparency International 
which helps to fight corruption in South Africa, is an example of a private institution. For 
more information, see <https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/> (accessed 25-06-2019). 
Another example of a regulated institution is the establishment of the Community Policing 
Forums (“CFP”) established under the s 221 of the Interim Constitution. Also see Buur 
“Vigilante Groups in South Africa” in Domesticating Vigilantism 434; and TG Kirsch 
(“Violence in the name of Democracy: Community Policing, Vigilante Action & Nation 
Building in South Africa” in TG Kirsch & T Grätz (eds) Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa 
[2010] 139-155 who discusses the phenomena of CFPs and their relationship with vigilante 
groups. 
149These could be elders in a community or victim support groups on social media. 
150 NN Koopman “Public Spirit: The Global Citizen’s Gift – A Response to William Storrar” 
95. Koopman (93-95) identifies three different principal ways in which the notion “public” is 
used. Firstly, as “that sphere of spaces and practices where an informed public opinion 
about the normative vision for society is formed and sustained”. This concept presumes that 
public discourse and debate occurs in a free space between equal partners. It is submitted 
that the public discourse in South Africa is not unconstrained, and participants are not equal 
or equally informed and consequently the formation of a normative bonos mores is difficult 
and complex. A second broader concept of public is that it has to do with life in general, life 
in the world: humanity, history, culture and reality. A third way of understanding public is 
when public refers to specific audiences or publics. 
151 Koopman (2011) IJPT 93. 
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especially true of South Africa, where the plurality of class, culture ethnicity, faith and 
law constitute a richly diverse and divisive public. The understanding and perception 
of the law by the different communities in South Africa is necessarily also complex, 
diverse and divisive. Accordingly, particular caution and care needs to be taken in 
defining the public or community and its voice in South Africa.152 Fundamental 
differences exist between one community and another that are critical to the 
strategies employed to involve the community in the fight against crime.153 In South 
Africa the huge socio-economic equality gap between different groups demands that 
additional care needs to be taken in defining community, including the defining of a 
particular group’s interests and the role a community can play in the prevention of 
crime and the restoration of the consequences of crime.154 Notwithstanding this 
plurality and deep diversity of the bonos mores of different cultural communities, it is 
submitted that basic human rights and basic bonos mores are found in each of these 
communities. These are the basic human rights and the basic bonos mores identified 
and protected by the Constitution of South Africa, and unified and cemented together 
across the different communities by ubuntu, the national adhesive.  
In the light of the complexity of defining community the value of the narrative 
nature of restorative justice and a process like mediation is fundamental. In this 
sense, the value of storytelling, of hearing the narratives of the offender and victim 
are critical. If the story of either one of the parties is silenced or marginalised through 
                                            
152 For example: Is the voice of the media the true voice of the public? Do media houses 
owned by wealthy, powerful, corporate shareholders reflect the voice of the unemployed and 
uneducated poor, natural persons? This is not denying that the media is a critical public 
voice and journalists have been described as “the superheroes of democracy” by senior 
prosecutors. See A Basson “New Anti-corruption Unit Boss: 'We Have Enough Money'” (22-
06-2019) news24 <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/new-anti-corruption-unit-
boss-we-have-enough-money-20190622> (accessed 25-06-2019). 
153 Clear et al Community Justice 1; Koopman (2011) IJPT 97. Importantly, too, is the 
concept of communal autonomy that allows local communities to deliberate and decide for 
themselves what constitutes their communal interests and bonos mores. 
154 Also see Clear et al Community Justice 140-145 for a discussion of the community’s role 
in fighting crime and the possible difficulties that may be encountered in diverse communities 
and the risk of inequalities arising, not only in identifying community interests, but also in 
addressing them.  
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procedural regulations or neglect,155 the integrity of the justice process is 
compromised and true justice cannot be attained. There is a disconnection between 
the dispute arising from the offence, the disruption of harmony and the subsequent 
reconciliation and reparation for such dispute and disruption. In addition, the 
recognition of each person’s inherent dignity through each party’s story is central to 
the successful functioning of restorative justice.  
It is submitted that the proposal to introduce mediation as an additional 
mechanism to combat economic crime in the justice system of South Africa will 
contribute to the reversal of the systemic failure by the state to address crime 
effectively. As has been shown mediation as a restorative justice process enables 
the meaningful participation of the offenders, victims and community and increases 
the parties’ satisfaction with their experience of the justice system.156 An outcome of 
restorative justice is the establishment of justice and ownership of justice at 
grassroots level.157 It is submitted that with the participation of different groups, 
including the offender and her or his supporters, the victim and her or his supporters, 
and the involvement of the community, a better understanding and appreciation of 
the operation and nature of the criminal justice system is cultivated. In addition, such 
involvement and participation increases the transparency and credibility of the justice 
system and leads to individuals and communities proudly taking ownership of the 
justice system. This, in turn, lightens the burden of the state to uphold law and order. 
Care also needs to be taken regarding the reference to public participation and 
the voice of the community. The participation of the community cannot be taken for 
granted and there may be little participation by the public.158 Obarrio refers to a need 
for a pedagogy, where mechanisms of traditional justice, formal justice and various 
                                            
155 For example, offenders not fully aware of their rights or victims marginalised by the formal 
criminal justice system.  
156 See discussion above ch 2, para 2 4, 89-91. 
157 Mekonnen (2010) AJCR 11 calls this “a bottom-up culture of human rights.” 
158 The public perception may be that restorative justice is “soft justice” and consequently 
there is a reluctance to participate in restorative justice practices. See, for example, JCIS 
Annual Report 2017/2018 41. Skelton & Batley Charting Progress 136 name financial 
constraints as another factor impeding the participation of the public. Also see Rosenblatt 
The Role of Community 207-2012, who concludes, after certain empirical studies, that the 
expectancies of public participation are set too high by restorative justice activists and that 
actual participation is not as effective as claimed. 
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public organisations educate persons with regard to their public voice and the need 
for public participation in matters of justice. 159 Consequently, a call for community 
participation is empty if not accompanied with proposals and structures for such 
community participation.  
Similarly, many victims and offenders are not aware what restorative justice is, 
and consequently it is necessary to enlighten them.160 Prior knowledge of the 
criminal justice system and the nature of restorative justice are fundamental and 
consequently education of the public regarding the various procedures existing in the 
criminal justice system is critical. It is submitted that the involvement of the 
community in the criminal justice system in South Africa has been undervalued and 
should go beyond mere rhetoric. It is further submitted that notwithstanding these 
challenges, community-based dispute resolution centres can collaborate with the 
other stakeholders and mediation processes can become integrated with the criminal 
justice system in the endeavour to meet restorative justice goals.  
3 3 5 The value of truth 
Truth is of significant importance in this dissertation. This is because of the nature 
of economic crime, its complexity and diversity, including the many different kinds of 
economic crime offences. The complexity and diversity of economic crime makes the 
burden of proof required in a conventional criminal court, especially onerous and 
cumbersome. In addition, emphases in this dissertation include the participatory role 
of the victim and the issue of restitution.  
It is true that the typical criminal justice system also focuses on the truth; yet the 
focus on truth in restorative justice seems broader than the narrow focus on proving 
the personal liability of the offender through providing the necessary evidence to 
                                            
159 Obarrio “Traditional Justice” in Peacebuilding and Rule of Law 40. 
160 After the offence has been committed, the communication process can take place in 
various formats; either indirect mediation, where a mediator shuttles between the parties, 
exchanging information; direct mediation involving only the offender and victim with a 
mediator; or conferencing involving more parties, primarily family members and supporters 
of either the offender or victim. See, for example, Principle 3 of Principles of Best Practice for 
Restorative Justice Processes in Criminal Cases in New Zealand available at 
<https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/RJ-Best-practice.pdf> 
(accessed 02-07-2019).  
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prove a particular offence. In addition, the evidence led in a criminal trial is strictly 
limited by rules of evidence and other procedural concerns. In contrast, in a 
restorative justice process the process is more open and unrestricted. An opportunity 
is given to the victim to question the offender about the “whys” and answers to these 
questions may contribute to the victim reaching acceptance and peace.161 Moreover, 
victims are granted an opportunity to express their feelings, their anger and despair 
to the offender.162 It is submitted that the voice of the victim adds to the various tones 
of the truth.  
Sachs J identifies four types of truth which are helpful to understand the different 
values of the different types of truths that usually play a role in a criminal justice 
system: observational truth, logical truth, experiential truth and dialogical truth.163 
Neither one necessarily has more value than another, yet each has its own particular 
worth. Observational truth is detailed and focused on a particular event at a 
particular time,164 and is the type of truth that is usually pursued in a conventional 
                                            
161 For example, a victim of a fraud scheme victim may ask: Why did you choose to harm 
me? Why did you do it? 
162 For example, victims of fraud may relate how destitute and concerned they now are 
consequent to the fraud.  
163 Sachs Strange Alchemy 80-82. In another article Sachs J calls “observational truth” 
“microscopic truth”. See A Sachs “Towards the Liberation and Revitalization of Customary 
Law” in D Cornell & N Muvangua Ubuntu and the Law: African Ideals and Postapartheid 
Jurisprudence (2012) 303 306-308. Similarly, De Vos differentiates between “legal truth” and 
“actual truth”. Legal truth includes the state having to prove a certain crime beyond 
reasonable doubt, but an acquittal does not necessarily mean that the offender did not 
commit the crime. It means the state did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
is the limitation of legal truth. This limitation may be due to various factors, including the 
constraints of the rules of evidence, the interpretation of the presiding officer on the 
presentation of the evidence and the standard of the presentation of the evidence and the 
examination and cross-examination of the presented evidence. P de Vos “On ‘Khwezi’, a 
Rape Acquittal, and the Limits of ‘legal truth’” (27-09-2017) Constitutionally Speaking 
<https://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/on-khwezi-a-rape-acquittal-and-the-limits-of-legal-
truth/ > (accessed 2-10-2017). 
164 For example, issues such as was credit card XYZ swiped at merchant A, B and C at 
times N, O and P, may be essential to proving that T committed a particular credit card 
fraud. 
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prosecution trial. Logical truth, in turn is deductive and inferential.165 Commonly, 
prosecutorial courts endeavour to connect logical and observational truth to prove a 
pre-defined issue or alleged act. This Sachs J concludes is narrow and limited to the 
legal issues in question.166 Dialogical truth, conversely, is open-ended and is derived 
from interaction between people, relating their different experiences and 
perspectives of an event and can be said to be infinite.167 Experiential truth is 
subjective, and involves an inner inward enquiry as to what one is experiencing, and 
is often contrasted with the so-called objective facts of a case.168  
Restorative processes, such as the TRC, are more concerned with dialogical and 
experiential truth, and this leads to “more” truth being revealed during meetings.169 
Logical and observational truth are necessary to attain convictions and satisfy the 
obligation of proving a person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This is in line with 
the primary aim of the prosecutorial criminal process to convict and punish. 
Contrariwise, restorative processes, like the TRC, concentrate on dialogical and 
experiential truth, enabling the understanding of the different parties’ motives and 
positions. Such engagement and expression are likely to promote restoration and 
reconciliation. The TRC, which aimed ay building a bridge between the political past 
and future and building foundations for a new nation, focused on different types of 
truth, including dialogical and experiential. Surprisingly, it revealed many truths. It 
has been mooted that many mysteries, killings and atrocities would have remained 
unresolved and the truth unknown forever had the TRC process not been 
                                            
165 For example, using the above example, if there is video material of T swiping a card at 
merchant A, B and C payment points, at times N, O and P it may be inferred that he was 
swiping credit card XYZ, although the actual credit card cannot be seen. 
166 Sachs Strange Alchemy 82. 
167 Sachs Strange Alchemy 82. In the above example, the owner of the credit card E, may 
relate in conversation with T, her or his anxiety in realising money was being debited against 
her or his account, whilst T may relate that she or he felt jittery or full of bravado whilst 
swiping the credit card.  
168 Sachs Strange Alchemy 82. In the above examples, T may reveal that she or he was 
feeling self-hate at performing a crime; whist E may relate feeling a violation of privacy and 
person on realising that her or his credit card was being used. 
169 Sachs Strange Alchemy 82-83; Sachs “Towards the Liberation and Revitalization of 
Customary Law” in Ubuntu and the Law 307-308. 
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followed.170 It may be argued that the reason for such revelations may in part be due 
to the amnesty offered to persons who came forward and told the truth.171 Likewise, 
it is submitted that the reason for an offender to enter into a plea negotiation process 
and disclose details of an offence may also be motivated by the possibility of gaining 
some benefit from the process, most likely a reduction in sentence.172  
It is further submitted that parties would have similar motivations for entering into 
a mediation process. In addition, more information is likely to be disclosed in the 
dialogical and experiential truths which emerge during the mediation process. These 
disclosures are likely to reveal the ways in which the offence was committed or even 
more offences. Dialogical and experiential truths from the affected parties are also 
likely to promote solutions, including restitution as part of a mediated sentencing 
agreement. It is also submitted that restorative justice processes, such as mediation 
that make use of more dialogical and experiential truth inquiries, are no less 
significant than prosecutorial processes primarily focused on observational and 
logical truth. Justice is served equally in either kind of process. In the light of these 
considerations, it may be concluded that restorative justice processes such as 
victim-offender interchanges and mediation are processes that allow for a more 
expansive form of the narrative of a crime; not only from the perspective of the 
offender and of the victim, but the broader community as well. A broader truth is told. 
3 4 Recognition and reception of restorative justice by the courts in South 
Africa  
“This so-called ‘restorative justice’ concept is a fabrication of a process whereby 
it is required of a prisoner to make peace with the family of the victim. … The 
whole process is an illegal concoction undermining the rights of prisoners to be 
released on parole when they legally qualify for it.”173 
                                            
170 Sachs Strange Alchemy 84-85. 
171 The TRC did not provide a blanket amnesty to all persons for all atrocities. Amnesty was 
only granted to individuals and amnesty was not guaranteed, but considered by an Amnesty 
Committee. See ch 4 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
Also see Sachs Strange Alchemy 77-79. 
172 See ch 4, para 4 4 2 1, 300, 313-314 below. 
173 Ebersohn J in Gwebu v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2014 1 SACR 191 
(GNP) para 5. 
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Recognition is given to the retributive nature of criminal law and the primary 
purpose of punishment under the criminal prosecutorial system.174 However, it is 
submitted that there is room for restorative justice to be integrated further into the 
criminal justice system. Particularly in respect of some instances of economic crime, 
it is submitted that using mediation as a method of alternative dispute resolution may 
be a more formative and effective manner of resolving the disruption of the balance 
between the offender, the victim and members of the community. To support this 
submission, attention is given to the recognition and reception of restorative justice 
principles by the courts, especially with regard to sentencing.  
Notwithstanding that restorative justice was considered and subsequently 
recommended more than two decades ago,175 it has not been widely applied in the 
South African criminal justice system.176 Restorative justice has, however, received 
limited application in the sentencing process.177 It is the submission of this 
dissertation that restorative justice is a much broader concept and should be 
recognised as having wider purposes and functions than its narrow role in the 
sentencing process: restorative justice is an alternative to punishment, not an 
alternative punishment.178 This discussion in section 3 3 has demonstrated that 
                                            
174 See the discussion of participatory justice system in para 3 6, 149ff. 
175 SALRC Sentencing Restorative Justice (Compensation for Victims of Crime and Victim 
Empowerment) (Project 82) Paper 7 (1997). The purpose of the paper was to consider the 
issue of restorative justice and the involvement of victims in the criminal justice system. A 
later report, SALRC Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) (Project 82) (2000) Part 1, 
para 1.17, 9 specifically emphasised the need for victims’ interests to be recognised and 
protected in the sentencing process, including participation by the victim (part 2, para 2.4, 
24) and reparation (part 3, ch 3, para 37, 70-73). 
176 Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing para 11.1, 191.  
177 Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing para 11.5, 194. 
178 Walgrave et al (2013) RJIJ 160 assert that the true potential for restorative justice will not 
be realised if restorative justice is simply seen narrowly as an alternative punishment. 
Compare the SCA in Director of Public Prosecutions, North Gauteng v Thabethe 2011 2 
SACR 567 (SCA) para 15 describing restorative justice narrowly as “an alternative form of 
punishment” and “a new trend in sentencing philosophy”. 
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restorative justice responds to crime in a more holistic manner as it responds to the 
needs of the victim, the offender and their communities.179  
Several courts have integrated the concept of restorative justice into their 
judgments, consequently broadening the function of restorative justice. However, 
such application has not been without difficulty and there have been varying 
perspectives on and constructions of restorative justice by the courts in criminal 
cases, primarily in cases relating to the sentencing process. This is not surprising in 
view of restorative justice being a supple and permeable concept and sentencing 
being a complex process.  
A notable judgment is M v S (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)(“M v S”)180 
a judgment written by Sachs J which accepted that: “the traditional aims of 
punishment had been transformed by the Constitution”.181 Acknowledging that 
sentencing is “innately controversial” Sachs J endorsed the Zinn triad which entails 
the established elements of sentencing: the nature of the crime, the circumstances of 
the criminal and the interests of the community.182 The Constitutional Court also 
confirmed the purposes of punishment as being “deterrent, preventative, reformative 
and retributive aspects”.183 Significantly, the court affirmed that the element of mercy 
                                            
179 Walgrave et al (2013) RJIJ 160, who also assert that such a broad response underscores 
the credibility of restorative justice, in contrast to classical penal justice which focuses more 
on the offender and potential offenders. 
180 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC). This was a case of economic crime. M, a 35-year-old divorced 
mother of three minor children and a repeat offender had pleaded guilty to several counts of 
fraud committed during the currency of a suspended sentence for an earlier conviction of 
fraud. M appealed against the sentence of four years’ imprisonment, subject to s 276(1)(i) of 
the CPA arguing that as a primary care-giver, the court needed to consider the constitutional 
and international rights of her minor children, and that incarceration of their mother, the 
primary care-giver was not an appropriate sentence. Although this case is best known for its 
developments in constitutional and child law, it is submitted that it also an established 
constitutional application of restorative justice principles. Also see A Skelton “Face to Face: 
Sachs on Restorative Justice” (2010) 25 SAPL 94 100.  
181 M v S para 10. The Constitutional Court followed Mthiyane JA in Director of Public 
Prosecutions, KwaZulu-Natal v P 2006 1 SACR 243 (SCA) (“DPP v P”) para 13. 
182 M v S para 10. Notably too, Sachs’ J refers (para 10 fn 3) to the SALRC Report on a New 
Sentencing Framework Project 82 (2000), including specific reference to restorative 
sentencing, position of the victim, compensation and reparation. 
183 M v S para 10; DPP v P para 13. 
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has to be included in the sentencing process.184 Also, a sentencing court has to 
balance competing legal considerations and appropriate weight needs to be placed 
on these interests in tension with one another.185  
Integral to restorative justice is the participation of the parties and the specific 
engagement between the victim and offender. In this regard, and in light of the issue 
of restitution, Sachs J states: “(i)t would have special significance if she is required to 
make the repayments on a face-to-face basis. This could be hard for her, but 
restorative justice ideally requires looking the victim in the eye and acknowledging 
wrongdoing.”186 Significantly, Sachs J goes on to describe the restorative and 
reintegration characteristics of restorative justice:  
“What matters is that in both a practical and symbolic way M begins to restore a 
relationship that would otherwise remain ruptured. For M herself this process of 
acknowledgement and reconciliation removes the silent brand of criminality that 
imprisonment would bring, and facilitates restoration of trust and her 
reintegration into the community” (writer’s emphasis).187 
Sachs J also highlights the role of the community in correctional supervision and 
restorative justice and holds: 
“Central to the notion of restorative justice is the recognition of the community 
rather than the criminal-justice agencies as the prime site of crime control.188  
These factors identified in M v S not only affirm the traditional elements and aims 
of sentencing but also relativise them by holding that other factors are also important 
and need to be considered in the sentencing process. Such factors include the 
elements of encounter, engagement, participation and restoration by the victim and 
offender, as well as the role of the community.  
                                            
184 M v S para 10; DPP v P para 13. 
185 For example, in M v S paras 37-42 the court had to balance “integrity of the family care” 
and the “duty to punish criminal misconduct”. 
186 M v S para 72. This demonstrates Sachs J’s emphasis on the need for an encounter and 
engagement between a victim and offender. Also see Skelton (2010) SAPL 96-97, 101-102. 
187 M v S para 72. Also see the discussion of restorative justice, particularly resonating with 
ubuntu-botho, in the judgment of Mokgoro J and Sachs J in Dikoko v Mokhatla paras 68 and 
114, respectively. This case is also discussed in para 3 4 above, 102, 107-112. 
188 M v S case para 62. In addition, in para 75 the community is described as having the 
capacity to deal with moral failures and that the “community should (not) be seen simply as a 
vengeful mass uninterested in the moral and social recuperation of one of its members”.  
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In addition, the sentencing philosophy of South Africa has developed. This is 
evident both in the SALRC’s report on a New Sentencing Framework Project 82 
(2000) and the introduction of correctional supervision into the criminal justice 
system.189 It is apparent that these developments incorporate more emphasis on the 
restorative nature of punishment and rehabilitation as opposed to simple 
retribution.190 Notably, in M v S Sachs J emphasises the importance of correctional 
supervision191 and further states that an advantage of correctional supervision is 
“that it keeps open the option of restorative justice in a way that imprisonment cannot 
do”.192 
Another case emphasising the principles of restorative justice is S v Maluleke.193 
Importantly, Bertelsmann J described the process of restorative justice as a new 
approach to dealing with crime, victims and offenders, which emphasises the need 
for reparation, healing and rehabilitation, contrary to long sentences of imprisonment 
which add to overcrowding of jails and increase the risk of recidivism.194 Restorative 
justice is a paradigm shift which shifts from retribution to reconciliation, removal and 
alienation to healing and re-establishing of societal bonds, and the risk of recidivism 
to the development of the offender.195 Restorative justice shifts the focus from 
retribution to rehabilitation, including healing, reconciliation, accountability and 
reintegration of the offender.196  
                                            
189 CPA ss 276 (1)(h) and (i) introduced in 1991 by s 41(a) of Act 122 of 1991. CPA s 276 
(1)(h) was subsequently substituted by s 20 of Act 98 of 1997. 
190 However, Terblanche (A Guide to Sentencing para 11.6) comments thus on the future of 
restorative justice: “Currently, the South African legislature appears to be fixated on using 
retributive justice to cure all society’s ills”. 
191 M v S paras 57-62. 
192 M v S para 62. Also see Skelton (2010) SAPL 101. 
193 2008 1 SACR 49 (T) paras 20-25. Bertelsmann J para 20 found the application of the 
community’s custom of an apology to the family of the deceased enabled the court to involve 
the community in the sentencing and rehabilitation process and to introduce the principle of 
restorative justice into the sentencing process. 
194 S v Maluleke para 26.  
195 Para 29.  
196 Para 26 
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The M v S and Maluleke cases demonstrate that restorative justice is established 
within the criminal justice system, particularly with regard to sentencing.197 The 
complex question, however, is: When is it appropriate to apply restorative justice? 
Bertelsmann J cautions in S v Maluleke that restorative justice cannot be applied in 
cases where offenders have no wish to reform and continue to be a risk to society.198 
The series of cases in the S v Seedat199 and S v Thabethe matters200 illustrate that 
the answer is not without difficulty  
In the Thabethe matter, the SCA and the High Court held strongly divergent views 
as to when restorative justice should be applied. The High Court found that in light of 
the circumstances of the Thabethe matter it was one “in which restorative justice 
could be applied in full measure in order to ensure that the offender continued to 
acknowledge his responsibility and guilt; that he had apologised to the victim and 
cooperated in establishing conditions through which she might find closure; that he 
recompensed the victim and society by further supporting the former and rendering 
community service to the latter; and that he continued to support his family.”201 
                                            
197 Also see S v Shilubane 2008 1 SACR 295 (T) para 4; S v Mfana Review Nr 103/2009 
High Court, Orange Free State paras 8, 19-23; S v Phulwane and Others 2003 1 SACR 631 
(T) para 9.  
198 S v Maluleke para 32f. 
199 Seedat v S [2016] ZASCA 153 (“Seedat v S 2016”) and S v Seedat 2015 2 SACR 612 
(GP) (“Seedat v S 2015”). 
200 Director of Public Prosecutions, North Gauteng v Thabethe 2011 2 SACR 567 (SCA) 
(“DPP v Thabethe 2011”) and S v Tabethe 2009 2 SACR 62 (T) (note that accused’s name 
is spelt wrongly in the report and should read Thabethe as in the SCA case)(“S v Thabethe 
2009”). In this case, Thabethe pleaded guilty to raping his life companion’s young daughter 
for whom he had become a father-figure, shortly before her 16th birthday. Thabethe 
supported the family, including the victim. The victim and her mother asked that Thabethe 
not be incarcerated so that he could continue to support the family, including supporting the 
victim to finish her schooling. Of his own volition the accused had reported the case to the 
police and pleaded guilty to rape. He had apologised to the victim and the family; the parties 
had reconciled; and the victim had forgiven him and the family were living as a family again 
in the same household. The parties had also participated in a victim/offender mediation 
programme. 
201 S v Thabethe 2009 para 36. The High Court acknowledged the concept of restorative 
justice, with reference to Dikoko v Mokhatla paras 68 & 114, S v Shilubane 2008 1 SACR 
295 (T) para 4; and S v Maluleke 2008 1 SACR 49 (T) para 52. Notably, Bertelsmann J was 
the judge in the Thabethe and Maluleke matters. 
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Bertelsmann J also found that if restorative justice is to be recognised in South 
Africa, it needs to be applied not only in the case of minor offences, “but also, in 
appropriate circumstances, in suitable matters of a grave nature.”202 Significantly, 
Bertelsman J supports his call to integrate restorative justice by referring to 
challenges in South Africa’s justice system. Regrettably, he does not expand upon 
this.203 He also refers to the overcrowding of the prisons – a utilitarian argument.204 
The SCA in the Thabethe matter acknowledged that restorative justice has grown 
in “stature and impact” after a “lukewarm reception” and that restorative justice is “a 
viable alternative sentencing option provided it is applied in appropriate cases.”205 
The SCA however cautioned against restorative justice being used in cases involving 
“serious offences which evoke profound feelings of outrage and revulsion amongst 
law-abiding and right-thinking members of society.”206 The SCA further cautioned 
against the use of restorative justice in inappropriate cases, believing that such use 
“is likely to debase it and make it lose is credibility as a viable sentencing option”.207 
Another complex issue is the weight to be given to the voice of the victim, as aptly 
described by Bosielo J in DPP v Thabethe 2011: 
“A controversial if not intractable question remains: do the views of the victim of 
the crime have a role to play in the determination of an appropriate sentence? If 
so, what weight is to be attached thereto? That the victim’s voice deserves to be 
heard admits of no doubt. After all, it is the victim who bears the real brunt of the 
offence committed against him or her. It is only fair that he/she be heard on, 
                                            
202 S v Thabethe 2009 para 39. Also compare Seedat v S 2015 paras 45-47. 
203 S v Thabethe 2009 para 39. 
204 S v Thabethe 2009 para 39. Compare S v Shilubane para 5. Also see the issue of 
possible conflation of powers in Mujuzi (2008) SAJHR 330-340 who contends that the courts 
are stepping onto the jurisdiction of the executive by reasoning that the courts need to be 
innovative in finding alternative punishments because of the overcrowding of prisons and the 
corrosive life in prisons in South Africa.  
205 DPP v Thabethe 2011 para 20. 
206 DPP v Thabethe 2011 para 20. Compare Seedat v S 2016 paras 38-40. Rape which the 
SCA found to be “a scourge or a cancer that threatens to destroy the moral and social fabric 
of our (South African) society” is clearly not appropriate. See DPP v Thabethe 2011 paras 
16-17, 22; Seedat v S 2016 paras 39-40. 
207 DPP v Thabethe 2011 para 20. 
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amongst other things, how the crime has affected him/her. This does not mean, 
however, that his/her views are decisive” (writer’s emphasis).208 
Although the view of the complainant is taken into consideration, this according to 
the SCA in the Seedat matter is not the only factor to be taken into account, and the 
court emphasised the deterrent value of sentences and held that the courts need to 
send clear messages to the accused and other potential offenders.209 In addition, the 
object of sentencing was to “serve the public interest”; and criminal proceedings had 
to instil public confidence in the criminal justice system, thereby highlighting the 
purpose of credibility of the sentencing process.210  
The status and role of the victim is addressed in S v Matyityi.211 The SCA found 
that the penal policy, also with regard to the sentencing process, should be victim-
orientated, basing its view on the UN Declaration of the Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and the Service Charter for Victims of 
Crime in South Africa; each of which grant a victim a right to participate in the 
sentencing process and furnish the court with information.212 In addition, the SCA 
relied on restorative justice which emphasises “that a crime is more than the 
breaking of the law or offending against the State – it is an injury or wrong done to 
another person.”213 Furthermore, the Court emphasised the constitutional value of 
human dignity and the need to reaffirm and vindicate “our collective sense of 
humanity and humanness”.214 Importantly, the Supreme Court gave this balanced 
essential view: 
                                            
208 DPP v Thabethe 2011 para 21; Seedat v S 2016 para 38. 
209 Seedat v S 2016 para 39. 
210 Seedat v S 2016 para 39. Notably, the public is described as including persons “close to 
the accused and those distressed by the audacity and horror of the crime”. 
211 2011 1 SACR 40 (SCA) (“S v Matyityi”). The need for the voice of the victim to be heard is 
acknowledged in DPP v Thabethe 2011 para 21, but as shown above is not considered to 
be decisive, particularly in view of the seriousness of the offence and the interests of the 
public.  
212 S v Matyityi 2011 para 16. 
213 S v Matyityi 2011 para 16. The Supreme Court based this on the SA Law Commission 
Discussion Paper 7 Sentencing Restorative Justice (Compensation for Victims of Crime and 
Victim Empowerment) (1997). 
214 S v Matyityi 2011 para 16. 
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“By giving the victim a voice the court will have an opportunity to truly recognise 
the wrong done to the individual victim… By accommodating the victim during 
the sentencing process the court will be better informed before sentencing about 
the after-effects of the crime. The court will thus have at its disposal information 
pertaining to both the accused and victim, and in that way hopefully a more 
balanced approach to sentencing can be achieved. Absent evidence from the 
victim, the court will only have half of the information necessary to properly 
exercise its sentencing discretion. It is thus important that information pertaining 
not just to the objective gravity of the offence, but also the impact of the crime on 
the victim, be placed before the court. That in turn will contribute to the 
achievement of the right sense of balance and in the ultimate analysis will 
enhance proportionality, rather than harshness.”215 
The SCA thus underlines the need to hear subjective evidence regarding the 
impact and aftermath of the crime. Such evidence may include information on the 
physical and psychological harm experienced by the victim, as well as the social and 
economic consequences the crime caused and is likely to cause in the future.216 It is 
submitted that this victim-orientated view which includes the voice of the victim 
during the sentencing process is more extensive and more encompassing than the 
usual evidence in aggravation of sentence. 
It is submitted that the application of restorative justice principles by the judiciary 
as illustrated above has significantly influenced the development and integration of 
restorative justice into the South African justice systems. It is no longer business as 
usual. It is further submitted that the triad of the crime, the criminal and the public, 
has certainly been squared by the victim, hitherto the missing quadrant, in the 
sentencing process.217  
It is also submitted that instances of economic crime need to be distinguished 
from instances of rape, and in this regard reliance is placed on the emphasis of 
Sachs J in M v S regarding the purposes of correctional supervision as being to 
distinguish between two types of offenders: “those who ought to be removed from 
society and imprisoned and those who, although deserving of punishment, should 
                                            
215 S v Matyityi paras 16 and 17. 
216 S v Matyityi para 16. 
217 KD Müller and IA van der Merwe “Squaring the Triad: The Story of the Victim in 
Sentencing” (2004) 6 Sexual Offences Bull 17-24. 
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not be so removed”.218 Reliance is also placed on the reasoning of Bertelsmann J 
that restorative justice should be applied not only to minor offences, “but also, in 
appropriate circumstances, in suitable matters of a grave nature”.219 It is submitted 
that instances of serious economic crime could present such appropriate 
circumstances.  
Restorative justice has also been raised in several cases relating to parole. 
Regarding the position of a victim’s family, Satchwell J found that no victim should 
ever be compelled to participate in a restorative programme, or be obliged to 
“interact with, meet with, communicate or engage with – and certainly not forgive – 
the offender”.220 This is significant and essential. It is agreed that no person should 
ever be obliged to participate in any restorative justice programme. The question 
now arises what about court mandated mediation? May a victim or a victim’s family 
refuse to participate in court mandated mediation? Despite advocating for mediation 
and court-mandated mediation, it is agreed that a victim or a victim’s family member 
should not be compelled to participate in a mediation. Essential to the mediation 
process is the voluntary participation of the parties, and the desire of each of the 
parties for resolution of the issues. Mediation can only be a credible process, if all 
the parties are able to participate, albeit reluctantly.221 However, it will not be in the 
true nature of mediation to obligate parties, who simply do not want to participate, to 
do so. The core characteristics of mediation will be diminished should any one party 
be compelled to participate.222  
In addition, Satchwell J held that a victim or a victim’s family member should never 
be burdened with the responsibility regarding the continued incarceration of an 
offender.223 Inversely put: a victim or victim’s family member should not be burdened 
with the responsibility of being party to the imprisonment or sentencing of the 
                                            
218 M v S para 58. See also the conclusions in ch 4, para 4 5, 365-366. 
219 S v Thabethe 2009 para 39. 
220 Kelly v Minister of Correctional Services 2016 (2) SACR 351 (GJ) para 47. 
221 Also see the discussion above in ch 2, para 2 2 2, 40-42. 
222 It should be noted that a party may over time change their stance. Healing, in particular 
the healing of a victim or a victim’s family member is not static and occurs in various stages 
over a period of time. Thus it may be possible, that someone may at one time refuse to 
participate and at another time agree to do so. 
223 Kelly v Minister of Correctional Services 2016 2 SACR 351 (GJ) para 47. 
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offender. In short, if they do not wish for their voice to be heard, they should not be 
compelled to make their voice heard. However, equally so, no victim or victim’s 
family member should ever be denied the opportunity to have their voice heard and 
to participate in the sentencing or post-sentencing processes. 
Ebersohn AJ has made startling and self-explanatory comments on restorative 
justice. In a matter where the applicant was applying to court to have his delayed 
parole reviewed, Ebersohn AJ stated: 
This so-called restorative justice concept is a fabrication of a process whereby it 
is required of a prisoner to make peace with the family of the victim, …. The 
whole process is an illegal concoction undermining the rights of prisoners to be 
released on parole when they legally qualify for it.”224 
In a similar matter in the same jurisdiction, Keightley AJ225 came to another 
conclusion regarding restorative justice and found that “considerations of restorative 
justice must be accepted as forming an inherent and underlying component of any 
parole process”.226 He based his view on the binding authority of the Constitutional 
Court in Van Vuren v Minister of Correctional Services that held: 
“Restorative justice, in our jurisprudence, is linked to the foundational value or 
norm of ubuntu-botho. It is a value that recognises – in the context of this case – 
that to rehabilitate an offender sentenced to life incarceration to a position where 
he or she is repossessed of the fuller scope of his or her rights, is to recognise 
the inherent human dignity of the individual offender. Evidently from the 
departmental release and placement policy, parole has a restorative-justice aim. 
It is aimed at the eventual rehabilitation and reconciliation processes of the 
                                            
224 Ebersohn AJ Gwebu v Minister of Correctional Services and Others 2014 1 SACR 191 
(GNP) para 5. Ebersohn AJ also held in Botha v Minister of Correctional Services and 
Others (GP case No 29765/08 10 March 2009) that restorative justice processes are not 
obligatory in parole cases. Regrettably the judgment in the Gwebu case is very brief and 
Ebersohn AJ does not expand or explain his enigmatic view on restorative justice.  
225 Barnard v Minister of Justice, Constitutional Development and Correctional Services and 
Another 2016 1 SACR 179 (GP). In this case the applicant applied for a review of the 
Minister’s decision denying him parole. Part of the Minister’s reasons for such denial was 
that the applicant needed to participate in restorative justice programmes and attempt 
contact with members of the deceased victims’ family. Barnard, based on two decisions by 
Ebersohn AJ who held that restorative justice is not compulsory for the granting of parole, 
applied for the Minister’s requirements of restorative justice to be ruled invalid. 
226 Barnard case para 67. 
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offender – themes that underpin restorative justice. Importantly, all these 
interests must be balanced against those of the community, which include the 
right to be protected against crime”. 227 
Importantly, in neighbouring Lesotho the Court of Appeal in R v Mochebelele 228 
held that restorative justice cannot be applied in a case of bribery, where the briber 
and bribee are equally guilty.229 This echoes the centuries old in pari delicto maxim. 
Describing restorative justice as the need for the offender, in an appropriate case, to 
make restitution or pay compensation to his victim for the harm that he has suffered 
at the hands of the offender, the court concluded that in an instance of bribery both 
parties are equally guilty and there could be no question of the one re-compensating 
the other, or in this case the bribee repaying the briber.230 
From these series of cases it can be concluded that the application of restorative 
justice remains difficult and complex to apply in criminal matters. Although 
restorative justice has been acknowledged by the Constitutional Court and the SCA 
it has been applied sparingly. Restorative justice is approached with great caution by 
the judiciary.231 In addition, restorative justice as a sentencing option is not to be 
applied over zealously and is not appropriate for “serious offences which evoke 
profound feelings of outrage and revulsion amongst law-abiding citizens and right-
thinking members of society.”232 
                                            
227 2012 1 SACR 103 (CC) para 51, followed by Keightley AJ in the Barnard case para 66. 
228 2010 1 SACR 577 (LesA). This is another case of economic crime, in which the two 
accused, who were employed in positions of trust and involved in the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project, were found guilty of accepting bribes from Lahmeyer International GmbH over 
a period of time. 
229 R v Mochebelele para 17. 
230 R v Mochebelele para 17. 
231 Notably, judgments promoting restorative justice have been made by a number of judges, 
including Sachs J and Mokgoro J, now retired Constitutional Court judges. Other judges 
Bertelsmann J and Bosielo J integrate restorative justice principles into their sentencing 
deliberations, although, in some instances their judgments have been set aside by higher 
courts. L De Klerk (The Role of The Victim In The Criminal Justice System: A Specific Focus 
on Victim Offender Mediation and Victim Impact Statements LLM Thesis, University of 
Pretoria [2012]) 44 makes similar observations after discussing a number of South African 
judgments. 
232 Thabethe (2011) para 20, followed by Seedat v S (2016) para 38. 
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It is also submitted that restorative justice is more than just a “sentencing option” 
as is implied by the SCA,233 but a broad and complex legal concept that should be 
integrated into the sentencing process. It is not a concept that stands contrary to the 
entrenched triad of the circumstance of the accused, the nature of the offence and 
the interests of the public, but should be read with it. Neither does restorative justice 
prohibit a sentence of imprisonment. It is not denied that some offences may be of 
such a serious and repulsive nature that an appropriate and just sentence includes 
incarceration. However, integrating restorative justice principles into the sentencing 
process may mean that part of such a sentence be suspended and the remaining 
part be conditional on some form of compensation being paid.  
Acknowledgment is also given by the courts to the voice of the victim in the 
sentencing process but it cannot be decisive. Although this acknowledgement is 
welcomed, it would seem that not enough weight is given to the voice of the 
victim.234 It is submitted that the voice of the victim should not be a lone voice, but 
should be heard along with those of the public, the state and the perpetrator. It is 
submitted that the process of mediation will enable all these voices to be heard 
properly and ensure that there is no power imbalance. 
3 5 Restorative justice and mediation as a restorative justice process 
“Restorative mediation is not an alternative form of justice but a valuable addition 
to the current criminal justice process which can successfully be used for males 
and females, young and adult offenders, across racial, ethnic and social class 
groups and for both property and violent crimes. It focuses on caring, dialogue, 
forgiveness, reconciliation, accountability and reintegration, and the community 
plays a crucial role in the mediation process.”235 
                                            
233 Thabethe (2011) para 20. 
234 This is shown in the trial court of the Seedat case where the prosecution did not echo or 
include the victim’s voice and her request for financial compensation in the argument for 
sentencing. See Thabethe (2011) para 15. 
235 B Naude, J Prinsloo & A Ladikos “Protocol and Ethical Guidelines on Restorative 
Mediation” (2003) 16 AC 23.  
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It is strongly submitted in this dissertation that mediation in the context of resolving 
economic crime is a restorative justice process.236 This submission is founded upon 
the links and overlaps between the characteristics of mediation and restorative 
justice. In particular, they both make provision for participation by all the 
stakeholders, party autonomy, consented resolutions, accountability and an informal 
and flexible process that allows dialogical engagement and a safe and non-
threatening space.237 The submission is also based on the strong success of victim-
offender mediation processes in different jurisdictions which aim at encouraging 
offenders to take responsibility for their actions and to participate in the dispute 
resolution; supporting victims in encountering the offender (on a voluntary basis), 
supporting their healing process and granting them the opportunity of participating in 
the dispute resolution process; facilitating and enabling a process that is empowering 
and satisfying; focusing on the dispute between the victim and the offender and 
facilitating an acceptable settlement agreement in the dispute that may include 
reparation, including monetary restitution for the victim.238  
In the mediation process each party, in this case it would be the complainant and 
the offender, have an opportunity to be heard. In the instance of the complainant, 
presumably the victim, the opportunity would be given in a safe and non-threatening 
                                            
236 Skelton (2010) SAPL 95. Tshehla (2004) SACJ 16. See also Sachs J in M v S para 59 
identifying victim-offender mediation and family conferencing as “prominent forms of 
restorative justice”. It is submitted that mediation is also the process upon which the (New 
Zealand) Principles of Best Practice for Restorative Justice Processes in Criminal Cases is 
based. Available at <https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/RJ-Best-
practice.pdf>. Mediation, together with conciliation, conferencing and sentencing circles are 
specifically described as restorative processes by the United Nations Commission on Crime 
Prevention and Criminal Justice, ECOSOC Resolution 2002/12 Annex, Basic Principles on 
the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters, para I.2., 40-41. 
237 These issues are discussed in detail in section 2 4 above and only summarised here. 
Also see MW Bakker “Repairing the Breach and Reconciling the Discordant: Mediation in the 
Criminal Justice System” (1994) 72 NCL Rev 1479 1500. Compare Clear et al Community 
Justice 80-81 who simply hold that various forms of mediation, like victim-offender 
mediation, family group conferencing and circle conferencing, are versions of restorative 
justice. 
238 See Dignan Understanding Victims 111-115, 136-139 for a general discussion and 
evaluation of the application of victim-offender mediation processes.  
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space to face the offender.239 The victim has the opportunity to confront the offender, 
ask questions, receive answers, express emotion, request restitution and proceed on 
the journey of gaining restoration.240 Restoration may be monetary by way of 
compensation being paid, but it may also simply be emotional such as feeling 
validated through an admission or apology by the offender.241 Significantly, the victim 
plays a far more active role than that which the classical criminal adversarial trial 
permits. Not only are the victims able to tell their stories, but they are also able to 
participate in the sanctions to be imposed upon the offender, and have the 
opportunity to seek restitution. Inevitably, such a participatory role leads to victims 
feeling more satisfied with the way in which the justice system has treated them.242  
Offenders too have been shown to benefit from mediation programmes in the 
criminal justice system.243 Accountability is key and the acknowledgment of her or 
his wrongdoing, and the effect it has had on the victim and others is likely to 
contribute to the rehabilitation of the offender.244 It has also been shown that 
offenders are more likely to comply with conditions of their sanctions, including 
payment of compensation if they personally and actively participate in concluding 
such sanctions.245  
Another key principle in this dissertation is the role of the community. The need for 
community participation in combating economic crime, including prevention and 
sanction, has been demonstrated through the fundamental constitutional principle of 
ubuntu. The magnitude and depth of economic crime in the South African economy 
can simply not be addressed by the state alone. In a mediation process, where the 
voice of the public can be heard and the public can also actively participate in the 
resolution, benefits not only will accur to the victim and offender, but also to the state 
                                            
239 It is acknowledged that in some instances the mediation may proceed through side-
meetings, and thus there may not be an actual face to face meeting. 
240 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1500. 
241 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1500-1501. 
242 Research has also shown that victims, subsequent to mediation feel they have more 
closure about the offence, less fearful of being re-victimised by the offender and the system. 
Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1502. 
243 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1502. 
244 This includes a positive change in attitude, a lower recidivism rate and satisfaction with 
the mediation process and outcome. Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1502. 
245 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1502-1503. 
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and promote the sense of justice of the community itself.246 In addition, the 
community can through collaboration and partnerships contribute its skills and 
expertise in providing mediation or other restorative justice practices and services.  
It is furthermore submitted that the justice systems, both criminal and civil, also 
benefit from the mediation process in the criminal justice system. Direct benefits 
include faster and less expensive resolution of offences.247 Restorative settlement 
agreements incorporating suspended or lesser imprisonment sentences will also 
lighten the burden on the prisons. The satisfactory experiences of the parties 
involved in a mediation process enhance the perceptions of the public that the formal 
justice system is fair and just, thereby strengthening its credibility and efficacy.  
As shown above in section 2 4 these outcomes of mediation in the criminal justice 
system are not only restorative in nature, but they also illustrate the core principles of 
restorative justice. 
3 6 A restorative and participatory system 
Serious economic crime is disruptive and destructive. It disrupts economic growth 
and the socio-economic harmony of a community. It causes harm, multi-lateral harm 
to the victim, the victim’s dependants and family, to the community and the 
economy.248 It also harms the offender. Consequently, it is submitted that multi-
lateral restoration is required:249 restoration for the offender, the victim and the crime. 
It is further submitted that the conventional adversarial system is not structured to 
offer such restoration on its own. Classical courts are impartial and detached from 
the parties affected and from their interests.250 In the conventional adversarial 
confrontational trial system the state and offender spar against one another. The 
                                            
246 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1503. 
247 Bakker (1994) NCL Rev 1503-1504. 
248 Clear et al Community Justice 78, also 101. Such loss is both social and economic, being 
a loss in trust and a tangible financial loss. 
249 Clear et al Community Justice 80-81. 
250 Clear et al Community Justice 61-63 contend that such detachment is due to the 
operation of courts being strange and impersonal to the offender and the victim, the value of 
independence and impartiality required from a presiding officer and the somber and formal 
physical space of a courtroom,  
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victim’s primary function is to testify and the court is not always aware of or sensitive 
to the needs of the victim. 
It is the submission in this dissertation that the dichotomy of retributive and 
restorative justice principles and processes is not sustainable and that a more 
nuanced and integrative system is required.251 Indeed, the two systems have much 
in common, including disclosure of the truth, ascribing responsibility to the offender, 
securing proportionality and fairness with regard to the sanction, seeking credibility 
with the community and broader public and participation and cooperation by the 
victim. Serious economic crime remains an issue of public importance, and the state 
remains uncontestably responsible for crime control. Likewise, the state is not alone 
responsible for crime control, the community is also responsible. Equally true is that 
the victim is inarguably the party that suffers direct loss and harm. Criminal justice 
systems should be participatory for all stakeholders, the state, the offender, the 
victim and the community. The criminal justice system should also be reparative on 
multiple levels and to multiple stakeholders. Cross-pollination between the classical 
retributive and restorative justice systems should occur and it is submitted that 
restorative justice practices should be further integrated into the formal criminal 
justice system.252 The proposal of this dissertation is that mediation, a restorative 
justice practice, should be formally introduced into the criminal justice system to help 
address instances of economic crime. 
It is acknowledged that a concern is that participatory dispute resolution in respect 
of instances of economic crime, particularly the participation of the offender and 
                                            
251 Doak & O’Mahony ((2006) Int Rev Vic) 173-174 and Obarrio (“Traditional Justice” in 
Peacebuilding and Rule of Law) 39-41 advocate a unitary model in the criminal justice 
system in which the principles of restorative justice are accommodated in and harmonised 
with the conventional formal system. Also see Woolford & Ratner Informal Reckonings 9-10, 
65-90, 118-119, 124-131 who show that restorative justice has become fragmented through 
the various applications and use of restorative justice by communities and the state. They 
contend further that this fragmentation has led to the integral connection of restorative justice 
with the formal justice system and such confluence actually “degrades the communicative 
and transformative potential” of restorative justice. Accordingly, they call not for an 
integration or mainstreaming, but for restorative justice to be an “informal justice 
counterpublic”, in the public domain, but persistently countering it.  
252 Provisions in plea and sentencing negotiations and parole hearings in South Africa that 
provide for participation by the victim are an example of this. 
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victim in the determination of the sanction, could lead to different solutions, that is 
different sanctions for similar crimes, because the parties are different and the 
process informal. This in turn means offenders and victims may not be treated 
equally and consequently raises constitutional concerns of equality and 
proportionality. It is submitted that the introduction of regulatory standards will help to 
alleviate these concerns. In addition, and also because of the public nature of 
economic crime, it is further submitted in this dissertation that any mediated 
settlement agreement with regard to an economic offence be presented to the court 
for judicial approval. It is submitted that this will ensure consistency in sanctioning. 
The mediated settlement agreement will also become part of the formal 
jurisprudence. The introduction of mediation will not only ensure the further 
integration of restorative justice into the criminal justice system, but grant an 
opportunity for all stakeholders to participate in and reach a just and satisfactory 
resolution for instances of economic crime. 
“If the courts can benefit from fewer hearings, if communities can benefit from a 
greater measure of self-help through private dispute resolution, if matters can be 
expedited more cheaply and effectively, then there is much to be said for 
arbitration and mediation as a ‘better way’.”253 
                                            
253 Scott-Macnab & Khan (1985) SACC 128. 
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4 1 Introduction: Mechanisms addressing economic crime in justice systems 
This chapter discusses a number of mechanisms, both in the civil and the criminal 
justice systems that are used to address instances of economic crime. The primary 
focus of this dissertation is introducing mediation as an additional mechanism with 
which economic crime may be dealt with in the criminal justice system. The proposal 
cannot be fully understood unless a brief overview is given of the context of 
corporate regulation and mechanisms within the justice systems to deal with 
instances of economic crime. This is necessary because of the multi-pronged and 
hybrid approach to corporate regulation and enforcement of such regulation.  
Contemporary corporate operations are complex and law reformers need to 
develop appropriate rules and sanctions to regulate corporate conduct.1 In a highly 
regulated business sector many violations, some of which may constitute criminal 
offences, arise from contraventions of regulations. Consequently, the nature of 
economic crime today is broader and more complex than the classical common-law 
offences against property. The responses and remedies to instances of economic 
crime are similarly complex, and the boundaries between criminal and civil resolution 
of such crimes at times overlap and become blurred.2 
Garret concludes that no country can claim to have found the ideal approach to 
corporate sanction and prosecution.3 This is true, and may always be true as both 
the nature of corporate crime and the nature of the response to it is continually 
changing. It remains, and is likely to remain a complex and controversial field of 
dynamic hybrid law. This conclusion is endorsed by a meta-analysis of approaches 
to corporate crime recently published by Schell-Busey and others, which though 
                                            
1 R Tomasic “Sanctioning Corporate Crime and Misconduct: Beyond Draconian and 
Decriminalization Solutions” (1992) 2 AJCL 82 106.  
2 For example, administrative penalties are imposed by administrative bodies without the 
involvement of the courts to hold companies and persons responsible for corporate crime. 
This is evidenced by the administrative actions and decisions of bodies such as the SEC in 
the United States and ASIC in Australia. Also, a statutory administrative body such as the 
FAIS Ombud in South Africa has the power to order restitution, a remedy equal in force and 
effect as a judgment in the civil court. 
3 B Garret “The Global Evolution of Corporate Prosecutions” (2017) 11 LFMR 55 59. 
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provisional, shows that a multifaceted approach is the most effective.4 It is finding the 
right mix, and the correct balance between persuasion and punishment that remains 
elusive.5  
In this complex field of corporate regulation the efficacy of Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
pyramid of responsive regulation and resolution6 is underscored. It is agreed that 
“the trick to successful regulation is to establish a synergy between punishment and 
persuasion”.7 The authors contend: 
“To adopt punishment as a strategy of first choice is unaffordable, unworkable, 
and counterproductive in undermining the good will of those with a commitment 
to compliance. However, when firms which are not responsible corporate citizens 
exploit the privilege of persuasion, the regulator should switch to a tough punitive 
response.”8 
A key principle in the responsive regulation pyramid is the existence of an upward 
gradient as this is the most effective deterrent. Companies which are compliant and 
have the good will and corporate culture of compliance will implement training and 
self-regulation positioned at the base of the pyramid. Indeed, the very existence of 
the pyramid, and an upward gradient leading towards punishment is likely to channel 
most regulatory action to the base of the pyramid. This is so, because even 
companies who may not initially be compliant will be persuaded to implement self-
regulation and training as the costs of sanctions for non-compliance, higher up the 
                                            
4 N Schell-Busey, SS Simpson, M Rorie & M Alper “What Works? A systematic review of 
corporate crime deterrence” (2016) 15 Criminology & Public Policy 387 406-408. The 
researchers themselves warn of the provisional nature of the research due to the paucity of 
empirical research of the sanctioning of corporate crime. 
5 J Braithwaite “In Search of Donald Campbell Mix and Multimethods” (2016) 15 Criminology 
and Public Policy 417 418; PC Yeager “The Elusive Deterrence of Corporate Crime” (2016) 
15 Criminology and Public Policy 439 446-448. 
6 The concept responsive regulation originates from a work of Ayres and Braithwaite 
Responsive Regulation in the early 1990’s and has since been refined and expanded by 
Braithwaite. See I Ayres & J Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (1992).  
7 I Ayres & J Braithwaite Responsive Regulation (1992) 25. 
8 Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 26. For a description of the principles of the 
pyramid of responsive regulation see Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 35-39. 
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gradient, persuade them to do so.9 And should administrative penalties not be a 
sufficient deterrent, then criminal prosecution may be appropriate. In short, 
responsive regulation responds to the degree of compliance, or conversely non-
compliance, by a company.10 Although an underlying principle of the synergy of 
persuasion and punishment is to start at the base of the pyramid with training and 
education, it may be necessary to jump to the peak in a case of an uncooperative 
and stubborn offender.11 The core characteristic of responsive regulation, namely 
that a regulator can respond to a particular situation with a particular remedy is only 
effective if the regulator is a “benign big gun”.12 It is being able to alternate between 
persuasion and punishment that make responsive regulation effective. 
It is submitted that the pyramid of responsive regulation for contravention of 
statutory misconduct is more effective than a binary approach of punishment or 
persuasion.13 It is suggested that the concept of a pyramid of responsive regulation 
assists in portraying the complexity of corporate misconduct, both in the regulation of 
corporate conduct and in the enforcement of such regulation. In this chapter, a 
                                            
9 For a discussion of enforcement pyramids and a critical challenge on the rational 
motivation of compliance see S Bronitt & A D’Amico “Fighting Cartels and Corporate 
Corruption – Public versus Private Enforcement Models: A False Dichotomy” (2018) 37 U 
Qld LJ 69 72-76. 
10 Responsive regulation is contextual. It responds to a particular situation in a particular way 
(so-called “tit-for-tat” strategy) and depends on the context, regulatory culture and history of 
a specific situation. See Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 5, 19-20; DK Smith “A 
Harder Nut to Crack – Responsive Regulation in the Financial Services Sector” (2011) 44 
UBCL 695 700, 711.  
11 Responsive regulation is based on optimistic rationality, namely that firms and officers 
want to comply with regulations and reluctant compliers will calculate the risk of non-
compliance. However, responsive regulation is not naïve and consequently it may be 
necessary to respond with severe punishment to a recidivist or irrational player. See Smith 
(2011) UBCL 695 701-702. Also see Ayres & Braithwaite (Responsive Regulation 20-35) on 
mixed motives for compliance  
12 This means that the regulator needs the armoury with which enforce regulation, the 
tougher the enforcement mechanisms, or the higher the apex the more effective the 
regulator will be in securing compliance, and the less likely it will be required to fire any 
shots. In Ayres’ & Braithwaite’s memorable words: “Regulatory agencies will be able to 
speak more softly when they are perceived as carrying big sticks”. Ayres & Braithwaite 
Responsive Regulation 6, 40-41.  
13 Ayres & Braithwaite Responsive Regulation 37. 
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pyramid of responsive regulation and resolution will be used to illustrate a number of 
different mechanisms used in justice systems to address economic crime.  
Figure 2 Pyramid of responsive regulation and resolution 
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The base of the pyramid is the sector of prevention and non-regulation. The 
foundational principle for addressing economic crime is to prevent it. Part of the 
practice of prevention comprises the mechanisms of training and education. These 
mechanisms will be referred to in paragraph 4 2 2 2 below in the discussion of 
corporate compliance and enforcement, with specific reference to the functions of 
the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (“CIPC”).14 Above the base-
sector of non-regulation and education is another preventative measure, corporate 
self-regulation. 
The mechanism of self-regulation is embodied in corporate South Africa in the 
self-regulatory principles, policies and practices of the King Report series, a series of 
governance codes, initiated by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (“IoDSA”) 
that have shaped and deeply influenced the culture of corporate South Africa since 
the advent of the new democracy in 1994.15 The King Reports are strongly supported 
in South Africa and are relevant as their aim is good corporate governance, a 
mechanism to prevent economic crime.  
Administrative bodies are another mechanism used in combating contraventions 
of corporate regulation. A brief discussion will be devoted to the FAIS Ombud 
operating in the financial sector. The relevance of this mechanism relates to both the 
scope and the nature of its operations. Within the scope of its authority the FAIS 
Ombud has the power to order restitution of money lost due to contraventions of 
                                            
14 179ff. 
15 Institute of Directors in South Africa (“IoDSA”) King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa 1994 (“King I 1994”) was released in 1994. It is primarily based on the United 
Kingdom’s Cadbury Report (Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance) (1992). The IoDSA King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 
2002 (“King II 2002”) came into operation in 2002. During 2008-2009 King II was reviewed to 
incorporate the provisions of the draft Companies Act 2008 and the third IoDSA King Report 
on Corporate Governance for South Africa was consequently released in 2009 (“King III 
2009”) and the IoDSA King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2016 (“King IV 
2016”) was released in December 2016 and became effective on 1 April 2017. Comparable 
corporate governance codes to the South African King Reports are the Australian Stock 
Exchange (“ASX”) Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (4 ed)(2019) 
and the UK Corporate Governance Code (2019); and the Nigerian Code of Corporate 
Governance (2018). See too I Esser “The Protection of Stakeholder Interests in terms of the 
South African King III Report on Corporate Governance: An Improvement on King II” (2009) 
21 SA Merc J 188 189-191, 195-196.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
158 
 
financial regulations. This sometimes occurs in the context of a pyramid scheme, 
which may result in criminal liability for the orchestrators of such scheme. The nature 
of the office of an ombud16 is significant, as it is informal and flexible. It offers a non-
adversarial way in which to resolve contraventions, potentially including serious 
contraventions, of financial regulations.  
Another mechanism under the civil justice system is civil legislation regulating 
corporate and commercial relationships in South Africa. A discussion of relevant 
aspects of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the Companies Act 2008”) is imperative. 
Several jurisdictions have seen significant reform in company law and in financial 
services law during the past two decades.17 Most have followed the approach to 
decriminalise certain conduct previously prescribed as criminal offences under 
company law and have adopted a hybrid and enabling approach, in preference to a 
predominantly penal approach.18 Brief attention is given to the decriminalisation of 
such conduct in the South African Companies Act with reference to the retained 
criminal liability of corporate entities and their officers, including the provisions of 
section 214 of the Companies Act. Attention is also given to CIPC, an administrative 
body created to ensure compliance and enforcement of the provisions of the 
Companies Act. It is shown that CIPC could and should play a bolder role in the 
South Africa corporate regime, similar to the authoritative role filled by the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”). The mechanisms of monitoring 
and enforcement are equally important to the mechanism of regulation. Therefore, 
the selected powers of CIPC and the introduction of alternative disputes resolution 
mechanisms into chapter 7 of the Companies Act 2008 are discussed. A 
comparative overview is given of the powers of ASIC, with particular attention to its 
powers to investigate suspected misconduct and impose penalties. This is an 
                                            
16 This term is discussed below in para 4 1 3. In this dissertation, the gender neutral word 
“ombud” or ombudsperson” will be preferred (see fn 198 below). 
17 Department of Trade & Industry (“DTI”) Policy Document of the Department of Trade and 
Industry The Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform, South African Company Law Reform for 
a 21st Century (2004) 14.  
18 J Folson “South Africa Moves to a Global Model of Corporate Governance but with 
Important National Variations” (2010) AJ 219 219-220. See the discussion in para 4 2 2, 
167ff below. 
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illustration of a hybrid mechanism as the nature of the administrative body and the 
scope of its powers include principles of both the civil and criminal law.19  
Hybrid mechanisms, which incorporate characteristics from both civil and criminal 
law, are higher up the pyramid and are discussed in the second part of chapter 4. 
The complexity, risk and value of hybrid mechanisms in the field of corporate 
economic crime are demonstrated through the mechanisms of criminal and civil 
asset forfeiture. Depriving an offender of the proceeds of crime is an effective way to 
deal with economic crime. Moreover, confiscated or forfeited property may be 
appropriated to contribute towards the restitution of the loss incurred by the victims 
of crime. In this regard, chapters 5 and 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
121 of 1998 (“POCA”) are discussed to illustrate these powerful mechanisms. 
As shown in chapter 1, the concept of economic crime is wide and diverse, 
including not only common-law offences of crimes against property, such as theft 
and fraud, but including an ever growing body of statutory offences. Combating 
economic crime is complex because the nature of economic crime is complex. 
Consequently, not all instances of economic crime may require to be resolved 
through the narrow, yet concentrated principles of criminal law that apply in an 
adversarial trial court. There are other mechanisms outside the trial court that may 
deal with economic crime effectively. The aim of the third part of chapter 4 is to 
discuss a selected number of mechanisms that illustrate the development of 
alternative additional mechanisms to the classic criminal trial under the criminal 
justice system.  
The mechanism of deferred prosecution agreements, commonly referred to as 
DPAs will be described. The focus will be on the informal DPA mechanism operative 
in the Unites States, as well as on the statutory DPA system in England. Again, the 
objective is not only to demonstrate the working of an additional mechanism with 
which economic crime can be addressed, but also to extrapolate principles from 
such mechanisms to use as building blocks for the mechanism of mediation. The 
mechanism of plea and sentencing agreements is entrenched in the United States 
and is a fast growing mechanism in South Africa. This mechanism will be discussed 
                                            
19 Hybrid mechanisms are located in the middle of the pyramid.  
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at some length as it is considered that many issues that relate to plea and sentence 
agreements will be equally relevant to the mechanism of mediation.  
Finally mechanisms under the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (“CPA”) that 
make provision for the payment of compensation to victims will be discussed. The 
issue of restitution for loss arising from economic crime is a critical thread in this 
dissertation. Consequently, the amplification of the use of mechanisms providing 
opportunities for restitution needs to be underscored.  
An important thread throughout chapter 4 is choosing an appropriate mechanism 
to enforce a particular regulation. In short, it is not only about responsive regulation, 
but also responsive resolution. The manner in which economic crime is resolved 
needs to be responsive, appropriate to the particular circumstances.  
The chapter concludes with a summary of the different mechanisms that 
emphasise their role in the integrated mix of multi-mechanisms used by the 
authorities and companies themselves to combat economic crime. Special issues 
that relate to the submissions made in this dissertation to use mediation as a 
mechanism to resolve instances of economic crime are highlighted. The principles of 
the mechanisms discussed are used to build the proposed alternative mechanism of 
mediation in the criminal justice system.  
4 2 Mechanisms in the civil justice system  
Corporate governance and its supervision is one of the mechanisms use to 
combat economic crime, particularly with regard to corporate misconduct and crime. 
South Africa has a mixed approach to corporate governance and accountability by 
corporate institutions, their governing bodies, officers and shareholders. A mixed 
approach includes self-regulation by a firm or by an industry. Also, the legislature 
and executive use regulatory mechanisms, together with common-law principles, to 
control and enforce the accountability of corporate institutions and their directors and 
employees.20 This hybrid approach to corporate governance includes various fields 
                                            
20 In his article discussing sanctions of corporate conduct and the recommendations of 
several enquiries into corporate law in Australia, Tomasic (1992) AJCL 82-114 points out 
how difficult it is to get the right mix – the appropriate hybrid package of sanctions. The 
legislature seems to swing between criminalisation and decriminalisation. He also points out 
the different approaches and responses of the different role-players, including regulatory 
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of law, including company law, contract law, labour law, law of delict, financial 
services law and criminal law.21 Moreover, there is a continual interaction between 
public and private law with regard to both the regulation of corporate governance and 
its enforcement.22 Likewise, the remedies may also lie in private and public law, 
comprising, for example, personal liability for damages in the law of contract or 
delict; administrative and penal sanctions under statutory law; or criminal measures 
such as fines or imprisonment under public law.  
In the regulation of the corporate sector two principles are in tension with one 
another. On the one hand there is the need for regulations to secure the protection of 
investors, and on the other the need for sufficient freedom for promotion of modern 
corporate operations.23 Often regulatory reform is reactive, in response to some or 
other scandal in the corporate domain.24  
Self-regulation as a preventative measure is indispensable in a multi-faceted 
approach to combat economic crime. Self-regulation may include internal measures 
put into place by a company itself;25 or external measures by a particular industry,26 
or by other important bodies within the relevant trade;27 or by the legislator.28 In 
                                            
bodies, the prosecuting authorities, the judiciary, the legislature and the public, which 
highlights the complexity of the issue.  
21 E Wymeersch “The Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes” (2006) 6 JCLS 113 
116. 
22 Tomasic (1992) AJCL 84 rightly points out that a distinct dividing line between civil and 
criminal sanctions is not always evident, particularly with regard to corporate conduct and 
misconduct.  
23 Compare the purposes of the Companies Act 2008 in s 7(b), (j) and (l). 
24 KJ Hopt “Modern Company and Capital Market problems: Improving European Corporate 
Governance after Enron” (2003) 3 JCLS 221 221-222. 
25 For example, internal company monitoring and audit protocol and system. 
26 For example, Johannesburg Stock Exchange Listing Requirements. See N Smith “The 
JSE Limited Listing Requirements” (25-05-2017) LexisNexis Bulletin 1 of 2017 1-4. 
27 For example, ISO 37001 is a new anti-corruption international standard aimed at certifying 
a company as bribery-free, introduced by the renowned and established International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) to encourage corporations to apply for certification of 
ISO 37001. See N Keith & C Oliver “ISO37001: The New Anti-Corruption International 
Standard” (23-06-2017) White Collar Post (accessed 03-11-2017). 
28 For example, internal monitoring bodies such as the Social and Ethics Committee (“SEC”) 
and the Audit Committee (“AC”) are prescribed by ss 72(4)-(10) read together with reg 43, 
and s 94 read together with reg 42, of the Companies Act 2008, respectively. The SEC is 
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addition, external monitoring bodies measuring corporate governance also play a 
role. Examples of these are the PIC Corporate Governance Rating Matrix in South 
Africa,29 and the innovative Corporate Governance Rating System (“CGRS”) in 
Nigeria that measures corporate compliance, fiduciary awareness and corporate 
integrity of companies.30 
It is a matter of concern that corporate self-regulation seems to be decreasing, 
despite an increase in corrupt activities within corporations.31 However, corporate 
South Africa has since the new political dispensation, commenced a new chapter in 
corporate governance with the introduction and endorsement of the King Reports on 
Corporate Governance.32 
                                            
obligated to report to the board and to shareholders at the AGM about a range of issues, 
including social and economic development and good corporate citizenship. For discussion 
on the role of the SEC and the legislator’s aim to broaden the responsibilities of a company 
to other stakeholders in the broader economic environment, see I Esser & P Delport “The 
Protection of Stakeholders: The South African Social and Ethics Committee and the United 
Kingdom's Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach: Part 2” (2017) 50 De Jure 221 221-
232, 241; Delport New Entrepreneurial Law 138-139; R Cassim “Governance and the Board 
of Directors” in Cassim Contemporary Company Law; FHI Cassim “The Duties and Liability 
of Directors” in Cassim Contemporary Company Law 505 522-533. 
29 This is a matrix developed by PIC (Public Investment Corporation) a government owned 
asset manager, that invests hugely on the JSE and Stellenbosch University Business 
School. It measures the corporate governance of companies from information drawn from 
public annual reports and statements. Also see Williams-Elegbe “Corporate Governance 
Rating Systems as a Means of Targeting Corporate Misconduct in Africa: The Nigerian 
Example” (2017) 1 JCLA 1 19. 
30 In early 2018, 35 companies and 437 individuals had passed the required 70% required by 
the CGRS. For general information and recent news see M Atumu “The Convention on 
Business Integrity (CBI) and the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) Honour Companies and 
Directors for Passing Corporate Governance Rating Assessment” (27-02-2018) cgrsng 
(accessed 30-08-2018); Williams-Elegbe (2017) JCLA 4, 9-18. 
31 PWC Global Economic Crime Survey 2016 found that one in five companies have not 
undertaken a fraud risk assessment in the past 24 month period and one in ten instances of 
economic crime are discovered by accident. PWC “Global Economic Crime Survey 2016: 
Adjusting the Lens on Economic Crime: Preparation Brings Opportunity Back into Focus” 
(2016) PWC 6 (accessed 20-10-2018).  
32 This positive contention does not disregard the disheartening conclusions of the IIA SA 
“Corporate Governance Index” (2018). The most recent index that measures responses by 
internal auditors found that the score for ethics, compliance and assurances as set out in the 
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4 2 1 Mechanism of self-regulation: King Reports on good governance for South 
Africa 
For almost a quarter of a century, corporate South Africa has been profoundly 
influenced by the King Reports on corporate governance. Although the provisions of 
the King Reports are not directly enforced by formal legislation, it is the primary code 
in South Africa for corporate self-regulation.33 Brief mention is made of some of the 
principles incorporated into the King Reports. 
The pillars that anchor the King Reports are ethical governance, including ethical 
and effective leadership, which emphasises responsibility, accountability, fairness 
and transparency.34 The establishment and promotion of an ethical culture in South 
Africa’s corporate milieu is consequently recognised and constituted in the King 
Reports.35 Integration, including integrated accounts as well as integrated thinking 
encompassing the interdependencies between a corporation and factors within its 
environment are central to King IV. From the outset, the King Reports have been 
advocating the broadening of the common-law principle that a company exists for the 
benefit and in the interests of its shareholders; a philosophy that at times pushes 
corporations to pursue profit at all costs, including cutting corners, breaking and 
bending rules.36  This integrated and inter-related philosophy recognises that a 
                                            
King Reports had dropped since 2017 and were the lowest since the IIA began measuring 
them in 2013. IIA SA “Corporate Governance Index” (2018). See too T Niselow “Worst-ever 
Score for Corporate Governance in SA – index” (01-11-2018) Fin24 (accessed 02-11-2018).  
33 King IV (2016) 35. Voluntary codes, such as King IV, do not operate separate from the 
law, but rather in conjunction with the law and statutory regulations. 
34 King IV (2016) 20.  
35 King IV (2016) is the first code to focus on outcomes-based good governance. The four 
outcomes are: ethical culture, good performance, effective control, and legitimacy. A pivotal 
driver in King IV (2016) is integration, illustrated in the principles of integrated thinking and 
integrated reporting. These drivers build upon the key principles of King III, including 
integrated sustainability, sustainable reporting, social transformation and leadership. For 
general discussion on King Reports see Esser (2009) SA Merc J 191-196; M Judin, L 
Roberts & R Naidoo “Corporate Governance . . . Innovative Thinking in South Africa’s Latest 
Code” (01-07-2017) American Bar Association (accessed 31-10-2017). 
36 King III (2009) recognised that companies operate in an integrated context, and that the 
sustainable running of a company needs to take cognisance of the social, environmental, 
political and economic issues and consequently the call for integration and for a company to 
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corporation is a corporate citizen, and does not exist in isolation from society. 
Consequently, inclusive recognition is also given to other stakeholders, not only the 
shareholders.37 This broader perspective fosters a positive corporate culture that 
contributes to ethical and viable corporate governance that impacts upon the 
prevention of corporate misconduct. The shift towards board governance does not 
diminish the central role shareholders need to play in corporate governance. The 
King Reports have long recognised the need for shareholders to participate more 
actively in the oversight of operations of a business to ensure good governance.38 
Moreover, the need to manage and promote internal and external stakeholder 
relationships is becoming an increasingly important part of corporate governance. 
Consequently, the use of ADR advocated by King III (2009) is underscored by King 
IV (2016).39 
Transparency, particularly with regarding to reporting, remains a fundamental 
objective of King IV (2016). Accordingly, it has adopted an “apply and explain” policy, 
as opposed to the earlier “apply or explain” policy of King III (2009)40 (writer’s 
emphasis).  
                                            
recognise that it is a responsible citizen, as much as a natural person is. Proceeding from 
this identity and philosophy is the inclusive stakeholder approach, which encompasses both 
the enlightened shareholder and pluralistic stakeholder approach. This can be compared to 
the approach ultimately taken by the legislature in s 76(3)(b) of the Companies Act 2008 that 
obligates a director to act in the best interests of the company. It is submitted that this more 
narrow focus, which may be termed the enlightened shareholder approach, does not 
necessarily exclude the inclusive stakeholder approach. For discussion hereon see King III 
(2009) 11-12; I Esser & PA Delport “Shareholder Protection Philosophy in terms of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008” (2016) 79 THRHR 1 14-18; TH Mongalo “An Overview of 
Company Law Reform in South Africa: From the Guidelines to the Companies Act 2008” 
(2010) 2 AJ xiii xix; FHI Cassim “Introduction to the New Companies Act” in Cassim 
Contemporary Company Law 20-21.  
37 King IV (2016) 23-25; Folson (2010) AJ 222-225; Esser & Delport (2016) THRHR 1 14-18; 
FHI Cassim “The Duties and Liability of Directors” in Cassim Contemporary Company Law 
505 517-522. 
38 I Esser “Shareholder Interests and Good Corporate Governance in South Africa” (2014) 
77 THRHR 38 44-45; Mongalo (2010) AJ xxi. 
39 King IV (2016) 33, 71. See too T Wiese “The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Methods in Corporate Disputes: The Provisions of the Companies Act 2008” (2014) 26 SA 
Merc LJ 668 669-670. This issue is discussed in more detail in para 4 2 2 below. 
40 King IV (2016) 22, 27. 
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The latest King Report is applicable to most forms of corporate entity, whether 
public or private, profit or non-profit. Compliance with the King Reports remains 
voluntary for many companies in South Africa.41 Notwithstanding voluntary 
compliance, several methods of enforcement exist in South Africa and elsewhere.42 
Compliance may be formalised through contractual stipulations:43 certain 
organisations such the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (“JSE”) Listing Requirements 
require compliance with the King Reports.44 Moreover, the King Reports themselves 
increasingly promote self-compliance through principles such as “comply or 
explain”;45 giving way to the self-proclamation principles, “apply or explain”, and, 
subsequently, “apply and explain” which facilitate monitoring and evaluation by the 
market.46 Consequently, the concept of voluntariness needs to be more closely 
defined, as “voluntary” does not necessarily mean no compliance, no enforcement or 
no consequences. The distinction between external and substantive compliance with 
voluntary corporate governance codes is helpful. The former includes monitoring by 
                                            
41 I Esser & P Delport “The Protection of Stakeholders: The South African Social and Ethics 
Committee and the United Kingdom's Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach: Part 1” 
(2017) 50 DJ 97 104; Esser I & Locke N “Corporate Law (Including Stock Exchanges)” 
(2009) ASSAL 259 263-264; Esser I (2009) SA Merc J 190; 
42 Wymeersch refers to factual monitoring by monitoring bodies, or monitoring by the market 
developments, or a form of legal enforcement such as incorporation into applicable 
legislation or a number of other hybrid public- and private law regulation. Wymeersch further 
identifies the gradual global tendency to codify former self-regulatory corporate governance 
rules. Wymeersch E “The Enforcement of Corporate Governance Codes” JCLS (2006) 6 113 
113-116, 135-137. 
43 As was stipulated in the agreement between Retief, Novus and Media 24 in the case 
Caxton & CPT Publishers and Printers Limited v Media 24 Proprietary Limited 2015 
ZAWCHC 209 (25-11-2015) 136/CAC/March 2015)(para 22). It may also be incorporated 
into a company’s articles of association. See too Wymeersch (2006) JCLS 123-124. 
44 Board Notice 87 in GG 40847 of 19-05-2017 providing in terms of s 71(3)(c)(ii) of the 
Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 that the effective date for the King IV is 19 June 2017. 
Whether the market supervisor, like the JSE, should, however, enforce compliance of the 
code’s provisions is another debatable issue. Is external supervision limited to monitoring 
reporting of compliance by a company, or does it encompass more substantive supervision 
of actual compliance with the code? Also see Wymeersch (2006) JCLS 114, 133-134. 
45 Incorporated into King II (2002). 
46 Also see Esser I & Locke N “Corporate Law (Including Stock Exchanges)” (2009) ASSAL 
259 263-264; Esser I (2009) SA Merc J 190-191; Wymeersch (2006) JCLS 121. 
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external entities such as an external audit, whilst the latter refers to internal 
monitoring, primarily by the board and management, but also by the general meeting 
of shareholders.47  
The judicial recognition of the King Reports by the courts in South Africa has been 
most influential with regard to compliance.48 At times the courts have referred to the 
King Reports in the same breath as to the Companies Act 2008, particularly with 
regard to the principles of good governance and the duties of directors.49 The 
provisions of the King Reports have not only been taken into account but held to be 
“persuasive” by the court.50 In addition, directors have been held liable for not 
complying with the King Reports.51 Victor J held in South African Broadcasting 
Corporation Ltd v Mpofu: 
“Ubuntu-botho is deeply rooted in our society. These values should assist in 
informing corporate decisions made by directors in state owned enterprises. 
Proper and constructive dialogue would enable better outcomes in the decision 
making process. Heated and impetuous decision making is the stuff of irrational 
outcomes. This must be avoided. This form of governance is underpinned by the 
philosophy of ubuntu-botho. The time is right to incorporate the views of umuntu 
                                            
47 In this context internal monitoring does not just mean ticking the boxes. Also see 
Wymeersch (2006) JCLS 118. 
48 “Practising sound corporate governance is essential for the well-being of a company and 
is in the best interests of the growth of this country’s economy especially in attracting new 
investments. To this end the corporate community within South Africa has widely and almost 
uniformly accepted the findings and recommendations of the King Committee on Corporate 
Governance.” Hussain J in Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining 
Co Ltd [2006] ZAGPHC 147 (“Stilfontein Gold Mining”) para 16.7. Wymeersch highlights the 
use by judges of corporate governance codes as yardsticks in deciding various issues, 
including questions regarding corporate negligence. See Wymeersch (2006) JCLS 114; 
Esser & Delport (2017) DJ 105-106. 
49 Mbethe v United Manganese of Kalahari (Pty) Ltd 2016 5 SA 414 (GJ) paras 21, 93-94, 
125-126, 182 & 185; Stilfontein Gold Mining paras 16.7-16.9. 
50 Myburgh v Barinor Holdings (Pty) Ltd (C280/13) [2015] ZALCCT 1. This was a labour 
court case and it was argued and then found by the court that provisions of King III which 
provided that the positions of CEO and the financial director should be separate and 
independent of one another were “persuasive” (paras 16 and 18). 
51 Stilfontein Gold Mining para 16.9. See too Esser & Delport (2017) DJ 105-107. 
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ngumuntu ngabantu in the King code of good governance.”52 (Writer’s 
emphasis).  
Essentially, the philosophy of ubuntu is expressed in King IV in the principle of 
interdependence between individual corporate institutions, the broader society and 
the consequential reciprocal rights and obligations which are inherent in ubuntu: 
“Ubuntu and Botho imply that there should be a common purpose to all human 
endeavours (including corporate endeavours) which is based on service to 
humanity. As a logical consequence of this interdependency, one person 
benefits by serving another. This is also true for a juristic person, which benefits 
itself by serving its own society of internal and external stakeholders, as well as 
the broader society.”53 
The King Reports illustrate the impact which integrated and transparent corporate 
governance principles can have on the prevention of economic crime. Moreover, 
typifying a company as a corporate citizen recognises that a corporation operates 
not only for its shareholders, but also for the sustainability of other stakeholders and 
for the public good. Likewise, the incorporation of the deep and strong philosophy of 
Ubuntu into corporate governance attributes moral worth and responsibility to a 
company which indisputably contributes to the development of a strong ethical 
corporate culture. Consequently, the King Reports have contributed and continue to 
contribute positively to address economic crime. 
The importance of self-regulation, in particular the development of an internal 
corporate culture of compliance is underscored.54 The need to develop upstream 
mechanisms of internal compliance and enforcement, in conjunction with the usual 
downstream enforcement mechanisms of external civil and criminal sanctions, 
should be encouraged.55 Accordingly, the King Reports with their emphasis on 
internal ethical governance and the promotion of a sound integrated compliant 
corporate culture are commended.  
                                            
52 2009 4 All SA 169 (GSJ) para 66. 
53 King IV (2016) 24. 
54 R Tomasic “The Challenge of Corporate Law Enforcement: Future Directions for 
Corporations law in Australia” (2006) 10 UWSLR 1 13-15, 19-23. 
55 Stages of self-regulation include commitment, implementation and institutionalisation. See 
Tomasic (2006) UWSLR 19-20. 
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4 2 2 Mechanisms in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
“If the breach is criminal in nature, criminal penalties should follow. But it is 
draconian to apply such penalties in the absence of criminality. … When gaol 
terms are provided for breach of the law but the courts are disinclined to impose 
them because they seem too draconian, the law tends to fall into disrepute. The 
modest fines which are imposed instead cause some discontent in the 
community.” 56 
A perennial thorny issue is the regulation and enforcement of corporate 
governance, including intentional dishonesty, but also directorial negligence. The 
recurring question remains whether such instances are best addressed through 
criminal sanctions, administrative penalties or civil accountability?57 Reform of 
corporate governance provisions needs to be ongoing, continually seeking answers 
in an ever evolving corporate environment. Corporations do not operate in a vacuum 
and the supervision and enforcement of corporate governance is not only a matter 
for the relevant trade sector, but instances of economic crime also involve the 
criminal courts. Moreover, the issue of economic growth and corporate governance 
are also matters of political significance. The financial services industry is also a 
powerful and influential sector, particularly with regard to commercial fraud, and 
consequently the regulation of the financial services industry is fundamental in the 
composite effort against economic crime.  
In South Africa the Companies Act 1973 contains a multitude of criminal 
sanctions,58 yet most have failed to be effective.59 The reasons for this are numerous 
                                            
56 See Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs Company Directors’ 
Duties, Report on the Social an Fiduciary Obligations of Company Directors (The so-called 
Cooney Committee, named after the chair, Senator Cooney) AGPS 1989 17 (para 2.37). 
Available at: 
<https://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/.../senate/committee/.../directors/report_pdf.ashx.>. 
57 A recent meta-analysis study of global on-line analyses indicated that a multi-policy 
approach incorporating various strategies, including education, cooperation and compliance, 
together with multi-enforcement remedies including administrative, civil and criminal 
sanctions, seemed to achieve the best results in deterring corporate crime. See N Schell-
Busey, SS Simpson, M Rorie & M Alper “What Works? A Systematic Review of Corporate 
Crime Deterrence” (2016) 15 Criminology & Public Policy 387 387 & 406-408. 
58 Henning & Du Toit reckon that there have been more than 640; most of which were 
“purely technical offences”. JJ Henning & S Du Toit “Corporate Law Reform in South Africa: 
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and diverse, including procedural, institutional and practical reasons.60 Most of the 
criminal penalties have been seldom used and some penalties related to what are 
perceived to be lesser contraventions and consequently it has been inappropriate to 
impose a criminal penalty for such a breach.61 Likewise, it has been argued that 
some offences may not necessarily be criminal in nature, and should consequently 
not attract criminal liability, but alternative mechanisms of accountability.62 
Additionally the penalties that were codified were limited in their application by the 
stringent procedural rules of criminal law and the delays and duration of criminal 
trials.63 The complexity of company law also poses challenges.64 In addition, the 
complexity of some instances of commercial fraud has contributed to the failure of 
                                            
Empowering the Victims of Economic Crime” in L De Koker, BAK Rider & JJ Henning (eds) 
Victims of Economic Crime (1999) 134 149.  
59 Davis (2010) AJ 411. 
60 Henning & Du Toit “Empowering the Victims of Economic Crime” in Victims of Economic 
Crime 149. In a review of a number of court cases in Australia, Professor Tomasic, identified 
the following reasons: poor drafting of company law rules, attitude of tolerance by business 
community, peer pressure to engage in company law breaches, failure of professions, such 
as law and accounting to maintain “arms-length” relationships with their clients, judicial 
restraint with regard to corporate abuses, the use of law as a tactical device, ineffective 
enforcement systems and an incremental approach to corporate law reform (a paraphrase 
by the writer). Tomasic (1992) AJCL 83-84.  
61 These may be unintentional or minor infringements. For example, s 207(2) of the 
Companies Act 1973 provided that it was an offence to publish a report of meetings that was 
not a “fair summary” and that the burden of proof of any defence was upon the defendant. In 
terms of this section a director could have been guilty of a criminal offence though he or she 
may inadvertently have been involved in such publication.  
62 For example, s 38(3)(a) of the Companies Act 1973 provided that it was an offence to 
provide a loan to a company for the subscription of shares, whilst in terms of the Companies 
Act 2008 (s 44 read with s 77(3)(e)(iv)) the failure to follow the correct procedure, including 
obtaining shareholder approval, will result in personal liability of the directors and not 
constitute a criminal offence. Jooste is critical of criminal liability being left out with regard to 
the financial assistance provisions in s 44 and contends that the threat of criminal liability 
was an effective deterrent in this instance. See R Jooste “Corporate Finance” in FHI Cassim 
(man ed) Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 262 333. 
63 Cassim FHI Cassim “Introduction to the New Companies Act: General overview of the Act” 
in FHI Cassim (man ed) Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 1 26; Davis (2010) AJ 
412. 
64 Henning & Du Toit “Empowering the Victims of Economic Crime” in Victims of Economic 
Crime 149-152. 
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the criminal sanctions contained in the Companies Act of 1973. Insufficient capacity, 
both in human and budgetary resources, has also hampered the effective 
supervision and application of the statutory provisions.65 It has become apparent that 
a different approach to the predominantly criminal sanction route is required.  
The Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (“Close Corporations Act”) set corporate 
legislation in South Africa on the route of decriminalisation.66 This route was 
endorsed twenty years later by the policy document South African Company Law for 
the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Reform67 (“Guidelines for Corporate 
Reform (2004)”) that advocated a focus on regulation and the enforcement of such 
regulation through various statutory administrative bodies and ADR.68 Recognition 
was given to creating the proper balance between administrative, civil and criminal 
enforcement and sanctions.69 Consequently, in line with the preceding Close 
Corporations Act, the Guidelines for Corporate Reform (2004) and international 
developments, the Companies Act 2008 have adopted a multi-faceted approach to 
corporate governance and its supervision and control.70 Significant to enforcement 
are the functions of the statutory authorities created in the Companies Act 2008, 
                                            
65 LA Tager “The Regulation of Economic Activity in Southern Africa” in JJ Henning (ed) 
Economic Crime in Southern Africa (1996) 25 28. Similar reasons were evident in Australia. 
Compare Tomasic (1992) 2 AJCL 82 90-91. 
66 See Henning & Du Toit “Empowering the Victims of Economic Crime” in Victims of 
Economic Crime 145-155 regarding some of the alternatives discussed at different meetings 
regarding reform of company law and commending the route of the Close Corporations Act 
that contains only 11 offences and emphasises self-enforcement, personal and several 
liability of the members. 
67 GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23-06-2004. 
68 Guidelines for Corporate Reform (2004) 43-48. 
69 Guidelines for Corporate Reform (2004) 10; Mongalo (2010) AJ xviii-xix; Cassim 
“Introduction to the New Companies Act” in Contemporary Company Law 26; Davis (2010) 
AJ 411-412. 
70 D Farisani “The Potency and Co-ordination of Enforcement Functions by the New and 
Revamped Regulatory Authorities under the New Companies Act” (2010) AJ 433 433-434; 
Cassim “Introduction to the New Companies Act” in Contemporary Company Law 1-5. 
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namely the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission “CIPC”),71 the 
Takeover Regulation Panel72 (“TRP”) and the Companies Tribunal.73  
The Companies Act 2008 provides primarily two routes through which 
enforcement of its regulations can take place. The first way is through private 
enforcement, and the second route is public enforcement which includes 
enforcement through the public regulator, CIPC, who can exercise its enforcement 
functions through either ADR, civil or criminal mechanisms. In this section, brief 
reference will be made to the expansion of the powers of enforcement of various 
persons in the private law route, but the primary focus will be on the mechanism of a 
public regulator, CIPC. Comparative comments will be made with regard to CIPC’s 
Australian counterpart, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(“ASIC”).  
4 2 2 1 Mechanism of private enforcement 
The Companies Act 2008 prescribes various mechanisms for private enforcement 
under civil law to regulate corporate conduct.74 Also, the codification of several 
common-law mechanisms, like piercing the corporate veil and directors’ duties, help 
strengthen the position of various stakeholders.  
The pivotal principle of the separate juristic personality of a company remains 
entrenched and consequently the facility to incorporate a company is provided for in 
the Companies Act 200875 and failure to comply with certain provisions could result 
                                            
71 An independent administrative body created in terms of s 185(1) which replaces the 
Registrar of Companies under the Companies Act 1973. 
72 An independent administrative body created in terms of s 196. 
73 An independent administrative body created in terms of s 193. A further body, the 
Financial Reporting Standards Council is created in terms of s 203, but unlike CIPC, the 
TRP and the Companies Tribunal, it does not have an independent juristic personality. 
74 Davis (2010) AJ 414, citing strengthening internal governance mechanisms and 
empowering shareholders in a number of ways. 
75 Ss 14-15 provide for the incorporating and registration of a company. Likewise the 
capacity of a company and authority of its officers remain important and thus the submission 
of Memorandum of Incorporation, any shareholders’ agreements or company rules are 
prescribed in s 15. The separate juristic personality of a company comes into being in terms 
of s 19(1) and evidence of its existence is the registration certificate issued in terms of s 
14(4).  
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in criminal liability.76 Significantly, the protection of the proper and legitimate use of 
corporate personality has been partly codified in terms of section 20 of the 
Companies Act 2008. Interested parties77 can apply to the court for a restraint order 
to restrain the company or its directors from doing anything inconsistent with the 
Companies Act 2008 or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.78  
A further statutory mechanism for ensuring accountability is the partial codification 
of the common-law principle “piercing the corporate veil”79 in terms of section 20(9) 
                                            
76 See for example, s 32(5) for criminal sanctions for non-compliance with the provisions on 
the use of company names. The proper use of a company’s name and registration number is 
integral to corporate law and thus any contravention of such proper use is a criminal offence 
(s 32(1)-(5)). Interestingly although s 32(4) provides that a company’s name needs to be 
mentioned in all official documents, in hardcopy or electronic form, the actual display of a 
company’s name outside its place of business is not prescribed as in s 50(1)(a) of the 
Companies Act 1973. Compare too Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe 1996 4 SA 1063 
(C) 1070A, where the court found that failure to display a close corporation’s name in terms 
of s 23 of the Close Corporation Act and to use its name at all constituted “gross abuse” in 
terms of s 65 of the Act. In this case meat was sold to a close corporation. However, the 
seller was not aware that he was supplying meat to a close corporation and thought he was 
dealing with a partnership, as the business used a trade name and at no time displayed or 
used the name of the close corporation. Consequently, it is likely that should a company 
misstate its name and trade in comparable circumstances that it would be in breach of the 
Companies Act 2008 and be guilty of a criminal offence in terms of s 32(1)(b) read with s 
32(5); or found to constitute “unconscionable abuse” of the juristic personality of a company 
under s 20 (9). Also see Ncube (2010) AJ 47. 
77 Including, directors, officers and shareholders. 
78 S 20(4) and (5) of the Companies Act 2008. 
79 Interestingly, Lady Justice Arden (2017) “Piercing the Corporate Veil – Old Metaphor. 
Modern Practice” (2017) 1 JCCL&P 1, 2 11, distinguishes between “piercing the corporate 
veil” and “lifting the corporate veil”. Lifting the corporate veil means looking behind it, but not 
necessarily piercing it; whilst piercing the corporate veil means holding the controllers liable, 
which lifting does not.. She also identifies various forms of veil piercing, including legal veil 
piercing, which entails statutory liability being imposed upon the shareholders or directors; 
judicial veil piercing, when judges in their judicial discretion pierce the veil and find someone 
behind the corporate veil liable; voluntary piercing where another person guarantees liability 
for a company’s debt; and reverse piercing where a court orders a third party to return an 
asset to a company. Yet another approach is distinguishing between peeping behind the veil 
to look and see who controls the corporation, but still treating each as separate legal entities; 
penetrating the corporate veil when the controllers are found to be liable; extending the 
corporate veil in finding two or more corporations acting as one entity; and ignoring the 
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of the Companies Act 2008.80 In terms of section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008, 
the courts may lift the corporate veil in instances where there has been 
“unconscionable abuse” of the corporate identity of the company by the directors or 
shareholders. The first case to consider section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 
was ex parte Gore.81 Binns-Ward J firstly sketched the history of case law in 
England, Australia and South Africa relating to piercing the corporate veil and 
highlighted that there seems to be no entrenched principles as to when the veil will 
indeed be pierced, illustrating that some courts followed a conservative approach, 
whilst others follow a more liberal and robust approach.82 A critical principle to any 
approach by the court, whatever its label, is “a facts-based determination by the 
courts”.83 Binns-Ward J concluded that section 20(9) appears to broaden the scope 
of the application of the piercing the corporate veil as illustrated in earlier cases; and, 
                                            
corporate veil is when the corporation is seen to be a total sham and consequently non-
existent. See C Hawes, AKL Lau & A Young “Lifting the Corporate Veil in China: Statutory 
Vagueness, Shareholder Ignorance and Case Precedents in a Civil Law System” (2015) 15 
JCLS 341 347-348. Binns-Ward J (Ex parte Gore 2013 2 ALL SA 437 (WCC) para 4) 
remarked that the use of the different terms is confusing and inconsistent, and “that nothing 
really turns on the labels”. 
80 This follows the earlier codification in s 65 of the Close Corporations Act. A primary 
difference 27 years later is that the criteria “gross abuse” is replaced with “unconscionable 
abuse”. In Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe,80 van Niekerk J interpreted s 65 of the 
Close Corporations Act liberally. The court further held that s 65 conferred a “wide 
discretion” upon the court in deciding when an organisation’s juristic personality may be 
ignored. It also held that section 65 is applicable to a more “oorkoepelende wyse van 
optrede” by the members of the close corporation, thus applying a general evaluation to the 
behaviour of the members. 
81 2013 2 ALL SA 437 (WCC). In this case, disregard for the separate legal personalities of 
41 companies within the so called King Group scheme group, led to monies being 
transferred between the companies without any regard to any one of the company’s 
independent legal identities. In view of this commingling, the court held that such disregard 
and use constituted “unconscionable abuse” of the separate legal personalities of the 
different companies and that such separate legal personalities should subsequently be 
disregarded (para 33 32-34). 
82 Ex parte Gore paras 19-27. Lim (E Lim “Formalism and Companies” (2013) 13 JCLS 477-
501) also highlights the inconsistencies, and subsequent uncertainties with regard to the law 
that arise from the courts approaches to lift, or to not lift, the corporate veil in the United 
Kingdom.  
83 Ex parte Gore para 4. 
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moreover, in terms of section 20(9)(b) the court has very wide powers with regard to 
the orders it could make.84  
Importantly Binns-Ward J regards “section 20(9) of the Companies Act as 
supplemental to the common law, rather than substitutive.”85 He found that in South 
Africa a court will pierce the corporate veil when necessary;86 nonetheless fraud or 
improper conduct has usually been present when the corporate veil has been 
pierced.87  In addition to section 20(9) the common-law remedy of lifting of the 
corporate veil is still available in instances of abuse by the directors or shareholders 
of the separate legal personality of a company. Although the grounds for such action 
have never been exhaustively defined, it is clear that the courts will lift the corporate 
veil in instances of fraud or improper conduct. Furthermore, in determining whether 
the legal personality of a company should be ignored or not the courts will weigh up 
the pivotal importance of “the legal concept of juristic personality”, on the one hand, 
and against its “unconscionable abuse” by corporate controllers on the other hand.88 
In considering these competing principles, the courts have shown awareness of the 
fact that the legal personality of an organisation remains a creature of statute, and 
such separate existence will be ignored by the courts if abused.89  
                                            
84 Paras 32-34. Binns-Ward J found that “unconscionable abuse” in terms of Companies Act 
allows for a broader interpretation than “gross abuse” in terms of s 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act. Also see Arden ((2017) JCCL&P 14-15) who argues that the courts in 
South Africa follow a maximalist approach and pierce the corporate veil more readily than 
their counterparts in the United Kingdom. She arrives at this conclusion on the basis that the 
judges have a broad discretion in interpreting “unconscionable abuse”; and on the basis that 
courts may pierce the corporate veil, even in instances where other remedies are available 
to the claimant.  
85 Ex parte Gore para 34. Also see paras 31-33. 
86 “(T)hat despite the repeated affirmation that the courts enjoy no general discretion to do so 
merely because it would be just and equitable, courts will ignore or look behind the separate 
legal personality of a company where justice requires it, and not only when there is no 
alternative remedy.” (Para 28.) 
87 Ex parte Gore para 28. 
88 Ex parte Gore para 29. 
89 “The courts have shown an acute appreciation that juristic personality is a statutory 
creation and that ‘their separate existence remains a figment of law, liable to be curtailed or 
withdrawn when the objects of their creation are abused or thwarted.’” (Ex parte Gore para 
29 and also para 4.) 
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Additional mechanisms for ensuring due corporate governance are the personal 
liability of directors, both civil and criminal, based on either statutory or common law, 
or both. The personal liability of directors for contraventions of a company remains a 
thorny issue as it can be argued that the corporate veil should protect the directors 
acting in their official capacity, unless the abuse of the separate corporate juristic 
personality is due to a director’s acts or omissions.90 Similarly contentious is the use 
of criminal sanctions to enforce proper corporate governance and attributing criminal 
liability to directors who are purportedly acting in the interests of a company and not 
their own.91 Also, the difficult question arises: what or who is included in the best 
interests of the company? Are only the shareholders considered to be the 
beneficiaries of a company or are other stakeholders also included? These are 
important questions as it was for a time considered that only shareholders had the 
right, as owners, to derivative actions on behalf of a company.92 Moreover, such 
entitlement calls for short-term financial results, that generally encourage risk taking, 
including the contravention of regulations, which may result in economic crime.93 
Recently, however, some have called for a broader inclusion of stakeholders, 
including the public, investors, creditors and employees.94 These issues are central 
to the duties of directors, as directors are mandated to act in the best interests of the 
company;95 or do they owe duties to a broader constituency? If the former, more 
narrow interpretation is followed, the shareholders are the exclusive stakeholders 
                                            
90 K van der Linde “The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate fault – An Exploration” 
(2008) 20 SA Merc LJ 439 441-442, 450-451, 460.  
91 T Liau “Is Criminalising Directorial Negligence a Good Idea?” (2014) 14 JCLS 175 176, 
181. 
92 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss these issues and the possible tension 
between s 165(2) of the Companies Act that specifically broadens the derivative actions to 
include a wider group of persons, and s 76(3)(b) which prescribes that directors need to 
exercise their powers and perform their function in the best interests of the company, as 
opposed to other stakeholders. See also fns 27, 35 and 40 above. 
93 TH Mongalo “Supervision of the Use of Corporate Power as the Ultimate Purpose of 
Directorial Duties and the Advisability of Corporate Law Enforcement in the Public Interest” 
(2017) 1 JCCL&P 17 18-19; 
94 Mongalo (2017) JCCL&P 17, 33;  
95 S 76(3)(b) of the Companies Act 2008. 
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who have the right to enforce the directorial duties.96 The Companies Act 2008 has 
however, taken a more expansive view for some purposes and recognised that other 
stakeholders, such as other directors, trade unions or other representatives of 
employees, or any other person whom the court is satisfied has a legal right 
requiring protection, may institute derivative proceedings.97 The right to enforce 
directorial duties has consequently been extended to a broader group of persons 
and this extension contributes to the promotion of corporate governance and 
consequent prevention of corporate crime.  
Furthermore, Nigeria has innovatively introduced an additional alternative remedy. 
The Corporate Governance Rating System (“CGRS”) which measures and certifies a 
director’s fiduciary awareness, is a ratings mechanism that assists in the regulation 
of the fiduciary duties of directors.98 This novel way of promoting compliance with the 
fiduciary duties of directors, in addition to the jurisdiction of regulatory bodies and 
courts, is commended. 
In addition, the Companies Act 2008 increases and partly codifies the statutory 
civil liability of directors.99 The codification of a director’s duties, including the 
                                            
96 Mongalo (2017) JCCL&P 22, 28-33. 
97 S 165(2). S 165 is a complex provision. For example, s 165(4)(b)(iii) provides that any 
derivative action needs to be in the “best interests of a company” and s 165(7) creates a 
rebuttable presumption that granting leave for a derivative action is not in the best interests 
of a company in certain circumstance. Persons who control the company or who are 
“related” in terms of ss 165(8) are excluded from the benefit of the rebuttable presumption, 
consequently it will not be presumed that derivative action against them is not in the interests 
of the company. However, this exclusion does not extend to directors who are not 
controllers. This may mean that directors who may be the wrongdoers, actually benefit from 
this presumption as it will be presumed that such derivative proceedings are not in the best 
interests of the company. For discussion on the derivative action and these possible 
obstacles to it, see MF Cassim “Shareholder Remedies and Minority protection” in Cassim 
Contemporary Company Law 755 775-796, particularly 787-789. See too Mongalo (2017) 
JCCL&P 41-45.  
98 The CGRS began in 2013 as an initiative of the Nigerian Stock Exchange and the 
Convention on Business Integrity. The CGRS in a novel way measures directors’ awareness 
of directorial duties through a training programme, and thus also achieves education and 
training in the model.  See Williams-Elegbe (2017) JCLA 9-21. 
99 Notably the definition of “director” is expanded in s 76(1) to include alternate directors, 
prescribed officers and any person who is a member of any board committee, or of the Audit 
Committee (“AC”). Notably, a potential defence for a director against a claim for breach of 
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fiduciary duties of good faith, and duties of care, skill and diligence, primarily falls 
under section 76 of the Companies Act 2008.100 Any liability arising from the breach 
of directorial duties is prescribed in section 77. In terms of section 77,101 a director 
can be held personally liable for loss or damages or costs arising from statutory or 
common-law breaches of duties.102 Actual loss or damages must have been suffered 
for a claim to succeed in terms of section 77 and a three-year prescription period 
applies to such a claim.103 In addition, section 218(2) is a wide provision attributing 
                                            
her or his duties is the business judgement rule has been codified in term of s 77(9). 
Personal liability may include compensation arising from damages and loss incurred and this 
may be either directly against a director, jointly or severally, in terms of s 77(6). See too, 
Henning & Du Toit “Empowering the Victims of Economic Crime” in Victims of Economic 
Crime 153;  
100 Interestingly, Mongalo, one of the authors of the Companies Act 2008, argues that the 
duty of care skill and diligence in terms of s 76(3)(c), is more onerous than its counterpart in 
the United States. Like, the United States and the United Kingdom, the objective standard is 
required in respect of the duty of care and/or diligence, as measured against a person in a 
similar position, with similar functions. The Companies Act 2008 however, introduced the 
subjective element with regard to the duty of skill as prescribed in s 76(3)(c)(ii) “ … that may 
reasonably be expected of a person … having the general knowledge, skill and experience 
of that director.” (writer’s emphasis). This implies that persons who may have a higher skill, 
face a higher risk of personal liability than persons of a lesser skill. For discussion of the 
interpretation of s 76(3)(c), see TH Mongalo “Director’s Standards of Conduct under the 
South African Companies Act and the Possible Influence of Delaware law” (2016 ) 1 
JCCL&P 1-16. 
101 S 218(2) and 218(3) are general provisions for civil actions and remedies.  
102 Broadly defined in terms of s 77(1) as including an alternate director, a prescribed officer 
and a member of a committee of the board or audit committee. The issue of liability of non-
executive and executive directors and whether a different duty of care and skill is required 
from each; and the issue of whether concurrent claims in delict and contract exist, and the 
unfortunate problematic wording of s 77(2)(b) is not canvassed in this dissertation. For a 
comprehensive discussion of these issues and liability of directors see R Stevens “The Legal 
Nature of the Duty of Care and Skill: Contract or Delict?” (2016) PELJ 1-28. Singapore, like 
South Africa, recently reformed its corporate law and partially codified the common-law 
duties of a director. Interestingly, the Singapore legislature provided that any breach of such 
duties incurs personal liability and criminal sanctions. See s 157 of Companies Act (Chapter 
50) 2006. Also see Liau JCLS 177-184; M Nietsch “Corporate Illegal Conduct and Directors’ 
Liability: An Approach to Personal Accountability for Violations of Corporate Legal 
Compliance” (2017) JCLS 1-34. 
103 S 77(7) of the Companies Act 2008. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
178 
 
civil liability to any person who contravenes any provision of the Companies Act for 
any loss or damages suffered by any other person as a result of that contravention 
(writer’s emphasis).104 Section 22105 read together with sections 77(3)(b), 214(1)(c) 
and 218(2) of the Companies Act 2008 illustrates the consequences that can arise 
for a director who knowingly “acquiesces in the carrying on of the company’s 
business in a reckless and fraudulent manner”.106 In terms of section 77(3)(b) a 
director will be held personally liable for the loss arising from such trading.107 In 
addition, a court is mandated to declare such a director delinquent.108 Criminal 
liability may also arise if a director “was knowingly a party to any act or omission by a 
company calculated to defraud a creditor, or employee …, or a holder of securities 
…, or with another fraudulent purpose”.109 Accordingly, the consequences for a 
director regarding personal liability can be serious.  
The Companies Act 2008 also provides various other remedies to encourage and 
ensure high standards of corporate governance.110 Internal supervision of a 
corporation’s conduct has been strengthened by granting shareholders more powers 
                                            
104 S 218(2) has been named one of the most controversial provisions of the Companies Act 
and commentators differ regarding the interpretation of it. See N Locke “Safe Harbour 
Provisions against Liability for Insolvent Trading” (2018) ABLU 45 57-58; FHI Cassim “The 
Duties and Liabilities of Directors” in Contemporary Company Law 582. 
105 S 22(1) provides that: “A company must not carry on its business recklessly, with gross 
negligence, with intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose.” S 22 is based 
on the earlier provisions relating to insolvent trading under s 424 of the Companies Act 1973. 
Locke (2018) ABLU 57; FHI Cassim “The Duties and Liabilities of Directors” in 
Contemporary Company Law 587. 
106 For a discussion on these sections and the liability arising for directors see Locke (2018) 
ABLU 53-61; FHI Cassim “The Duties and Liabilities of Directors” in Contemporary Company 
Law 586-592. 
107 In addition, s 78(6) provides that company may not indemnify a director in respect of any 
liability arising from s 77(3)(a)-(c) or from wilful misconduct.  
108 S 162(5)(c)(iv)(bb). 
109 S 214(1)(c). The offence incurs the heavier punishment of either a fine or imprisonment of 
up to ten years or both under s 216(a). For a discussion on the interpretation of “knowingly”, 
see FHI Cassim “The Duties and Liabilities of Directors” in Contemporary Company Law 
589-590. 
110 Preamble and s 7(b)(iii).  
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and clarifying their rights.111 These mechanisms help ensure the proper fulfilment of 
regulatory provisions, or otherwise stated, they deter owners and directors of 
companies from contravening regulations. The decriminalisation of certain improper 
conduct under the Companies Act 2008 in South Africa, together with the provisions 
enabling civil enforcement, illustrates the principle that persuasion is preferred to 
punishment to regulate and discourage corporate misconduct. However, persuasive 
measures need to be supported by a gradient of punitive mechanisms; and 
consequently the role played by CIPC as a public regulator is essential to the proper 
functioning of corporate law in South Africa. 
4 2 2 2 Mechanism of the public regulator: CIPC  
The Companies Act of 2008 provides a hybrid of enforcement provisions, 
including remedies of a private, administrative and public-law nature. Innovatively, 
the Companies Act 2008 introduced alternative ways of enforcement by providing 
four different ways in which a complaint may be addressed: (i) by filing a complaint 
with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (“CIPC”) or the Takeover 
Regulation Panel (“TRP”); or (ii) through Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) 
procedures in terms of Part C of Chapter 7; or (iii) by applying to the Companies 
Tribunal to adjudicate the dispute; or by (iv) by applying to the High Court.112 It is 
                                            
111 Particularly by ss 160-165 of the Companies Act 2008. Generally speaking minority 
shareholders are bound by the resolutions of the majority unless those resolutions were 
intentionally made to prejudice the minority. However, in the event of fraud on the minority, 
instances of the majority abusing their power to expropriate the minority, the minority are not 
bound by the resolutions of the majority and can take appropriate legal remedies in terms of 
ss 20(4), 20(6) and s 165. For a general discussion on improving corporate governance by 
empowering shareholders, see D Davis “Dealing with Corporate Defaulters: Curbing the 
Unfettered Exercise of Criminal Law” (2010) Modern Company Law for a Competitive South 
African Economy (formerly Acta Juridica) 411 414; Hopt (2003) JCLS 226-229; D Davis (ed) 
Companies and Business Structures 291-306; Esser & Delport (2016) THRHR 18-22. 
112 The High Court continues to play an important role in the enforcement of the provisions of 
the Companies Act 2008. The need for a specialised commercial court has been recognised 
and Gauteng High Court JP Mlambo announced in 2018 that a new Commercial Court would 
be established in Gauteng. The purpose is to promote case management of commercial 
matters and ensure that commercial disputes are dealt with efficiently. A further outcome will 
be the development of commercial jurisprudence and a pool of skilled legal practitioners and 
experienced judges. C Rickard “New Gauteng Commercial Court could Reshape Corporate 
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beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the four different mechanisms in 
detail and reference will only be made to CIPC.113 The significance of these 
developments in corporate law is the emphasis on civil and administrative law 
remedies and, moreover, the introduction of ADR. The South African legislature is 
following international trends to establish alternative forums, separate to the 
conventional court forum, as places for the resolution of disputes, which should 
prove to be faster and less expensive than formal court-based litigation.114  
CIPC has a number of functions under the Companies Act,115 and in this part the 
focus will be on its function as a public regulator to enforce the provisions of the 
Companies Act 2008.116 Importantly, an objective of CIPC is that such enforcement 
has to be “efficient, effective and [the] widest possible enforcement of [the] Act”.117 In 
addition, the aims of enforcement, together with its other functions, are to be 
understood in the context of the overall purposes of the Companies Act 2008, 
including the purpose of “provid[ing] a predictable and effective environment for the 
efficient regulation of companies”.118 Brief reference will be made to some of the 
                                            
Disputes” (08-01-2019) Business Live (accessed 18-03-2019). For a general discussion on 
the alternative mechanisms, see Davis (2010) AJ 421; Farisani (2010) AJ 434, 438, 443-
444; P Sutherland “The State of Company law in South Africa” (2012) Stell LR 157 177; 
Wiese SA Merc LJ 670-671. 
113 For brief discussions on these mechanisms, see Davis Companies and Other Business 
Structures 307-311; Delport New Entrepreneurial Law 263-270. 
114 Davis Companies and Other Business Structures 308; Farisani (2010) AJ 433-434; 
Guidelines for Corporate Reform (2004) 47. 
115 S 187 of the Companies Act prescribes the functions of CIPC which include promotion of 
reliable financial statements, and establishment and maintenance of a register. See also, MF 
Cassim “Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies” in FHI Cassim (man ed) Contemporary 
Company Law 2ed (2012) 824 835-837. 
116 S 187(2) prescribes the enforcement functions of CIPC, including promoting voluntary 
resolution of disputes, monitoring proper compliance, receiving or initiating and investigating 
complaints, negotiating and concluding undertakings and consent orders, issuing and 
enforcing compliance notices and referring matters to the NPA, court or Companies Tribunal. 
CIPC is also responsible for the enforcement of the legislation listed in Schedule 4, including 
the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 and the Co-operative Acts 14 of 2005. Also see 
Cassim “Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies” in Contemporary Company Law 834. 
117 S 186 (1)(e). 
118 S 7(l) of the Companies Act 2008, which needs to be read together with all the purposes 
described under s 7. Compare s 1(2) of the ASIC Act of 2001 that sets out its objects, 
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mechanisms available to CIPC to satisfy it enforcement functions: the duty to initiate, 
evaluate and investigate complaints119 and to issue and enforce compliance 
orders,120 which it can do unilaterally; the duty to negotiate and conclude 
undertakings and consent orders which it can do consensually, and the duty to refer 
matters for civil or criminal investigation which involves cooperation with other public 
bodies.  
An objective of the South African company law reforms was to strengthen the 
office and role of the then Registrar of Companies, particularly with regard to 
regulation and enforcement.121 Consequently, under the Companies Act 2008, 
CIPC122 and the TRP123 both have powers of enforcement. The scope of CIPC’s 
jurisdiction is very wide and in terms of section 168 of the Companies Act a 
                                            
including the object to promote and protect commercial certainty and to administer its 
functions effectively and with a minimum of procedural requirements. For a discussion on the 
aims of regulation and enforcement of corporate law, see H Bird, D Chow, J Lenne & I 
Ramsay “Strategic Regulation & ASIC Enforcement Patterns: Results of an Empirical Study 
(2005) 5 J Corp L Stud 191-201. 
119 S 187(2)(c) of the Companies Act 2008. 
120 S 187(2)(g) of the Companies Act 2008; Guidelines for Corporate Reform (2004) 47. 
121 Henning & Du Toit “Empowering the Victims of Economic Crime” in Victims of Economic 
Crime 153. Some (Farisani (2010) AJ 438) argue that this shift in focus on enforcement is 
not necessarily a decriminalisation of company law, but simply a provision of other 
mechanisms of enforcement. However, seen holistically it is argued that the new avenues of 
enforcement do establish a new map for enforcement, without erasing the ultimate role of 
the courts in enforcing the laws.  
122 CIPC is established in terms of s 185, whilst its objectives are described in s 186 and its 
functions in s 187 of the Companies Act 2008. CIPC is responsible for a wide range of 
matters, including the registration of companies and intellectual property rights, the 
establishing and keeping of a register and, under s 188, for advising the government and the 
public and doing research on issues relating to its mandate. CIPC Is also responsible for 
monitoring compliance and for issuing and enforcing compliance orders and for promoting 
the use of ADR and true and accurate accounting practices. For brief discussion of the role 
of the CIPC see Davis Companies and other Business Structures 307-311; CIPC Annual 
Report 2016/2017; Farisani (2010) AJ 435-439; 
123 The TRP, established in terms of s 196(1) of the Companies Act 2008, is not only 
concerned with the monitoring and regulation of affected transactions under chapter 5 of the 
Companies Act, but also has the authority under chapter 7 (ss 168-169) to initiate or receive 
and investigate a complaint relating to its mandate under chapter 5 or as the minister may 
direct. For a brief discussion on the role of the TRP, see Davis Companies and Other 
Business Structures 216-222. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
182 
 
complaint may be laid by “any person . . . alleging that a person has acted in a 
manner inconsistent with this Act, or that the complainant's rights under this Act, or 
under a company's Memorandum of Incorporation or rules, have been infringed”.124 
Significantly, CIPC may also initiate a complaint and subsequently evaluate and 
investigate such a complaint.125 It is submitted that the provision to initiate and 
investigate a complaint grants CIPC extensive powers which it has apparently not 
actively used since its establishment.126 In its five-year strategic plan for mid-2017 to 
mid-2022, CIPC is focusing on two strategic outcomes, the second of which is to 
establish a reputable business regulation environment in South Africa.127 To achieve 
this its strategic objectives are: increased knowledge and awareness on company 
laws,128 and improved compliance with company laws.129 It is not usual for a 
                                            
124 Excluding complaints that in terms of s 168(1)(a) fall under the jurisdiction of the TRP as 
described in part B or C of chapter 5. Also compare s 156 (d) and s 157 (1). This broadened 
locus standi for complainants is welcome, and includes the possibility of class actions. For a 
short discussion, see Cassim “Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies” in Contemporary 
Company Law 827-828. Details of number and types of recent complaints received, 
investigated and resolved can be found in Table 6 of the CIPC Annual Report 2016/2017. 
Significantly, the CIPC implemented an independent hotline for complaints of fraud in 
November 2016. Presently complaints of fraud are dealt with by the Governance, Risk and 
Compliance Division. See CIPC Annual Report 2016/2017 50 & 74-75. 
125 S 187(2)(c). A complaint may also be directed by the Minister under s 168(3) read with s 
187(2)(d). CIPC may decline to investigate a matter if it deems it to be “frivolous or 
vexatious” or finds no grounds for such investigation under s 169(1)(a). 
126 Interestingly, in CIPC’s Annual Report 2017/2018 (para 1.7 18), the function to initiate or 
even to investigate complaints and the function to issue and enforce compliance notices was 
not even recorded in the summary of its mandate under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 
despite CIPC being introduced as a “reputable regulator” by the Minister of Trade and 
Industry (para 1.3 10). However, mention is made of a case initiated by CIPC in the period 
under review (33).  
127 The outcomes also include the IP protection. 
128 For example, see the number of educational campaigns held by CIPC in 2nd Quarter 
2018/2019 Performance Report 16. This is in line with the proposed reform that education 
will be a critical function of CIPC through which CIPC is to create awareness of 
shareholders’’ rights and promote shareholder participation. Guidelines for Corporate 
Reform (2004) 46. 
129 CIPC 2nd Quarter Performance Report 2018/2019 6. These objectives are specifically 
linked to the Minister of Trade and Industry’s priorities. See also the Commissioner’s 
statement (CIPC Annual Report 2017/2018 25) that CIPC “is heavily influenced by 
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regulatory body to formalise its enforcement objectives, but certain focus areas can 
be derived from annual reports and policy statements.130 It is, nevertheless, difficult 
to identify any specific focus areas from CIPC’s recent annual reports although there 
is emphasis on improving compliance.131 It is strongly submitted that CIPC should 
specially focus on ensuring compliance with the regulations of the Companies Act 
2008 as this is essential for the proper functioning of CIPC and for the attainment of 
the purposes and objectives of CIPC and the Companies Act 2008.132 In the light of 
the fact that CIPC is a young institution and not much information is available, brief 
reference is made to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(“ASIC”)133 and its relevant functions and powers to further illustrate the mechanism 
of a statutory public regulatory body in this field.  
                                            
government policy and strategy and must align itself to these”. Compare s 185(2)(b) which 
states that CIPC is independent, yet subject to any policy statement, directive or request 
issued by the minister in terms of the Act and s 185(2)(c) that prescribes that CIPC has to be 
“impartial and perform its functions without fear, favour, or prejudice”. 
130 As an illustration, see the analysis of ASIC’s enforcement objectives derived from its 
Annual Reports 1996-2000 in Bird et al (2005) J Corp L Stud 203-209.  
131 For example, the Strategic Objective 2.2 is to improve compliance with company laws; 
and Programme 3: Business Regulation and Reputation is to educate, promote and enforce 
legislative compliance. CIPC Annual Report 2017/2018 51 and 58. 
132 It is difficult to determine, but the latest reports reflect that less than 50% of registered 
companies are active and submit the prescribed annual returns and financial statements; 
and CIPC has reported that the compliance of newly registered companies below 20%. This 
is alarming. See CIPC 2nd Quarter Performance Report 2018/2019 Annexure A; CIPC 
Annual Report 2017/2018 26; CIPC Annual Report 2016/2017 37. 
133 ASIC is responsible for the regulation and enforcement of company regulations, like 
CIPC. However, ASIC is constituted in terms of s 8 of the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 2001 51 of 2001 (“ASIC Act 2001”) which came into force 
together with the Corporations Act 50 of 2001 (“Corporations Act 2001”). ASIC’s scope is 
broader as it includes the financial services industry. Some of the statutory powers attributed 
to CIPC in ss 186-188 of the Companies Act 2008 are comparable to those attributed to 
ASIC under ss 11 and 12A of ASIC Act and those prescribed to it under the Corporations Act 
2001. For general information see ASIC website and the ASIC Annual Report 2016-2017 
available at <https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/corporate-publications/asic-annual-
reports/#ar17> (accessed 20-08-2018). 
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ASIC is comparable,134 yet also different to CIPC.135 Similarities between CIPC 
and ASIC are that their objectives and powers are based on principles of responsive 
regulation and restorative justice. The remedies that each have are based on the 
regulatory pyramid, and range from education and persuasion at the bottom of the 
pyramid,136 moving up towards civil remedies such as enforcement notices and 
escalating further up to criminal sanctions at the apex.137 Of particular significance 
for this dissertation is the statutory authority of CIPC to meet with the complainant 
and affected persons with the aim to resolve the matter by way of a consent order.138 
These provisions specifically allow the parties to meet and resolve the issues 
through an ADR mechanism and then submit the consent agreement to the court for 
approval.139 This mechanism can be compared to the enforceable undertaking in 
Australia.140 
                                            
134 It is the commission established as a public statutory body over registered companies, 
like CIPC. Several of its administrative enforcement powers are comparable to ASIC. See 
Wiese (2014) SA Merc LJ 676. 
135 With regard to jurisdiction, ASIC is also responsible for the financial services industry, 
which CIPC is not, although CIPC does have jurisdiction over all registered companies, 
including companies in the financial services industry. ASIC has greater power than CIPC, in 
that it can make certain unilateral decisions like banning a company or director (s of 
Corporations At) and instituting prosecution proceedings (s of Corporations Act). CIPC, in 
contrast needs to refer delinquent applications to court (ss 162(3) & 187(2)(g) and matters 
for prosecution to the NPA (s 187(2)(h) of the Companies Act 2008). 
136 Awareness was visualised as being a “critical function” of CIPC. Guidelines for Corporate 
Reform (2004). See fn 130 above. 
137 Hedges et al (2017) Melb UL Rev 925-936 set out the policy of responsive regulation and 
pyramidal enforcement of corporate law. See too, Bird et al (2005) J Corp L Stud 201-202; 
Tomasic (2006) UWSLR 8-9.  
138 S 170(1)(d) of the Companies Act read together with reg 138 and Form CoR 138. 
139 Reg 138(2). Importantly, the consent agreement cannot include an amount for damages 
unless the complainant has specifically agreed to such damages. A consent order can thus 
be concluded between only CIPC and the respondent, but may not include damages for the 
complainant unless she or he has specifically agreed to such an award. This provision is to 
safeguard the rights of complainant to bring a civil claim against the complainant. Similarly, s 
218(3) protects the rights to other remedies, while s 219(2) safeguards a respondent against 
double jeopardy. See also MF Cassim “Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies in Cassim 
Contemporary Company Law 850.  
140 In terms of s 93AA(1) of the ASIC Act 2001, ASIC may accept a written undertaking from 
a person in connection with a matter falling under ASIC’s jurisdiction. This is very broad 
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Significantly, CIPC is also to encourage the voluntary resolution of disputes as 
prescribed in Part C of Chapter 7, which emphasises ADR.141 Accordingly, CIPC can 
also refer a complaint to the Companies Tribunal or other accredited body, with the 
purpose of resolving the dispute by way of mediation, conciliation or arbitration.142 
The Companies Act thus provides various routes for a complaint to be resolved 
through ADR and a final consent order: a complainant may apply directly for ADR;143 
or if a complainant has lodged a complaint with CIPC, CIPC may itself resolve the 
dispute through ADR;144 or refer the matter to the Companies Tribunal or an 
accredited entity.145 It is proposed in this dissertation that these are routes that may 
be used by the mechanism of mediation to resolve instances of economic crime.146 
CIPC may also issue a compliance notice,147 described by one commentator as 
“the most novel feature” of the Companies Act 2008.148 A compliance notice can 
order a wide number of actions which may include restitution and community 
                                            
provision and may include a wide range of actions. Importantly, it relates to a negotiated 
undertaking and may include compensation to be paid. Breach of an undertakings has 
serious consequences, and invariably ASIC applies to court for a disqualification order or a 
fine. See Hedges et al (2017) Melb UL Rev 924, 942-943.  
141 S 187(2)(a) of the Companies Act 2008. In addition, s 158 emphasises that the purpose 
of the remedies are to promote the purpose of the act and the administrative bodies are 
specifically mandated by s 158(b) to promote the spirit, purpose and objects of the Act. See 
also Farisani (2010) AJ 436-437; Wiese (2014) SA Merc LJ 671-672. 
142 S 169(1)(b) read with s 166(3) and reg 132(2) and Form CTR 132.2. In terms of s 167(1) 
and (2), if the parties consent to an order from the tribunal or accredited entity, the tribunal or 
entity may submit the order as a consent order to the court, which has the discretion to make 
the order as agreed, change the order or refuse to make the order. 
143 To the Companies Tribunal or an accredited entity or to any other person: s 166(1)(c) 
read with reg 132(1) and Form CTR 132.1. 
144 S 170(1)(d) of the Companies Act read together with reg 138 and Form CoR 138. See fn 
148 above. Wiese ((2014) SA Merc LJ 674-676) points out that s 169(1) is vague and 
provides for CIPC to either investigate a complaint or refer it to ADR, and consequently a 
problem arises should ADR not succeed (s 166(2)) as the same complaint cannot be dealt 
with twice. See too s 156(c) and (d) also worded in the alternative.  
145 S 169(1)(b) read with s 166(3) and Reg 132(2) and Form CTR 132.2. See fn 149 above. 
146 Ch 5 2 below. 
147 S 170(1)(g) read together with s 171.  
148 Davis (2010) AJ 419. 
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service.149 These alternative remedies, new in the Companies Act 2008, are clearly 
in line with restorative justice systems as the aim is to resolve disputes to promote 
the spirit, purpose and objects of the Companies Act 2008 and will best improve the 
realisation and enjoyment of rights.150 In addition, the consequence of non-
compliance with a compliance order grants CIPC the option of referring the matter to 
the court for an administrative fine or to the NPA for criminal prosecution.151  
CIPC is increasingly issuing compliance orders, particularly with regard to 
financial reporting, which will promote financial accountability and so contribute to 
discouraging economic crime.152 Significantly, in 2016 the first criminal conviction in 
terms of section 214(3) of the Companies Act153 was secured against a company for 
non-compliance with a compliance order for not holding annual general meetings or 
submitting financial statements.154 
                                            
149 S 171(2)(c) and (d). A compliance order may also require a person to cease, correct or 
reverse any action in contravention of the Companies Act 2008, take any action mandated 
by the Companies Act 2008 or to take any steps reasonably related to the contravention and 
designed to rectify its effect. See s 172(2)(a), (b) and (e); Davis (2010) AJ 419. 
150 S 158(b) of the Companies Act; MF Cassim “Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies” in 
FHI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 824 828-829. 
151 S 171(7)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act 2008. An administrative fine may be imposed 
by a civil court under s 175(1) read with s 175(5) and reg 163, which fine may be 10% of the 
respondent’s turnover, but may not exceed R1,000,000. If CIPC refers the matter to the NPA 
and a respondent is convicted of a criminal offence for failing to satisfy the compliance order, 
under s 216(b) a sentence may include a fine or imprisonment of a period not exceeding 12 
months, or a fine and imprisonment. See also Farisani (2010) AJ 437-438; Delport (2014) 
New Entrepreneurial Law 267. Conversely, a person issued with a compliance notice has 
the right under s 172 to apply to the Companies Tribunal or to the court to review the notice 
and the tribunal or court, after considering representations by the applicant and any other 
relevant information, may confirm, modify or cancel all or part of the compliance notice. See 
Public Investment Corporation SOC v Companies and Intellectual Property Commission 
[2019] ZAGPPHC 103.  
152 CIPC Annual Report 2016/2017 36-37. 
153 Read with ss 171(7) and 216(b). Interestingly CIPC chose not to apply to court for an 
administrative fine for non-compliance but laid a criminal complaint for the offender to be 
charged in terms of s 214(3). In terms of s 216(b), read with reg 163 the conviction of an 
offence for non-compliance may result in liability of either a maximum fine of R1,000,000 or 
imprisonment of a maximum of 12 months, or both. 
154 CIPC Annual Report 2016/2017 39. S v Quantum Property Group Ltd (“S v Quantum”) 
(WC)(SCCC, Bellville) (21-07-2016) SH7/67/2016. Interestingly enough this matter was 
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CIPC can also be a surrogate claimant for a complainant and commence 
proceedings in the name of the claimant.155 This is presumably to assist 
complainants who may not have the necessary information, or the ability to evaluate 
information or afford the costs of private enforcement.156 This also raises questions: 
on whose behalf does a public regulator act – the public or private persons? What 
are the purposes of public regulation and enforcement?157 
                                            
resolved via a plea agreement in terms of s 105A of the CPA. Notably the duration of this 
process was fairly quick: a complaint was lodged by a shareholder in August 2013, and 
consequently the CIPC in October 2013 first invited the company to fulfil the outstanding 
obligations and subsequent to failing to do so the CIPC issued a compliance notice in 
January 2014 which the company also failed to comply with (S v Quantum paras B5-B16). 
The agreed sentence was a fine of R40,000 of which R15,000 was suspended for a period 
of 5 years. Part of the agreement too was that only the company and not any one of the 
directors would be held criminally liable for the non-compliance (S v Quantum para E). Much 
emphasis in the plea agreement was placed on the accountability of a company, particularly 
a listed public company (S v Quantum paras D2.1-D2.5) (Writer’s note: the copy of the plea 
agreement/judgment the writer found did not have reference to the presiding officer). CIPC 
also commenced with 16 other criminal cases to impose fines upon companies not adhering 
to compliance orders. CIPC Annual Report 2016/2017 36. See too Brand-Jonker “1ste 
Direkteur nóg ‘misdadig’ Verklaar vir Firma se Probleme” (02-11-2017) Netwerk24. S 
Theobald (“More Vigilant and Energetic Regulator Needed to Tackle White-collar Crime in 
SA” (06-08-2018) Businesslive (accessed 15-08-2018)) is more critical, however, and has 
called for a more vigilant and active CIPC which should not only react to complaints but also 
undertake investigations required by the Minister of Trade and Industry under s 187(2)(d) 
read with s 190(2)(b) of the Companies Act 2008.  
155 Ss 157(2) read with 170(1)(g) and reg 130 and CoR 135.1 of the Companies Act. 
156 M Berkahn & L Trotman “Public and Private Enforcement of Company Law in New 
Zealand 1986-1998 (2000) 7 Canta LR 516 518-519. CIPC has extensive powers to 
investigate complaints and gather information. See Cassim “Enforcement and Regulatory 
Agencies in Contemporary Company Law 842-845.  
157 It is contended that the purpose is more than regulating the market and ensuring stability 
and promoting business confidence (see fns 116 and 122 above); but also to ensure good 
corporate governance and disclosure of required information by firms. For a discussion on 
different approaches in support of private or public enforcement see Berkahn & Trotman 
(2000) Canta LR 517-222. Also see Cassim “Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies in 
Contemporary Company Law 825-829, 843, who warns that CIPC’s powers of investigation 
should not be abused to badger companies. 
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The powers of ASIC are extensive,158 yet Smith cautions that ASIC has had mixed 
success in exercising its enforcement powers and that it lacks the invincibility to 
ensure the efficacy of responsive regulation.159 Its degree of success also differs 
from industry to industry and ASIC has not been successful in the financial services 
sector. Smith contends that responsive regulation is based on relationships. This 
means that a core characteristic is human agency, namely relationships between 
regulators and corporations; the former usually represented by inspectors and the 
latter by corporate representatives.160 Consequently, if a regulatory body lacks the 
resources to attend to such relationships through regular inspections and contact, 
the body does not develop credibility and the successful implementation of a 
responsive regulation pyramid becomes more challenging. If a regulatory body like 
ASIC or CIPC does not have the human resources to regulate by building 
relationships with the corporate sector based on dialogue at the bottom of the 
pyramid, its efficacy is weakened.161  
Notwithstanding these challenges, the submission remains that responsive 
regulation is integral to regulating the corporate sector and more research is needed 
to refine and review the parameters if necessary. Such research and review also fall 
under the mandate of CIPC.162 
Consequently, it is submitted that CIPC should play a stronger and more vibrant 
role in South Africa’s corporate sector;163 similar to the proactive role ASIC is playing 
                                            
158 For example, ASIC has the discretionary power not only to grant exemptions from 
statutory obligations, but also to amend the primary Corporation Act 2001 legislation through 
“class orders”. For a detailed discussion on these powers see S Bottomley “The Notional 
Legislator: The Australian Securities and Investment’s Commission’s Role as a Law-Maker 
(2011) 39 Fed L Rev 1-31. In comparison, CIPC has no such powers, whilst the Companies 
Tribunal has the power to grant certain exemptions, such as exemptions to establish Social 
and Ethics Committees in terms of s 72(5) of the Companies Act 2008. 
159 Smith (2011) UBCL Rev 708.  
160 Smith (2011) UBCL Rev 708 
161 Notably, a major constraint of CIPC has been the volatility in its human resources 
department. See CIPC Annual Report 2016/2017 82; CIPC Annual Report 2017/2018 12. 
162 S 188 of the Companies Act 2008. 
163 In the 2016-2017 year the ASIC prosecuted 409 directors for offences in terms of 
insolvency laws, reviewed more than 320 financial accounts which culminated in almost an 
AUD billion worth of assets being revalued by companies and reviewed 9,000 complaints of 
misconduct from the public. ASIC Annual Report 2016/2017 4-5. See S Theobald “More 
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in fulfilling its mandate, taking into account the differences in the respective 
corporate contexts.  
CIPC’s power to initiate its own enquiry is of particular importance.164 CIPC need 
not only play a responsive role in responding to complaints filed with it, but may in 
monitoring and supervising the corporate industry initiate its own inquiry. This could 
lead to the issue of compliance orders and other corrective actions, including 
prosecution. In short, CIPC does have the teeth in theory to make a significant 
contribution in addressing economic crime. It is submitted that CIPC needs to 
sharpen and use its teeth frequently.  
The role played by ASIC, in conjunction with the office of the Attorney General 
and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, illustrates the effective 
collaborative steps that can be made against corporate crime.165 Cooperation, 
communication and liaison by CIPC with other regulatory bodies are provided for in 
terms of section 188(3)166 of the Companies Act 2008 that grants CIPC the authority, 
not only to liaise with any other regulatory authority, but also to conclude agreements 
with such authorities to co-ordinate, harmonise and ensure consistent enforcement 
of the principles of the Companies Act 2008.167 Moreover, the surveillance168 and 
                                            
Vigilant and Energetic Regulator Needed to Tackle White-collar Crime in SA” Businesslive. 
For other statistics see Locke (2018) ABLU 63. 
164 Ss 168(2) & 187(2)(c) of the Companies Act 2008; Farisani (2010) AJ 436-437. 
165 ASIC Annual Report 2016/2017 14. This collaboration resulted in several criminal 
prosecutions and imprisonments for corporate misconduct. ASIC Annual Report 2016/2017 
5, 30-32 & 41. 
166 S 188(4) grants the CIPC authority to liaise with international or foreign bodies that have 
similar functions and objectives. 
167 Farisani (2010) AJ 444-445. Compare the reference in the CIPC Annual Report 
2017/2018 46 to indicative partners. A comparative example, is the 2006 collaboration and 
cooperation memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) between ASIC and the DPP in 
Australia. For a list of MOUs with entities, see ASIC website: <https://asic.gov.au/about-
asic/what-we-do/our-role/other-regulators-and-organisations/. 
168 70% of ASIC’s resources are spent on surveillance and enforcement. In the 2016-2017 
year 1,440 surveillance undertakings and 160 investigations were conducted across the 
various sectors. For details, see the ASIC Annual Report 2016/2017 4-5. Monitoring and 
enforcement are part of the objectives of CIPC in terms of ss 186(1)(d) and (e) of the 
Companies Act 2008. 
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educational169 role played by ASIC is influential in relation to the reform of corporate 
accountability and consequent regulatory compliance, culminating in reduced 
corporate misconduct.170  
Recently, CIPC succeeded in the finalisation of an enforcement process. 
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission v Creswell171 is the first case in 
which CIPC secured an order to declare a director delinquent in terms of section 162 
of the Companies Act 2008. Although the process took almost a decade from the 
commencement of the investigation to the granting of the order, it is has been hailed 
as an historic achievement.172  
                                            
169 Through several programmes ASIC has trained and educated tens of thousands of 
persons, focusing on financial literacy programmes for schools, older persons and culturally 
and linguistically diverse communities (ASIC Annual Report 2016/2017 25). Notably the 
promotion of education and awareness of corporate law is one the primary objectives of the 
CIPC in terms of ss 186(1)(c) & 188(2) of the Companies Act 2008.  
170 The value of education and regular inspections by a supervisory body in deterring 
corporate crime has been proven by the meta-analysis conducted by Shell-Busey. See 
Schell-Busey et al (2016) Criminology & Public Policy 406. 
171 [2017] 38 ZAWCHC. In this case CIPC became aware of possible suspicious operations 
of Skyport Corporation Ltd, which averred that it was erecting an airport in Malmesbury and 
was selling shares to the public to raise monies for this operation. In 2008 and 2009, the 
Minister of Trade and Industry appointed investigators to investigate the operations in terms 
of ss 258(2), 259(1) and 259(2) of the Companies Act 1973 and arising from these 
investigations application was made under the current Act to declare the director, Owen 
Wienand, delinquent for gross abuse of his position as director (paras 1-7). Davis J found 
Wienand grossly negligent and consequently declared him delinquent for 7 years in terms of 
s 162(5)(c)(iv)(aa) of the 2008 Act (paras 35-37 and 40-41). Quite fittingly the judgment was 
delivered by Davis J who has played an instrumental role in the reform of company law in 
South Africa. 
172 CIPC Annual Report 2016/2017 10 and 39; L Ensor “Historic Delinquent Director 
Declaration for Skyport” (30-03-2017) Business Live 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/companies/2017-03-30-historic-delinquent-director-
declaration-for-skyport/> (accessed 03-11-2017); N Brand-Jonker “1ste Direkteur nóg 
‘misdadig’ Verklaar vir Firma se Probleme” (02-11-2017) Netwerk24 
<https://www.netwerk24.com/Sake/Maatskappye/1ste-direkteur-nog-misdadig-verklaar-vir-
firma-se-probleme-20171102?giftcode=093d85b5ff7745688adae8f1fbe3d47f> (accessed 
03-11-2017). CIPC acknowledges that is has various challenges in executing its compliance 
mandate and has plans to improve it fraud prevention strategy. Also see CIPC Strategic Plan 
2017/2018 to 2021/2022 11, 15-17 and 32. 
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Significantly, a recent article demonstrates that banning or disqualification is the 
dominant enforcement mechanism used by ASIC.173 This practice is not without 
criticism.174 This prevailing trend is probably due to banning orders being a unilateral 
decision by ASIC.175 In contrast, other enforcement mechanisms, such as 
enforcement orders need the consent of the affected parties, or administrative or 
criminal sanctions need judicial execution.176 Making a banning order is an 
administrative function and is accordingly not subject to strict rules of procedure and 
evidence. Banning orders are incapacitating and fatal to a company or an individual, 
particularly as many such orders are permanent.177 Importantly, the effect and 
purpose of banning orders have been found to be both protective and punitive by the 
Australian High Court.178 Concern has been raised at the increasing prevalence of 
banning orders as an enforcement mechanism and a call has been made for ASIC to 
be more accountable and transparent with regard to such orders.179 As is evident 
from the Creswell case, CIPC does not have any unilateral administrative powers to 
                                            
173 J Hedges G Gilligan & I Ramsay “Banning Orders: An Empirical Analysis of the Dominant 
Mode of Corporate Law Enforcement in Australia” (2017) 39 514-516 Sydney L Rev 501 
529. Banning order constituted almost 41% of the total of all enforcement orders and of 
these 87% of banning orders in the past 18 years (1997-2015) were administrative and the 
duration of the disqualification orders were longer.  
174 For general evaluation, concern and criticism see Hedges et al (2017) Sydney L Rev 501-
537.  
175 In terms of s 206F of the Corporations Act 2001 ASIC may disqualify a person for up to 5 
years as an administrative sanction. S 206F provides that ASIC has to give the person 
notice and an opportunity to be heard and needs to satisfy itself that the disqualification is 
justified. No reasons for the disqualification need to be given. This unilateral power of 
disqualification is in addition to s 206C which provides that ASIC may apply to court for a 
disqualification order in the event of the contravention of a civil penalty provision. Hedges et 
al (2017) Melb UL Rev 923-924. 
176 Hedges et al (2017) Sydney L Rev 517. 
177 Hedges et al (2017) Sydney L Rev 529. 
178 This is a typical case of the blurring of civil and criminal sanctions as the consequences of 
banning are punitive and quasi-criminal. For a discussion, see Hedges et al (2017) Sydney L 
Rev 529-531; Bird et al (2005) J Corp L Stud 209-212; Tomasic (2006) UWSLR 8-10. 
Compare case law in South Africa that has held that disqualification orders are not to punish 
a person but to protect the public. For a discussion on these cases and issues, see R 
Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in Contemporary Company Law 432-433. 
179 Hedges et al (2017) Sydney L Rev 531-536. 
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make disqualification orders, but is able to apply to a court to declare a director 
delinquent.180 
It is also significant that recent empirical analyses show that contrary to the 
pyramidal responsive regulation enforcement model, most sanctions imposed in 
Australia were incapacitative sanctions, high up in the pyramid model.181 Criminal 
enforcement was emphasised above civil enforcement and this is inconsistent with 
the policies and purposes of decriminalisation of improper conduct under corporate 
law and the establishment of a pyramid of responsive regulation and enforcement.182 
Notwithstanding these findings, it is submitted that a pyramid of responsive 
regulation and enforcement remains the best way in which to establish a hybrid of 
administrative, civil and criminal corporate enforcement mechanisms. 
Cassim prudently observes that a nation’s corporate regulation needs to consider 
that particular country’s economic, political and social structures, as well as its 
history and cultural values.183 Undoubtedly South Africa’s corporate milieu is being 
overshadowed by the extraordinarily high levels of economic crime. Notwithstanding 
this dark shadow South Africa also has a robust and progressive Constitution, 
supported by modern and appropriate corporate laws. It is submitted that the 
enforcement of corporate regulations, whether private or public, should remain 
responsive and be developed under the spirit, purpose and objects of both the 
Companies Act and the Constitution. In this light, the recent establishment of a 
commercial court dedicated to commercial matters is commended.184 So too are the 
                                            
180 S 162 of the Companies Act 2008. For a discussion on the application and declaration of 
a director as delinquent or under probation, see R Cassim “Governance and the Board of 
Directors” in FHI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 400 436-439. 
181 J Hedges, H Bird, G Gilligan, A Godwin & I Ramsay “The Policy and Practice of 
Enforcement of Directors’ Duties by Statutory Agencies in Australia: An Empirical Analysis” 
(2017) 40 Melb U L Rev 905 909. 79% of all sanctions in a 10 year data set from 2005-2014, 
were incapacitative, being either custodial sentences or disqualification orders. 
182 Hedges et al (2017) 40 Melb UL Rev 949-966. The analysis showed that the sanctions 
imposed were not pyramidal as more than 78% were incapacitative, namely disqualification 
and incarceration, at the top of the apex.  
183 FHI Cassim “Introduction to the New Companies Act: General overview of the Act” in FHI 
Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) 1 27. 
184 See fn 112 above for reference to newly established Gauteng Commercial Court High 
Court.  
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calls by CIPC and the Companies Tribunal to promote alternative dispute resolution 
and for persons to use the options provided in the Companies Act 2008. CIPC can 
and must play an ever stronger and more vibrant role in the regulation of corporate 
South Africa. 
Recent empirical analyses of twenty years of enforcement by ASIC timely remind 
regulators, judges and corporate policy makers that the field of economic crime 
remains complex. Self-regulation and instilling ethical values in a corporate culture 
are critical.185 In addition, to ensuring compliance with corporate regulation, a call is 
made to move beyond rational utilitarian motives, such as risk-calculating186 to more 
emotional motives, including corporate shaming models for developing the principles 
of corporate culture and conscience.187 
4 2 3 Mechanism of the ombud office: FAIS Ombud188 
In the light of the pivotal role played by the financial services industry in promoting 
both micro- and macro-economic development and growth, and, moreover, 
influencing a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including investors, shareholders, 
bankers and the ordinary citizen, prudential regulation and good corporate 
governance of the industry are critical.189 Recent reformation of the global financial 
sector has been necessitated through the Global Financial Crisis the past decade, as 
well as the increased complexity of financial products and operations.190 The 
                                            
185 Tomasic (2006) UWSLR 21-22. 
186 Some civil and criminal sanctions result in a corporation calculating the risk of being 
caught in breaking the rules and the costs of such wrongdoing, in contrast to actually 
changing the corporation’s behaviour. Bronitt & D’Amico (2018) U Qld LJ 83. 
187 The submission is that proper compliance originates from legitimacy, moral values such 
as fairness and emotional dimensions. Consequently, such principles should be developed 
in designing models for ensuring compliance. Bronitt & D’Amico (2018) U Qld LJ 76-79, 82-
84. 
188 At the time of writing, the new regulations, discussed below, had not yet come into force 
and consequently the names of the FAIS Ombud and FSB Board are retained in this 
discussion. 
189 P Puri & A Nichol “Developments in Financial Services Regulation: A Comparative 
Perspective” (2014) 55 Can Bus L J 454 470, 487. 
190 A Godwin, T Howse & I Ramsay “Twin Peaks: South Africa’s financial sector regulatory 
framework” (2017) 134 SALJ 665 665-666. 
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domestic financial sector has also seen continual reform, and recently, in December 
2017 the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 (“Financial Sector Regulation 
Act”) was passed.191 South Africa has now introduced the so-called Twin Peaks 
structure of financial regulation by establishing two regulators,192 being the 
Prudential Authority (“PA”)193 and the Financial Sector Conduct Authority (“FSCA”). 
194 In short, the PA will be responsible for prudential supervision of the financial 
sector, promoting financial stability and prudence; whilst the FCSA will monitor and 
regulate the market conduct of financial providers.195 The PA will resort under the 
Reserve Bank of South Africa, whilst the FSCA is a stand-alone authority created 
and regulated by statute.196 Important for this dissertation is the establishment of the 
Ombud Council,197 and the role played by ombuds198 in resolving instances of 
                                            
191 The Financial Sector Regulation Act replaces the Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012, which 
in turn replaced the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004. This is an over simplification, as the 
Financial Sector Regulation Act impacts on a broad number of acts which are listed in 
Schedule 1, while the repeals and amendments of numerous acts are listed in Schedule 4. 
There is also a transition period for various parts of the act. For example, chapter 14, the 
part relating to the Ombud Council, is due to come into operation on 1 April 2019. For 
general transitional measures and time periods see GN 169 in GG 41549 of 29-03-2018, GN 
R 405 in GG 41550 of 29-03-2018 & GN 1019 in GG 41947 of 28-09-2018. For notices, 
regulations and press releases see National Treasury <www.treasury.gov.za/twinpeaks>; 
Financial Sector Conduct Authority <www.gsca.co.za> (accessed 215-03-2019); H Ziady 
“Banks Face Hefty Fees from Twin Peaks” (18-07-2017) Business Day (accessed 20-07-
2017).  
192 South Africa’s financial regulatory framework is primarily based on the Australian model: 
AJ Godwin & AD Schmulow “The financial sector regulation bill in South Africa, second draft: 
Lessons from Australia” (2015) 132 SALJ 756 756. 
193 Established under s 32 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act; while s 33 prescribes its 
objectives and s 34 its functions.  
194 Established under s 56 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act. Its objectives and 
functions are prescribed in ss 57 and 58 respectively. The objectives of FSCA include the 
promotion of the integrity of financial markets, the protection of customers and the 
enhancement of financial stability. Significantly s 58(6) provides that FSCA is to exercise its 
functions, without fear, favour or prejudice, echoing constitutional vocabulary and values. 
195 For a discussion of the Twin Peaks model see Godwin & Schmulow (2015) SALJ 756-
768. 
196 Godwin et al (2017) SALJ 670-671. 
197 Established in terms of s 175 of the Financial Sector Regulation Act. The South African 
legislature chose to retain a plurality of Ombud schemes in the broad financial industry which 
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financial misconduct, which may include financial contraventions and offences by 
financial service providers. A global tendency in the enforcement of financial 
regulations and the protection of customers has been the increased use of ADR and 
the office of the ombud.199 South Africa is no exception and several ombuds are 
present in the South African financial industry.200 One such ombud is the Financial 
Advisory and Intermediary Services (“FAIS”) Ombud, resorting under The Financial 
Services Board (“FSB”).201 Before highlighting some of the decisions of the FAIS 
Ombud, illustrating its functions and powers, a few introductory comments on the 
role of an ombud, demonstrate the role ombuds can play in combating economic 
crime, particularly crimes in the comprehensive financial sector. 
The word ombudsman202 originates from the Viking word umbodhsmadhr, 
meaning an agent or deputy who had the role of recouping compensation on behalf 
of a victim from a perpetrator.203 The contemporary ombudsperson is defined by its 
                                            
can be recognised by the Ombud Council, as opposed to the English model of merging the 
various ombuds in the financial industry into one central authority. See N Melville “Has 
Ombudmania Reached South Africa? The Burgeoning Role of the Ombudsmen in 
Commercial Dispute Resolution” (2010) 22 SA Merc LJ 50 62-63. 
198 For a definition of ombud or ombudsperson see next paragraph and fn 204 below. 
199 Melville (2010) SA Merc LJ 51; Wiese (2014) SA Merc LJ 669. 
200 For example, Ombudsman for Long-Term Insurance, Ombudsman for Short-Term 
Insurance, Credit Ombud and Tax Ombud. 
201 The FSCA under the new Financial Sector Regulation Act. See in particular ss 292-294 
regarding transitional provisions. Of specific importance is s 299 relating to the appeals to 
the Tribunal in terms of s 26 of the FSB Act. As at the time of writing, the FAIS Ombud still 
operated under the FAIS Act and resorted under the FSB, the discussion in this dissertation 
relates to the FAIS Ombud. Moreover, the decisions of the FAIS Ombud will remain part of 
the jurisprudence of the financial industry in South Africa. At present, the FSB is an 
independent body whose vision and purpose is to promote and maintain a sound financial 
investment setting in the non-banking sector in South Africa and further afield. The FSB is 
created and regulated by statute, the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 (“FSB Act”), 
and has played a supervisory role since its inception in the non-banking financial services 
industry, including investment schemes (stock market and unit trusts) and insurances 
schemes (short-term, long-term, funeral). Importantly, too the FSB oversees the licencing 
and activities of financial advisors and brokers; but can crucially also act against financial 
service providers that are not properly licensed in terms of the FSB legislation. 
202 In this dissertation, the gender neutral word “ombud” or ombudsperson” is used.  
203 Poignantly in Ethiopia, Emba Tebaki, the name of the ombudsperson means “Keeper of 
the People’s Tears”. See Mellville (2010) SA Merc LJ 50, 57. 
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primary role, being a representative or an intermediary who acts and investigates 
complaints on behalf of a complainant. This role model is derived from Sweden, the 
northern Germanic country, whose parliament more than two centuries ago, 
appointed an ombudsperson to investigate complaints between the government and 
common citizens.204 The global use of ombudspersons has increased exponentially 
in the past half-century and ombuds have been established in various industries, 
also in commerce to settle disputes between consumers and service providers and 
are particularly prevalent in the financial sector.205 The attractions of ombuds are 
primarily their accessibility206 and flexibility.207 Though many, like the FAIS Ombud, 
are creatures of statute and regulated by statute, they are more accessible than a 
court and are enabled to use ADR mechanisms, which grants them a freedom from 
the constraints of formal rules present in adversarial structures, such as courts. 
Moreover, ombudspersons are not regulators, but like other presiding officers, 
interpret and apply regulations.208 Ombuds are of course required to be independent 
and impartial, although they receive complaints from one party, usually the weaker 
party against a stronger party.209 Ombuds are primarily tasked with solving issues 
conciliatorily and informally, but significantly, some statutory ombudspersons have 
the power to make binding decisions upon the parties, thereby bringing a conclusion 
to an issue speedily and cost effectively.210 This brief description of the role and 
functions of an ombudsperson strongly reminds of the role played by traditional and 
                                            
204 Anonymous “Ombudsperson” The Free Dictionary <https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Ombudsperson> (accessed 06-09-2018). 
205 For a classification of ombudspersons and the different sectors they operate in see 
Mellville (2010) SA Merc LJ 52-53. 
206 Accessibility includes low or no costs as the cost of the procedure, including assistance 
with the lodging of a complaint, investigation and inquiry is borne by the relevant bodies in 
the industry.  
207 For brief description of office and advantages of ombudsperson, see Sharemax 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Siegrist & Bekker FAIS 00039/11-12/GP1 & FAIS 06661/10-11/WC1, 
the consolidated appeal before the FSB Appeal Board (“Sharemax Appeal”) para 15. 
208 Mellville (2010) SA Merc LJ 55-56; Sharemax Appeal para 16. 
209 For example, an insured client against an insurance company. 
210 For example, in terms of s 28 of the FAIS Act, the FAIS Ombud may make a 
determination, which has the effect of a civil judgment. 
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customary leaders in settling disputes and, consequently, the growth of ombuds in 
contemporary South Africa has been well received and understood.211  
The work and influence of the FAIS Ombud office has grown remarkably. In the 
annual period of 2016/2017, it received more than 10,500 new complaints of which 
4,263 were justiciable complaints, compared to a decade previously when 666 
justiciable complaints out of 3,808 new complaints were received in 2005/2006.212 
Pointedly, the Rand value of cases settled or determined at the end of the 2016/2017 
year exceeded R58 million, a figure that illustrates the significance of the work of the 
FAIS Ombud.213 The FAIS Ombud was established in terms of section 20 of the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 (“FAIS Act”).214 The 
vision of the FAIS Ombud is to be a preferred and world-class dispute resolution 
forum providing an accessible, impartial, efficient and professional service by 
committed and passionate staff, and to be respected by all stakeholders.215 The 
mission of the FAIS Ombud is to promote consumer protection and enhance the 
integrity of the financial services industry through resolving complaints impartially, 
expeditiously and economically.216 In a recent FAIS Ombud Annual Report, the then 
Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan emphasised the Twin Peaks model of regulation 
for the financial sector, and underlined the role of the FAIS Ombud as forming “an 
integral feature of the ombud landscape as it provides customers with an alternative 
                                            
211 Mellville (2010) SA Merc LJ 57-58. For example, the recognition of ADR and the role of 
ombuds under chap 7 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and under chaps 3 & 4 of the 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. Notably, too the Financial Services Ombud Scheme 
Act 37 of 2004 regulating and co-ordinating the various ombuds in the financial services 
sector.  
212 A total number of 10, 846 complaints, of which 5,630 were justiciable, were received. 
Regarding resolution of complaints for the 2016/2017 year, 3,794 complaints were 
dismissed, 4,639 were referred to other entities, 592 settled and 24 determined, and 1,810 
carried over to the following year. Remarkably the FAIS Ombud resolved more than 11,000 
cases in the 2016/2017 year, including cases carried forward from previous years (FAIS 
Ombud Annual Report 2016/2017 17-18 & 41-43); see too FAIS Ombud Annual Report 
2015/2016 34-36 for the 2015/2016 period. 
213 The precise amount was R58, 343, 824, an increase from the previous year of R50,2 
million (FAIS Ombud Annual Report 2016/2017 18). 
214 Read with the former Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act 37 of 2004. 
215 FAIS Ombud Annual Report 2014-2015 4. 
216 FAIS Ombud Annual Report 2014-2015 4. 
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dispute mechanism thus obviating the need to access the courts”.217 It is thus as a 
dispute resolution model, alternative to the courts, that the FAIS Ombud is being 
discussed as a mechnsim to use in instances of financial misconduct in the financial 
sector. In addition, the office of the FAIS Ombud has an administrative body with 
regard to the resolution of complaints and the orders it is able to give with regard to 
compensation are significant for the pillar of restitution in this dissertation. 
The FAIS Ombud has, rightfully so, wide and pragmatic powers and its objective 
is defined by its creating statute as having “to consider and dispose of complaints by 
clients against financial services providers in a procedurally fair, informal, 
economical and expeditious manner and by reference to what is equitable in all the 
circumstances”.218 The requirement of procedural fairness is based on the 
Constitution and amplified by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
Importantly any dispute retains its legal character, despite being defined as a 
complaint in the FAIS Act and accordingly the FAIS Ombud remains bound by the 
principles of statutory and common law.219 In addition, section 27(5) grants the FAIS 
Ombud broad discretion as to the manner in which the FAIS Ombud wishes to 
proceed with the investigation.220 Determinations of the FAIS Ombud may be taken 
on appeal to the Appeal Board of the FSB;221 and any determination by the FAIS 
                                            
217 FAIS Ombud Annual Report 2015-2016 4-5. The FAIS Ombud does not have the 
jurisdiction to resolve matters that constitute a criminal offence and these would be referred 
to the relevant authorities.  
218 S 20(3) of the FAIS Act. S 20(4) of the FAIS Act further provides that the FAIS Ombud 
needs to be independent and impartial when dealing with complaints in terms of ss 27 & 28 
of the FAIS Act. S 27(4) of the FAIS Act describes the jurisdictional scope of the FAIS 
Ombud and primarily codifies the audi alteram partem rule by prescribing that the FAIS 
Ombud cannot investigate a matter until the FAIS Ombud has informed all the parties of the 
complaint and each party has been given an opportunity to respond to such complaint. 
219 Sharemax Appeal paras 16-19. 
220 S 27(5) reads: “The Ombud (a) may, in investigating or determining an officially received 
complaint, follow and implement any procedure (including mediation) which the Ombud 
deems appropriate, and may allow any party the right of legal representation.” 
221 S 28(5)(b) of the FAIS Act. The Appeal Board is also a creature of statute and does not 
have “an unfettered or inherent jurisdiction”. See DH Janssens v Life Force Financial 
Services CC & A Priday (23-03-2015) para 20. (Writer’s note: there is no reference number 
allocated to the case). For the nature and scope of authority of the Appeal Board of the FSB 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
199 
 
Ombud or decision by the Appeal Board of the FSB has the same status as a civil 
judgment of a court.222 The role and nature of the ombud is succinctly described by 
the Appeal Board of the FSB as follows: 
“Because of the special nature of the office, the Ombud deals with matters 
inquisitorially. She not only investigates but also mediates and if necessary 
determines disputes by administrative fiat or monetary award which must, by 
virtue of sec 20(3), be related to legal relationship between the parties. A 
determination (subject to the right of appeal and review) has the force of a court 
judgment and may be executed.”223 
Notwithstanding the flexibility and informality of the office of the FAIS Ombud, its 
office is regulated by the provisions of the FAIS Act, and as a creature of statute its 
powers are also defined by statute and administrative law.224 Though playing a 
significant role in the financial services industry, providing an alternative dispute 
resolution forum where complaints are dealt with in a more informal, fast and virtually 
costless process, it is this flexibility, together with the wide discretion attributed to an 
ombud that has raised various concerns with some of the decisions of the FAIS 
Ombud over the years. Some decisions of the FAIS Ombud are problematical with 
regard to the jurisdiction of and procedures used by the FAIS Ombud. Recent 
determinations by the Appeal Board of the FSB have helped clarify the powers and 
procedures of the FAIS Ombud.  
                                            
see the Sharemax Appeal paras 23-25; CS Brokers CC v JB Wallace FAB 5/2016 paras 12-
14. 
222 S 28(5)(a) of the FAIS Act. 
223 Sharemax Appeal para 20. For further amplification, see paras 21-22. Also see CS 
Brokers CC v JB Wallace FAB 5/2017 para 15. 
224 The general administrative powers of the FAIS Ombud are listed in s 24 of the FAIS Act 
and relate to the general running and functioning of the FAIS Ombud office. More 
importantly, the scope of the judicial powers and authority of the FAIS Ombud is prescribed 
in s 28 of the FAIS Act which empowers the FAIS Ombud to make a final determination. This 
may include (a) the dismissal of the complaint; or (b) the upholding of the complaint, wholly 
or partially, in which case the FAIS Ombud may award the complainant an amount as fair 
compensation for any financial prejudice or damage suffered; issue a direction that the 
authorised financial services provider, representative or other party concerned take such 
steps in relation to the complaint as the Ombud deems appropriate and just; or make any 
other order which a court may make. Also see GA Hattingh v PW Mackie (in his capacity as 
executor of estate late CW Mackie) FAB 15/2017 para 20.  
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With regard to procedural fairness the Appeal Board of the FSB has held that 
undue delays in investigating and processing a matter,225 showing bias towards a 
complainant,226 not putting allegations to the parties,227 refusing to hear oral 
evidence,228 or refusing to consider an application to have a matter referred to 
court229 may constitute a failure of natural justice and result in the setting aside of a 
determination by the FAIS Ombud to the detriment of the complainant. Moreover, the 
findings and any determination made by the FAIS Ombud need to be based on facts 
before the ombud and should not be influenced by personal opinion, speculation or 
conjecture.230 Though the ombudsperson is a special office, with a flexible and broad 
nature, the ombud is not “a super investigator or super judge”.231 
In the Siegrist and Bekker matters232 the Appeal Board of the FSB held that the 
jurisdiction of the FAIS Ombud is properly determined by the interpretation of a 
                                            
225 DH Janssens v Life Force Financial Services CC & A Priday (23-03-2015) paras 2 & 23. 
226 Audenberg Versekering Makelaars BK v Hannes Waterboer FAB 13/2017 paras 15, 18 & 
20; GA Hattingh v PW Mackie (in his capacity as executor of estate late CW Mackie) FAB 
15/2017 para 24. Also see s 20(4) of the FAIS Act prescribing that the Ombud needs to be 
impartial and independent. 
227 Audenberg Versekering Makelaars BK v Hannes Waterboer FAB 13/2017 paras 11-15 & 
20; CS Brokers CC v JB Wallace FAB 5/2016 para 20. 
228 CS Brokers CC v JB Wallace FAB 5/2016 para 9. 
229 CS Brokers CC v JB Wallace FAB 5/2016 para 10. 
230 GA Hattingh v PW Mackie (in his capacity as executor of estate late CW Mackie) FAB 
15/2017 para 26; CS Brokers CC v JB Wallace FAB 5/2016 paras 14-15 & 21. 
231 Jacobus Johannes van Zyl v Sydney Perumal Naidoo FAB 2/2015; Herman Bester and 
Durandt van Zyl v Stephanus Lourens Gerber FAB 8/2014; and Jacobus Johannes van Zyl v 
Stephanus Lourens Gerber FAB 9/2014 (“Van Zyl Appeals”) para 35. 
232 Siegrist v Botha t/a CJ Botha Finansiële Dienste FAIS 00039/11-12/GP 1 (“Siegrist”) and 
Bekker v Carter-Smith 06661/10-11/WC 1 (“Bekker”) are cases determined by the FAIS 
Ombud in 2013; and subsequently heard as a consolidated FSB Appeal Board case in 2015 
with the same case numbers (“Sharemax Appeal”). These matters relate to the Sharemax 
Scheme, a failed property syndicate scheme in which more than 33,000 investors lost an 
estimated R3 billion. Sharemax Investments (Pty) (“Sharemax”) was a duly licenced financial 
services provider (“FSP”) in terms of the FAIS Act. Sharemax’s portfolio included two 
property development companies, Sharemax Zambezi Retail Park Investments (Pty) Ltd and 
Sharemax Zambezi Retail Park Holding (Pty) Ltd (“Sharemax Properties”) that raised monies 
through unlisted shares and debentures. An integral part of the Sharemax scheme was the 
use of a so-called “section 13 FSP”. S 13 of the FAIS Act allows a registered FSP to use 
representatives, who are not registered, to provide financial services under the supervision 
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“complaint” in terms of section 1 of the FAIS Act, and consequently the FAIS Ombud 
cannot “join” parties to a matter by giving them notice in terms of section 27(4) of the 
FAIS Act.233 The main argument for the appellants was that neither of them were 
cited as wrongdoers by the complainant in the original complaint and consequently 
the FAIS Ombud did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter. Thus, the procedure 
adopted by the FAIS Ombud in relation to them was not competent or procedurally 
fair as prescribed in section 20(3) of the FAIS Act. Much of the decision by the 
Appeal Board of the FSB thus dealt with the meaning of “complaint” as defined in 
terms of section 1 of the FAIS Act.234 The Appeal Board of the FSB upheld the 
appeal against the decision of the FAIS Ombud on the grounds of the definition of a 
complaint in terms of section 1 of the FAIS Act. The complaint initially laid was 
improperly defined as the complaint was only made against the FSP acting under 
section 13 and not against the appellants. Consequently, the appellants were 
                                            
of a registered FSP. A company FSP Network (Pty) Ltd t/a Unlisted Securities South Africa 
(“USSA”) was a licensed FSP and used by Sharemax to market the unlisted securities and 
debentures in Sharemax Properties. USSA only marketed the prospectuses of Sharemax 
Properties and it did this through more than one thousand brokers, who did not have the 
necessary licences, as representatives under s 13 of the FAIS Act. The Ombud found that 
USSA was intentionally created as the marketing arm of Sharemax and found that USSA 
and Sharemax were joined at the hip (Siegrist paras 51-53, 122). In addition, the FAIS 
Ombud pierced the corporate veil and found the directors of Sharemax, together with 
Sharemax, jointly and severally liable for the loss of the investors due to their reckless 
conduct and unconscionable abuse of the corporate personality (Siegrist para 148, 212-224; 
Bekker para 108). Notably, the original complaint laid with the FAIS Ombud was only against 
the s 13 FSP and not also against USSA, Sharemax or its directors. The FAIS Ombud joined 
USSA, Sharemax and the directors of Sharemax by granting them notice as interested 
parties under s 27(4) of the FAIS Act, and these parties appealed (“appellants”) against the 
determination of the FAIS Ombud. For a summary of the facts, see Sharemax Appeal paras 
26-38.These principles were confirmed in October 2015 by the Appeal Board of the FSB 
when it jointly heard three appeals Jacobus Johannes van Zyl v Sydney Perumal Naidoo 
FAB 2/2015; Herman Bester & Durandt van Zyl v Stephanus Lourens Gerber FAB 8/2014; 
and Jacobus Johannes van Zyl v Stephanus Lourens Gerber FAB 9/2014 and confirmed the 
principles laid down in the Sharemax Appeal. 
233 Sharemax Appeal paras 12-14, 44, 47-49.  
234 A complaint has to be properly defined as prescribed by the FAIS Act and the FAIS 
Ombud may not “flesh out” or expand a complaint on behalf of a complainant. Sharemax 
Appeal paras 18, 42-43; GA Hattingh v PW Mackie (in his capacity as executor of estate late 
CW Mackie) FAB 15/2017 para 24. 
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improperly joined by the FAIS Ombud as parties to the complaint.235 The Appeal 
Board of the FSB further held that notice given by the FAIS Ombud to the other 
appellants under section 27(4) of the FAIS Act did not constitute proper notice of the 
particulars of a complaint against a party in terms of the Act.236 
As a large part of the FAIS Ombud’s determination in the Siegrist and Bekker 
cases related to the ombud piercing the corporate veil and finding the directors jointly 
and severally liable, the Appeal Board of the FSB made brief reference to this 
principle.237 The Appeal Board of the FSB cryptically declared that section 20(9) of 
the Companies Act 2008 granted courts and not tribunals the power to pierce the 
corporate veil. Application for the court to pierce the corporate veil needs to be done 
as prescribed by section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008, and cannot simply be 
done during the course of a judgment without prior notice to the relevant parties.238 
The stance of the Appeal Board of the FSB is, however, compounded by its decision, 
a few months earlier in November 2014, in the case John Alexander Moore and 
Johnsure Investments CC v Gerald Edward Black,239 in which the Appeal Board did 
                                            
235 Sharemax Appeal paras 44-49. 
236 Sharemax Appeal paras 48-52; Van Zyl Appeals paras 19-21.  
237 Sharemax Appeal para 54.The Appeal Board of the FSB found that the FAIS Ombud did 
not have the jurisdiction to hear the matter against the appellants on the grounds that the 
appellants were not part of the complaint originally submitted to the FAIS Ombud (paras 49-
51) and consequently the references to piercing the corporate veil are obiter dicta.  
238 Sharemax Appeal para 55. It thus appears, according to this decision by the FSB 
Appeals Board, that the FAIS Ombud does not have the jurisdiction to pierce the corporate 
veil on two grounds. Firstly, it does not have the power to do so; and, secondly, piercing the 
corporate veil can only be done through the statutory route of s 20(9) of the Companies Act 
2008. 
239 FAIS 0110-10/11 WC1. This case involved another property syndicate scheme, Blue 
Zone (liquidated), where the directors fraudulently used a company to secure improper 
investments and consequently misappropriated them. In this appeal, the financial broker, 
Moore, was appealing, claiming that he was not responsible for the loss of the respondent 
Black, as he was only a FSP representative under s 13, and thus there was no causal link 
between him providing financial services to Black that led to the investment by and 
subsequent loss of Black. The supervisor in terms of s 13 was Van Zyl, also a director of 
Blue Zone. The Appeal Board found both Moore as supervisee responsible, together with 
Van Zyl the supervisor, as neither exercised the necessary care and skill required from a 
FSP (paras 37 & 66). It is also important to note that in the Appeal Board found that the 
corporate veil may be pierced (para 59). The Appeal Board found Van Zyl accountable in his 
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pierce the corporate veil.240 In contrast, in October 2015 the FSB Appeal Board 
jointly heard a further three appeals and confirmed the principles laid down in the 
Sharemax Appeal case with regard to the jurisdiction of the FAIS Ombud.241 Notably, 
it is suggested by the FSB Appeal Board that the FAIS Ombud could have advised 
the complainant to amend the complaint to include the erstwhile directors of the 
failed syndicate company under the complaint. Consequently, a complaint would 
have been properly constituted against them and the FAIS Ombud could have 
enquired into the issues and held them answerable.242 This is significant as it infers 
that other parties, companies and directors may be added to an original complaint 
and be answerable to a complaint provided, inter alia, that they have been cited 
properly and been given proper notice of the complaint against them. Indeed, it is 
submitted the FAIS Ombud does have the authority to pierce the corporate veil, 
provided that the procedural requirements the FAIS Act have been complied with. 
This is supported by the finding in ex parte Gore that the common-law principle of 
piercing the corporate veil exists alongside section 20(9) of the Companies Act. 
Moreover, it is suggested the courts and other independent judicial bodies have had 
a robust approach to instances when they have been prepared to pierce the 
                                            
personal capacity as director of Blue Zone, as well as the supervisor in terms of s 13 (paras 
60 & 67) and ordered Van Zyl to be jointly and severally liable for the complainant’s loss. 
This is incomprehensible, as Van Zyl was not a party to the proceedings, and this is 
categorically stated by the Appeal Board (paras 54-55).  
240 Paras 59-60. 
241 Jacobus Johannes van Zyl v Sydney Perumal Naidoo FAB 2/2015; cf FAIS); Herman 
Bester & Durandt van Zyl v Stephanus Lourens Gerber FAB 8/2014; and Jacobus Johannes 
van Zyl v Stephanus Lourens Gerber FAB 9/2014 (Van Zyl Appeals). These cases also 
involved the failed Blue Zone property syndicate and the common appellant in each case, 
Van Zyl, (and Gerber in one matter) was an erstwhile director of Blue Zone. In all the 
matters, the complainants had originally laid a complaint only against the FSP, and not 
against Van Zyl or any of Blue Zone’s directors. The Appeal Board found there was no 
complaint as defined in s 1 of the FAIS Act laid against the appellant Van Zyl (or Gerber), 
who was director of Blue Zone, and consequently the FAIS Ombud had no jurisdiction to 
make an order against van Zyl (para 18). The Appeal Board is harshly critical of the case 
management of the matter and the determinations of the FAIS Ombud; including the 
determination to hold the directors liable on the grounds of running a fraudulent property 
syndication scheme and further holding the directors as being personally liable by piercing 
the corporate veil; and the determination to dismiss the leave to appeal (paras 10, 21). 
242 Van Zyl Appeals para 35. 
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corporate veil, balancing the commercial principle of separate juristic personality of 
companies, with its abuse by persons controlling the companies.243  In addition, the 
power of the FAIS Ombud to apply the substantive law is comparable to that of a 
court. In the light of these principles, it is submitted that the FAIS Ombud does have 
the common-law discretion to pierce the corporate veil; provided that proper 
application for such piercing has been made and that such application is part of a 
complaint lodged with the FAIS Ombud; and provided further that the application has 
been properly put to the relevant parties to answer and that they have been given 
proper notice regarding such application. This is further supported by the wide 
discretion granted to the FAIS Ombud in terms subsections 28(1)(b)(i)-(iii) of the 
FAIS Act. 
The model of an ombudsperson is invaluable in assisting with the enforcement of 
financial laws and regulations in the contemporary financial sector. Moreover, the 
nature of the office of the ombud, its accessibility and flexibility of procedure in 
resolving disputes within the financial sector, and its authority to make 
determinations, including orders for compensation have become instrumental in 
contributing to addressing economic crime. One of the primary purposes of the 
establishment of the Office of the FAIS Ombud was to provide the ordinary South 
African who uses financial services anywhere in the country easy and expeditious 
access to free adjudication. “This is what the FAIS Ombud’s work is about, providing 
access to justice for ordinary people.”244 There is reason for the FAIS Ombud, 
together with the other ombud offices, which will resort under the Ombud Council 
under the new FCSA, to continue to grow in providing an alternative, procedurally 
fair, informal, expeditious and economical resolution of disputes within the dynamic 
financial sector. 
In the first part of chapter four, selected models within civil and administrative law 
were briefly discussed to illustrate the different models already operative to combat 
economic crime. The impact of self-regulatory codes of corporate governance, such 
as the King Reports in South Africa, was highlighted to show how influential they are 
in the prevention of corporate crime. Likewise, the decriminalisation of improper 
                                            
243 See discussion above paras 4 2 2 1, 171ff above. 
244 A Sithole, then Chairperson of the Board of the FSB in the Chairman’s Report FAIS 
Ombud Annual Report 2012/2013 5. 
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conduct under the Companies Act 2008 and a move to enable stakeholders to seek 
resolution under private law against persons who breach their duties in terms of the 
Companies Act were shown to be in line with trends in other jurisdictions. In addition, 
the concept of a company being a corporate citizen, together with the broad 
stakeholder approach, is another development that will contribute to good corporate 
governance, and subsequently reduce corporate crime.  
The innovative approach of chapter 7 of the Companies Act 2008 that introduces 
ADR and re-creates CIPC as a public regulatory body is particularly important. It was 
submitted that the proper use and full fleshing out of the role and functions of CIPC 
could enhance the establishment and enforcement of the parameters of good 
corporate governance. Lastly, the contribution that an ombud can make to the 
resolution of disputes in the financial sector was illustrated through the office of the 
FAIS Ombud. It was submitted that the creation of the Ombud Council in the new 
financial regulations of the financial sector in South Africa should promote the role of 
ombudspersons in the financial sector. The large variance demonstrated in the 
mechanisms already in existence in the civil justice realm illustrates the prudence of 
a multi-pronged responsive regulation approach to the enforcement in the corporate 
sector to promote good corporate governance and to combat economic crime.  
In the second part of this chapter, asset forfeiture as a hybrid mechanism is 
discussed. Asset forfeiture is a mixed mechanism which entails characteristics of 
both civil and criminal law, and in addition the procedure crosses the boundaries 
between conventional criminal and civil legal systems. Attention is given to asset 
forfeiture under Chapters 5 and 6 of Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. 
Chapter 5 regulates so-called criminal forfeiture and Chapter 6 civil forfeiture. 
4 3 Hybrid mechanism: Asset forfeiture  
The complexity of economic crime has increased with the development of 
globalisation and transnational business and economic activities. Individual, 
corporate and organised crime have been on the increase. Evolving technology has 
also contributed to an increase in technically sophisticated crime, including economic 
crime such as cyber-crime. Consequently, the response to economic crime has also 
needed to increase. The fight against economic crime involves all three arms of a 
democratic society, namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The past 
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two decades has seen much volatility in the South African national and international 
context regarding the response to economic crime. There has been movement in all 
three democratic arms, with new and amended legislation by the legislature and new 
specialised units in the executive. In its endeavours to combat corruption and in 
adherence to its obligations under international laws,245 the legislature has passed a 
number of anti-corruption laws.246 These efforts of the legislature are in conjunction 
with special units created by the executive, such as the Hawks.247 Recent judgments 
interpreting these new acts have contributed to evolving jurisprudence in this field.248  
Fighting economic crime is difficult, complex and multi-fronted.249 The multi-
fronted approach means there is a continual interface between public and private law 
regarding the regulation of trade and industry but also the enforcement of such 
regulation.250 Likewise, the remedies may also be in private and public law, 
comprising, for example, personal liability for damages in law of contract or delict; or 
administrative sanctions and penalties under statutory law; or criminal measures 
such as fines or imprisonment under public law. In the previous section attention was 
given to mechanisms in civil and administrative legal systems. The overlap between 
civil and criminal law was illustrated through the statutory criminal offences created 
by the legislature in civil legislation, namely section 214 of the Companies Act 2008. 
                                            
245 For example, the United Nations Conventions Against Corruption, ratified by South Africa 
in 2004 and acknowledged in Shaik v S 2008 2 SACR 165 (CC) (“Shaik v S 2008”) para 73; 
the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption ratified by South 
Africa in 2005 and acknowledged in Shaik v S 2008 para 74. Also see National Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Mohamed 2003 1 SACR 561 (CC) (“NDPP V Mohamed 2003”) para 
14-16; United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 ratified by 
South Africa on 14 December 2000 and 20 February 2004. 
246 For example, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (“POCA”), and the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (“PCCA”).  
247 The official title of the Hawks is the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation, established 
in terms of the South African Police Service Amendment Act 10 of 2012, as a specialised 
unit under the South African Police Service. 
248 For example, NDPP V Mohamed 2003; Shaik v S 2008 and Savoi v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions 2014 1 SACR 545 (CC) (“Savoi v NDPP”) interpreting POCA.  
249 This has been acknowledged by the courts in Falk v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions 2012 1 SACR 265 (CC) (“Falk v NDPP”) para 1; Savoi v NDPP para 82. 
250 Tomasic (1992) AJCL 84 rightly points out that a distinct dividing line between civil and 
criminal sanctions is not always evident, particularly with regard to corporate conduct and 
misconduct. 
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Other hybrid mechanisms that are commonly used in the field of economic crime like 
asset forfeiture, the imposition of penalties and the disgorgement of profits also blur 
the lines between civil and criminal law.251 Civil law usually covers matters between 
private parties. Disputes arising from such matters are characterised by proceedings 
in civil courts with civil laws of procedure and evidence. Classic criminal law 
comprises matters between the (alleged) offenders and the state representing the 
public and usually relate to criminal offences that attract moral censure and severe 
punishment. Criminal law has complex and strict rules of evidence and procedure 
that function in an adversarial trial context, which is often subject to long time delays. 
Criminal law is consequently not always appropriate for complex contemporary 
economic crime and frustrates the efforts of government to control such crime.  
Responsively, a number of national governments have introduced new 
mechanisms. These are specifically designed to empower authorities outside the 
criminal trial court to take action and impose sanctions that are normally the subject 
matter of criminal law. Examples are different types of penalties, disgorgement of 
profit orders and asset forfeiture orders. Such specially designed statutory 
mechanisms and processes are found in a number of fields, including corporate and 
financial laws and are further interpreted and developed through jurisprudence.252 
Young calls these hybrid mechanisms “civil for criminal processes”,253 which it is 
submitted is a helpful but cumbersome term. Purposes of hybrid mechanisms, 
include granting to governments flexibility and extraordinary powers.254 Hybrid 
mechanisms also enable governments to decriminalise certain areas of law, 
particularly with regard to corporate and financial law.255 There are also utilitarian 
                                            
251 SNM Young “Enforcing Criminal Law through Civil Processes: How does Human Rights 
Law Treat Civil for Criminal Processes?” (2017) 133 J Int’l & Comp L 133 133. 
252 For a list of such processes in different jurisdictions see Young (2017) J Int’l & Comp L 
135-139. Domestically, s 59 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 authorises the Competition 
Tribunal to impose penalties; whilst part D of chapter 5 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 
2011 authorises the South African Revenue Service, if there are reasonable grounds to 
suspect tax crimes, to apply to court for a warrant to search and seize property.  
253 Young (2017) J Int’l & Comp L 134. 
254 Young (2017) J Int’l & Comp L 138. For example, the empowering of government through 
asset forfeiture under chapters 5 and 6 of POCA. 
255 Young (2017) J Int’l & Comp L 138. For example, the issue of compliance notices in the 
Companies Act 2008, discussed above in para 4 2 2 2.  
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benefits, including the saving of costs and time that traditional criminal proceedings 
would have entailed.256 In many instances, these hybrid processes provide for less 
formal procedures than classic trial processes. Significantly, hybrid mechanisms are 
appropriate in corporate law to ensure compliance with regulations.257 However, 
there are also risks relating to the application of such hybrid mechanisms. The fact 
that a forfeiture order can be of a penal nature has led persons to contend that it is a 
criminal and not a civil procedure and consequently defendants are entitled to rights 
under criminal law. Thus the infringement of individual human rights is a risk and 
certain penalties and sanctions may be considered to be criminal in nature, despite 
being described as being civil in nature. They accordingly trigger a defendant’s 
human rights under national and international law. 258  
Asset forfeiture is a powerful tool that can be applied to address serious economic 
crime. However, it is highly intrusive259 and deeply controversial.260 South Africa 
followed other national jurisdictions and amended its asset forfeiture legislation by 
passing the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (“POCA”).261 In this 
                                            
256 Young (2017) J Int’l & Comp L 139. For example, investigations and actions taken by 
administrative bodies such as ASIC discussed in para 4 2 2 2 above. 
257 Young (2017) J Int’l & Comp L 139. This has been illustrated by Braithwaite and the 
responsive regulation pyramid, discussed in the introduction to this chapter, para 4 1 above. 
258 The severity of a potential penalty is one of the three criteria laid down by the European 
Court to determine if a particular mechanism constitutes a criminal mechanism that triggers 
criminal law rights under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedom. The criteria were laid down in Engel v Netherlands 1976 1 (EHRR) 
647. The other two were the domestic classification of the regulation and the nature of the 
offence. For a discussion on the inconsistent classification of hybrid mechanisms by the 
ECHR, see Young (2017) J Int’l & Comp L 140-153. 
259 In Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 2 SACR 525 (CC) (“Prophet v 
NDPP”) para 46 Nkabinde J held: “Asset forfeiture orders as envisaged under Chapter 6 of 
the POCA are inherently intrusive in that they may carry dire consequences for the owners 
or possessors of properties particularly residential properties.” 
260 In Mohunram v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 4 SA 222 (CC) (“Mohunram 
v NDPP”) para 114 fn 7, also paras 119-120, Moseneke DCJ acknowledged the criticism 
and condemnation of civil asset forfeiture, particularly in the United States. 
261 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the international cooperation with 
regard to asset forfeiture. In Falk v NDPP para 1 international cooperation was stated to be 
essential. This case considered the relationship between POCA, the International Co-
operation in Criminal Matters Act 75 of 1996, and asset forfeiture legislation in Germany.  
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
209 
 
section, the focus will be on the mechanisms of civil and criminal asset forfeiture 
under POCA.262 The foundations of POCA are traced to both American and English 
law, as well as the development of international pressure under conventions and 
policies to pass harsher laws to combat international crime. The principles of 
constitutionality, instrumentality and legality developed by the South African courts in 
the application of POCA are discussed as they serve as safeguards to this powerful 
and indeed draconian mechanism. 
4 3 1 Introduction to POCA 
Asset forfeiture is a hybrid mechanism. It has characteristics of both civil and 
criminal law, evident in its nature and in the prescribed procedure. Hybrid 
mechanisms present problems because of their mixed nature and application. In the 
light of this, some of the difficulties encountered in the use of such a mechanism are 
discussed, including its constitutionality, particularly with regard to the basic rights of 
a defendant under the Constitution. The scope of POCA is directly related to the 
interpretation of the statutory concepts “proceeds of crime” and an asset which is an 
“instrumentality of an offence” and accordingly the issue of instrumentality is also 
discussed. Finally, the invasive power of the authorities under POCA are considered. 
The courts have developed the legality principle as a guide to interpreting these 
unusual powers. Specific reference is given to so-called criminal forfeiture in chapter 
5 of POCA and civil forfeiture in chapter 6, and the interpretation by the courts of 
POCA relating to the confiscation and forfeiture of assets under civil and criminal law 
principles. In addition, the relationship of the forfeiture of assets to criminal 
sentencing are touched upon. Another problematic issue is the terminology used in 
various jurisdictions to describe asset forfeiture. 
                                            
262 S 35 of the CPA, a general asset forfeiture provision under South African criminal law 
system, needs to be distinguished. S 35 of CPA is a procedure for forfeiture of an article that 
was used in the commission of offence of which the accused has been convicted. 
Significantly, it is part of the criminal court proceedings and is not deemed to be a civil 
procedure as are the forfeiture proceedings under chapters 5 and 6 of POCA. The court in 
National Director of Prosecutions v Swart 2005 2 SACR 186 (SE) at 191 recorded 
differences between the forfeiture procedure under s 35 of the CPA and s 48 of POCA. Also 
see Basdeo (2013) J Int’l & Comp L 318. 
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Chapter 5 of POCA, for example, uses the terminology “restraint” and 
“confiscation” orders. The latter can only be made after conviction, whilst a restraint 
order preserves the assets during the criminal investigation and trial. Restraint and 
confiscation orders are commonly referred to as criminal forfeiture. In contrast, 
chapter 6, which relates to forfeiture of assets before a criminal conviction, uses the 
terms “forfeiture” and “preservation”. Such action is commonly referred to as civil 
forfeiture or forfeiture in rem. However, in terms of POCA, whose title itself refers to 
the “prevention of crime”, both procedures are described as being civil in nature.263 
As noted above, Young coins a new term “civil for criminal processes”, and calls for 
new terminology to be developed to help the discourse in this hybrid field of law to 
distinguish it from both civil and criminal law proceedings.264  
Asset forfeiture is a mechanism specifically designed to enable government to 
make radical intrusions into the rights of individuals by empowering government to 
seize and remove assets derived from the profits of crime or used in the commission 
of crime. It is important to understand the history of this mechanism and its 
development. The origins of POCA265 can be traced back to forfeiture legislation in 
England266 and the United States.267 A distinction needs to be made between civil 
                                            
263 S 13 prescribes that any proceedings under chapter 5 are civil in nature and not criminal; 
likewise s 37 prescribes that proceedings under chapter 6 are also civil in nature. To add to 
the confusion, it is the National Director of Public Prosecutions who is authorised in terms of 
POCA (eg s 48(1)) to represent the state in any proceedings. 
264 In this dissertation, the terms used in POCA are mainly used, namely a chapter 5 
confiscation and a chapter 6 forfeiture; except where it is necessary to use the common 
terms civil forfeiture and criminal forfeiture. 
265 Domestically, POCA was preceded by the Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996, the 
confiscation order provisions of which were in turn modelled on the English Drug Trafficking 
Offences Act 1986 and the Criminal Justice Act 1988. POCA is also developed from the 
Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. See also J Bourne “Money Laundering: What is 
Being Done to Combat it – A Comparative Analysis of the Laws in the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom and South Africa” (2002) 14 SA Merc LJ 475 487; L Jordaan 
“Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime and the Fair-Trial Rights of an Accused Person” 
(2002) 15 SACJ 41 41 fn 1.  
266 Primarily the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. For a 
discussion on the asset forfeiture legislation in the United Kingdom see Bourne (2002) SA 
Merc LJ 482-486 Jordaan (2002) SACJ 55. 
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asset forfeiture and criminal asset forfeiture. The latter is usually in the form of an in 
personam confiscation order against a defendant after a criminal conviction by the 
criminal court, although the proceedings for the confiscation are civil in nature. 
Confiscation orders are readily accepted as it is logical that offenders be deprived of 
the proceeds of the crime they have been convicted of and accordingly there is little 
criticism against this mechanism.268  
Civil asset forfeiture, however, is controversial because it happens independently 
of a criminal conviction and so raises several legal concerns. The justification for civil 
asset forfeiture has for decades been based on the legal fiction in rem. The legal 
fiction in rem is that the property committed the crime and consequently proceedings 
                                            
267 There are many forfeiture statutes in the United States, but the primary statute upon 
which POCA is modelled is RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Act), 
Title 18 of the Organised Crime Control Act of 1970, ss 1961-1968. See NC Ndzengu & JC 
von Bonde “Legal Expenses POCA Clauses: A Loophole to Make Crime Pay” (2011) 24 
SACJ 309 313 fn 30. Asset forfeiture in the United States is traced back to the English legal 
principle of the deodant developed in piracy and maritime laws. After a period of dormancy 
asset forfeiture was revived in the 1970s to empower authorities to address money 
laundering and illegal drug activities. For discussion on the origin, development and types of 
asset forfeiture in the United States see D O’Connell “Civil Asset Forfeiture: Lining Pockets 
and Ruining Lives” (2018) 74 Nat’l Law Guild Rev 237 237-244; LE Ellsworth “Pennies from 
Heaven or Excessive Fines from Hell – Commonwealth v 1997 Chevrolet Keeps Civil Asset 
Forfeiture’s Threat to Homeownership in Purgatory” (2018) 63 Vill L Rev 125 129-136; M 
Fourie & GJ Pienaar “Tracing the Roots of Forfeiture and the Loss of Property in English and 
American Law” (2017) 23 Fundamina 20 21-31; N Boister “Transnational Penal Norm 
Transfer: The Transfer of Civil Forfeiture from the United States to South Africa as a Case in 
Point” (2003) 16 SACJ 271-294 severely criticises this transnational transfer of penal 
legislation, which is referred to as the “transnational law enforcement enterprise”. He 
contends that it is unnecessary and improper. He argues that it is particularly worrying when 
penal legislation is seamlessly transferred from a developed state with a sophisticated law 
enforcement system to a developing state that may have an unsophisticated or dysfunctional 
criminal justice system. Boister finds further that the provisions in POCA in fact extend 
beyond South Africa’s international legal obligations under various conventions which have 
been held to be the justification for the adoption of POCA by the Constitutional Court (for 
example, NDPP v Mohamed paras 14-16 referred to in fn 245).  
268 D Erasmus & NC Ndzengu “A Note on the Introduction of the nullum crimen, nulla poena 
sine lege or Principle of Legality in the South African Asset Forfeiture Jurisprudence” (2016) 
3 SACJ 247 250. 
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are taken against the guilty property, in contrast to a person.269 The source of this 
fiction has been held to be Judeo-Christian.270 It is submitted that justification upon 
the Biblical and Torah sources is misplaced as the motive for the killing of the goring 
ox is more likely to be due to theological reasons, such as the sanctity of human life 
for Yahweh,271 rather than to legal reasons. It is further submitted that looking back 
at older and similar provisions in legal sources, such as the Laws of Eshnunna272 
and the Code of Hammurabi273 it is evident that the owner of the ox, not the ox, was 
liable for legal consequences caused by a goring ox. There is no legal precedent for 
holding the ox guilty. The ox remains innocent. It is suggested it would be more 
helpful to validate asset forfeiture legislation as a specifically designed mechanism 
developed by legislators in response to contemporary crime; instead of persisting 
with a misplaced reliance on an ancient near-east source. 
                                            
269 Prophet v NDPP para 58. 
270 The source is taken to be Exodus 21:28-32. Exodus 21:28 reads: “If an ox gore a man or 
a woman, and he dies, the ox shall surely be stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten; but the 
owner of the ox shall be quit” (writer’s emphasis). For discussion on the origins see 
O’Connell (2018) 74 Nat’l Law Guild Rev 237-238; Fourie & Pienaar (2017) Fundamina 21-
22. See also, Commonwealth v 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized from James Young 160 A 
3d 153 (Pa 2017)(“1997 Chevrolet”) 179; USA v One Parcel Property 74 F 3d 1165(11th Cir 
1996) 1168. 
271 HL Bosman, Emeritus Professor in Old Testament Stellenbosch University in e-mail 
correspondence with the writer.  
272 The Laws of Eshnunna (“LE”) date back to the 18th century BC. LE 53-55 are relevant. LE 
53 decrees that if an ox was known to be a gorer and its owner warned to guard it and it 
killed a person, the owner was to held liable and pay monetary damages. There is no action 
against the ox. For comparative discussion of LE and Biblical texts, see R Yaron “The 
Goring Ox in Near Eastern laws” (1966) 1 Isr L Rev 396-406. 
273 The Code of Hammurabi (“CH”) dates back to the 17th century. CH 250-252 are relevant. 
CH 250 decrees that if an ox incidentally killed a man along a street there is no legal action 
arising against the owner of the ox. The absolving of the innocent owner is similar to the first 
part of Exodus 21:28. However, like LE 54-55, if the ox was a known gorer and the owner 
was warned and he did not take precautionary measures, the owner was liable and had to 
pay monetary damages. Again no action was taken against the ox. Only in Ex 21:29-31 both 
the man and the ox were to be put to death. See Yaron (1966) Isr L Rev 401-402. It is 
submitted by the writer that the difference lies not in legal rationale, but rather in theological 
rationale.  
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The purposes of POCA are comprehensively set out in the preamble of POCA.274 
The relevant purposes can be summed up as depriving persons of the proceeds of 
unlawful activities and confiscating the assets used or that may be used in unlawful 
activities. The purposes of POCA have been interpreted by the Constitutional Court 
in a number of cases.275 In addition to the overall purpose of POCA, the specific 
purposes of chapters 5276 and 6277 have been highlighted in a number of cases. In 
Savoi v National Director of Public Prosecutions278 Madlanga J gave a broad 
encompassing description of the objective of POCA: 
                                            
274 In brief, it may be said the focus of POCA as set out in the preamble is upon national and 
international “organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities”. Importantly, it 
is recognised that such activities “infringe on the rights of the people as enshrined in the Bill 
of Rights”; and moreover every person has the right “to be protected from fear, intimidation 
and physical harm caused by the criminal activities of violent gangs and individuals”. 
Furthermore, such criminal activities have a broader effect: that they “present a danger to 
public order and safety and economic stability, and have the potential to inflict social 
damage”. The preamble strongly states that no person convicted, or otherwise, should 
benefit from the fruits of any related offence or unlawful activity, or be entitled to use property 
for the commission of an offence and consequently provision needs to be made for a civil 
remedy for the restraint and seizure, confiscation or forfeiture of property which is part of the 
benefits derived from an offence or is derived from unlawful activities or is concerned in the 
commission or suspected commission of an offence. It is also noted that the proceeds of 
forfeited assets should be applied to the combating of such criminal activities.  
275 Including NDPP v Mohamed 2002 para 14; Mohunram v NDPP para 125; Prophet v 
NDPP para 59; Shaik v S 2008 paras 49-57; Savoi v NDPP paras 1, 14-15.  
276 Chapter 5 makes provision for the confiscation of the proceeds of unlawful activities, their 
prior seizure under a restraint order, the realisation of confiscated property and the 
application of such proceeds. The specific purpose is thus to ensure that no person benefits 
from the proceeds of wrongdoing. Shaik v S 2008 paras 22-24 relate to confiscation orders 
and paras 49-57 refer to the purposes of chapter 5; NDPP v Mohamed 2002 para 16; 
Mohunram v NDPP para 118; Falk v NDPP para 15. 
277 Chapter 6 makes provision for civil proceedings in terms of which the NDPP may apply 
for orders for the preservation and subsequent forfeiture of property. Such applications 
under chapter 6 are not dependent on a criminal conviction or the rules of evidence 
particular to a criminal court. Again the specific purpose is to deprive a person from the 
proceeds of crime and also to remove the instruments of crime from offenders. See ss 37 
and 38(2) of POCA; Shaik v S 2008 paras 44 and 47; NDPP v Mohamed 2002 para 16. 
278 2014 1 SACR 545 (CC) paras 15-33. In this case, the applicants failed in their argument, 
the so-called definitional challenge, that the definitions of “a pattern of racketeering” and 
“enterprise” in ss 1 and 2 of POCA were unconstitutional due to being vague and overbroad.  
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“POCA seeks to ensure that the criminal justice system reaches as far and wide 
as possible in order to deal with the scourge of organised crime in as many of its 
manifestations as possible.”279  
The purpose of POCA was also considered in National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Mohamed,280 and said to be necessary because of the rapid growth 
of organised criminal activities such as money laundering and racketeering, which 
was described as an international problem and a security threat.281 Importantly, it 
held that “conventional criminal penalties are inadequate as measures of deterrence 
when leaders of organised crime are able to retain the considerable gains derived 
from organised crime, even on those occasions when they are brought to justice.”282 
The Constitutional Court consequently endorsed POCA, although draconian in its 
provisions, and found its objective to deprive criminals of proceeds acquired through 
crime to be in line with relevant international instruments.283 The core purpose of 
POCA is to “remove the incentive for crime, not to punish”.284  
Chapter 5 of POCA prescribes the procedures for criminal asset forfeiture and in 
para 4 3 2 below, the mechanism of restraint and confiscation and some of the 
                                            
279 Savoi v NDPP para 15. 
280 2003 1 SACR 561 (CC) paras 14-15; NDPP v Mohamed 2002 4 SA 843 (CC) paras 14-
15. Two separate cases were heard before the Constitutional Court between the same 
parties regarding the constitutionality of s 38 of POCA, regarding preservation orders, and 
Ackermann J delivered both judgments; and coincidentally the purposes of POCA are 
discussed in paras 14-15 of each of the judgments. 
281 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mohamed 2003 1 SACR 561 (CC) (“NDPP v 
Mohamed 2003”) para 14. 
282 The Constitutional Court in the second NDPP v Mohamed 2003 para 14 followed the 
findings in the first case, NDPP v Mohamed 2002 para 14. 
283 NDPP v Mohamed 2003 paras 14-16. For examples of international conventions and 
instruments see Bourne (2002) SA Merc LJ 476. See also the critical evaluation by Boister 
(2003) SACJ 271-294 of POCA’s scope extending beyond its international obligations under 
conventions. 
284 NDPP v Mohamed 2002 para 15; NDPP v Mohamed 2003 para 15. Moreover, the 
Constitutional Court (NDPP v Mohamed 2003 para 52) found that a preservation order 
granted in terms of s 38 of POCA, though resulting in a temporary deprivation of an owner’s 
rights, and thus limiting an owner’s property rights, is a justified limitation in the light of s 36 
of the Constitution, as it enables the Act to operate for the purpose it was enacted and to 
help prevent the disposal of the proceeds of crime.  
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safeguards developed by the courts in South Africa during the past two decades are 
discussed.  
Regarding chapter 6 of POCA, brief reference is made to issues regarding the 
nature and process of civil asset forfeiture and the principles developed by the courts 
with regard to the granting of a forfeiture order in terms of chapter 6. The discussion 
will be limited to the constitutional imperatives of instrumentality, proportionality and 
legality. 
Restitution is a central principle in this dissertation and accordingly attention in 
para 4 3 4 will be given to ways in which victims can seek restitution under chapters 
5 and 6 of POCA.  
4 3 2 Mechanism of restraint and confiscation under Chapter 5 of POCA 
As indicated above the provisions of POCA are modelled upon forfeiture 
provisions in the United States’ federal legislation285 and England’s Criminal Justice 
Act 1988.286 Accordingly, the interpretation of the provisions of POCA are influenced 
by case law and asset forfeiture jurisprudence in the Unites States and England.287 
The primary purpose of chapter 5 is to deprive criminals from the proceeds of their 
crime.288 In Shaik v S (“S v Shaik 2008”),289 dealing with the provisions on the 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime,290 the Constitutional Court succinctly set out 
                                            
285 RICO (see fn 266 above).  
286 Part VI of Criminal Justice Act 1988. Particularly, parts relating to money laundering (ss 4 
to 7) and confiscation order provisions (ss 18 to 24) of POCA (fn 221) and also the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002. See Bourne (2002) SA Merc LJ 488-489; Basdeo (2013) Afr J Int’I & 
Comp L 304; Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2013) Obiter 378 fn 2. 
287 NDPP v Prophet 2006 2 SACR 525 (CC) para 24; NDPP v Prophet 2006 1 All SA 212 
(SCA) paras 14, 16, 36-37, 43 & 47; NDPP v Cole 2005 2 SACR 553 (W) para 9. Also see 
Fourie & Pienaar (2017) Fundamina 33-34. 
288 NDPP v Kyriacou 2004 1 SA 379 (SCA) paras 3 & 27. 
289 2008 2 SACR 165 (CC). In this case, Shaik and two corporate appellants, Nkobi Holdings 
(Pvt) Ltd and Nkobi Investments (Pty) Ltd appealed against confiscations orders valued at 
an agreed amount of R34 million made by the Durban High Court in relation to benefits 
derived from convictions of corruption as defined by s 1(1)(a)(i) of the Corruption Act 94 of 
1992. The benefits which formed the basis of the Constitutional Court appeal was a 25% 
shareholding in the third appellant, and accumulated dividends from such shareholding. See 
S v Shaik 2008 paras 1, 6-10. 
290 POCA s 18.  
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the purposes of Chapter 5 of POCA that relate to confiscation orders291 by a criminal 
court after a conviction has been obtained: 
“[t]he primary object of a confiscation order is not to enrich the State but rather to 
deprive the convicted person of ill-gotten gains.”292  
O’Regan ADCJ then continued to describe two secondary purposes that flow from 
this primary objective, namely general deterrence and prevention.293 General 
deterrence means that persons will, in general, be deterred from committing crimes 
upon the realisation that it does not pay as the proceeds are confiscated. Prevention 
means that due to the confiscation of the proceeds of crime, no further crime can be 
committed with such proceeds.294  
Importantly, O’Regan ADCJ distinguished the primary purpose of chapter 5 of 
POCA from similar provisions in English law, where English courts held that the 
purposes of confiscation orders are punitive in nature.295 The court found that in 
interpreting the provisions of POCA under the South Africa Constitution, the primary 
purpose is not the punishment of offenders but ensuring “that criminals cannot enjoy 
the fruits of their crimes”.296 Deprivation of ill-gotten assets and not punishment is 
thus the primary objective of chapter 5 of POCA, although such deprivation may 
have a punitive effect.297 This is important as a chapter 5 confiscation order is 
                                            
291 S 18(1) of POCA provides that a prosecutor may apply for a confiscation order once a 
person has been convicted, on which the court makes an inquiry as to whether the convicted 
person derived a benefit from the offence of which she or he has been convicted. See Shaik 
2008 paras 23 and 50. 
292 S v Shaik 2008 para 51 (footnote omitted). The Constitutional Court endorsed the 
description of the Supreme Court in NDPP v Rebuzzi 2002 2 SA 1 (SCA) para 19; Falk v 
NDPP para 15.  
293 S v Shaik 2008 para 52; Falk v NDPP para 15. 
294 S v Shaik 2008 para 52. The Shaik 2008 judgment also held that the primary target at 
which deterrence is aimed is organised crime, and therefore maximum confiscation orders 
may be necessary to give effect to such intended deterrence (para 71).  
295 S v Shaik 2008 para 56. 
296 S v Shaik 2008 paras 51 and 57 following National Director of Public Prosecutions v 
Rebuzzi 2002 2 SA 1 (SCA) (“NDPP v Rebuzzi”) para 1; National Director of Public 
Prosecutions v Mansoor 2011 1 SACR 292 (ECP) (“NDPP v Mansoor”) para 11. 
297 S v Shaik 2008 para 57. Also, National Director of Public Prosecutions v Phillips 2001 2 
SACR 542 (W) (“NDPP v Phillips 2001 (W)”) para 42. 
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independent of and does not form part of the sentencing process. It is also not an 
additional punishment.298 
The court also importantly defined the nature of a confiscation order, confirming 
that it is a civil judgment and is in addition to a criminal sentence.299 This is 
significant as it touches upon the interaction between criminal and civil procedure 
and remedies in a justice system. It also has an impact on the principles of 
sentencing. It is important to weigh the aims of sections 25 and 26 of chapter 5300 
against the constitutional rights of a defendant, including the right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty.301 Although the power to restrain, confiscate and realise 
assets and proceeds under chapter 5 has, as its primary object, deprivation of 
enjoyment of tainted proceeds from crime, sections 30 and 31 of POCA 
acknowledge the rights of persons who have interests in the restrained property, 
including creditors and victims of a crime, to make representations to the court. They 
also provide for payments from proceeds of a confiscation to be made to such 
claimants.302  
                                            
298 Erasmus & Ndzengu (2016) SACJ 250 and especially fn 16. The defendant in chapter 5 
proceedings, although being a convicted person, is not an accused person as the 
proceedings are civil in nature. Consequently, the fair-trial rights of an accused person in 
terms of s 35(3) of the Constitution do not apply, e.g. the double jeopardy rule in terms of s 
35(3)(m). In NDPP v Phillips 2001 (W) paras 33-44 the constitutionality and nature of 
chapter 5 proceedings are discussed at length. The court concludes (para 44) that an 
application for a confiscation order is properly characterised in s 13 of POCA as civil 
proceedings and accordingly a defendant in such proceedings is not an accused person in 
terms of s 35(3) of the Constitution. For general discussion on constitutionality concerns, see 
Basdeo (2014) PELJ 1061-1065. Jordaan contends that though these presumptions are no 
longer reverse onus presumptions they still have a ‘”sweeping effect” and it would be difficult 
for the NDPP to prove their case without them. In addition, she suggests that because they 
are mandatory presumptions they may very well be a challenge to a defendant’s rights to a 
fair trial under s 35(3) of the Constitution. See Jordaan (2002) SACJ 46-47, 55-56, 58-60. 
299 The court also found that it was an order for the payment of a sum of money, and not the 
confiscation of a particular object: S v Shaik 2008 para 24.  
300 The sections relating to restraint orders over property to prevent the disposal of assets. 
301 NDPP v Mansoor) para 24. The right to be presumed innocent is provided for in s 
35(3)(h) of the Constitution of RSA 1996. 
302 Ss 30(3)-(5) and 31(1) of POCA discussed in para 4 4 below. 
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Consequently, any confiscation order does not form part of the sentencing of an 
accused.303 The inquiry into whether the defendant received any benefit takes place 
after conviction upon the application of the state. However, the process under 
chapter 5 invariably begins long before conviction.304  
The main stages of the chapter 5 procedure305 are restraint, seizure, confiscation 
and realisation. The most significant event which triggers a confiscation order is a 
conviction,306 a prerequisite and distinct characteristic of chapter 5 forfeiture. 
However, because it may be necessary to protect and preserve property before a 
person is convicted, provision is made for a restraint order, the seizure of assets and 
the appointment of a curator bonis over seized property. The NDPP makes an ex 
parte application before a High Court for a restraint order in the event of prosecution 
proceedings having been instituted against a defendant307 or in the event that the 
court is satisfied that a person is to be charged and there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that a confiscation order may be made against such a person.308 
Significantly, the criterion is “reasonable grounds” which is not a high standard, but 
only requires that the NDPP presents evidence that may reasonably support a 
conviction and consequent confiscation order.309  
                                            
303 POCA s 18(1).  
304 It usually begins when investigations start and application for a restraint order can be 
made before a suspected offender is even charged. However, s 25(2) prescribes that if a 
person is not charged within a reasonable period the court may rescind the restraint order. 
See Basdeo (2013) Afr J Int’l & Comp L 305-306. 
305 For a discussion on the stages of a chapter 5 forfeiture, see Basdeo (2013) Afr J Int’l & 
Comp L 304-312; Phillips v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 2 SACR 410 
(SCA) (“NDPP v Phillips 2003 (SCA)”) paras 7-11. 
306 POCA s 18(1). 
307 S 25(1)(a). Notably in chapter 5 a person is called a defendant and not an accused, in 
line with the proceedings being defined as civil proceedings in s 13. 
308 S 25(1)(b). In this case, under s 25(2) a restraint order against a suspect can be 
rescinded by the court if the person is not charged within a period deemed reasonable by the 
court. Prosecution need not be imminent, or a charge sheet presented to the court, but 
“sufficient information” needs to be placed before the court to enable it to perform its judicial 
function. See NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 1 SACR 530 (SCA) para 88; Basdeo (2013) Afr J 
Int’l & Comp L 306. 
309 NDPP v Kyriacou paras 10 & 15, also para 30 (although Southwood AJA on the facts 
found that there were no reasonable grounds); NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 1 SACR 530 
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The purpose of a restraint order is to preserve assets so that they may be realised 
in the event of a confiscation order being granted.310 Conversely, it prevents the 
assets from being disposed of pending the outcome of a criminal trial that may be 
pending for a number of years.311 A restraint order is made over realisable 
property,312 and may be made over all the defendant’s property, including property 
not necessarily identified by the NDPP313 or tainted by the pending or instituted 
charges.314 Realisable property also includes property legitimately held by third 
parties, which is defined as “affected gifts” under POCA.315 A restraint order deprives 
any holder316 of property rights of such rights317 and usually the court orders that the 
property be surrendered to a curator bonis appointed in terms of section 28 of 
POCA. The restraint order may be provisional and grants a defendant an opportunity 
to defend the provisional order.318 A restraint order is temporary and is rescinded 
when the proceedings against the defendant are concluded.319 The court has wide 
                                            
(SCA) para 27; Basdeo (2013) Afr J Int’l & Comp L 307. It is important that it appear to the 
court and not merely to the NDPP, and that there are reasonable grounds. See NDPP v 
Basson 2001 2 SACR 712 (SCA) para 19.  
310 NDPP v Kyriacou paras 5 & 22; NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 1 SACR 530 (SCA) (“NDPP v 
Rautenbach”) paras 24 and 84; Basdeo (2013) Afr J Int’l & Comp L 306;  
311 Basdeo (2014) 17 PELJ 1050. 
312 As defined in s 14 of POCA. 
313 POCA s 26(2)(b). In terms of s 26(2)(c) assets that may be transferred to the defendant in 
the future, which are clearly unknown assets, may also be included in the restraint order. 
314 This because all property, including property acquired before and after the criminal 
offence of which the defendant is convicted can be confiscated to satisfy a confiscation 
order. The order is not restricted to property relating to the criminal offence, 
315 Under s 14(1)(b) read with s 16 of POCA “affected gifts” can primarily be described as 
property which the defendant transferred for a consideration significantly less than the 
property supplied by the defendant. 
316 This could be an owner or a creditor. 
317 Basdeo (2014) 17 PELJ 1053. Compare NDPP v Rautenbach para 56 weighing up the 
extent of the interference of property rights against the purpose of a restraint order.  
318 POCA s 26(3). A provisional restraint order may have immediate effect, but a rule nisi 
may simultaneously be issued granting a defendant an opportunity to defend the order. 
319 POCA s 26(10)(b). Conclusion in terms of s 17 of POCA means acquittal, or if no 
confiscation order is made despite conviction or if the confiscation order is satisfied. The 
court has no inherent jurisdiction to rescind a restraint order and can only do so as 
prescribed by s 25(2) and 26(10) of POCA. See Phillips v NDPP 2003 2 SACR 410 (SCA) 
para 25. 
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discretion with regard to the orders it may make for a “proper, fair and effective 
execution” of a restraint order; which will usually include a seizure order.320 
Importantly, a defendant may apply that any restraint order may provide for 
reasonable living expenses and legal expenses she or he may incur.321 Similarly, 
any affected person may apply to the court for the restraint order to be rescinded or 
varied if such order will deprive her or him of reasonable living expenses and cause 
undue hardship, and the court finds that such hardship outweighs the risk of the 
restrained property being destroyed, lost, damaged, concealed or transferred.322 
The confiscation inquiry aims at ascertaining whether the defendant benefited not 
only from the offences of which the defendant is convicted, but also from any 
criminal activity the court finds “sufficiently related” to such offences.323 This may 
include criminal activity before or after the occurrence of those offences of which the 
defendant has been convicted. Importantly, any such determination by the court is 
based on the civil standard of a balance of probabilities.324 The inquiry is a question 
of fact and there are several provisions relating to evidence that assist the state.325  
There are safeguards built into the chapter 5 forfeiture mechanism regarding the 
amount of a confiscation order. The primary purpose of the confiscation order is to 
deprive a convicted person of the proceeds of unlawful activities. The court has a 
wide discretion and may order an amount that it considers is appropriate. However, 
                                            
320 POCA s 26(8).  
321 S 26(6).This includes reasonable living expenses of the person’s family and household 
and legal expenses pertaining to chapter 5 proceedings and any related criminal 
proceedings. The court needs to be satisfied that the defendant has disclosed all her or his 
assets and that there is not sufficient money for living and legal expenses from any 
unrestrained assets.  
322 POCA s 26(10). See also Basdeo (2013) Afr J Int’l & Comp L 308.  
323 POCA s 18(1)(c). 
324 S 18(1) and s 13. See Phillips v NDPP 2003 (SCA) para 8. 
325 S 22(1) provides that if it is found that the defendant did not have legitimate sources of 
income to validate the interest in any property, then the court shall accept this as prima facie 
evidence that such interest forms part of the benefit the defendant received from the criminal 
activity. Failure by a defendant to disclose information when ordered to do so by a court 
under s 26(7) or knowingly disclosing false information could also result in negative findings 
under s 22(2). Although the NDPP retains the burden of proof, these evidentiary 
presumptions mean certain types of evidence are prima facie proof and assist the NDPP in 
satisfying the burden. See further Jordaan (2002) SACJ 43-45. 
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this figure in terms of section 18(2) may not exceed the lesser of two amounts. The 
first is the value the defendant derived from the criminal offences of which she or he 
is convicted, including criminal activities which the court finds to be sufficiently 
related to such offences. The second is the realisable value of the restrained assets 
at the time of the confiscation order.326  
Realisation of chapter 5 forfeited assets only takes place in the event of a 
defendant failing to pay a confiscation order.327 Realisation is consequently a 
statutory form of execution against property that has been restrained. 
Particularly important for purposes of this dissertation are the provisions of section 
30(4) and 30(5) of POCA to the effect that a court may not authorise a curator bonis 
to realise property before granting persons directly affected and persons who have 
suffered injury or loss arising from the offences or related criminal activities an 
opportunity to make representations to the court regarding the proposed realisation. 
Victims of criminal activity are thus granted an opportunity to make representations. 
4 3 3 Mechanism of preservation and forfeiture under Chapter 6 of POCA 
An asset forfeiture order under chapter 6 constitutes civil asset forfeiture which is 
independent of criminal proceedings and which is accordingly highly invasive against 
property rights. Since the introduction of POCA there has been a significant number 
of cases heard by the South African courts with regard to the interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of POCA and the status of the rights of interested persons. 
Significantly, the Constitutional Court has interpreted the peremptory term “shall” in 
section 50(1) of POCA328 to mean “may” and has consequently developed the 
                                            
326 This includes, in terms of s 20(1), the value of property held by the defendant and the 
value of the affected gifts made by the defendant. See Phillips v NDPP 2003 (SCA) para 9. 
327 Basdeo (2013) Afr J Int’l & Comp L 312. 
328 POCA s 50(1) reads (in part): “The High Court shall, subject to section 52, make an order 
applied for under section 48(1) if the Court finds on a balance of probabilities that the 
property concerned   ̶  (a) is an instrumentality of an offence referred to in Schedule 1” 
(writer’s emphasis). An “instrumentality of an offence” is defined in s 1(1) as: “any property 
which is concerned in the commission or suspected commission of an offence at any time 
before or after the commencement of this Act, whether committed within the Republic or 
elsewhere.” 
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proportionality test to determine when a forfeiture order may be granted.329 As 
appears from the discussion of the case law below, the crystallisation of the principle 
of proportionality and the interpretation of the terms “offence” and “instrumentality of 
an offence” are definitive in the application of chapter 6 of POCA. The judgments 
discussed below also illustrate the relationship between forfeiture and other criminal 
sanctions, particularly sentencing. The judgments highlight the role that asset 
forfeiture plays in the authorities’ efforts to combat crime. In addition, these asset 
forfeiture cases show the fine balancing of constitutional rights, namely the right of 
property owners not to be arbitrarily deprived of ownership, weighed up against the 
right of citizens to be protected against crime and criminals.  
Forfeiture is said to be “a strong weapon in the State’s arsenal in the war against 
organised crime”; but if “improperly used, forfeiture could become more like a 
roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent but hapless owners whose 
property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded to punish those who associate 
with criminals, than a component of a system of justice.”330 The question arises as to 
how far the scope of POCA with regard to forfeiture orders reaches? Does it only 
cover offences listed under POCA or reach other criminal offences as well? Answers 
to these question have been sought with reference to the purposes of POCA and the 
                                            
329 Mohunram v NDPP para 121 following National Director of Public Prosecutions v R O 
Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SACR 208 (SCA) (“NDPP v Cook Properties”) para 74; 
Prophet v NDPP paras 46 and 61. 
330 Brooks v National Director of Public Prosecutions (“Brooks v NDPP”) 2017 1 SACR 701 
(SCA) paras 69 & 81. In this matter the two appellants were married to one another in 
community of property and first appellant was charged with contravening the Diamonds Act 
56 of 1986. The High Court granted a forfeiture order in respect of immovable property and 
ordered that the curator bonis pay the second appellant her share of the forfeited property. 
The appellants appealed against this order, arguing that the granting of the forfeiture order 
was disproportionate. The property in question consisted of a piece of land upon which the 
family home was built, in which the appellants and their two minor children resided. The first 
appellant also ran his legitimate business from the property. Ten of the 19 illegal diamond 
transactions took place on the property. The monies the first appellant received for being a 
middleman amounted to R58,000 and the property was valued at R960,000. Taking into 
account all the factors the SCA found the forfeiture order to be disproportionate, 
notwithstanding that the wife’s share in the proceeds of the forfeited assets had been 
safeguarded in the forfeiture order (paras 2, 6, 9-11, 46, 77-82). See also the US 1997 
Chevrolet case, discussed below in fn 3563.  
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interpretation of an “instrumentality of an offence”. The question also raises 
constitutionality issues, such as the right not to be deprived of one’s property.331 In 
the light of this constitutional right, the courts have developed the proportionality test 
against which any forfeiture order has to be weighed before it may be granted. 
Basically, two types of asset forfeiture are prescribed:332 namely forfeiture of 
instrumentalities of offences333 and proceeds forfeiture.334 The former relates to 
property which is shown to be an instrument of an offence, whilst the latter relates to 
the proceeds of an offence. Unlike chapter 5 forfeiture, no prior criminal conviction is 
required; but like chapter 5 the procedure is prescribed as being civil in nature.335 
Though the criminal law term “offence” is used, only civil law rules of evidence and 
procedure apply.336  
There are primarily two stages in chapter 6 asset forfeiture, firstly the preservation 
stage and secondly, the forfeiture stage.337 In terms of section 38 the NDPP may 
apply to court for a preservation order. Invariably, the NDPP brings an ex parte 
application338 before a judge in chambers. Notably, there is no provision for a 
provisional preservation order.339 The issue of an ex parte application without notice 
to a defendant was extensively considered in the Mohamed series of cases.340 The 
defendant argued that the omission of the legislature to compel the NDPP to grant a 
defendant an opportunity to present her or his case was an infringement of the basic 
right of access to courts. The Constitutional Court found that section 38 of POCA did 
                                            
331 S 25 of the Constitution. 
332 In terms of s 38(2)(c) a third type relates to terrorist or related activities but such asset 
forfeiture is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
333 POCA s 38(2)(a). 
334 POCA s 38(2)(b). 
335 POCA s 37. 
336 POCA ss 37(1) and (2). 
337 Ex parte NDPP [2018] case no1540/2018 ZAFSHC 100 para 22; NDPP v Mohamed 2002 
paras 17-19. For discussion of the two-stage process see Basdeo (2013) Afr J Int’l & Comp 
L 316-320. 
338 POCA s 38(1). 
339 Basdeo (2013) Afr J Int’l & Comp L 316. Compare s 26(3)(a) regarding a provisional 
restraint order and a return date for a rule nisi to afford a defendant an opportunity to defend 
the provisional restraint order. 
340 NDPP v Mohamed 2002 and NDPP v Mohamed 2003. 
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not exclude the audi alteram partem rule and that courts could still grant a rule nisi 
and a defendant an opportunity to defend a preservation order.341  
The constitutionality of section 38 regarding an application for a preservation order 
under chapter 6 of POCA was raised in Prophet v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions (“Prophet v NDPP”).342 Nkabinde J succinctly set out the issue before 
the court: 
“The Court is called upon to strike an appropriate balance between two 
constitutional principles. The one is that no one should be arbitrarily deprived of 
property. The other is that the State is under an obligation to protect members of 
the public from criminal depredations.”343  
The Constitutional Court explained further what is meant by striking the necessary 
balance and stressed the important role of courts to interpret the intrusive provisions 
of POCA in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution344 and the need to bear in mind 
the property rights protected in terms of section 25 of the Constitution.345 The court 
also laid down fundamental principles of the proportionality test.346 The Constitutional 
Court held that the inquiry into proportionality included “weighing the severity of the 
interference with individual rights to property against the extent to which the property 
was used for the purposes of the commission of the offence, bearing in mind the 
nature of the offence”.347 It is also important for the court to be mindful that as 
                                            
341 Mahomed v NDPP 2002 paras 37-52, particularly para 51.  
342 2006 2 SACR 525 (CC) (“Prophet v NDPP”). In this case the appellant was appealing 
against a forfeiture order granted by the High Court, and confirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, of a residential property which had been used in the manufacturing of “tik”. The 
appellant was acquitted of charges under the Drugs and Drugs Trafficking Act 140 of 1992 
Act due to a technicality (paras 6-7, 21).  
343 Prophet v NDPP para 1. 
344 Courts are enjoined by section 39(2) of the Constitution
 
to interpret legislation such as 
POCA in a manner that “promote[s] the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. See 
Prophet v NDPP para 46. 
345 Prophet v NDPP para 46. 
346 The court (Prophet v NDPP para 69) also held that no real significance or variance in 
standard lies between different terminology used by the courts regarding proportionality, 
including phrases like “significantly disproportionate” or “disproportionate” or “reasonably 
proportional” or “roughly proportional”.  
347 Prophet v NDPP para 58. 
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forfeiture orders under chapter 6 may be ordered without a criminal conviction348 
such forfeiture orders do not necessarily constitute “arbitrary deprivation of property” 
for purposes of section 25 of the Constitution.349 
Once a preservation order has been granted350 notice has to be given to all 
persons that may have an interest in the property,351 including owners and 
creditors.352 A preservation order may also be reviewed, varied or taken on appeal. 
In addition, section 47 of POCA grants an affected person an opportunity to apply to 
court to vary or rescind a preservation order on the basis that such an order deprives 
her or him of reasonable living expenses and causes her or him undue hardship, and 
such undue hardship outweighs the risk of destruction or disposal of the property. A 
preservation order is valid for 90 days, within which period application needs to be 
made for a forfeiture order and notice of such application served on the defendant, 
failing which the preservation order automatically expires.353  
The second stage entails an application by the NDPP to have the assets 
forfeited.354 The SCA has held that an inquiry into the granting of a forfeiture order is 
a two-stage inquiry by the court. The SCA heard a trilogy of cases together: National 
Director of Public Prosecutions v (1) RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd; (2) 37 Gillespie 
                                            
348 In contrast to forfeiture orders under chapter 5 of POCA, which may only be ordered 
consequent to a criminal conviction. 
349 Prophet v NDPP para 61. The court continued by setting out a number of factors that may 
be taken into account in deciding whether a forfeiture is arbitrary or not (paras 62-63). On 
the facts the court found that the residential property was integral to the manufacturing of tik 
and in light of the offence and the objectives of POCA the forfeiture order was not 
disproportionate to the owner’s property rights (paras 64-69). 
350 The criterion for granting a preservation order is in terms of s 38(2) “reasonable grounds 
to believe”, a like criterion to that with regard to restraint orders under s 25(1)(b)(ii).  
351 S 39(1)(a) of POCA. In terms of s 39(1)(b) a notice also needs to be published in the 
Government Gazette, 
352 S 39(3) grants “any person who has an interest in the property” an opportunity to exclude 
her or his interest and to oppose forfeiture of the property.  
353 S 40 of POCA. In Levy v NDPP 2002 1 SACR 162 (W) application for a forfeiture order 
was made within the 90 day period, but notice was only given 91 days after publication in the 
Government Gazette. Consequently, the court found (para 7) that the forfeiture was outside 
the 90 days and it was set aside on the grounds of irregularity as the preservation order had 
by then expired. 
354 S 48 read with s 50 of POCA. 
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Street Durban (Pty) Ltd; and (3) Seevnarayan355 (“NDPP v Cook Properties”). The 
first inquiry relates only to the property and the question whether it was an 
“instrumentality of an offence” or not?356 The second inquiry relates to the issue of 
constitutionality, namely the proportionality test.357  
With regard to the first inquiry whether a property is “an instrumentality of an 
offence”, the SCA formulated a test in NDPP v Cook Properties: 
“[T]o constitute an instrumentality of an offence the property sought to be 
forfeited must in a ‘real or substantial sense . . . facilitate or make possible the 
commission of the offence’ and ‘must be instrumental in, and not merely 
incidental to, the commission of the offence’”.358  
The Constitutional Court in Prophet v NDPP followed NDPP v Cook Properties in 
interpreting the words “concerned in the commission of an offence” to mean that the 
link between the crime committed and the property should be reasonably direct, that 
is the property must play a reasonably direct role in the commission of the offence; 
and that the employment of the property must be functional to the commission of the 
crime.359 In Mohunram v The National Director of Public Prosecutions (“Mohunram v 
                                            
355 2004 2 SACR 208 (SCA). 
356 Compare the criteria, namely the six factors recently set out to determine the 
instrumentality inquiry by the American Supreme Court in 1997 Chevrolet 191-192. These 
factors are: (i) is the property uniquely important to the success of the illegal activity; (ii) is 
the use of the property deliberate and planned; (iii) is the illegal use of the property isolated 
or repeated; (iv) is the purpose of acquiring, maintaining, or using the property to carry out 
the offence; (v) is the use of the property extensive spatially, temporally, or both; and (vi) is 
the property divisible. Also see Ellsworth ((2018) Vill L Rev 139-141, 13-148) who gives a 
critical analysis of these criteria. 
357 Compare the criteria, namely the value of the forfeiture and the gravity of the offence set 
out recently for the proportionality inquiry by the American Supreme Court in 1997 Chevrolet 
191. See also Ellsworth ((2018) Vill L Rev 141-143, 148-151) who gives a critical analysis of 
these criteria 
358 2004 2 SACR 208 (SCA) para 56. This test was applied by the SCA in Prophet v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions 2006 1 SA 38 (SCA) para 31 and endorsed by the 
Constitutional Court in Prophet v NDPP 2006 2 SACR 525 (CC)(para 22). 
359 Prophet v NDPP para 56. On the facts the court found that the house “was appointed, 
arranged, organised, furnished and adapted or equipped
 
to enable or facilitate the 
applicant’s illegal activities” (para 57). 
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NDPP”)360 it was confirmed that the legislature meant to give the phrase 
“instrumentality of an offence” a “very wide meaning”.361 However, in order to ensure 
that such a wide interpretation is not unconstitutional and a violation of section 25 of 
the Constitution a court has to inquire:  
“whether there is a sufficiently close link between the property and its criminal 
use, and whether the property has a close enough relationship to the actual 
commission of the offence to render it an instrumentality”.362 
The second part of the inquiry into the granting of a forfeiture order, the issue of 
proportionality, was also considered in Mohunram v NDPP. Moseneke DCJ363 
                                            
360 2007 4 SA 222 (CC). In this case the first applicant Mohunram had been charged and 
consequently paid admission of guilt fines relating to offences under the KwaZulu Natal 
Gambling Act 10 of 1996, namely a fine of R1,500 for each of 57 counts of being in 
possession of unregistered gaming machines without the necessary licence, totalling 
R85,500 and a fine of R1,000 for each of 3 counts of employing persons in an unlicensed 
casino. The total value of fines was thus R88,500. In addition the 57 machines, valued at 
R285,000, were seized and destroyed in terms of the KwaZulu Natal Gambling Act. This 
constitutional appeal related to the SCA granting the NDPP a forfeiture order in respect of 
the property in which the gambling machines were housed as “an instrumentality”. The 
building was also used for a legitimate glass manufacturing business. The building was 
registered in the name of the second applicant, a close corporation, Shelgate Investments 
CC, in which Mohunram held a 100% shareholding (paras 1, 5-7). 
361 Mohunram v NDPP para 44 (excluding footnotes). 
362 Mohunram v NDPP para 44 (excluding footnotes). The CC in Mohunram followed the 
reasoning of the Constitutional Court in Prophet v NDPP, which in turn was based on the 
reasoning of the SCA in NDPP v Cook Properties. It is necessary to repeat the reasoning of 
the SCA to illustrate the interpretation of an instrumentality by the courts: “the words 
‘concerned in the commission of an offence’ must . . . be interpreted so that the link between 
the crime committed and the property is reasonably direct, and that the employment of the 
property must be functional to the commission of the crime. By this, we mean that the 
property must play a reasonably direct role in the commission of the offence. In a real or 
substantial sense, the property must facilitate or make possible the commission of the 
offence. As the term ‘instrumentality’ itself suggests ... the property must be instrumental in, 
and not merely incidental to, the commission of the offence. For otherwise there is no 
rational connection between the deprivation of property and the objective of the Act: the 
deprivation will constitute merely an additional penalty in relation to the crime, but without the 
constitutional safeguards that are a prerequisite for the imposition of criminal penalties” (para 
31 of NDPP v Cook Properties).
 
 
363 For the majority who upheld the appeal, and consequently dismissed the forfeiture order. 
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emphasised that “the requirement of proportionality is a constitutional imperative”.364 
Although it is not a statutory requirement in terms of POCA, it a requirement in terms 
of the “constitutional disdain for arbitrary dispossession of property and unwarranted 
or excessive punishment”.365 The principle of proportionality is thus “an equitable 
requirement that has been developed by the courts to curb excesses of civil 
forfeiture”.366 The application of the proportionality test is, however, not without 
complexity, and the three different judgments given in the Mohunram case regarding 
this issue demonstrates this complexity.  
With further regard to the proportionality test, Moseneke DCJ367 emphasised that 
although draconian, “[s]tatutory civil forfeiture of assets is meant to pursue worthy 
and noble objectives aimed at curbing serious crime.” He continued significantly 
“[t]he initial and central enquiry in asset forfeiture is whether the property is an 
instrumentality of an offence,”368 and there is no need for the prosecution to prove 
the owner of an asset committed an offence or had the necessary criminal intent to 
do so. The court clearly stated that the “criminal standard of proof does not come 
into it”.369 A forfeiture order, however, has to meet the standard of proportionality, 
meaning that the forfeiture should not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property 
or to punishment not allowed in terms of sections 25 and 12(1)(e) of the Constitution 
                                            
364 Mohunram v NDPP para 130. 
365 Mohunram v NDPP para 130. 
366 Mohunram v NDPP para 130. See also Sachs J in Mohunram v NDPP para 142. 
367 Moseneke DCJ, reasoned there were three issues to be considered, namely i) whether 
the property is an instrumentality of an offence”; ii) what the meaning is of “offence” in terms 
of civil forfeiture under chapter 6 of POCA; and iii) whether the forfeiture is disproportionate 
or not in applying the proportionality test (para 108). With regards to i) Moseneke DCJ 
agreed that the property was “an instrumentality of an offence” and agreed further with the 
reasoning of Van Heerden AJ (para 110), but took a different view from Van Heerden AJ on 
the second and third issues (para 109). The majority judgment specifically disagreed that 
there was a link between the offence that the instrumentality served and the purposes of 
POCA to fight organised crime (paras 109, 129). See too Sachs J’s judgment para 146-154. 
The majority thus found that the forfeiture of the property was disproportionate when 
applying the proportionality test and weighing up the purposes of POCA against various 
factors, including the effect it had on the individual. 
368 Mohunram v NDPP para 118 (writer’s emphasis). 
369 Mohunram v NDPP para 118. 
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respectively.370 This involves balancing the need to combat crime against the 
interference with a person’s property rights;371 and weighing the forfeiture itself 
against the purpose it serves.372  
One of the criteria to take into consideration in applying the proportionality test is 
the effect a forfeiture will have upon the owner of the property.373 In addition, the 
nature of the offence and the purpose of POCA are to be considered when 
determining whether a forfeiture is disproportionate or not. As Moseneke DCJ 
succinctly put it:  
“[w]hen ordinary crime is in issue, the sharp question should be asked whether it 
is a crime that renders conventional criminal penalties inadequate. Is it a crime 
that requires extraordinary measures for its detection, prosecution and 
prevention?”374 (Writer’s emphasis).  
Van Heerden AJ375 stated that the purpose of the proportionality inquiry is to 
establish whether “the grant of a forfeiture order would amount to an arbitrary 
                                            
370 Mohunram v NDPP para 121. Section 12(1)(e) of the Constitution relates to the right of 
freedom and security and the right not “to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or 
degrading way”. 
371 Mohunram v NDPP para 122. 
372 Mohunram v NDPP para 123. And this involves an inquiry into the relationship of the 
property to the commission of the crime, whether the forfeiture will prevent further 
wrongdoing, the nature and use of the property and the effect of the forfeiture on the owner. 
In his judgment Sachs J held that the primary purpose of POCA is deterrence. 
Consequently, the purpose of deterrence has to be weighed up against the effect the 
forfeiture may have upon the individual in light of the relevant offence. If such an effect is 
unfair or unjust it will be in violation of the constitutional right to dignity of such a person 
(para 146).  
373 Mohunram v NDPP para 123. The owner of the property may not necessarily be the 
offender of a particular offence, but for the purposes of the inter-play between the principles 
of forfeiture and sentencing, it is presumed that the owner and offender are the same 
person. 
374 Mohunram v NDPP para 126. Moseneke DCJ (para 112) made a distinction between 
“organised crime offences”, being racketeering, money laundering and criminal gang 
activities specifically created by POCA; and “ordinary crimes” being other crimes, including 
those listed din Schedule 1 
375 For the minority (5:6 split), who would have dismissed the appeal against the forfeiture 
order. 
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deprivation of property in contravention of section 25(1) of the Constitution”.376 Van 
Heerden AJ stressed that courts should guard against such forfeiture provisions 
being abused.377 The test of proportionality, in her view, concerned the weighing up 
of the purposes of forfeiture under POCA against the effect it has on the owner of the 
asset.378 The judge emphasised the need for criminal sanctions and civil forfeiture 
provisions to help fight crime, but also the need for such provisions to be 
constitutionally permissible.379 Concurrent to the constitutional property rights of 
owners, which are protected, but not absolute,380 are the property owners’ 
responsibilities to be stewards and to guard against the use of their property for 
criminal purposes.381 Van Heerden AJ clarified that the standard test for 
proportionality is a legal one382 that needs to consider all factors and that the burden 
to prove the requirements of a forfeiture order in terms of section 50 of POCA rests 
on the prosecution.383  
A further issue is the scope of POCA and how far chapter 6 reaches? The answer 
to this question in turn rests upon the question as to how widely the term “offences” 
is to be interpreted. In several SCA cases384 it was held that “offences” is to be 
interpreted widely and may relate to offences other than organised crime and 
specifically racketeering,385 money laundering386 and criminal gang activities387 as 
                                            
376 Mohunram v NDPP para 56. 
377 Mohunram v NDPP para 56. 
378 Mohunram v NDPP para 57. See too Sachs J’s judgment paras 143, 146. 
379 Mohunram v NDPP para 58. 
380 Mohunram v NDPP para 59-60. 
381 Mohunram v NDPP para 58. 
382 Mohunram v NDPP para 75. Previously, courts had distinguished between “organised 
crime” and “ordinary crime” and “disproportionality” and “significant disproportionality”. See 
the discussion in paras 68-74. On the facts and criteria set out, Van Heerden AJ (minority 
judgment) found that the forfeiture of the factory was not disproportionate (paras 101-102). 
383 Para 75. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the standard of proof, being 
“on a balance of probabilities” in terms of s 50(1); compared to the standard of “reasonable 
grounds” under s 51 of POCA for believing that property is an instrumentality of offence.  
384 NDPP v Cook Properties para 65; Prophet v NDPP 2005 2 SACR 670 (SCA) para 33; 
NDPP v Van Staden 2007 1 SACR 338 (SCA) paras 1 and 10. 
385 Chapter 2 of POCA. 
386 Chapter 3 of POCA. 
387 Chapter 4 of POCA. 
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described in POCA, and may include individual wrongdoing. This issue was 
considered but not decided in Mohunram v NDPP.388 Van Heerden AJ considered 
“offences” to have a broad interpretation, and to include “individual wrongdoings”.389 
Van Heerden AJ followed several Supreme Court decisions that found that the 
provisions of POCA did indeed reach far beyond organised crime and extended to 
individual wrongdoings.390 Moseneke DCJ did raise the question, but doubted that it 
was to be interpreted as widely as it was by van Heerden AJ. 391 For purposes of this 
dissertation it is suggested that the provisions of POCA also extend to individual 
wrongdoing.392 
With regard to the nature of the mechanism of forfeiture orders, the Constitutional 
Court in Prophet v NDPP held: 
“Civil forfeiture provides a unique remedy used as a measure to combat 
organised crime. It rests on the legal fiction that the property and not the owner 
has contravened the law. It does not require a conviction or even a criminal 
charge against the owner. This kind of forfeiture is in theory seen as remedial 
and not punitive.” 393 
Importantly, the Constitutional Court also clarified the different standards of proof 
in chapter 6 of POCA. The standard of proof required in section 38 with regard to a 
                                            
388 As the appeal succeeded on the third issue of proportionality it was not necessary to 
pursue the issue of the broad interpretation of “offences” (paras 114-117).  
389 Mohunram v NDPP paras 21-34, 56. See too para 113 of the judgment of Moseneke 
DCJ. 
390 The following Supreme Court cases were discussed in the judgment of van Heerden AJ 
(paras 21-34) and cited in footnote 6 to para 113 of Moseneke DCJ’s judgment: National 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Van Staden 2007 1 SACR 338 (SCA) para 1; National 
Director of Public Prosecutions v (1) RO Cook Properties (Pty) Ltd; (2) 37 Gillespie Street 
Durban (Pty) Ltd; (3) Seevnarayan 2004 2 SACR 208 (SCA) (“NDPP v RO Cook Properties”) 
para 65. See also National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mohunram 2006 1 SACR 554 
(SCA) and Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2005 2 SACR 670 (SCA) para 
33.  
391 Mohunram v NDPP paras 112-117. Sachs J, handing down a separate judgment agreed 
that “no bright lines can be drawn between organised crime and private criminal activities”, 
and assumed that forfeiture orders under POCA need not only be related to organised crime 
(para 140). 
392 This follows the interpretation in NDPP v RO Cook Properties para 65; and the views of 
Van Heerden J in paras 21-34 of Mohunram v NDPP. 
393 2006 2 SACR 525 (CC) para 58. 
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preservation order is that of “reasonable grounds”, while the burden of proof 
applicable to section 50 of POCA with regard to a forfeiture order is higher, namely 
“on a balance of probabilities”.394 The onus to satisfy this burden of proof with regard 
to a forfeiture order lies upon the state.395 In NDPP v Cook Properties it was held 
that the objectives of chapter 6 entail both remedial and penal goals. Sanctions such 
as forfeiture can include both: although the primary objective may be to remove the 
incentive from crime and not to punish persons, such forfeiture also has a penal 
aspect.396  
Pertaining to the interaction between forfeiture and punishment, the majority of the 
Constitutional Court in Mohunram v NDPP held: “[c]ivil asset forfeiture constitutes a 
serious incursion into well-entrenched civil protections particularly those against 
arbitrary and excessive punishment”,397 and cautioned that any civil forfeiture order 
cannot violate the constitutional right against disproportionate or irrational 
punishment.398  
The Constitutional Court emphasised that the purposes of a forfeiture order under 
POCA are not primarily punitive, but “to remove the incentive for crime”.399 
Consequently, the question should not necessarily be whether the offender has been 
adequately punished, but “whether the civil asset forfeiture is properly related to the 
purpose of removing the incentives for crime and whether the forfeiture will serve as 
adequate deterrence to the offender and to the broader community”.400 
A further factor to be taken into consideration is the relationship between the 
specific legislation regulating the crime and POCA. In the event of such legislation, 
making provision for the forfeiture of property in the case of a conviction, an 
additional forfeiture order under POCA may either be redundant or excessively 
                                            
394 Prophet v NDPP para 55; Mohunram v NDPP para 131. 
395 Mohunram v NDPP para 131. In Prophet v NDPP it was not necessary for the court to 
decide this issue (para 70). 
396 NDPP v Cook Properties paras 17 and 18. 
397 Mohunram v NDPP paras 120 and 118. 
398 Mohunram v NDPP paras 118. S 12(1)(e) of the Constitution of South Africa provides that 
every person has the right “not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading 
way”.  
399 Mohunram v NDPP paras 133. See too Sachs J’s judgment para 144. 
400 Mohunram v NDPP para 134. 
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punitive.401 An illustrative description of the relationship between POCA and other 
legislation is given by Sachs J: 
“In my view, POCA was not adopted with a view to providing either a substitute 
for, or a top-up of, ordinary forms of law enforcement. It has its own rationale and 
its own objectives, which should be jealously guarded”.402 
It can safely be concluded that although the primary objectives of forfeiture under 
POCA are not punitive, they may indeed be punitive in nature. In addition, the 
punitive effect which a forfeiture or confiscation order may have upon an individual 
ought to come into consideration in the application of the proportionality test. 
Moreover, the constitutional rights that have been referred to by the courts, in 
determining whether a forfeiture order is disproportionate or not, include the right not 
to be arbitrarily deprived of property,403 the right not to be treated or punished in a 
cruel, inhuman or degrading manner,404 and the right to dignity.405 The provisions of 
POCA with regard to restraining, preservation, confiscation or forfeiture orders can 
play a role in the proposed mechanism of mediation as it is envisaged that such a 
strong tool can be prudently used in the proposed process at different stages.406 
4 3 4 Concluding remarks about hybrid mechanisms and POCA 
 “Lex semper reformanda.”  
Conventional criminal law limits the efficacy of governments in curbing crime. 
Consequently, new mechanisms need to be found. Asset forfeiture is not new, but its 
                                            
401 Mohunram v NDPP paras 127-128. In this particular case the KZN Gambling Act provided 
for forfeiture of movable property, but not of immovable property. The majority of the 
Constitutional Court held this is a factor to be taken into consideration when weighing up the 
proportionality of a forfeiture order under POCA. It can normally be accepted that the 
remedies enacted by the legislature are effective, adequate and exhaustive. 
402 Mohunram v NDPP para 152. 
403 S 25 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
404 S 12(1)(e) of the Constitution of South Africa; Mohunram v NDPP para 134. 
405 S 10 of the Constitution of South Africa; Mohunram v NDPP para 146. 
406 For example, assets that are forfeited under POCA may, in terms of a mediation 
settlement agreement, be realised to contribute towards restitution for the victims. See the 
discussion in chapter 5 below. 
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application to new fields of law is ever evolving.407 New statutes with specifically 
designed procedures for asset forfeiture, like POCA, are being passed, which can 
help in combating economic crime. The mechanism of asset forfeiture is clearly an 
area where the conventional delineation between civil and criminal law is blurred. 
The courts is South Africa have found, like their counterparts in other jurisdictions, 
that asset forfeiture is a powerful tool in the hands of the state, and that cooperation 
between different countries regarding asset forfeiture is essential.408 
POCA remains controversial and intrusive. Yet, asset confiscation and asset 
forfeiture have been adopted as essential mechanisms to combat economic crime in 
the light of the unprecedented levels of crime, organised and individual, prevailing in 
South Africa and in other jurisdictions.409 In line with its political and legal 
commitments South Africa followed other jurisdictions in introducing unusual 
legislation for unusual circumstances. It has been shown that in the past two 
decades, since its introduction, the courts have developed certain principles to 
safeguard the principles of the Constitution and also to protect the rights of 
individuals in the application of POCA. In South Africa in particular, the Constitutional 
Court has innovatively succeeded in upholding not only the primary purpose of 
POCA, namely to deprive persons of the proceeds of crime, but also to protect the 
basic rights of persons in such hybrid procedures. This has been illustrated by 
constitutional principles of proportionality and instrumentality discussed above and 
legality discussed below in the application of POCA.  
In addition, further safeguards have been developed to check the extraordinary 
power of the state. Fundamental principles, which underlie the right of access to 
courts and the right to a fair public hearing,410 are the opportunity for each party to 
state her or his case and for such procedure to be public, open and transparent. 
These rights are limited by sections 26(1) and 38(1) of POCA which empower the 
NDPP to apply to court to have property respectively restrained or preserved by 
means of an ex parte application. However, an established legal principle serves as 
safeguard against abuse of this procedural advantage by the state. The uberrima 
                                            
407 Fourie & Pienaar (2017) Fundamina 21. 
408 Falk v NDPP 2012 1 SACR 265 (CC) para 1. 
409 Bourne (2002) SA Merc LJ 490. 
410 S 34 of the Constitution of South Africa. 
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fides rule binds the NDPP to act and bring the application with the utmost good 
faith.411 This is particularly so with regard to the disclosure of information to the court 
and the obligation to place all material facts that might influence the court exercising 
its functions before the court.412 It is acknowledged that the purpose of the legislature 
in granting the state such a powerful procedural tool is to deprive a criminal of assets 
acquired through unlawful activity. The justification underlying the ex parte procedure 
is the need to secure a restraint or preservation order upon assets without the prior 
knowledge of the defendant so that the defendant is not granted an opportunity to 
dispose of or destroy the property in any manner.413 The courts retain a discretion to 
grant an order based on an ex parte application and such discretion includes the 
appraisal of whether facts omitted from the application are material or not.414 The 
emphasis by the courts on utmost good faith, honesty and openness serve to ensure 
that the expedient, but unusually powerful procedural tool of an ex parte application 
retains its legality and credibility under POCA.415 
Further safeguards to ensure the constitutionality of the procedures under 
chapters 5 and 6 are the provisions that grant a defendant and other interested 
parties an opportunity after a restraint or preservation order to make representations 
before the court.416 Important too, particularly with regard to the issue of 
compensation or restitution to victims, are the matters relating to the proceeds417 of 
confiscated or forfeited goods. The management of such proceeds is provided for 
                                            
411 The classical authority for this is Schlesinger v Schlesinger 1979 4 SA 342 (W) 348E-
349B. For a discussion on a number of ex parte applications regarding asset-forfeiture and 
the application of this rule see NC Ndzengu & JC von Bonde “The Duty of Utmost Good 
Faith in Asset-Forfeiture Jurisprudence – Some Lessons to Learn” (2013) Obiter 377-388. 
412 NDPP v Basson 2001 2 SACR 712 (SCA) para 21. Ndzengu & Von Bonder (2013) Obiter 
378-379. 
413 Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2013) Obiter 379. 
414 Phillips v NDPP 2003 2 SACR 410 (SCA) 29F-G. The court stated that it would consider 
the extent of the non-disclosure, the question whether the court may have been influenced 
by the non-disclosed facts, the reasons for non-disclosure and the consequences of setting 
aside any order. 
415 Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2013) Obiter 388. 
416 S 26(3)(a) and (c), which specifically entitle the defendant to anticipate the return date of 
the provisional order. 
417 The word “proceeds” is used in general terms and is not referring to the specific definition 
of “proceeds of unlawful activities” in terms of s 1 of POCA.  
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under Chapter 7 of POCA. In terms of section 63 of POCA, a Criminal Assets 
Recovery Account (CARA) was established and section 64 defines the funds that are 
to be deposited into CARA, including proceeds from confiscation and forfeiture 
orders.418 In terms of section 65 of POCA a high-powered committee,419 known as 
the Criminal Assets Recovery Committee (“CARC”), has been established to 
administer the fund, make distributions from the fund and report to cabinet. The 
proceeds of any assets confiscated or restrained are to be paid over to the state and 
to be distributed to law enforcement agencies to assist in combating crime, or to 
other organisations that render assistance to victims of crime.420 Thus, although 
some of the proceeds may be paid out to organisations who take care of victims, no 
mention is made of payments being made directly to victims of crime. The question 
arises: what about the rights of victims of crime to claim loss or damages arising 
from a crime? 421 These rights may arise from the common law or in terms of section 
300 of the CPA.422  
Various issues which relate to the provisions of POCA and the rights of a victim 
were raised in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Rebuzzi423(“NDPP v 
                                            
418 S 64(a) and 64(aA). 
419 In terms of s 64(2) the members include the Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development, the Minister of Safety and Security, the Minister of Finance and the NDPP. 
420 S 68(b) and (c) read together with s 69(A) of POCA. CARC makes recommendations to 
cabinet regarding the distribution of monies and the actual authorisation for distributions is 
made by cabinet  
421 For example, X may steal R1,000,000 from his or her employer, and the employer will 
have the right under civil law to claim such monies from X. Also see M Cowling “Criminal 
Procedure: Recent cases” (2000) S Afr J Crim Just 227 231-233. 
422 See further para 4 4 3, 346ff. 
423 2000 1 SACR 227 (W). In this case the respondent was charged with having stolen or 
defrauded the complainant, who was her employer PG Bison Ltd, of approximately 
R900,000. It was alleged that the respondent was gambling away the proceeds and that the 
value of assets the respondent was said to have retained from the monies stolen was worth 
only R153,000 (paras 6-8). The assets that the NDPP applied to have confiscated were 
consequently less than the value of the damages suffered by PG Bison Ltd, and for which it 
had a right in terms of the common law or s 300 of the CPA to claim from the respondent. 
The issue before the court in considering the restraint order under s 25(1)(b)(iii) of POCA, 
was whether there were reasonable grounds for believing that a confiscation order may be 
made against the respondent (para 10). Goldstein J reasoned that the court had a discretion, 
and it is unlikely that a court would grant a confiscation order that would result in the 
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Rebuzzi (W)”). In NDPP v Rebuzzi (W) the court held that it was inconceivable that a 
confiscation order in terms of section 18(1) of POCA would be made so as to deprive 
a complainant of its right to claim compensation from the respondent.424 However, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal clarified certain issues in NDPP v Rebuzzi425 when the 
decision was taken on appeal. The appellate court held that when exercising the 
court’s discretion in determining whether a confiscation order should be granted or 
not, the interests of the victim and its possible claim for recovery of loss should be 
ignored.426  
Moreover, reading sections 30(5) and 31(1) of POCA together, the appellate court 
held that the legislature clearly envisaged instances where an identifiable victim, who 
has a claim for recovery against a respondent, may co-exist with a confiscation 
order.427 The rights of a victim are protected as the process of realisation of assets 
and the distribution of funds by a curator bonis are done under the supervision of the 
court.428 The court also underlined that the state does not have a preferential claim 
as this is clearly stated by section 31(1) of POCA.429 Importantly, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal placed the emphasis on the purpose of a confiscation order, which is 
aligned with the primary purpose of POCA and that is to deprive the offender of the 
proceeds of crime: 
                                            
proceeds being forfeited to the state and thus deprive the complainant of its right to claim 
damages from the respondent (para 11). In addition, should ss 30(5) and 31(1) be read 
together, it can be argued that the complainant could apply to have its claim paid out of the 
confiscated assets. Granting a confiscation order in terms of s 18(1) would not only put the 
complainant to unnecessary expense to protect its interest in the confiscated assets, but 
would also in effect result in undoing the consequence of the payment to the state (para 18).  
424 Para 11. 
425 2002 1 SACR 128 (SCA) (“NDPP v Rebuzzi (SCA)”). 
426 NDPP v Rebuzzi (SCA) para 14. In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Kyriacou 
2004 1 SA 379 (SCA) (“NDPP v Kyriacou”) the court held that the omission by the NDPP to 
mention that an order in terms of s 34(1)(a) of the CPA for return of stolen goods to the 
rightful owners had been refused, did not preclude the granting of a confiscation order 
against the convicted person (para 19). However, the decision can be distinguished as the 
confiscation order also concerned related criminal activity. 
427 NDPP v Rebuzzi (SCA) para 17. In the SCA case it became apparent that it was upon the 
request of the victim that the NDPP applied for a restraint order over the respondent’s assets 
(para 6). 
428 NDPP v Rebuzzi (SCA) paras 16 and 17. 
429 NDPP v Rebuzzi (SCA) para 17. 
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“The primary object of a confiscation order is not to enrich the State but rather to 
deprive the convicted person of ill-gotten gains. In my view it is therefore not 
significant that in some cases the State might end up receiving nothing. It is 
because the purpose of such an order is to prevent the convicted person from 
profiting rather than to enrich the State that the court's inquiry in terms of s 18(1) 
is directed towards establishing the extent of his benefit rather than towards 
establishing who might have suffered loss (writer’s emphasis).”430  
Brief mention needs to be made of interests of different actors that are in tension 
with one another in the confiscation and forfeiture of proceeds of crime. On the one 
hand the interests of the victim are recognised, and on the other hand there are the 
rights of the defendant to claim reasonable living and legal expenses from the 
restrained or preserved property.431 There are some safeguards for ensuring that the 
purposes of a restraint order, including the need to preserve property and to satisfy a 
confiscation order and pay restitution to victims are not frustrated.432 Firstly, the 
applicant433 has to make an application to court meaning the court has a 
discretion,434 and the applicant bears an onus to show that it needs the funds and 
that it is only for reasonable expenses. Secondly, the applicant also has to show that 
such expenses cannot be met out of unrestrained assets.435 However, it has been 
said that POCA is “not victim friendly” as the rights for the victims to make 
representations in terms of section 30(5) are only at a later stage, the realisation 
                                            
430 NDPP v Rebuzzi (SCA) para 19. Also see Cowling (2000) SACJ 232. 
431 The state also has interests in the property. Under ss 26(6) and 44 a defendant can claim 
reasonable living and legal expenses from restrained or preserved property. Chapter 6 
places limits on legal expenses by way of ss 45 and 46 but there is no similar provision 
under chapter 5 restraint orders and this could constitute a loophole for defendants to 
dissipate restrained  
property at the expense of victims. For a full discussion on the inter-relationship of these 
interests see Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2011) SACJ 310, 312-315. 
432432 For a full discussion on these limitations, see Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2011) SACJ 318-
321. 
433 This could be the defendant or a possible victim such as the owner of the property. 
434 Fraser v Absa Bank Ltd (NDPP as amicus curiae) 2007 3 SA 484 (CC) para 13. The court 
continued (paras 71-74) to discuss the discretion the High Court has under s 26(6) at some 
length, including the discretion it has under s 31(1). It also lists a number of factors the High 
Court could take into consideration when exercising its discretion and that it “will necessarily 
have to take a somewhat robust approach”.  
435 NDPP v Mcasa para 85; Fraser v Absa Bank Ltd para 13. 
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stage, whereas the rights of a defendant to claim living and legal expenses are 
available at the earlier stages of restraint and preservation.436  
It is clear that the primary purpose of POCA is to deprive a convicted person of 
the proceeds of crime. However, it is also evident that POCA provides an indirect 
mechanism for victims to recover losses from the proceeds of realised forfeited or 
confiscated assets.437 It is this establishment of a statutory procedural mechanism 
for the forfeiture and confiscation of property that makes POCA relevant to this 
dissertation. The powers granted to the NDPP under POCA are extraordinary and 
the burden of proof is the lighter burden under civil law. In addition, POCA illustrates 
a convergence of civil and criminal law.438 This statutorily created convergence is 
significant because of the role that restraint and confiscation orders could play at 
different stages of the proposed mechanism of mediation in the criminal process. 
Moreover, the statutory recognition of the rights of victims in POCA could strengthen 
the negotiation position of victims in the mediation process, particularly with regard to 
restitution.  
In the United States, under the legislation on which POCA is modelled, the issue 
of income raised from asset forfeiture is highly controversial, particularly civil asset 
forfeiture. Civil asset forfeiture amounts to billions of dollars per year.439 Critics 
                                            
436 Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2011) SACJ 321, 331-332. The same applies for creditors in 
terms of s 30(3). For a detailed discussion of judicial interpretation of the inter-relatedness of 
the rights of the different actors under the provisions of POCA, including ss 26(6), 30(5), 
31(1), and 33(1), see the discussion by Ndzengu & Von Bonde (2011) SACJ 321-327 of the 
case law, especially of the Fraser series of cases namely Absa Bank Ltd v Fraser 2006 2 All 
SA 1 (SCA); Fraser v Absa Bank Ltd (NDPP as amicus Curiae) 2007 3 SA 484 (CC). The 
facts were that property of Fraser had been restrained and Fraser consequently applied for 
money for reasonable legal expenses. Absa applied to intervene as it was a concurrent 
creditor of Fraser. The Constitutional Court held that in the light of the court’s discretion 
under s 26(6) creditors’ claims may form part of the court’s considerations. Consequently, 
creditors may be able to intervene; but creditors do not have right to be joined to s 26(6) 
proceedings. See paras 63, 70 and 74. 
437 In NDPP v Rebuzzi NDPP applied for a confiscation order at the request of the victim, the 
employer from whom the monies were stolen (see paras 6-10). 
438 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mcasa 2000 1 SACR 263 (TkH) paras 9-12.  
439 For figures and detailed discussion see DM Carpenter et al “Policing for Profit: The Abuse 
of Civil Asset Forfeiture” 2 ed (2015) Institute for Justice (accessed 20-02-2019). Recent 
figures from the US DOJ show a decline in the number and value of asset forfeitures in the 
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contend that the government is lining its pockets and ruining lives440 and describe 
civil asset forfeiture “as the great money racket”441 of the United States 
contemporary criminal justice system.  
In South Africa the value of asset forfeiture has also grown. In 2011/2012 the 
value of recoveries under POCA was R131,1 million, representing R93,8 million paid 
over to victims and R37,3 million into CARA; whilst R444,2 million was recovered in 
2015/2016 of which R390,2 million was paid over to victims and R54,2 million into 
CARA.442 The NDPP attributes this to the intentionally aggressive443 focus on 
                                            
five- year period 2014-2018 which is attributed to the DOJ Policy 15-1 of severely limiting 
certain types of asset forfeiture. More recently, DOJ Policy 17-1 relaxed the limitations and 
there has been a slight increase again. For details see US DOJ “5 year Summary of Seizure 
and Forfeiture Trends” DOJ (accessed 20-02-2019); US DOJ Policy Directive 15-01 (16-01-
2015) DOJ (accessed 20-02-2019); US DOJ Policy Directive 17-01 DOJ (accessed 20-02-
2019). On a state level, the focus on asset forfeiture is illustrated by the Southern District of 
Ohio, which caused assets valued at more than US $ 9 million to be forfeited in 2016; and 
which in 2017 established a unit dedicated to asset forfeiture. See DOJ Southern District of 
Ohio “U.S. Attorney Creates Unit Dedicated to Asset Forfeiture” (20-03-2017) DOJ 
(accessed 20-02-2019). 
440 O’Connell is very critical, contending that civil asset forfeiture does not serve justice and 
is “one of the most universally reviled aspects of the current” legal system in the United 
States. He illustrates that both state and federal asset forfeiture laws serve to enrich the 
government, at both the state and federal level, at the expense of individual property owners. 
See D O’Connell “Civil Asset Forfeiture: Lining Pockets and Ruining Lives” (2018) 74 Nat’l 
Law Guild Rev 237-256. 
441 N Goetting “Editor’s Preface” (2018) 74 Nat’l Law Guild Rev 192 & 257(front & back 
cover). 
442 NDPP Annual Report 2015/2016 51. The 2014/2015 year was exceptional in that a total 
of R1 658 million was recovered and paid over to victims and a further R58,2 million paid 
into CARA. In the NDPP Annual Report 2017/2018 (20 & 85) it is reported that assets valued 
at more than R50 billion have been identified in respect of which chapter 5 and 6 forfeiture 
actions are planned in the coming three to five years! This remarkable increase would be 
unprecedented, particularly compared to the R415,5 million (a lower figure of R308,3m is 
given at 20) recovered under POCA in 2017/2018. The AFU maintains a success rate of 
over 90% and part of its increase and success is attributed to participation in the ACTT (Anti-
Corruption Task Team), a presidential initiative set up to fast track the investigation and 
prosecution of serious corruption cases. The units involved are the NPA, SCCU, NPA, AFU, 
SIU and DPCI (Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation). For more information see NDPP 
Annual Report 2015/2016 22 & 43. 
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chapter 6 asset forfeiture orders, as opposed to chapter 5 asset confiscation.444 A 
significant amount of recovered monies under POCA is reported to have been paid 
over to victims.445 
The aggressive approach by the NDPP to focus on chapter 6 forfeiture, in contrast 
to chapter 5 confiscation, has raised several constitutional issues. The NDPP has 
broad statutory powers under POCA, yet the question has risen whether these 
powers are unlimited with regard to the type of asset forfeiture that is chosen. In 
short, are there any factors that limit the powers of the NDPP in deciding whether to 
follow the criminal asset forfeiture under chapter 5, which is commonly accepted as 
being more cumbersome;446 or the faster and less burdensome process of civil asset 
forfeiture under chapter 6 of POCA? This question and a number of constitutional 
issues were raised in Ntsoko v National Director of Public Prosecutions (“Ntsoko v 
NDPP”).447 The reliance on the doctrine of legality448 by the courts has introduced 
further safeguards to the application of POCA, particularly chapter 6 proceedings. 
                                            
443 In contrast to a more cautious approach with regard to chapter 5 actions. NDPP Annual 
Report 2017/2018 85. 
444 Chapter 6 actions represented 34% of forfeiture cases in the ten years up to 2009, 
increasing to 54% in the following four years and increasing to 75% in 2013/2014. See NPA 
Annual Report 2013/2014 86. 
445 This involves a cumulative amount of over R2,505 million over the six-year period 
2012/2013 to 2017/2018. This amount includes the unusually high amount of R1,658 million 
in 2014/2015, including an amount of almost R1,5 billion relating to a single case involving 
corruption in the Gauteng Health Department. See NDPP Annual Report 2014/2015 96-98 & 
105. 
446 Ntsoko v NDPP para 9. 
447 2016 1 SACR 103 (GP). In this case, the NDPP had applied for a forfeiture order of the 
defendant’s’ assets under chapter 6 proceedings and not chapter 5. The defendant argued 
that he was still to face criminal charges and therefore the NDPP should have waited and 
instituted chapter 5 proceedings after the criminal conviction, if any. In addition, should he 
wish to defend the proceedings under chapter 6, it would be to his detriment as such 
defence would in effect violate his constitutional rights to a fair trial and to property (para 2). 
448 For a discussion on the origin, development and application of the doctrine of legality see 
Erasmus & Ndzengu (2016) SACJ 247-272. Erasmus & Ndzengu demonstrate how the 
doctrine of legality has evolved from being a defence in criminal proceedings also to be 
applied in civil litigation between private individuals and public officials. It is used as a 
safeguard to ensure that the exercise of public administrative powers is constitutional. The 
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The doctrine of legality affirms that the exercise of public powers needs to be 
lawful, within the powers conferred by any statue and that such exercise complies 
with the constitutional standards of administrative justice.449 In the context of asset 
forfeiture under POCA, the question is did the NDPP in electing to institute either 
chapter 5 or chapter 6 proceedings exercise its discretion properly as measured 
against the doctrine of legality. More specifically, the questions are: Did the NDPP 
act in accordance with the empowering statute POCA? Was the NDPP’s decision to 
institute chapter 6 forfeiture proceedings rational?450 The court held in Ntsoko v 
NDPP that the rationality or irrationality of the decision is related to the purpose for 
which the extraordinary power is given to the NDPP under POCA.451 In addition, the 
court held that the NDPP, when making the decision as to which forfeiture procedure 
to institute, is duty bound to take into account and balance the interests of the 
defendant against those of the communities as stated by the objects of POCA.452  
The court in Ntsoko v NDPP endorsed a further safeguard in the application of 
POCA. The court confirmed that the decision by the NDPP whether to institute 
chapter 5 or chapter 6 proceedings falls within the exclusive discretion of the NDPP 
and is an administrative action which accordingly falls beyond the ambit of PAJA.453 
Nevertheless, “such decisions fall to be reviewed in terms of the principle of 
legality”,454 and accordingly remain reviewable. The election made by the NDPP thus 
                                            
authors also show how the doctrine has developed to include the criterion of rationality in the 
legality doctrine. The benchmark is: was the decision rational? 
449 Erasmus & Ndzengu (2016) SACJ 254, 257, 258, 259. 
450 Erasmus & Ndzengu (2016) SACJ 
451 Ntsoko v NDPP paras 19-20. See also, Erasmus & Ndzengu (2016) SACJ 270-271. 
452 Ntsoko v NDPP para 21. This would include taking into account the circumstances of 
each case and the proximity of the proceeds of crime to the alleged offence. In this particular 
case the forfeited assets included bank accounts and vehicles evidently purchased from the 
proceeds and it is probable that such assets would have been depleted or devalued by the 
end of the criminal proceedings (paras 22-28). See also, Erasmus & Ndzengu (2016) SACJ 
271. 
453 In terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, s 1 “administrative 
action” (ff), the decision to institute or continue a prosecution is excluded from the scope of 
that Act and is thus not subject to review under it. See also Erasmus & Ndzengu (2016) 
SACJ 269. 
454 Ntsoko v NDPP paras 17-18. Erasmus & Ndzengu (2016) SACJ 269. See also State 
Information Technology Agency SOC v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 2 SA 23 (CC) paras 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
243 
 
remains discretionary, but is not beyond the scrutiny of the courts. The need for such 
decision to be constitutional and rational helps to keep the draconian and invasive 
powers of POCA in check.  
It is submitted in this dissertation that the application of a hybrid mechanism, such 
as asset forfeiture, can enhance the opportunity for securing restitution for victims. It 
is acknowledged that some provision has been made for interested parties, such as 
creditors and victims, to make representations to the court. However, it is submitted 
that the opportunity for restitution should be both more explicit and mandatory. 
Provisions, similar to those of section 105A(1)(b)(iii) of the CPA455 can easily be 
incorporated into both chapters 5 and 6 of POCA.  
Asset forfeiture under both chapters 5 and 6 has been held to be constitutional. 
The courts have developed a number of constitutional safeguards, including the strict 
instrumentality test, the proportionality test and the legality test. These are welcome 
developments in the field of forfeiture jurisprudence where the provisions are 
draconian and invasive: consequently the need for court vigilance is high.456  
It is submitted that new terminology needs to be developed to properly and 
correctly describe and evaluate this growing dimension of jurisprudence. It has been 
illustrated that the classic delineation between criminal and civil legal systems is not 
necessarily effective in the interpretation of new contemporary laws. There is no 
consistency or uniformity in such an approach. Recognising asset forfeiture 
procedures as indispensable mechanisms, specifically designed for contemporary 
issues in addressing complex crimes, will contribute to the proper functioning of such 
statutes. It is submitted that a more effective approach is to interpret and appraise 
any hybrid mechanisms for what they are, specially designed statutory mechanisms; 
and to allow the courts to develop jurisprudence specifically to deal with these 
mechanisms to ensure their application is proportional, rational and constitutional.  
                                            
52-54 and para 3(b) regarding the granting of a just and equitable remedy against Sita 
where it raised its own constitutionally illegal granting of a contract after an unreasonable 
delay.  
455 This subsection provides for representations to be made by the victims and for 
compensation to be included in a plea and sentence agreement. These issues are fully 
discussed in full in para 4 3 below. 
456 NDPP v Rautenbach 2005 1 SACR 530 (SCA) para 88; Mohunram v NDPP paras 56, 
120; Prophet v NDPP para 45; Ntsoko v NDPP paras 15 & 18. 
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4 4 Mechanisms in the criminal justice system 
The criminal justice system in South Africa houses different mechanisms, but the 
conventional adversarial criminal trial remains dominant. However, the criminal 
justice system is not keeping up with the number of cases and it is commonly 
accepted that the conventional criminal trial, though important, cannot be the only 
mechanism through which economic crime can be addressed. In this third part of 
chapter 4, specific attention is given to the evolution of alternative procedures within 
the criminal justice system, alongside the conventional accusatorial prosecutorial 
process, namely plea negotiation and out of court settlements, such as deferment. 
The fairly new mechanism of deferred prosecution agreements, introduced into 
several jurisdictions across different continents primarily to address serious 
instances of economic crime, is discussed. The application of deferred prosecution 
agreements, as a statutorily structured procedure in the United Kingdom, is 
compared to a more informal use of the mechanism in the United States. 
The mechanism of plea and sentence agreements, commonly referred to as plea 
bargaining, is the primary procedure upon which the criminal justice system in the 
United States operates.1 The use of plea and sentence agreements in the United 
States is discussed, as well as the evolving use of the mechanism in South Africa.  
The issue of restitution under the criminal process is identified as being critical in 
this dissertation, and consequently mechanisms within the criminal justice system 
that grant opportunities for restitution and other restorative justice remedies are 
discussed, with particular focus on sections 297 and 300 of the CPA. Brief reference 
is also given to section 276 prescribing correctional supervision and section 276A, a 
comparatively recent post-sentencing mechanism, based on restorative justice 
principles, both of which also afford the opportunity for compensation orders. 
The purpose of this section is to identify a number of mechanisms already in 
existence in the criminal justice system that have been or can be applied in 
addressing economic crime. Another objective is to distil certain principles from 
these mechanisms to use as building blocks, to develop a further mechanism, 
mediation in the criminal justice system, alongside the existing mechanisms. Chapter 
4 will conclude with a summary of the different mechanisms in the administrative, 
civil and criminal justice systems. The boundaries between these classically 
distinguished systems are shown to be blurred and that principles from different 
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fields of law may be present in any particular mechanism. The application of 
principles of restorative justice within such mechanisms is highlighted, with specific 
emphasis on developing the role of the victim and community in criminal processes. 
The issues of alternative criminal procedures, restitution, the role of the victim and 
community impact upon the conventional principles of sentencing under the criminal 
justice system are considered. Consequently, attention is also given to sentencing 
and its characteristics. It is submitted that the mechanism of mediation is able to be 
used in different stages of criminal and civil procedure in attempts to hold the 
perpetrator of economic crime accountable; and simultaneously to grant the victim of 
the offence restitution.  
4 4 1 Mechanism of deferred prosecution agreements in England and the United 
States 
4 4 1 1 Introduction to deferred prosecution agreements 
Procedural options for the agencies involved in combating crime continue to 
evolve. As shown below, the alternative mechanism of plea and sentence 
negotiation, now complements the classic binary options of declination to prosecute 
or trial. Recently, yet another mechanism has evolved and is now being used in a 
number of jurisdictions. It is again an option based upon pre-trial negotiation and 
involves the authorities entering into an agreement of deferment, commonly called a 
deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”). It is primarily aimed at companies involved 
in serious economic crime. It evolved organically in the United States, but has since 
been introduced in other jurisdictions as a specific creature of statute. In this section 
the development of DPAs in the United States is discussed, together with the formal 
introduction of DPAs in England. The purpose is to show an alternative mechanism 
that can be applied to combat serious economic crime, particularly offences 
committed by corporations. A further objective is to distil a number of restorative 
justice principles, to use as criteria for the development of the proposed mechanism 
of mediation in the criminal justice system.  
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Singapore recently passed new legislation introducing deferred prosecution 
agreements (“DPAs”) into their criminal justice system.457 This follows similar 
introductions of DPAs in France,458 Argentina,459 Australia460 and Canada.461 These 
statutory provisions are similar to and likely to have been influenced by the earlier 
enactment of DPAs in England.462  
                                            
457 Part VIIA and the Sixth Schedule of the Criminal Justice Reform Act 19 of 2018.  
458 Art 18 of Law No 2016-1691 of 9 December 2016 (Sapin II Law) amending articles of the 
Penal Code, particularly art 131-39-2. Also art 22 of Law No 2016-1691 amending art 41-1-2 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure providing for the proposal by the public prosecutor of the 
entering into a “public interest court agreement”, commonly known by its French acronym 
CJIP (conventions judiciaire d’intérêt public”).  
459 Ley 27401 Responsabilidad Penal published on 1 December 2017. (Unofficially 
translated as Law 27.401 Criminal Liability of Legal Persons for Corruption Offences). Art 16 
provides for the conclusion of an “effective collaboration agreement” between the 
prosecution and the corporation. Art 39 provides that the Act will come into force 90 days 
after its publication, which would have been in March 2018. See too G Jorge and F Basch 
“Argentina Introduces Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Standards for Compliance 
Programs” (16-01-2018) FCPA Blog <http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2018/1/16/jorge-and-
basch-argentina-introduces-deferred-prosecution-ag.html?printerFriendly=true> (accessed 
03-07-2018). 
460 Sch 2 of the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017.  
461 Budget Implementation Act Bill C-74 assented to on 21 June 2018 and in terms of s 409 
to come into force 90 days after being assented to. Available at 
<http://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/bill/C-74/royal-assent#enH23405> (accessed 
03-07-2018); Department of Justice Canada “Remediation Agreements and Orders to 
Address Corporate Crime” (27-03-2018) Department of Justice Canada 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2018/03/remediation-agreements-to-
address-corporate-crime.html> (accessed 21-05-2018); W Berman, JM Picone & K Byers 
“Deferred No More: Deferred Prosecution Agreements Finally on their Way to Canada” (02-
02-2018) casselsbrock.com 
<http://www.casselsbrock.com/CBNewsletter/Deferred_No_More__Deferred_Prosecution_A
greements_Finally_on_Their_Way_to_Canada> (accessed 21-05-2018); N Keith “Features 
of Canada’s New DPA Scheme” (25-04-2018) whitecollarpost.com 
<http://whitecollarpost.com/category/topics/sentencing-deferred-prosecution-agreements/> 
(accessed 21-05-2018). In Canada a DPA is called a “remediation agreement” and defined 
as “an agreement, between an organization accused of having committed an offence and a 
prosecutor, to stay any proceedings related to that offence if the organization complies with 
the terms of the agreement”. See s 715.3(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-
46. 
462 S 45 and Sch 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. 
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As its name implies a DPA is by nature an agreement between the prosecution 
and defendant, and accordingly rights and obligations are established for both the 
parties. The primary obligation upon the prosecution is to defer prosecution for an 
agreed period of time, usually ranging between 18 months and three years, or in 
some instances for a period of five years. The primary obligations of the defendant 
are multi-fold, including payments of various financial amounts, cooperation with 
investigating and prosecuting authorities, remedial and compliance requirements.463 
A distinguishing factor of a DPA is that it is laid before a court, needs court approval, 
and is filed with the court records. Consequently, a DPA becomes a document of 
public record, subject to public scrutiny and interrogation.464 Once the period of 
deferment is over and the conditions fulfilled by the defendant, the charges filed by 
the prosecution are withdrawn, and consequently the defendant is not convicted and 
sentenced.  
A DPA needs to be distinguished from a Non-Prosecution Agreement (“NPA”) and 
a “declination with disgorgement” agreement used in the United States.465 A NPA is 
similar to a DPA and generally includes a brief statement of facts and terms that 
include payment of penalties and remedial actions such as new corporate 
governance and compliance procedures and cooperation with the authorities. A 
fundamental difference is that a NPA is not laid before the court for approval, and 
can thus be described as a private agreement between the DOJ and defendant 
company. Advocates for NPAs justify an NPA as being permissible as it falls within 
the principal discretion of a prosecutor whether to prosecute or not. On the other 
                                            
463 See Nasar (2017) NYU JL & Liberty 849-870 for practical illustrations of the standard 
terms in a DPA. See also United States v HSBC (2017) at 130. 
464 In United States v HSBC (2017) at 135 & 142 it was held that a Monitor’s Report in terms 
of a DPA is not a judicial document, and is thus not open to public scrutiny. See too paras 12 
& 13 of Schedule 17 that provide for the possible postponement of the publication of 
information by the prosecutor and the limitations on the use of such information in criminal 
proceedings.  
465 For full discussion on DPAs, NPAs and declination with disgorgement agreements see 
Woody (2018) U Mich JL Reform 269-311; Koehler (2015) 49 UCD L Rev 497-565. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
248 
 
hand, critics of NPAs and DPAs argue that the DOJ is abusing its discretion and 
fulfilling the roles of prosecutor, judge and jury simultaneously.466  
A declination with disgorgement agreement is yet another option, introduced by 
the DOJ in April 2016 under a pilot programme within the enforcement of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”).467 The purpose is to incentivise companies 
to self-report wrongdoing. Basically, a declination with disgorgement agreement 
entails that in the event of a corporation voluntarily self-reporting and disclosing a 
wrongdoing, offering its cooperation and disgorging its profits derived from such 
wrongdoing, the DOJ will decline to prosecute. After the initial year and the 
application of this novel mechanism, it was incorporated into the United States 
Attorneys’ Manual (“USAM”) in November 2017.468 This model, particularly its name, 
has been criticised as causing confusion and blurring the lines of criminal law. 
Inherently, the agreement itself appears corrupt. On the one hand, in the event of a 
company having committed a crime, it can now simply buy a declination and so 
avoid criminal prosecution. On the other hand, equally objectionable, if the 
prosecution is unable to prove a crime in a criminal court, then the agreed 
disgorgement becomes government extortion.469 Moreover, like a NPA, there is no 
judicial supervision and consequently, possible instances of economic crime are 
settled outside the court. 
The enactment of legislation in a number of important jurisdictions in different 
continents, with the definite purpose of introducing DPAs, as an alternative dispute 
mechanism to deal with instances of economic crime, illustrates the increased use of 
DPAs across the world. It is argued that this discretionary tool is a commendable 
additional manner in which to respond to alleged economic crime. It enables parties 
to enter into negotiations with the aim of concluding a DPA. The authorities are able, 
                                            
466 Koehler (2015) 49 UCD L Rev 557; Copland & Gorodetski “Without Law or Limits” 
Manhattan Institute 13. 
467 The guidelines are: DOJ Criminal Div “The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Enforcement Plan and Guidance” (05-4-2016) available at 
<https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog-entry/file/838386/download> (accessed 19-12-
2018). 
468 USAM Insert 9-47.120 – FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy available at 
<https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/838416/download> (accessed 19-12-2018). 
469 Woody (2018) U Mich JL Reform 299-302.  
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with the cooperation of the defendant, to do a thorough investigation, and 
subsequently enter into an agreement with various terms. The essence of a DPA is 
the prosecution agreeing to defer and not to continue with conventional prosecution 
and trial procedures, whilst the defendant agrees to certain reform and repayment 
conditions. Moreover, a DPA needs to be approved by a court, thereby ensuring 
transparency and public oversight. 
Below a short overview will be given of the legal framework created by DPA 
legislation in England and the interpretation and application of such legislation by the 
courts in recent cases. A brief comparison will also be made between the use of 
DPAs in England and in the United States, with specific reference to contentious 
issues and points of difference relating to the use of DPAs in the two jurisdictions. 
Concluding remarks will highlight lessons that can be drawn from the experiences of 
the United States and United Kingdom to enhance the building blocks for the use of 
mediation as a further alternative way in responding to instances of economic crime 
in South Africa. 
4 4 1 2 Deferred prosecution agreements in England and Wales and in the United 
States  
DPAs were introduced into the criminal justice system of England and Wales470 
through section 45 and Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (“Schedule 
17”);471 which is to be read in conjunction with the applicable rules, Part 11 of the 
Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 (“the 2015 Rules”).472 Significantly, the legislation 
and codes introduced in England are specifically directed at the introduction of 
DPAs, in contrast to the use of DPAs in the United States, which are concluded 
through indirect legislation, in terms of section 3161(h)(2) of the Speedy Trial Act,473 
which was enacted for a completely different purpose.474  
                                            
470 In terms of s 61(13)(g) of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the provisions relating to DPAs 
only relate to England and Wales. In this dissertation, the term England is used with the 
understanding that it includes Wales, unless otherwise stated. 
471 S 45 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 simply refers to Schedule 17. 
472 Originally the Criminal Procedure (Amendment No 2) Rules 2013 in SI 3183 (L 25), but 
now Part 11 of the revised 2015 Criminal Procedure Rules. 
473 The proper citation is s 3161(h)(2) of 18 United States Code (“USC”), but more commonly 
known as the Speedy Trial Act, which imposes time limits in the criminal justice system to 
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The operation of DPAs in England occurs within an integrated legal framework. It 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss such framework in detail. The 
basic framework includes the main role-players, the Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) 
and the Crown Prosecutors, who are tasked with the investigation and prosecution of 
economic crime, particularly bribery and corruption, both nationally and 
internationally. This integrated network evolved from the recommendations of the 
Roskill Report (Fraud Trials Committees Report) 1986, and subsequently the SFO 
was established under the Criminal Justice Act 1987 and authorised to investigate 
and prosecute instances of economic crime that primarily fall under the Bribery Act 
2010 and Criminal Law Act 1977. In addition, the SFO and Crown prosecutors are 
guided by several codes, including the Code for Crown Prosecutors 7th Edition 
(2013) (“Code for Crown Prosecutors”) issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
under section 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985; and the Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice (2013) (“DPA Code of Practice”) issued 
by both the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director of the Serious Fraud 
Office in terms of paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 17.475 These codes have been 
judicially applied in a number of cases involving DPAs brought before the courts for 
                                            
ensure that cases are dealt with within a reasonable time. Provision is made for certain 
exceptions to the time limits. S 3161(h)(2) is such an exception and reads: "[a]ny period of 
delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant to 
written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of 
allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct." The United States Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) has also published guidelines and memoranda to guide the DOJ in the 
application of DPAs. These are discussed below. Also see PR Reilly “Corporate Deferred 
Prosecution as Discretionary Injustice” (2017) Utah L Rev 839 844-845; United States v 
HSBC Bank USA 863 F3d 125 (2 Cir 2017) [“United States v HSBC (2017)”] at 144; United 
States v Saena Corp 140F Supp 3d 11 (“United States v Saena Corp”) at 38-40.  
474 The enactment of s 3161(h)(2) was initially intended for minor instances of crime and was 
further aimed at the rehabilitation of a certain profile of persons, being individuals who were 
disadvantaged not only regarding the legal justice system, but also economically and 
socially. This purpose is clearly in contrast to the development and use of DPAs for large 
corporations in terms of s 3161(h)(2).  
475 Furthermore, when negotiating the terms of a DPA the members of the SFO and Crown 
Prosecution need to take into consideration the Joint Prosecution Guidance on Corporate 
Prosecutions and the Bribery Act 2010: Joint Prosecution Guidance of the Director of the 
Serious Fraud Office and the Director of Public Prosecutions (2011).  
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approval, namely Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank plc,476 Serious Fraud Office 
v XYZ Limited,477 Serious Fraud Office v Rolls-Royce plc478 and Serious Fraud Office 
v Tesco Stores Limited.479 Importantly, when negotiating financial issues, the subject 
of victim compensation needs to be addressed in terms of the Code of Practice for 
Victims of Crime (2015); as does financial disgorgement and financial penalties in 
terms of the Definitive Guideline issued by the Sentencing Council for Fraud, Bribery 
and Money Laundering Offences. Consideration also needs to be given to the 
prosecutorial power to recover assets under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.480 
The formal statutory definition of a DPA in England is a very general broad 
definition: “an agreement between a designated prosecutor and a person whom the 
prosecutor is considering prosecuting for an offence.”481 In essence, a DPA provides 
prosecutors with an additional pre-trial option to the conventional binary options of 
either prosecuting or declining to prosecute.482 The choice is within the prosecutor’s 
discretion and is to be made upon consideration of the various prescribed factors, 
including the seriousness of the offence, the history of prior misconduct of the 
                                            
476 U20150854. 
477 U20150856. For example in para 18 of SFO v XYZ Ltd (Preliminary). 
478 U20170036. 
479 U20170287 2017 WL 10765126 para 9. 
480 Regard is also to be given to international conventions, including the OECD Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. 
Generally too, members of the SFO need to follow their internal guideline, the SFO 
Handbook. 
481 Para 1(1) of Schedule 17. It is to be noted that “an offence” is delineated by Part 2 of 
Schedule 17. Para 1(2) as read with s 2 of Schedule 17 provides for compliance by the 
accused person and suspension of prosecution by the prosecution. In addition para 5 of 
Schedule 17 sets out the required contents of a DPA, including a statement of facts of the 
offence, the period of the DPA, financial penalties, compensation for victims, disgorgement 
of profits, payment of costs, compliance and cooperation terms. 
482 United States Attorneys’ Manual (“USAM”) Principles of Business Organizations 9-
28.1100B. See too K Woody “Declinations with Disgorgement in FCPA Enforcement” (2018) 
U Mich JL Reform 269 279-280; M Koehler “Measuring the Impact of Non-Prosecution and 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement (2015) 49 
UCD L Rev 497 500-503. 
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corporation, self-disclosure and cooperation by the defendant, remedial measures 
and collateral consequences.483  
The purpose of a DPA, as an alternative procedural option in criminal law, is 
succinctly described by Sir Brian Leveson P in the very first DPA assessed and 
approved by the court in England, Serious Fraud Office v Standard Bank plc:484 
“Its purpose is to provide a mechanism whereby an organisation (being a body 
corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association, but not an individual) 
can avoid prosecution for certain economic or financial offences by entering into 
an agreement on negotiated terms with a prosecutor designated by the 2013 
Act.”485 
There are numerous other aims of a DPA that have been enumerated by the 
legislators, policy makers and courts, including efficacy and utilitarian purposes, 
reformation of corporate governance, restitution for victims, and avoidance of 
economic and political collateral consequences such as losses to employees, 
shareholders and general business.486 It is correctly argued that the use of DPAs 
                                            
483 The DPA Code of Practice para 1.2 sets out a two-stage test: firstly, an evidential stage 
and, secondly, a public interest stage. This is extensively amplified in para 2 which sets out 
the factors to be taken into consideration to determine if a DPA is an appropriate 
mechanism. In the United States the guidelines are in the USAM Principles of Business 
Organizations 9-28.1000. 
484 Case No U20150854. It is to be noted that there are two judgments under the same case 
name and number. A preliminary judgment heard privately on 4 November 2015 (“SFO v 
Standard Bank (Preliminary)”) but which judgment was only made public during the final 
judgment on 30 November 2015 (“SFO v Standard Bank (Final)”). This is in accordance with 
the procedure laid down by paras 7 and 8 of Schedule 17 that the judgments only become 
public once the court has finally approved the DPA. Also see paras 2 and 3 of SFO v 
Standard Bank (Final) judgment. 
485 Para 1 of SFO v Standard Bank (Final). 
486 For example, the Australian legislators explain that the DPA scheme is to address serious 
corporate crime through encouraging self-reporting by corporations; to avoid financial and 
reputational losses that are linked to long investigations and trials; to improve accountability 
of Australian businesses for corporate misconduct, and to promote corporate compliance 
with regulations. See Paras 11 and 12 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Crimes 
Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017. Also see the United States 
DOJ USAM, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations at 9-28.000 
available at <https://www.justice.gov/United States/United Statesm-9-28000-principles-
federal-prosecution-business-organizations> (accessed 09-07-2018). 
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ensures a faster and less costly mechanism of resolution for all the parties 
concerned than a conventional criminal trial. Although investigations could still last 
for a considerable period of time and cost a vast amount of money, the cooperation 
between the investigating authorities and the company concerned does result in time 
and expenses being saved in comparison to both parties needing to prepare for and 
conduct a lengthy trial.487 Significantly, Leveson P warns corporations not to take 
calculated risks and attempt to “brazen out an investigation” as the direct and indirect 
costs of litigation would “almost inevitably spell a far greater disaster”.488 Since the 
Arthur Andersen implosion at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the limitation 
of the ramifications of the prosecution of a large corporation for its employees, other 
stakeholders and the broader economy has been the paramount consideration in 
economic, political and legal evaluations of the use of DPAs.489 Various national 
governments and corporate sectors have been cautious to avoid such consequential 
ramifications of the collapse of a large corporation resulting from criminal litigation 
and thus the use of DPAs is being advocated.490 In addition, the opportunity for the 
                                            
487 This includes the company having to fund costly internal investigations and, in some 
instances, paying the prosecution’s’ costs. The costs of the Crown’s investigation alone in 
the Rolls Royce matter totalled just under £13 million. In the United Kingdom it is a 
recommended standard clause that the defendant pays the costs of investigation of the 
Crown. Reilly (2017) Utah LR 842; Paras 58, 59, 124, 125 & 143 of SFO v Rolls Royce. In 
SFO v Tesco, the defendant had to pay £3 million towards the Crown’s costs (paras 102-
103). 
488 Para 143 of SFO v Rolls Royce. A fundamental risk of a conviction of a corporation is of 
being disqualified from tendering for government business, or of being generally disqualified 
from doing business with the government.  
489 Commonly referred to as “the Arthur Andersen Effect”. In the United States companies 
that have been convicted of a crime lose government subsidies and are debarred from doing 
business with government which could lead to the financial implosion of the company. See 
Koehler (2015) 501-501; JA Nasar “In Defense of Deferred Prosecution Agreements” (2017) 
11 NYU JL & Liberty 838 839-840; G Markoff “Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the 
Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century” 
(2013) 15 U Pa J Bus L 797 804-807. 
490 A number of countries which have introduced DPAs are mentioned above, including 
Canada, Singapore, Argentina and France. Interestingly, some argue that prosecution does 
not necessarily lead to an implosion as experienced by the Arthur Andersen saga and that 
the Andersen Effect does not exist and is “no more than a bogeyman” See Markoff (2013) U 
Pa J Bus L 828-830, 846; Koehler (2018) UCD L Rev 501-511. 
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authorities, not usually available in adversarial processes, to introduce and enforce 
corporate structural reform through compliance procedures, serves as another 
purpose of using DPAs.491 The last two decades the United States has promoted the 
increased use of DPAs to address instances of corporate crime to such an extent 
that DPAs are now the dominant means used by the United States Securities 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the DOJ to deal with investigations under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.492  
This phenomenon has been mainly achieved through pragmatic and utilitarian 
policies and guidelines released by the United States DOJ. To understand this 
remarkable growth of DPAs and the present debate on the use of DPAs in the United 
States a brief overview of the policies issued by the DOJ and the establishment of a 
new enforcement agency is necessary. The Enron debacle and the implosion of 
Arthur Andersen in the period 2000-2004 substantially changed the way in which 
economic crimes were being addressed by the SEC and DOJ. In 2002 President 
Bush established the Corporate Fraud Task Force and together with aggressive 
prosecutors, the practice of using DPAs for corporate crime came into being and a 
substantial increase in the use of DPAs was seen.493 The basis for such practice was 
                                            
491 Markoff (2013) U Pa J Bus L 807-812. Markoff undertook an empirical study of 
prosecuted companies in the decade 2001-2010 and proved that there is no hard evidence 
of the Andersen Effect and showed that corporate structural reform can be obtained through 
the plea negotiation mechanism: see Markoff (2013) U Pa J Bus L 812-831. 
492 Koehler’s research has shown that in the decade 2004-2014, approximately 85% of 
cases dealing with FCPA enforcement used an ADR mechanism, either a DPA or a NPA. 
See Koehler (2015) 49 UCD L Rev 500-521. See too Reilly (2017) Utah L Rev 841. For 
statistical data and evaluations of the use of NPAs and DPAs see JR Copland & I Gorodetski 
“Without Law of Limits The Continued Growth of the Shadow Regulatory State” (19-03-2015) 
Manhattan Institute <https://www.manhattan-institute.org/download/8980/article.pdf> 
(accessed 19-07-2018); JR Copland & RA Mangual “Justice Out of the Shadows Federal 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the Political Order” (June 2016) Manhattan Institute 
<https://www.manhattan-institute.org/download/8980/article.pdf> (accessed 19-07-2018); 
Markoff (2013) U Pa J Bus L 807. 
493 There were 18 NPAs and DPAs in the decade 1992-2002, which increased to 85 NPAs 
and DPAs in the three-year period 2005-2007, and to 100 in 2015 (this included 75 of the 
so-called Swiss Bank Agreements). D Thornburgh “Deferred Prosecution and Non-
Prosecution Agreements” Washington Legal Foundation (17-3-2007) available at 
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the vehicle of pre-trial deferment offered by section 3161(h)(2) of the Speedy Trial 
Act, coupled with guidelines and memoranda issued by the DOJ. The early pre-trial 
diversion regulations were not particularly relevant to corporations and instances of 
economic crime guidelines, but were intended for the diversion of certain offenders, 
mainly individuals, charged with minor offences. The purpose was to divert such 
offenders from the traditional criminal trial system into probationary-type 
programmes for supervision and rehabilitation thus granting such offenders an 
opportunity for rehabilitation, while avoiding the conventional trial and sentencing 
process.494 However, with the formation of the new unit, the Corporate Fraud Task 
Force, and with a forceful and creative DOJ, the modus for addressing corporate 
crime was to use NPAs and DPAs more frequently.   
NPAs and DPAS are attributed to different sources. The agreement with Solomon 
Brothers in 1992 is commonly recognised as the origin of contemporary NPAs. 
Instead of being prosecuted for making false bids to purchase treasury notes, the 
defendant agreed to pay penalties, cooperate with the DOJ, remove employees 
responsible for the contraventions and introduce compliance measures.495 However, 
there is the notable agreement in 1994 between Prudential Securities Inc and the 
United States,496 in which the DOJ agreed to defer prosecution for securities fraud 
against Prudential for three years on condition that Prudential agreed to cooperate 
and pay a penalty and appoint an external overseer.497 Ironically, in 1996 a NPA was 
signed between Arthur Andersen LLP and the DOJ (District of Connecticut) 
regarding the investigation into the audit of a real estate firm, Colonial Realty 
Company, which had been running a Ponzi scheme. The DOJ agreed not to 
prosecute whilst Arthur Andersen LLP agreed to cooperate and pay an amount of 
                                            
<http://www.wlf.org/upload/chapter6DPAs.pdf> (accessed 20-12-2018). Thornburgh was a 
former Attorney General. 
494 USAM 9-22.000 Pretrial diversion program available at <https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-
22000-pretrial-diversion-program> (accessed 20-12-2018). See too Pooler J overview in US 
v HSBC 863 F 3d (2017) at 142-143.  
495 Nasar (2017) NYUJL & Liberty 845. 
496 Attorney’s office for the Southern District of New York. 
497 See Buell (2018) 827-828 fns 13-14 for details of the letter agreement from MJ White, the 
US Attorney S Dist of NY to the attorneys of Prudential Securities Inc (27-10-1994).  
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US $10 million.498 These precedents, together with the memoranda issued by the 
Deputy Attorney General (“Deputy AG”)499 provided mechanisms and guidelines for 
the use of NPAs and DPAs.500 To better understand the remarkable evolution of 
DPAs, and how such development is linked to the policies issued by the DOJ, it is 
necessary to sketch the time-line of the prominent Deputy AG memoranda.  
The Holder Memorandum (1999)501 read together with the 2001 Seaboard 
Report,502 are considered to be the official birth of NPAs and DPAs for corporations 
and economic crime. The Seaboard Report set out four factors that were taken into 
account by the SEC when considering enforcement against companies that are 
under investigation and which may influence the SEC to grant leniency, namely self-
                                            
498 The money was paid into an investment fund against which investors in the failed 
Colonial Reality Company could claim. See Buell (2018) 829 fns 26-28. See too G Judson 
“Accountants to pay $10 million to Victims of Real Estate Fraud” (24-04-1996) New York 
Times <https://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/24/nyregion/accountants-to-pay-10-million-to-
victims-of-real-estate-fraud.html> (accessed 26-12.2018). 
499 Traditionally named after the Deputy AG issuing the memorandum. 
500 For a discussion on the prosecutorial procedure and practice, including the provisions of 
the USAM and The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, see SS 
Beale “The Development and Evolution of the US Law of Corporate Criminal Liability and the 
Yates Memo” (2016) 46 Stetson LR 41 50-55. 
501 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder “Bringing Criminal Charges 
Against Corporations” (16-06-1999) (“Holder Memorandum”) available at 
<https://www.justice.gov/>. 
502 The name “Seaboard Report” is derived from two official releases and a statement by the 
SEC on 23 October 2001 advising that the SEC was not pursuing enforcement against the 
Seaboard Corporation for financial accounting irregularities. The specific grounds for the 
leniency and non-enforcement: self-reporting, cooperation, self-policing and remediation still 
prevail today. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No 44969 (23-10-2001) & 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No 1470 (23-10-2001). Interestingly, a cease 
and desist order was given against Meredith, the controller of the subsidiary, who was 
responsible for the financial accounting irregularities which misrepresented the finances of 
the parent company, Seaboard Corporation. The SEC releases and statement are available 
at <https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm> (accessed 20-12-2018). The 
releases and cease and desist order pertaining to Meredith are Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 Release No 44970 & Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No 1471 (23-10-
2001) available at <https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-44970.htm> (accessed 20-12-
2018).  
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reporting, cooperation, self-policing and remediation by corporations.503 The Holder 
Memorandum (1999) hinted at the possibility of deferred prosecution by including the 
option of weighing up likely collateral consequences as one of the factors to be 
considered when the prosecution decides to decline to prosecute or indict a 
corporation. Significantly, the Thompson Memorandum (2003) 504 specifically, though 
indirectly, referred to the possible use of pre-trial diversions for instances of 
economic crime, by stating “(i)n some circumstances … granting a corporation 
immunity or amnesty or pretrial diversion may be considered” (writer’s emphasis). 
The McNulty Memorandum (2006)505 replaced the Thompson Memorandum. It 
primarily refined the assessment by the DOJ of cooperation given by corporations by 
formalising the practice of the DOJ to demand attorney-client waivers from 
defendants, and to negatively assess the assistance corporations gave employees 
facing criminal investigation.506 Subsequently the Filip Memorandum (2008)507 
explicitly stated that the use of DPAs should be considered as mid-way between a 
declination and a trial. Recently, the Yates Memorandum (2015)508 expounded the 
criteria for DPAs and particularly focused on stipulating that a company can only 
                                            
503 Also see the SEC webpage on its enforcement programme SEC “Enforcement 
Cooperation Program” (20-09-2016) US Securities and Exchange Commission 
<https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enforcement-cooperation-initiative.shtml> (accessed 20-12-
2018). 
504 Memorandum from Deputy AG Larry D Thompson “Principle of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations” (20-01-2003)(“Thompson Memorandum”) available at 
<https://www.justice.gov/>. 
505 Memorandum from Deputy AG Paul J McNulty “Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations” (12-12-2006) (“McNulty Memorandum”) available at 
<https://www.justice.gov/>. For evaluation of the McNulty Memo (2006) see WM Sullivan 
“The McNulty Memorandum: New DOJ Policies on Attorney-Client Privilege and Attorney 
Work Product Protections” (01-02-2007) CCBJ 34 
<http://ccbjournal.com/articles/7857/mcnulty-memorandum-new-doj-policies-attorney-client-
privilege-and-attorney-work-produc> (accessed 02-08-2018). 
506 Some employers would grant employees assistance in paying for legal costs and such 
assistance was assessed negatively by the DOJ.  
507 Memorandum from Deputy AG Mark Filip “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations” (28-08-2008)”Filip Memorandum”) available at <https://www.justice.gov/>. 
508 Memorandum from Deputy AG Sally Yates “Individual Accountability for Corporate 
Wrongdoing” (09-09-2015) (“Yates Memorandum”) available at <https://www.justice.gov/>. 
For an evaluation of Yates Memorandum see Beale (2016) 46 Stetson L R 41 63-68. 
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receive mitigation for cooperation if it has fully disclosed the names of all the 
individuals involved in the misconduct being investigated.  
Although these policies and guidelines are not legally enforceable legislation, they 
comprise the shadow under which, not only the DOJ, but also corporations, critics 
and the state approach and address corporate crime.509 Indeed these policies and 
guidelines of the SEC and DOJ have evolved into what has been referred to as “a 
common law of corporate criminal enforcement”.510 However, there is little 
consistency in the United States regarding the terms and conditions of DPAs and the 
limited role played by the courts in the use of DPAs. Consequently, the increase in 
the use of DPAs in the United States has not been without criticism.511  
There have been attempts by some members of congress in the United States to 
introduce statutory regulation of NPAs and DPAs but this has until now not been 
successful.512 In addition some judges have made a strong call for statutory 
regulation of pre-trial deferment processes like NPAs and DPAs that result in 
circumventing true judicial oversight. Sullivan J in US v Saena Tech Corp made an 
in-depth analysis of the legislative history of section 3161(h)(2) of the Speedy Act;513 
finding that an amendment to the draft legislation specifically introduced the need for 
court approval.514 Despite this the courts continued to interpret such prescribed 
                                            
509 Buell (2018) NCL Rev 834.  
510 SW Buell “Why do Prosecutors Say Anything: The Case of Corporate Crime” (2018) 96 
NCL Rev 823 835. 
511 See Buell (2018) NCL Rev 832-836; Gilchrist (2018) Ga St U L Rev 350-356; Koehler 
(2015) 500-515; Nasar (2017) NYUJL & Liberty 844-849; S Oded “Coughing up Executives 
of Rolling the Dice: Individual Accountability for Corporate Corruption” (2016) 35 Yale L & 
Pol’y Rev 49 52-59; Beale (2016) 46 Stetson L R 41 62-68; Markoff (2013) U Pa J Bus L 
808-812. 
512 Since 2008 certain congressmen have attempted to introduce legislation to regulate the 
use of NPAs and DPAs. The last such attempt was HR 4540 (113th): Accountability in 
Deferred Prosecution Act of 2014 (“ADP Act”), which though introduced in January 2014 has 
not progressed further than being referred to a sub-committee in July 2014. See the United 
States Congress Tracker at <https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
bill/4540/text>.  
513 140F Supp 3d 11 (2015) 23-24 & 37-46. 
514 140F Supp 3d 11 (2015) 25. 
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judicial approval narrowly;515 and Sullivan J calls for limited, but meaningful, court 
review.516 In addition, Sullivan J asked for the expansion of the use of DPAs, not only 
for corporations, but for individuals too, which the Speedy Act specifically allows, 
advocating that a DPA would be a powerful tool for use against individuals charged 
with non-violent offences.517 Pooler J in US v HSBC stated that the use of DPAs for 
corporate crime, though very different from the original intention by Congress, is 
“neither improper nor undesirable”.518 However, Pooler J also raised concern about 
“the prosecution exercis[ing] the core judicial functions of adjudicating guilt and 
imposing sentence without any meaningful oversight from the courts” 519 and made a 
strong call for Congress to review the bill before them at that time.520 
Another perspective of DPAs is given by a jurisdiction in which the entering and 
conclusion of DPAs is strongly regulated. In addition, it calls for a meaningful and 
stronger supervisory role to be played by the court in approving a DPA by having to 
measure it against the prescribed statutory criteria. An illustration of the operation of 
DPAs in a more regulated context is England. A brief description of the prescribed 
procedure in England is given. This is followed by a discussion of some pertinent 
issues relating to the use of DPAs, both in a regulated context such as England, and 
in a less regulated context such as the United States. 
                                            
515 140F Supp 3d 11 (2015) 25-27. Sullivan J sketches the courts’ decisions in several 
cases, including US v HSBC 12 CR 763 (2013) and the US v Fokker cases.  
516 140F Supp 3d 11 (2015) 29-30 & 30-35. Sullivan J continued to discuss the nature of 
such judicial supervisory power in some detail, saying that it serves to protect the integrity of 
the court and ensures that DPA agreements are neither unlawful nor improper.  
517 140F Supp 3d 11 (2015) 46 and 37-46. Sullivan J discusses the original purposes of the 
Speedy Act trial, the problems connected with incarceration and Presidential call for 
rehabilitation of young offenders. 
518 United States v HSBC 863 F 3d (2017) at 142-143. Also see  US v Saena Tech Corp 
140F Supp 3d 11 (2015) 37-42. 
519 United States v HSBC 863 F 3d (2017) at 142-143. Pooler J concurred with the majority 
to limit the power of the court in DPAs, but wrote separately to highlight the need for 
statutory regulation of DPAs and strongly suggested that Congress should implement 
legislation regulating the review of DPAs by the court.  
520 United States v HSBC 863 F 3d (2017) at 143-144. Bill HR 4540 specifically provides in s 
7 for a stronger role to be played by the courts in the approval of the terms and conditions of 
a DPA and for monitoring reports to be submitted to the court for judicial review. 
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The procedure set out by Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 
emphasises the role of the court. Indeed, the court is intensely involved in a two-step 
procedure.521 The prosecution first has to apply to the court to approve a proposal to 
enter into a DPA,522 which application is held in private.523 After that a further 
application has to be made to the court for approval of the final terms of the DPA.524 
This hearing may either be in public or in private.525 Variation of a DPA is possible in 
the event where there has been a breach of the DPA,526 or to avoid a possible 
breach of the DPA by the defendant.527  
                                            
521 Para 7(1) of Schedule 17 read with R 11.3 of the 2015 Rules deals with the preliminary 
hearing, whilst para 8(1) read with R 11.4 of the 2015 Rules regulates the final hearing. This 
two-step judicial procedure usually results in two judgments being published. The first 
judgment relates to the preliminary application, while the second judgment relates to the 
application for final approval of a DPA. Importantly, the preliminary hearing is considered to 
be private and its contents are usually only published upon the approval by the court. 
Usually the publication of the preliminary and final judgments occur simultaneously. Also see 
paras 8(7) and 12 of Schedule 17 regarding mandatory publication of the judgments.  
522 Para 7(1) of Schedule 17 read with R 11.3 of the 2015 Rules. Para 7(3) states that a 
prosecutor may re-apply for preliminary approval in the event of the court having refused the 
first application. This implies that the parties have an opportunity to re-negotiate part of the 
terms of the DPA before returning for preliminary approval by the court to conclude a DPA. 
523 Para 7(4) of Schedule 17 read with R 11.2(1)(a) of the 2015 Rules. 
524 Para 8(1) of Schedule 17 read with R 11.4 of the 2015 Rules. Para 10 of Schedule 17, 
read with R 11.6 of 2015 Rules, provides for the variation of an approved DPA; and para 11 
of Schedule 17 read with R 11.7 of 2015 Rules for the termination of an approved DPA and 
the lifting of the suspension of prosecution.  
525 R 11.2(1)(b) of 2015 Rules. 
526 Para 10(1)(a) grants the prosecutor and defendant the opportunity to agree to vary the 
terms of an approved DPA; while para 10(2) of Schedule 17 read with R 11.5 specifically 
provides that the prosecutor needs to apply to court in the case of a suspected breach of a 
DPA for the court to decide whether there is in fact such a breach and whether to vary or 
terminate the DPA. Once again the test for any variation is that such variation needs to be in 
the interests of justice, and on fair, reasonable and proportionate terms. 
527 Para 10(1)(b) of Schedule 17 read with Rule 11.6. 
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Leveson P held that “(j)udicial involvement in the process is pivotal.”528 In fact, he 
specifically underscores the different approach in England to that of the United 
States: 
“In contra-distinction to the United States, a critical feature of the statutory 
scheme in the UK is the requirement that the court examine the proposed 
agreement in detail, decide whether the statutory conditions are satisfied and, if 
appropriate, approve the DPA. … In that way, the court retains control of the 
ultimate outcome”.529 
In considering both the preliminary and final applications, the court needs to be 
satisfied that the DPA is in the public interest; and that the terms of the agreement 
are fair, reasonable and proportionate”530 (writer’s emphasis). These are the 
important criteria laid down by the legislators. Firstly, the entering into531 and 
conclusion532 of a DPA are to be “in the interests of justice”.533 The first step, the 
preliminary hearing, entails the court adjudicating that the use of a DPA, an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism, as opposed to prosecution, is in the 
                                            
528 Para 2 of Serious Fraud Office v XYZ Limited 2016 Case no. U20150856, which 
preliminary hearing judgment was handed down in redacted form on 8 July 2016 (“SFO v 
XYZ Ltd (Preliminary)”). 
529 Para 2 of SFO v Standard Bank (Preliminary); and repeated in para 2 of SFO v XYZ Ltd 
(Preliminary). Also see paras 2 and 27 of Serious Fraud Office v XYZ Limited 2016 Case no. 
U20150856, of which the final hearing judgment was handed down on 11 July 2016 (“SFO v 
XYZ Ltd (Final)”). 
530 The same criteria are applicable in the federal legislation of Canada and Australia. See s 
715.37(f) of the Canadian Criminal Code as amended by Bill C-74. Notably, s 17D(1) of the 
Australian Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017 provides 
that a DPA has to be approved by an “approving officer”, as opposed to a court. S 17(G), in 
turn, stipulates who may be appointed as “an approving officer”. The grounds for approval, 
however, are the same: s 17D(4) specifies that the terms of the DPA are to be “in the 
interests of justice” and that they are to be “fair reasonable and proportionate.”  
531 Para 7(1)(a) of Schedule 17 applying for court approval at the preliminary hearing, read 
together with para 5 of Schedule 17, setting out the contents and requirements of a DPA that 
are mandatory and non-mandatory; and with R 11.3(i), particularly R 11.3(i)(i) of the Rules 
2015. 
532 Para 8(1)(a) of Schedule 17 applying for court approval for the agreed terms at the final 
hearing. 
533 Paras 7(1)(a) and 8(1)(a) of Schedule 17. 
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interests of justice.534 Factors to be taken into account in weighing up whether a DPA 
is in the interests of justice were judicially expounded by Sir Brian Leveson P in the 
first three cases approved by the courts in England.535 In the first case, SFO v 
Standard Bank plc, four factors were emphasised: the nature and seriousness of the 
offence; the cooperation given by the defendant; the defendant’s prior conduct with 
regard to economic crime; and finally the change of culture and future compliance 
measures by the company.536 Notably, regarding the factor of the seriousness of the 
offence, Leveson P held that the “more serious the offence, the more likely it is that 
prosecution will be required in the public interest and the less likely it is that a DPA 
will be in the interests of justice”.537  
The factors to be considered in determining whether a DPA is in the interests of 
justice were explained further in the second case, SFO v XYZ Ltd, in which the court 
also highlighted the importance of incentivising the exposure and self-reporting of 
corporate wrongdoing.538 In addition, the importance of considering possible 
                                            
534 Para 6 of Schedule 17 provides that the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director 
of the Serious Fraud Office must jointly issue a Code for prosecutors to give guidance as to 
when the use of a DPA will be appropriate. This is the DPA Code of Practice which must be 
read together with the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Also see generally other related codes 
available on the SFO website https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-
protocols/codes-and-protocols/ (accessed 21-06-2018). 
535 These factors include: i) the seriousness of the offence; ii) the importance of incentivising 
the exposure and self-reporting of corporate wrongdoing; iii) the history of similar conduct; iv) 
corporate compliance; v) the extent to which the entity has changed both in its culture and in 
relation to relevant personnel; vi) the impact of prosecution on employees and others 
innocent of any misconduct. (A summary of para 20 of SFO v XYZ Ltd (Preliminary)). The 
court continued to apply these factors in paras 21-34. Also see paras 24-35 of SFO v 
Standard Bank (Preliminary). 
536 Paras 24-35 of SFO v Standard Bank Plc (Preliminary); paras 32-46 of SFO v XYZ Ltd 
(Preliminary) and para 15-18 of SFO v XYZ Ltd (Final). 
537 Para 25 of SFO v Standard Bank Plc Preliminary Judgment; para 21 of SFO v XYZ Ltd 
(Preliminary); para 2.5 of the DPA Code. In SFO v XYZ Ltd the court went into some detail to 
explain the approval of a DPA despite the offences being serious (paras 15-18 and 27-28 of 
SFO v XYZ Ltd (Final)). 
538 Para 16 of SFO v XYZ Ltd (Final). The relevance of incentivising was also considered in 
Serious Fraud Office v Tesco Stores Limited (“SFO v Tesco”) Case no. U20170287 2017 
WL 10765126 paras 45 & 66. It should be noted that in SFO v Tesco there are several 
documents. There is the judgment SFO v Tesco. There is also the actual DPA between the 
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collateral consequences, namely the impact that a conviction may have on innocent 
persons, such as employees and shareholders and the broader economy was 
endorsed.539 In SFO v Rolls-Royce, other more utilitarian considerations such as the 
cost of investigations and the limited resources of the prosecution and court were 
also factored into the computation of whether a DPA would be in the best interests of 
justice.540 Interestingly, in SFO v Tesco the court phrased the inquiry differently, 
stating that in considering whether a DPA was in the interests of justice the court had 
to examine “on the one hand, the seriousness of the offence and, on the other hand 
six features of relevance.”541 This suggests that the seriousness of the offence has to 
be weighed against the other features and is not simply one of the criteria to be 
taken into account along with the other criteria.  
Importantly too, the avoidance of debarment542 and the ability to continue 
operating and participating in tender procedures may be critical to an organisation.543 
A further criterion in determining if a DPA would be in the interests of justice is that of 
self-reporting.544 In terms of the DPA Code of Practice, self-reporting is considered to 
be central to determining the cooperation of a defendant.545 Moreover, self-reporting 
has been emphasised by the SFO and endorsed by the courts in the earlier 
                                            
parties, referred to as “Tesco DPA”; and the Statement of Facts, incorporated into the Tesco 
DPA referred to in this dissertation as the “Tesco Statement of Facts”. 
539 Paras 15 and 16 of SFO v XYZ Ltd (Final); Paras 52-57 and 60 of Serious Fraud Office v 
Rolls-Royce Plc & Rolls-Royce Energy Systems Inc Case no. U20170036 handed down on 
17 January 2017 (“SFO v Rolls-Royce”); SFO v Tesco paras 45 & 61-64. Also see A Milford 
“Deferred Prosecution Agreements – the Perspective from England and Wales” (14-09-
2016) SFO <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/09/14/deferred-prosecution-agreements-
perspective-england-wales/> (accessed 23-06-2018). 
540 Paras 58 and 59 of SFO v Rolls-Royce; SFO v Tesco paras 45 & 65. 
541 The six features were: the extent of cooperation; changes in leadership in Tesco; 
remedial measures undertaken; the consequences of the misconduct; the efficient use of 
public resources; and incentivising other companies to cooperate in cases of corporate 
misconduct (para 45). 
542 Debarment refers to mandatory rules and policies in different countries that prohibit trade 
by public bodies with any organisation that has been convicted of an offence. 
543 Para 53 of SFO v Rolls-Royce. Clearly illustrated too by the KPMG and Arthur Andersen 
LLP cases in the United States discussed above.  
544 SFO v Tesco para 50. 
545 Para 2.8.2(i) as read with para 2.9 of the DPA Code of Practice. 
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judgments.546 However in SFO v Rolls-Royce, Leveson P went further and approved 
a DPA, even though there had been no initial self-reporting by Rolls-Royce. The 
court held that though there had been no initial self-reporting, there had been 
“extraordinary cooperation” by the defendant, including the waiver of privilege.547 The 
court emphasised that a purpose of DPAs is to incentivise disclosure by corporations 
to enable the proper investigation and effective prosecution of corruption, and such 
disclosure may include information that would not otherwise have been known to the 
prosecution.548 This approach has been criticised. It is argued that the court has 
clouded the issue of requirements for a DPA.549 However, it is submitted by the 
writer that the “robust and pragmatic approach”550 by the court needs to be 
applauded. The non-exhaustive listed criteria in the DPA Code of Practice and other 
Codes should not be so rigidly and restrictively interpreted that no discretion remains 
for the parties and the court to evaluate, boldly and pragmatically, the factors that 
may be in the interests of justice, on an individual, case by case, basis.551 
Cooperation, including cooperation by the corporation before and after concluding a 
DPA, remains essential for the proper functioning of a DPA and for the purposes of a 
                                            
546 See Milford “Deferred Prosecution Agreements – the Perspective from England and 
Wales” SFO Speeches; Para 16 of SFO v XYZ Ltd (Final). 
547 SFO v Rolls-Royce paras 20-22, 38-39, and 60. 
548 SFO v Rolls-Royce paras 20-22, 38-39, and 60. The magnitude of this investigation was 
unprecedented, encompassing the disclosure of more than 30 million documents and 
costing the SFO more than £13 million and Rolls-Royce itself more than £123 million. 
549 R Cheung “Deferred Prosecution Agreements: Cooperation and Confession” (2018) CLJ 
12 13-14.  
550 Cheung (2018) CLJ 13. Milford echoes the pragmatism of DPAs stating that the courts 
have recognised that DPAs “are a pragmatic response by our Parliament to serious 
corporate crime”. Milford “Deferred Prosecution Agreements – the Perspective from England 
and Wales” SFO. 
551 Subsequent to the SFO v Rolls-Royce judgment and criticism, Milford on behalf of the 
SFO mentioned the extent of the cooperation of Rolls-Royce, making it clear that though 
there was no initial self-reporting, the intensive cooperation disclosed more information of 
wrongdoing that what the SFO had knowledge of, including wrongdoing unrelated to the 
initial investigation. Milford “Alun Milford on Deferred Prosecution Agreements” SFO 
Speeches. 
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DPA scheme to be achieved.552 The determination of such cooperation, particularly 
with regard to disclosure by the company and the tension between waiver and the 
safeguarding of legal professional privilege, is problematic. A further complexity is 
the extent to which a company’s cooperation is adjudged by the company needing to 
identify the employees involved in the misconduct. These issues are discussed 
below.  
The second test the legislator requires to be applied is inter-related to the first 
question. The court needs to approve the proposed553 and agreed554 terms of the 
DPA as “fair, reasonable and proportionate”.555 Paragraph 5 of Schedule 17 gives 
guidance on the primary content of the terms of a DPA, including imposition of 
financial penalties,556 compensation to victims and others,557 disgorgement of 
                                            
552 Conversely stated: “(i)f a company is not co-operative, we will not offer it the opportunity 
to enter into a DPA.” Milford “Deferred Prosecution Agreements – the perspective from 
England and Wales” SFO Speeches. In other words, it is the stance that a corporation takes 
once it becomes aware of wrongdoing that is determinative. B Morgan “Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements (DPA): A Practical Guide by Defence and Prosecution” (17-10-2016) SF0 
Speeches <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/10/17/deferred-prosecution-agreements-dpa-
practical-guide-defence-prose> (accessed 23-06-2018). 
553 Para 7(1)(b) of Schedule 17 as regards applying for court approval at the preliminary 
hearing, read together with para 5 of Schedule 17 setting out the contents and requirements 
of a DPA that are mandatory and non-mandatory; and with R 12.3(i), particularly R 12.3(i)(ii) 
of the Rules 2015. 
554 Para 8(1)(b) of Schedule 17 on applying for court approval for the agreed terms at the 
final hearing. 
555 Paras 7(1)(b) and 8(1)(b) of Schedule 17, read with the provisions of the DPA Code of 
Practice, and in some instances s 130(12) of the Power of Criminal Courts Act 2000; the 
Definitive Guideline issued by the Sentencing Council in respect of Fraud, Bribery and 
Money Laundering Offences read with s 142-144 and 164 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
Usually the indictment relating to a DPA is in terms of the Criminal Law Act 1977 and the 
Bribery Act 2010 and as such these are also to be read when adjudicating the terms of the 
DPA. Also see Milford “Deferred Prosecution Agreements – the Perspective from England 
and Wales” SFO. 
556 Para 5(3)(a), read with other relevant legislation. See fn 472 above.  
557 Paras 5(3)(b) and (c), read with other relevant legislation, including s 2A of the Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002, the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime 2015, SFO Handbook: Victims 
and Witnesses. Also see SFO Publications “Victims and Witnesses – Our Commitment to 
You”.  
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profits,558 payment of costs559 and future compliance and cooperation.560 The 
assessment of these terms occurs within the context of the agreed measures a 
defendant takes and the need to reflect the conventional elements of sanction, 
including deterrence, penalisation, disgorgement and compensation. However, the 
terms of a DPA also need to incentivise other corporations to self-report and give 
disclosure. It is an issue of balance, a very delicate balance.561 
The pivotal role played by the court in the measurement of these criteria was 
emphasised in both the preliminary and final judgments in the first DPA matter in 
England, namely SFO v Standard Bank plc and echoed in subsequent cases.562 
Indeed, in the second case in England, SFO v XYZ Ltd, Leveson P endorsed the 
strong and important role played by the court in identifying and laying down 
additional principles against which the use and terms of a DPA are to be adjudicated 
to ensure that it is in the best interests of justice with fair, reasonable and 
proportionate terms.563 The challenging issue for the court in this case was in 
determining what is in the best interests of justice: should one prosecute and heavily 
fine a small to medium enterprise “demonstrably guilty of serious breaches of the 
criminal law”, which would inevitably lead to insolvency of the enterprise and 
consequential loss of jobs and harm suffered by various role players; or should one 
enter into a DPA, which includes terms that substantially mitigate the penalties 
                                            
558 Para 5(3)(d) of Schedule 17. 
559 Para 5(3)g) of Schedule 17. 
560 Paras 5(3)(e) and (f) of Schedule 17. 
561 Morgan, the joint head of Bribery and Corruption at the SFO, illustrated the difficulty in 
getting the balance right between sanction for a serious criminal offence and leniency as a 
reward in order for the terms of a DPA to be approved as fair, reasonable and proportionate 
by the court. On the one hand, “a DPA must be a punishment. It cannot be a cosy deal”. On 
the other hand, the sanction needs to be sufficiently lenient to reward the corporation for 
self-reporting and disclosure, and in addition to encourage others to do likewise. B Morgan 
“Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPA): A Practical Guide by Defence and Prosecution” 
(17-10-2016) SF0 Speeches <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/10/17/deferred-prosecution-
agreements-dpa-practical-guide-defence-prosecution/> (accessed 27-12-2018). 
562 SFO v Standard Bank plc (Final) para 2; SFO v XYZ Ltd (Preliminary) para 2; SFO v 
Rolls-Royce paras 7-11. Also see A Milford “Alan Milford on Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements” (08-09-2017) SFO Speeches <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/09/05/alun-milford-
on-deferred-prosecution-agreements/> (accessed 27-12.2018). 
563 SFO v XYZ (Final) para 27. 
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imposed upon the enterprise?564 The role played by the courts was accentuated in 
SFO v Rolls-Royce when the court pushed the boundaries of the applicability and 
approval of a DPA even further by finding a DPA to be in the best interests of justice, 
notwithstanding the gravity of the offences over a period of time.565 
In contrast to the United Kingdom, the extent of the involvement of the court in 
DPAs in the United States is contentious, even more so after the Fokker cases.566 In 
Fokker I, District Judge Leon did the unprecedented: he refused to approve a DPA 
between the prosecution and the defendant Fokker, holding that the terms of the 
DPA were “grossly disproportionate to the gravity” of the offences567 and that “it 
would undermine the public’s confidence in the administration of justice and promote 
disrespect for the law for it to see a defendant prosecuted so anemically for 
engaging in such egregious conduct for such a sustained period of time”.568 The 
decision was overturned on appeal on the grounds of separation of powers and the 
higher court found that the District Court had “significantly overstepped its 
authority”.569 Fokker II was followed by yet another Court of Appeals judgment in 
United States v HSBC Bank which found that a court does not have the authority to 
monitor the progress of a DPA and to ask for monitoring reports to be submitted to 
it.570 Moreover, the court went further and held that the supervisory power of the 
court should be narrowly interpreted and limited to determining that a DPA is made 
                                            
564 SFO v XYZ (Preliminary) paras 3 and 6-10. Also, the substantially large discount in 
computing the fine in the SFO v Rolls-Royce matter has been criticised as being difficult to 
reconcile with the earlier judgments. See Cheung (2018) CLJ 14-15. 
565 SFO v Rolls-Royce paras 35-37 and particularly the conclusion reached in paras 61-67. 
Despite stating “(m)y reaction when first considering these papers was that if Rolls-Royce 
were not to be prosecuted in the context of such egregious criminality over decades, 
involving countries around the world, making truly vast corrupt payments and, 
consequentially, even greater profits, then it was difficulty to see when any company would 
be prosecuted;” the court still found a DPA to be in the interests of justice. 
566 The District Court judgment of 2015 United States v Fokker Services BV 79 F Supp 3d 
160 (DDC 2015) (“Fokker I”), overturned by the appellate court United States v Fokker 
Services BV 818 F 3d 733 (DC Cir 2016) (“Fokker II”). For a detailed analysis of these cases 
see Reilly (2017) Utah L Rev 848-851 and 853-878. 
567 Fokker I at 167. 
568 Fokker I at 167. 
569 Fokker II at 747. 
570 863 F 3d 125 (2 Cir 2017) 136 and 137. 
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in good faith and genuinely intended to allow a defendant to demonstrate his good 
conduct; it does not extend to the court considering public policy matters in approving 
a DPA.571 The perennial issue of the discretion of the prosecution, and the 
relationship between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary is highlighted in 
the use of DPAs in the United States.572 Particularly, the seemingly unfettered power 
of the prosecution in the conclusion, and even extension of DPAs, seems to be 
virtually unlimited and is receiving criticism from two opposing camps.573 The effect 
of Fokker II and United States v HSBC (2017) is that the court does not have the 
authority to reject DPAs.574 Zendeh graphically states that the issue is not that the 
                                            
571 863 F3d 125 (2 Cir 2017) 137 and 138. This echoes the interpretation of limited review of 
the court in United States v Saena Corp 40 F Supp 3d 11 (DDC 2015) 30 and 31. 
572 Zendeh discusses this issue in depth and concludes that Congress, the legislature, is 
authorised to and should regulate the powers of the executive by making provision for 
increased judicial review through legislation. See ZA Zendeh “Can Congress Authorize 
Judicial Review of Deferred Prosecution and Nonprosecution Agreements? And does it need 
to?” (2017) 95 Tex L Rev 1451-1485. It is to be noted that in the United States the 
prosecution is considered to form part of the executive. See Bekker (1996) CILSA 187-192 
for a discussion on the role of the judge and prosecutor in the United States, particularly in 
plea negotiation, the discretion of the prosecutor and the difference between prosecutors in 
the United States and Europe. This issue, specifically the power of the prosecutor, is 
discussed above in para 4 4 and again below in para 5. 
573 Zendeh helpfully refers to the powers of the executive as “nonprosecution discretion” as 
he argues that this is a more accurate description of the “discretionary and plenary power 
not to prosecute” which is sacrosanct in the criminal justice system in the United States. 
Zendeh further identifies two camps of critics. On the one side are abuse critics who 
advocate that the prosecution could coerce corporations into concluding unfair and unjust 
DPAs. On the other side, the leniency critics argue that the prosecution is influenced by the 
power of the corporations and that the terms of DPAs are not strict enough. Zendeh (2017) 
Tex L Rev 1453, 1457-1462. Also see Nasar (2017) N Y U J L & Liberty 878-882; Reilly 
(2017) Utah L Rev 842-843. Reilly 839-840 and 878-883, moreover raises concerns about 
the limitations Fokker II places on a court’s power to review and warns that such limitations 
result in underscoring the unfettered discretion of the prosecution and could lead to the 
relegation of public interest and the reduction of the principle of separation of powers. 
Koehler (2015) U C D L Rev 557-560 also warns of the disturbing trend of DPA 
jurisprudence developing outside the courts and the DOJ simultaneously fulfilling the role of 
prosecutor, judge and jury.  
574 This limitation on the court’s discretion results in judges becoming rubber stamps. Nasar 
(2017) NYUJL & Liberty 843. Also see Reilly (2017) Utah L Rev 840. 
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prosecution is playing with the judiciary’s toys, but that the court is “being shut out 
the playpen altogether”.575  
The DPAs concluded in the Rolls-Royce matters are Illustrative of the different 
approaches to the conclusion of DPAs and the role played by the court and 
prosecution in the United States and the United Kingdom.576 In December 2016, the 
United States District Court approved a DPA between United States of America v 
Rolls-Royce plc,577 (“United States v Rolls-Royce DPA”) whilst on 17 January 2017 
the Crown Court approved a DPA in SFO v Rolls-Royce. The latter case is indicative 
of the court weighing up and evaluating the use of a DPA and the terms of the DPA 
against the statutory requirements that a DPA needs to be in the interests of the 
public and that its terms be fair, reasonable and proportionate. The documents 
available in the United States are only the charge sheet, the actual DPA agreement 
and a press release statement.578 These are, however, simply descriptive, leaving 
the public uninformed of the actual application and appraisal of the terms of the DPA 
                                            
575 Zendeh (2017) Tex L Rev 1480. 
576 The investigation involving bribery and corruption offences by Rolls-Royce was a global 
undertaking and DPAs were concluded between Rolls-Royce and authorities in the United 
States, Brazil and England. The DPA between the United States DOJ and Rolls-Royce was 
approved on 20 December 2016, and took into account terms, including financial orders of 
the leniency agreement between the Brazilian Ministério Público Federal (“MPF”) and Rolls-
Royce (see para 128 of SFO v Rolls-Royce). The United States’ DPA was only unsealed on 
publication of the judgment regarding the English DPA between the SFO and Rolls-Royce. 
The global financial sanctions against Rolls-Royce amounted to over US $800 million, 
including approximately US $170 million paid in terms of the United States v Roll-Royce, a 
penalty of approximately US $25,6 million paid to the MPF and almost £500,000 paid in 
terms of SFO v Rolls-Royce. See DOJ “Rolls-Royce plc Agrees to Pay $170 Million Criminal 
Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Case” (17-01-2017) United States DOJ 
<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/rolls-royce-plc-agrees-pay-170-million-criminal-penalty-
resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act> (02-08-2018); Editor “Rolls Royce to pay $810 Million 
to Get Prosecutions Deferred in Bribery Case” (17-01-2017) Corporate Crime Reporter 
<https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/?s=Rolls+Royce+to+get+prosecutions+deferred> 
(accessed 02-08-2018). 
577 Case No. 2:16 cr 247 in the US District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Eastern 
Division. 
578 United States of America v Rolls-Royce plc Case No. 2:16 cr 247 para 4, including sub-
paras 4a-4k, in the US District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Eastern Division, 
available on the DOJ website at <https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/fcpa/cases/rolls-
royce-plc” (accessed 30-01-2019),  
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against the DOJ policies and guidelines. This is indicative of the lack of transparency 
in the conclusion of DPAs in the United States, which confirms the unchecked power 
of the prosecution. The worrying ambiguity regarding the use of DPAs and the role of 
the courts presently prevailing in the United States appears to reflect the result of 
DPAs being introduced through the backdoor through legislation drafted for a 
different purpose.579 The path taken by other jurisdictions to specifically provide for 
DPAs, and, moreover, to specifically provide for judicial approval, is consequently 
preferable.580 Indeed, this has been advocated by some judges and academics in 
the United States.581  
Lack of transparency is a criticism against the use of DPAs, particularly in the 
United States. The assertion has been that little detail is known about the 
negotiations between the prosecutor and the company involved.582 In contrast, the 
DPA Code of Practice in the England specifically states that “(t)ransparency remains 
a key aspect of the success and proper operation of DPAs”583 and provision is made 
for the publication of court decisions and agreements.584 The proceedings with 
regard to the preliminary court approval in terms of paragraph 7 of Schedule 17 are 
                                            
579As discussed above, the Speedy Trial Act was introduced to make provision for pre-trial 
diversion programmes focused on rehabilitation for individuals with a certain profile and from 
backgrounds with socio-economic challenges.  
580 These jurisdictions include France, Canada, Argentina and Australia. See above 246-
247. 
581 See above regarding the concerns voiced and calls made by Pooler J in the United 
States v HSBC (2017) and Sullivan J in United States v Saena Corp 40 F Supp 3d 11 (DDC 
2015) 29-31 and 37-47. Also see Nasar (2017) NYUJL & Liberty 883-885, 889; Reilly (2017) 
Utah L Rev 878-883; Zendeh (2017) Tex L Rev 1485; PC Henry “Individual Accountability for 
Corporate Crimes after the Yates Memo: Deferred Prosecution Agreements & Criminal 
Justice Reform” (2016) 6 Am U Bus L Rev 153 165-167. 
582 Koehler (2015) 49 UCD l Rev 527-528; Buell (2018) N C L Rev 852. 
583 Para 16.1 of DPA Code of Practice. 
584 Paras 8(7), 9(5)-(8), 10(7)-10(8) read with para 12 of Schedule 17 and para 16 of the 
DPA Code of Practice. The provisions regarding publication are discussed in detail by the 
court in SFO v Tesco paras 107-114. Notably, in Australia, publication of a DPA is required 
even if it is not laid before an open court. See s 17D(7) of the Australian Combatting 
Corporate Crime Bill 2017. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
271 
 
held in private.585 The initial application in terms of paragraph 8(1) of Schedule 17 for 
the final approval of a DPA is in also heard in private.586 This is understandable as 
privacy needs to be maintained in the event of the court refusing an application in 
terms of paragraph 8(1) of Schedule 17. But if a court approves a DPA and makes a 
declaration in terms of paragraph 8(1) of Schedule 17, it has to do so in open 
court.587 The court retains the discretion to postpone the publication to avoid 
prejudicing any legal proceedings.588 Transparency through open court hearings and 
publication of the DPAs and court judgments contributes to building the public’s 
confidence in the DPA mechanism.589 It also serves to incentivise other corporations 
to self-report and to cooperate with the SFO and other authorities, and to 
                                            
585 Para 7(4) of Schedule 17. The preliminary hearing judgment is usually only published 
upon the final approval of the DPA by the court. Consequently the publication of the 
preliminary and final judgments occurs simultaneously. Also see para 11 of the DPA Code of 
Practice. The court may order any part of the DPA to be kept confidential (see para 11.3 of 
DPA Code of Practice) and application for private hearings may be made (para 15 of the 
DPA Code of Practice).  
586 Para 8(5) of Schedule 17; SFO v Tesco para 108. 
587 Para 8(6) of Schedule 17. Also see para 8(7) of Schedule 17, which prescribes that a 
prosecutor has to publish the DPA, the declaration and reasons of the court, and in the event 
of the court having initially declined to approve a DPA, the reasons for such refusal.  
588 Para 12 of Schedule 17; SFO v Tesco para 110. Publication may also be prohibited by 
other enactments, like s 4 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981. This was the case in the DPA 
between the SFO and Tesco, which was not published initially because of a court order, 
pending the finalisation of criminal charges against three of Tesco’s executives. Leveson P 
(paras 111-114) postponed the publication of the DPA, the statement of facts, and reporting 
of the proceedings in the public hearing in terms of para 12 of Schedule 17 and s 4 of the 
Contempt of Court Act. These documents were finally published on 23 January 2019 after 
the criminal charges against three senior executives were decided. See SFO “SFO agrees 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Tesco” (10-04-2017) SFO News Releases 
<https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2017/04/10/sfo-agrees-deferred-prosecution-agreement-with-
tesco/>; SFO “Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the SFO and Tesco Published” 
(23-01-2019) SFO News Releases <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2019/01/23/deferred-
prosecution-agreement-between-the-sfo-and-tesco-published/>. Another illustration is the 
DPA in SFO v XYZ Ltd, where the DPA was published but the SME was not named due to 
ongoing legal proceedings. See SFO “SFO Secures Second DPA” (08-07-2016) SFO News 
Releases <https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2016/07/08/sfo-secures-second-dpa/> (all accessed 06-
02-2019). 
589 Milford “Deferred Prosecution Agreements – the Perspective from England and Wales” 
SFO Speeches. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
272 
 
demonstrate to shareholders, customers and employees of the opportunities and 
consequences of DPAs.590 
The statutory obligation to publish the terms of a DPA in England has caused 
some controversy in the SFO v Tesco matter. All three former senior executives of 
Tesco were acquitted because of the lack of evidence against them.591 The 
controversy is based on the publication of the Tesco DPA and the Tesco Statement 
of Facts which clearly names and provides details of the alleged wrongdoing by the 
three persons. Ironically, on the day that the third accused was acquitted, the Tesco 
DPA and Tesco Statement of Facts were published.592 The difference of opinion 
regarding the facts between the court which approved the DPA and the criminal 
court is puzzling. In the criminal trial court, Sir John Royce found that in crucial 
areas, the prosecution’s case was so weak that no reasonable jury, properly 
directed, could find the accused guilty.593 However, in SFO v Tesco, in the judgment 
approving the DPA, Leveson P had previously given credit and recognition to the 
                                            
590 Leveson P remarked on openness and the importance and benefits of the public process: 
SFO v XYZ Ltd (Preliminary) para 45 and SFO v XYZ Ltd (Final) para 28. The importance of 
self-reporting and compliance have been underlined by the SFO. See Milford “Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements – the Perspective from England and Wales” SFO Speeches; 
Milford “Alun Milford on Deferred Prosecution Agreements” SFO Speeches. 
591 Charges against two of the employees, Bush and Scouler, were dismissed by the trial 
court under s 6 of the Criminal Justice Act which provides that a judge may dismiss charges 
if it appears to the judge that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient for a 
jury to properly convict an accused. This dismissal was confirmed by the Court of Appeal on 
in R v Bush, Scouler Case no. 2018049021 C1 (30-01-2019) paras 5-7 & 143. The third 
accused, Rogberg, was “super acquitted’ in the sense that the SFO offered no evidence 
against him at a hearing on 23 January 2019. See SFO “Tesco plc” (23-01-2019) SFO Case 
Information <<https://www.sfo.gov.uk/cases/tesco-plc/> (accessed 06-02-2019); Z Wood & S 
Butler “Former Tesco executive Carl Rogberg cleared of fraud” (23-01-2019) The Guardian 
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jan/23/former-tesco-executive-carl-rogberg-
cleared-of-fraud> (accessed 07-02-2019). 
592 On 23 January 2019, when the SFO offered no evidence against Rogberg. Publication 
was delayed in terms of the order of postponement of publication of the DPA and other 
ancillary matters made by Leveson P on 10 April 2017. See para 114 of SFO v Tesco. 
593 R v Bush, Scouler Case no. T201606538 (26-11-2018) (“R v Bush, Scouler”) para 59. 
See also, reports on the judgment: Wood & Butler “Two Tesco Directors Cleared of Fraud as 
Judge Labels Case ‘weak’” The Guardian; BBC “’I Should Never Have Been Charged’ – 
Former Tesco Director” BBC (23-01-2019); Reuters “Former Tesco Directors Cleared of 
Fraud Over 2014 Accounting Scandal” (06-12-2018) IOL (accessed 26-02-2019). 
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“fullest investigation” and remarked that it “revealed clear evidence of what amounts 
to a serious breach of the criminal law and, without reaching any conclusion (which, 
in the light of criminal prosecutions that are presently being pursued, at the time of 
this judgment is still to be determined), implicates senior management” (writer’s 
emphasis).594 Notwithstanding Leveson P qualifying his statement and the different 
standards of proof in the two different courts,595 the invidious position is that in one 
court individuals are named as the perpetrators of false accounting, while being the 
controlling minds of Tesco.596 However, in another court, they were acquitted due to 
weak or no evidence. This situation has been called perverse.597  
The acquitted persons did apply to court to have the statement of facts redacted 
but their application was turned down by Leveson P.598 This refusal is 
understandable as the publication of a DPA is a requirement of the DPA Scheme 
under Schedule 17, and the court cannot amend an earlier judgment. However, the 
court approving a DPA does have a discretion to prevent the publication of a DPA, or 
to order the publication of a redacted version, which, for example, does not identify 
individuals. Ironically this was the case with the whistle-blower in SFO v Tesco who 
in the Tesco Statement of Facts is simply referred to as Employee A,599 but in the 
criminal trial is clearly identified as Mr Soni. Similarly, in SFO v Rolls-Royce no 
individuals were named in the published documents although the names were 
                                            
594 R v Bush, Scouler para 16. 
595 In light of a DPA being approved on the basis of a statement of facts and other criteria 
there is no prescribed standard for proof of facts. Again, the DPA procedure illustrates a 
hybrid mechanism: it is a deferred prosecution agreement of alleged criminal offences but is 
heard in a civil court based on an agreed statement of facts. 
596 The three individuals are named throughout the Statement of Facts, but in paras 9, 61, 62 
& 70, are specifically implicated in the falsification of Tesco’s accounts, and in paras 51-52 
Bush and Rogberg respectively are said to be a controlling mind of Tesco. 
597 The full quotation is: “The position is perverse. The three men have been cleared by a 
court, but damned in the SFO’s court-approved agreement with Tesco Stores.” N Pratley 
“Tesco Trio Cleared by a Court but Damned by Other Means” The Guardian (23-01-2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/nils-pratley-on-finance/2019/jan/23/tesco-trial-
proves-to-be-a-drubbing-for-the-sfo-and-its-dpa> (accessed 07-02-2019). 
598 Serious Fraud Office v Tesco Stores Limited (“SFO v Tesco (2019)”) case no. 
U20170287 (22-01-2019) 2019 WL 00295772 para 4. 
599 Para 10 of the Tesco statement of facts 
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disclosed to the court.600 It is certainly an injustice to the individuals. It is submitted it 
is poor comfort for them for the court to state that it is common knowledge that the 
acquitted persons are not involved in or party to the DPA, and that the DPA only 
addressed the liability of Tesco, and not that of the individuals.601 Conversely, it can 
be argued that the whole DPA was based on the “statement of facts” setting out in 
some detail the wrongdoing of the persons who had been identified as perpetrators 
on the assumption that they were guilty. It is submitted that much of the inequity 
suffered by the individuals named in the SFO v Tesco matter could have been 
avoided had the court ordered that no names be mentioned in the documents, as 
had been done in the SFO v Rolls-Royce matter.  
The absence of transparency in the United States necessarily also raises 
questions about the powers attributed to the negotiating parties. Does the prosecutor 
have unfettered discretion? Are very powerful companies using their power to 
negotiate beneficial terms?602 With the publication of the SFO v Tesco judgment and 
DPA, the matter and its regrettable consequences for the individuals are open to 
public scrutiny and criticism. It is submitted that the public evaluation and response 
to the use of the mechanism of DPAs in England can contribute to the reform and 
more prudent use of DPAs by the SFO and corporations in England. Public 
participation simply enhances the reform of and respect for justice and different 
mechanisms in a justice system.  
A further concern regarding lack of transparency and thus the secrecy of 
negotiations is the volume of the voice of the public, the victims and other interested 
parties. Are they being heard? Again, under the legal framework in England the 
legislator has specifically addressed this by providing that a DPA must include 
details of compensation for victims603 and the court is mandated to apply itself to this 
                                            
600 Paras 31-32. Moreover, in SFO v XYZ Ltd the approved judgment that was published was 
redacted, keeping the name of the company and the names of the employees undisclosed. 
The group of which it is a member was also only referred to as “ABC Companies” (para 6).  
601 SFO v Tesco (2019) para 4. 
602 Buell (2018) 825-826, 857; Reilly (2017) Utah L Rev 866-867. 
603 Para 5(3)(b) of Schedule 17. Significantly para 5(3)(c) of Schedule 17 also provides the 
possibility “to donate money to a charity or other third party”. These dual provisions for 
compensation and donations are echoed in s 17C(1)(2)(a)(i) and s 17C(1)(2)(a) of the 
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issue when considering the terms of the DPA.604 In addition, various policies and 
codes exist to guide the negotiating parties regarding the need to consider victims’ 
positions and compensation for them.605 Subsequently, part of the composite 
purpose of the DPA mechanism is restitution for the victims or the community. It is 
argued in this dissertation that the concepts of “the victim” and “victim compensation” 
should be understood broadly. In many instances of corporate corruption, direct 
victims cannot easily be identified and consequently in some instances the courts 
and public prosecutors have not used the provisions for restitution. However, 
Thomas advocates a restorative justice model with regard to corruption606 and 
maintains that restitution may incorporate anti-corruption programmes607 and 
practices608 by the offending company in communities where the corruption 
occurred.609 Such programmes and practices can help to have a positive impact on 
the culture of corruption in such communities. This would increase the efficiency of 
business and increase the trust of the citizens in the corporate world and, 
                                            
Combatting Corporate Crime Bill 2017 of Australia, and in s 149E(3)(b) and (c) of the 
Criminal Justice Reform Act 19 of 2018 of Singapore.  
604 Indeed Leveson P states that compensation “is a necessary starting point for any DPA.” 
See SFO v Standard Bank (Preliminary) para 41. In this case it was a term of the DPA that 
Standard Bank pay the Government of Tanzania compensation (paras 39 and 40). See also 
Para 40 of SFO v XYZ Ltd (Preliminary) in which Leveson P held that compensation is a 
“priority” over fines. The proposed s 715.31(e) of the Canadian Criminal Code RSC 1985 
places an obligation upon the public prosecutor to inform the victims of a possible DPA and 
to obtain victim-impact statements. 
605 In the United Kingdom there is: the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime 2015; the 
section on “Victims and Witnesses” in SFO Operational Handbook; paras 7.2 and 7.9.ii of 
the DPA Code of Practice. See paragraphs 39-41 of SFO v Standard Bank (Preliminary) for 
application of the legislation by the court. 
606 A Thomas “A Reimagined Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: From Deterrence to Restoration 
and Beyond” (2016) 30 Temp Int'l & Comp LJ 385 398. 
607 For example, programmes that may empower local communities by educating them about 
corrupt practices and how to detect and eradicate them through insisting on transparency, 
monitoring and accountability of authorities and corporations. See too Thomas (2016) Temp 
Int'l & Comp LJ 407-408. 
608 For example, practices such as identifying both compliant and non-compliant companies 
and sharing such information with relevant authorities; partnering with compliant role-
players; and identifying and supporting independent organisations promoting an anti-
corruption culture. Also see (2016) Temp Int'l & Comp LJ 407-409. 
609 Thomas (2016) Temp Int'l & Comp LJ 407-411. 
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accordingly, benefit the community.610 It is submitted that such participation in and 
contribution to for example, anti-corruption programmes and practices can be 
incorporated into the terms of a DPA.  
In SFO v Rolls-Royce Plc and SFO v XYZ Ltd, the court followed a narrow 
interpretation when considering the issue of compensation, stating that it is intended 
for “clear and simple cases” with regard to both the identification of individuals and 
the calculation of the loss.611 This is regrettable, and it is submitted that this 
overlooked the possibility of indirect victims and the possibility of introducing 
programmes and practices by the offending companies to help change the culture of 
corruption, as elucidated by Thomas. It is further submitted that these are issues that 
can readily be explored during the intensive and comprehensive negotiations 
between the SFO and a defendant company. The payment of compensation was 
part of the terms of the DPA approved in SFO v Standard Bank.612 In SFO v Tesco, 
which was evidently not a clear and simple case, recognition was also given by the 
court to money paid into a fund to benefit shareholders who may have suffered 
loss.613 In contrast to the statutory and judicial emphasis on compensation in 
England, enforcement authorities in the United States have been slow to recognise 
the need for compensation.614 Interestingly, in the United States a provision 
                                            
610 In addition, Thomas (2016) Temp Int'l & Comp LJ 404-407 argues that such interventions 
promote the corporate social responsibility of a company, increase investor confidence in the 
company and attract future business contracts. They are accordingly beneficial to all. 
611 SFO v Rolls-Royce plc paras 81-84; SFO v XYZ Ltd (Preliminary) para 41; SFO v XYZ 
Ltd (Final) para 20; SFO v Tesco paras 74-76. 
612 Standard Bank was required to pay the Government of Tanzania the amount it would 
have received but for the payment of the bribe, i.e. US $ 6 million plus interest. See SFO v 
Standard Bank (Preliminary) paras 39-41 and SFO v Standard Bank (Final) para 13 i. 
613 Although the payment of compensation was not part of the terms of the DPA, recognition 
was given by the court to a scheme of compensation in terms of an agreement reached 
between Tesco and the Financial Conduct Authority. Tesco agreed to pay £84,4 million into 
a fund from which shareholders whose share value had dropped due to the overstatement of 
income in the accounts could claim. This payment was considered when assessing the 
penalty to be paid by Tesco, as well as when confirming that the DPA is in the interests of 
justice and that its terms are fair, reasonable and proportionate. See paras 6, 41, 77-79, 85 
& 105.  
614 Thomas (2016) Temp Int'l & Comp LJ 399 & 400. 
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prohibiting payment to unidentified victims was included in the draft (United States) 
Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Bill.615 
Another matter that has led to different interpretations is legal privilege and the 
waiver of legal privilege,616 particularly in the context of assessing the cooperation of 
a defendant company. In the SFO v Standard Bank plc and SFO v XYZ Ltd cases, 
no waiver of privilege was made by the defendants. However, in the SFO v Rolls-
Royce plc matter, one of the criteria reckoned into the extraordinary cooperation of 
the defendant was the waiver of legal professional privilege by Rolls-Royce. 
Nevertheless, it is less clear how the claiming by a company of legal professional 
privilege will be construed.617 Could this be interpreted as non-cooperation?618 And 
how far do the powers of the SFO under section 2(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 
1987 reach?619 These questions are particularly important in the context of DPAs 
and the principles of self-reporting, cooperating with and disclosure to the authorities 
like the SFO in England. Important too for the successful operation of DPAs is the 
status of evidence arising from investigations once discussions occur between the 
SFO and a corporation.  
The court in Director of Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources 
Corporation Limited (“SFO v ENRC”),620 clarified the issue of the privilege of 
                                            
615 S 6. 
616 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the law of legal privilege or, more 
specifically, the interpretation of legal advice privilege and legal litigation privilege in English 
law. 
617 Para 3.3 of the DPA Code of Practice emphasises the voluntary nature of DPAs and 
specifically states that neither Schedule 17, nor the DPA Code of Practice changes the law 
on legal professional privilege.  
618 Cheung ((2018) CLJ 14) suggests the link by the court in SFO v Rolls-Royce on 
cooperation and waiver may be taken to mean that a corporation’s insistence on legal 
privilege could be interpreted as non-cooperation.  
619 In terms of s 2(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1987, the SFO has far-reaching powers to 
demand documents pertaining to any investigation. 
620 2018 EWCA Civ 2006. This was an appeal from the judgment of Andrews J in Director of 
Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Limited [2017] EWHC 1017 
(QB). The Law Society was joined as an intervener in the appeal. Briefly, the facts are that 
the SFO and ENRC were in discussion regarding possible wrongdoing by one of ENRC’s 
subsidiaries. In the light of allegations raised by a whistle-blower, ENRC had appointed legal 
advisers to investigate the allegations and to give them legal advice. Extensive 
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documents621 arising from discussions between a corporation and the SFO. 
Significantly, the court held that once the SFO “specifically makes clear to the 
company the prospect of its criminal prosecution, …, and legal advisers are engaged 
to deal with that situation, …, there is a clear ground for contending that criminal 
prosecution is in reasonable contemplation” (writer’s emphasis)622 and, subsequently, 
litigation privilege would be applicable. It is difficult to imagine any corporation 
practising good governance not seeking legal advice once it has become clear, or 
even hinted, that the SFO might be investigating its activities for alleged 
wrongdoing.623 Consequently, any subsequent communication between the legal 
advisers and the company is likely to be covered by legal professional privilege, 
including legal advice privilege and probably also, litigation privilege.  
Indeed, the inter-play between legal professional privilege, investigation into a 
company’s allegations of wrongdoing, and the possible waiver of any legal 
                                            
investigations were done, including a vast number of interviews with employees. Discussions 
between ENRC and the SFO broke down. The SFO demanded disclosure of documents 
relating to the investigation by ENRC and its legal advisers. ENRC, however, claimed legal 
privilege over the documents. In the earlier case, Andrews J found that most of the 
documents were not privileged. Andrews J found that a criminal investigation by the SFO 
should not be construed as criminal litigation, as criminal prosecution might not necessarily 
follow, and therefore a company could not rely on professional privilege as a defence in 
declining to disclose certain documents.  
621 In English law, legal professional privilege is sub-divided into legal advice privilege and 
litigation privilege (writer’s emphasis). The latter relates to communications in connection 
with or in contemplation of legal proceedings. The former relates to communication made in 
connection with the giving of legal advice. See Director of Serious Fraud Office v Eurasion 
Natural Resources Corporation Limited [2018] EWCA Civ 2006 (“SFO v ENRC [2018] 
EWCA Civ 2006”) paras 61-66, specifically para 63. 
622 SFO v ENRC [2018] EWCA Civ 2006 para 96. The court of appeal also suggested that 
not “every SFO manifestation of concern would properly be regarded as adversarial 
litigation” (writer’s emphasis).  
623 As was the case in SFO v ENRC: immediately ENRC received an e-mail from a whistle-
blower it handed the matter over to legal advisers for further investigation and advice (see 
SFO v ENRC [2018] EWCA Civ 2006 paras 8 & 92). ENRC’s handling of the receipt of the e-
mail in view of corporate “compliance” and “governance” principles and the risk of civil or 
criminal litigation illustrates probable action to be taken by a company in such an event. The 
inference is that a whistle-blower’s allegations are likely to be handed over to legal advisers 
for advice and investigation, and subsequent communications between the legal adviser and 
the company will be covered by legal professional privilege (paras 98 &109). 
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professional privilege in the negotiation of a DPA is specifically raised by the court of 
appeal.624 Leveson P makes specific reference to the waiver of any privilege 
attached to documents produced from internal investigations, as being one of the 
factors a court will take into account in considering the cooperation of a company 
when determining whether a DPA is in the interests of justice and whether its terms 
are fair, reasonable and proportionate.625 Indeed, Leveson P goes as far as to 
suggest that had the court been asked to approve a DPA, ENRC’s failure to be full 
and frank (and waived its privilege by disclosing the documents) would have counted 
against it!626 The inference from this obiter dictum is that the question asked earlier 
as to whether a company wishing to uphold its rights of legal professional privilege 
will be adjudged to be non-cooperative is answered in the affirmative. It is submitted 
that this could be considered to be coercive.  
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the issue of legal professional privilege need not 
hamper cooperation between the SFO and a corporation, but may in fact promote 
such cooperation, as the rules of the negotiation and cooperation are now defined 
more clearly. A more narrow interpretation of legal professional privilege would be 
contrary to the purposes of a DPA and the incentivising of corporations to self-report 
as they would be reluctant do so in the event of their legal professional privilege 
being confined. The balance between retention and waiver of legal professional 
privilege is a perilous balance. In the context of DPA schemes, the importance of 
disclosure of information and the waiver of privilege can be understood. The 
corporation does after all gain benefits by making disclosure and waiving parts of its 
legal professional privilege, including the avoidance of criminal conviction, costs and 
debarment.627 
                                            
624 SFO v ENRC [2018] EWCA Civ 2006 paras 115-117. Interestingly, Leveson P, (then 
president of the QB) the author of the three DPA judgements in England is also the author of 
the judgment of the court of appeal in SFO v ENRC [2018] EWCA Civ 2006.  
625 SFO v ENRC [2018] EWCA Civ 2006 para 117. 
626 Para 117. Leveson P refers to the cooperation of Rolls-Royce plc in SFO v Rolls-Royce 
to illustrate his obiter dictum. 
627SFO v ENRC [2018] EWCA Civ 2006 para 115. 
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In addition, it is submitted that this uneasy balance is linked to a DPA being an 
ADR mechanism, as opposed to being a simple adversarial mechanism.628 Arising 
from the nature and dynamics of concluding a DPA and the cooperation between the 
role players, more information is likely to come to light than in the case of an 
adversarial process.629 This reminds one of former Justice Sachs’ distinction that 
there are different types of truth and that ADR mechanisms, such as plea 
agreements, DPAs and mediation enable parties who participate in the processes to 
come to disclose other truths in addition to limited facts that are likely to come out of 
in evidence during an adversarial trial process. Disclosure of more information is an 
outcome in the best interests of all.630 
In England DPAs are not available for individuals, unlike in the United States 
where natural persons may enter into DPAs.631 A major criticism against the use of 
DPAs in the United States has been the insignificant consequences for 
executives.632 The main criticism has been that while companies are being 
                                            
628 In the United States, the DOJ issued guidelines to regulate the demand of the waiver of 
attorney-client privilege by its officers in the McNulty Memo (2006). Also see Buell (2018) N 
C L Rev 843-844; Sullivan “The McNulty Memorandum: New DOJ Policies on Attorney-
Client Privilege and Attorney Work Product Protections” CCBJ 34. 
629 As pointed out by Sir Leveson P in para 22 of SFO v Rolls-Royce Plc. 
630 See Ch 3, para 3 3 5, 131ff. 
631 The Manhattan Institute that reviews DPAs and NPAs has only noted one NPA and one 
DPA with individual persons in the last few years. Although pre-trial diversions with 
individuals regarding corporate crime are not common, Copland & Gorodetski reckon the 
very fact of such agreements with individuals is alarming as the prosecution exert too much 
power over an individual regarding such agreements and the individual consequently does 
not have the protection of constitutional criminal safeguards which accused individuals would 
normally have through the laws and courts. See Copland & Gorodetski “Without Law or 
Limits: The Continued Growth of the Shadow Regulatory State” Manhattan Institute 12-15. 
632 Recently, however, more individuals, 25 in 2018, have been prosecuted by the DOJ or 
had administrative enforcements imposed upon them by the SEC under the FCPA. For 
analysis of enforcement action taken by the DOJ and SEC against individuals with regard to 
the FCPA see Shearman & Sterling “FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and Patterns in the 
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (January 2019) FCPA Shearman 
<https://fcpa.shearman.com/> (accessed 02-02-2019); Wilmer Hale “Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Alert: Global Anti-Bribery Year-in-Review: 2017 Developments and Predictions 
for 2018” Wilmer Hale <https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/2018-01-12-
global-anti-bribery-year-in-review-2017-developments-and-predictions-for-2018> (accessed 
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prosecuted or pursued and pre-trial diversion agreements concluded, very few 
individuals are being prosecuted, and even fewer executive members of an 
organisation.633 The adage that a “corporation can only act through natural 
persons”634 highlights not only the accountability of the corporation through vicarious 
liability,635 but also that of the natural person. It is the latter, the accountability of the 
natural individuals, that the Yates Memorandum seeks to address: “(o)ne of the most 
effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is by seeking accountability from the 
individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing.”636 
The relationship between a company and its employees in the context of a DPA is 
emphasised by the court in SFO v Tesco: 
“[I]t is important to add some remarks about the significance of DPAs in general 
and this DPA in particular. As I have said, any corporate entity is only a structure 
that operates through its directors and employees. If they commit crime in 
apparent interests of the company, that criminal offence is personal to them 
unless they are a controlling mind in which case the crime can be brought home 
against the company itself.”637 
However, as Yates herself concedes, holding an individual accountable is not a 
simple matter for a number of reasons, including the complexity of white-collar crime 
                                            
02-02-2019). Also, Dep AG Rosenstein reported that prosecution of white-collar crime had 
increased in 2018, and charges against 30 individual defendants under the FCPA were 
brought in 2018. See Dep AG RJ Rosenstein “Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein 
Delivers Remarks at the American Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (29-11-2018) DOJ 
<https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-
remarks-american-conference-institute-0> (accessed 02-02-2019). 
633 Gilchrist (2018) Ga St U L Rev 335-340, 354; Henning (2014) Miss L J 43-45; Beale 
(2016) Stetson L Rev 62-36; Henry (2016) Am U Bus L Rev 155-156. 
634 Holder Memo (1999) 4. Also see Yates Memorandum (2015) 4; Gilchrist (2018) Ga St U L 
Rev 337, 344.  
635 In United States jurisprudence, this is known as the respondeat superior principle. See 
Holder Memorandum (1999) 4; Beale (2016) Stetson L Rev 43-49. For discussion on 
corporate liability under the respondeat superior doctrine see LE Dervan “Corporate Criminal 
Liability, Moral Culpability, and the Yates Memo” (2016) 46 Stetson L Rev 111 111-114. 
636 Yates Memorandum (2015) 1; Gilchrist Ga St U L Rev (2018) 338, 350-351;  
637 Para 115. In this matter Bush and Rogberg were each stated to be a “controlling mind” in 
the statement of facts (paras 51, 52). 
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and the organisational structure of a company.638 Gilchrist argues that the call for 
increased prosecution of individuals will fail due to what he calls the “accountability 
gap”.639 The accountability gap exists not only between the corporation and the 
individuals, but also between executive persons and lower managers. In the case of 
the former, it is the company, or in reality the shareholders that usually pay the price 
for contraventions while the executives escape accountability.640 In the latter 
situation, the executive usually also escapes liability as lower-level employees are 
held accountable.641 Gilchrist emphasises that the lack of evidence or the complexity 
of the evidence in corporate crime constitutes the primary stumbling-block in 
securing criminal convictions for individuals in the context of corporate crime.642 
Convictions in criminal law condemn offenders and as such high standards in law 
are set to secure such convictions. The prosecution needs to prove the necessary 
mens rea of an accused but it is particularly difficult in cases of corporate crime to 
prove the accused had an intention to commit a crime.643 Often it is the intangible 
                                            
638 Yates Memorandum (2015) echoes the obstacles already identified in the Holder Memo 
(1999). See too Buell (2018) N C L Rev 855-856; Oded (2016) Yale L & Pol’y Rev 52, 56-57. 
639 GM Gilchrist “Individuality Accountability for Corporate Crime” (2018) 34 Ga St U L Rev 
335 335. 
640 Gilchrist (2018) Ga St U L Rev 337. 
641 Gilchrist (2018) Ga St U L Rev 351-352. 
642 Gilchrist (2018) Ga St U L Rev 363-364.This is illustrated in the criminal charges brought 
against three senior executives in the Tesco matter, who after 4 years of criminal 
investigation and prosecution were acquitted of fraud by abuse of position and false 
accounting charges due to lack of sufficient evidence to hold them individually liable. See P 
Rappo & L Bullock “Failed Tesco trial shows that when it comes to evidence, every little 
helps” (13-12-2018) DLA Piper 
<https://www.dlapiper.com/en/pr/insights/publications/2018/12/failed-tesco-trial-shows-that-
when-it-comes-to-evidence-every-little-helps/>; Also, R v Bush, Scouler. 
643 Gilchrist (2018) Ga St U L Rev 365-366; Beale (2016) Stetson L Rev 66-67. Enlightening 
is Henning’s proposal that the mens rea standard for corporate crime could be replaced by a 
new crime with a lower standard of recklessness. Gilchrist reminds that recklessness is also 
a thorny issue, as shareholders not only suffer losses, but often reap the rewards of 
recklessness by executives. See Gilchrist (2018) Ga St UL Rev 383-384. Also see PJ 
Henning “A New Crime for Corporate Misconduct?” (2014) 84 Miss LJ 43 46-47 & 51, 82. 
Henry ((2016) Am U Bus L Rev 169-172), in turn, argues that the Park doctrine arising from 
United Sates v Park 421 US 658 (1975) that attributed criminal liability to corporate 
executives who were unaware of violations by the corporation but were in a position to stop 
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culture of an organisation evolved over time through executive management and 
boards that form the context for contraventions by middle or lower management.644 
Furthermore, contemporary corporate operations are heavily regulated. 
Consequently, corporate crime involves contraventions of regulations.645 As many 
regulations are vaguely or widely worded or out of date this adds to the difficulty of 
the state to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.646 Consequently, from a 
criminal law perspective, it is very difficult to acquire and present the necessary 
evidence that a certain senior executive committed a specific crime. In an attempt to 
address these difficulties the Yates Memorandum introduced new policies, 
particularly with regard to cooperation and disclosure by companies wishing to enter 
into DPAs. The Yates Memorandum promotes an “it’s all or nothing” approach by 
stating that a corporation can only receive credit for cooperation if it discloses all the 
details of the employees involved in the wrongdoing, regardless of position or 
seniority.647 This approach raises a number of concerns. 
                                            
such violations should be extended to the finance and security industries. For the past 40 
years this doctrine of strict liability for corporate officials has been applied in the food and 
drug industry in the United States.  
644 For example, because of a corporate culture involving uncompromising pressure for 
profits, this may cause subordinates to disregard safety measures and to take short cuts, but 
this falls well short of providing evidence of criminal intent on the part of senior management: 
see Gilchrist (2018) Ga St UL Rev 360-367. Another example is the Rolls-Royce saga 
discussed above (fn 576) involving persons at various management levels in different 
countries, which illustrates how complex a corporate culture of a large corporation is. Also 
compare the operational structure in the Tesco matter fn 673 below.  
645 For example, insider trading, banking regulations and safety regulations. Many 
investigations of corporate contraventions in the United States are in the environmental or 
health and safety sectors. For a detailed analysis see Koehler (2015) UCDL Rev 516-556; 
Markoff (2013) U Pa J Bus L 818-820. 
646 Gilchrist (2018) Ga St UL Rev 368-374. 
647 Yates used these words when she announced the new policy. SQ Yates Deputy Attorney 
General US Dep't of Justice Remarks at New York University School of Law Announcing 
New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing (10-09-2015), 
<https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attomey-general-sallyquillian-yates-delivers-
remarks-new-york-university-school> (accessed 14-07-2018) See too the guidelines in the 
Yates Memo: “In order for a company to receive any consideration for cooperation …, the 
company must completely disclose to the Department all relevant facts about individual 
misconduct. Companies cannot pick and choose what facts to disclose. That is, to be eligible 
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A thorny issue is the effect that the Yates Memorandum will have upon the 
relationship between the corporation and its executives. The Yates Memorandum not 
only places a major burden upon a corporation, but also effectively places 
corporations in direct confrontation with its employees, including executives, and 
creates a conflict of interests between them.648 In addition, executive management 
has control and influence over what information to give and what to withhold, 
precisely what the guidelines attempt to avoid.649 Oded argues that the Yates 
Memorandum will influence the way in which both corporations and employees 
respond to economic crime.650 Employers will need to choose: whether to disclaim 
their employees or whether to go to trial,651 and whether to self-report and cooperate 
or to take the chance of not being detected. Each of these choices will have cost and 
risk consequences. Moreover, employers run the risk of infringing on the employees’ 
constitutional rights in cases of possible coercion to give statements or evidence in 
                                            
for any credit for cooperation, the company must identify all individuals involved in or 
responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of their position, status or seniority, and 
provide to the Department all facts relating to that misconduct.” Yates Memorandum (2015) 
3. 
648 Dervan (2016) Stetson L Rev 125. Oded (2016) Yale L & Pol’y Rev 75-82. This is 
illustrated in the SFO v Tesco matter where former executives, Bush and Grace instituted 
action against Tesco for unlawful dismissal. See A McCulloch “Tesco Faces Unfair Dismissal 
Claim after Fraud Case Acquittal” (25-01-2019) Personnel Today (accessed 08-02-2019).  
649 Gilchrist (2018) Ga St UL Rev 359-360.  
650 Employees, who may be involved in wrongdoing, are also likely to be reluctant to whistle-
blow, self-report or challenge any investigation into any wrongdoing, knowing that the focus 
is now more on the wrongdoers, than on the wrongdoing. Oded (2016) Yale L & Pol’y Rev 
75-88. 
651 The three acquitted individuals in the SFO v Tesco matter claim that Tesco chose to put 
its commercial interests first and to sacrifice them by concluding a DPA with the SFO in 
which they were used as scapegoats. See I Quinn “Carl Rogberg Cleared in Tesco Fraud 
Case” (23-01-2019) The Grocer (accessed 06-02-2019); Apparel Resources News-Desk 
“Former Tesco Director, the Third Accused in 2014 Fraud Case, Acquitted; Says he was 
Made a Scapegoat” (25-01-2019) Apparel Resources (Accessed 08-02-2019); N Pratley 
“Tesco Trio Cleared by a Court but Damned by Other Means” (23-01-2019) The Guardian; 
BBC “’I Should Never have Been Charged” – Former Tesco director” (23-01-2019) BBC 
(accessed 08-02-2019); J Bloom “Analysis: Justice Abandoned?” (23-01-2019) BBC 
(accessed 08-02-2019). 
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the event of an investigation by authorities.652 Prior to the Yates Memorandum the 
United States enforcement authorities followed a cooperation enforcement model, 
granting credit cooperation to corporations that cooperate in the prevention and 
detection of contraventions.653 The introduction of the Yates Memorandum and the 
all or nothing approach have narrowed the principle of cooperation credit. This is 
likely to have a chilling effect not only on corporate cooperation, but also on the 
addressing of economic crime. The nature of much economic crime is such that its 
detection and prosecution is difficult and thus cooperation by corporations, 
employers and employees alike plays a pivotal role in combating economic crime. 
The credit cooperation model incentivises such cooperation and it is argued that that 
the Yates Memorandum will dampen such motivation.654 Moreover, it is argued that 
such provisions result in corporations becoming part of the legal enforcement teams, 
as opposed to simply enforcing their own corporate governance.655 The Yates 
Memorandum and its all or nothing approach could consequently have adverse 
effects. It could actually deter and not encourage corporate cooperation.656  
The Yates Memorandum has since been revised and a differentiation has been 
made between criminal liability and civil liability.657 Regarding the former “any 
                                            
652 Another risk is a company concluding a DPA and a statement of facts with the authorities 
on the assumption that certain identified individuals are guilty of wrongdoing, without 
granting such employees an opportunity to state their case. This was the invidious position in 
SFO v Tesco where the identified executives were suspended and not given an opportunity 
to participate in the compilation of the statement of facts. 
653 This could be in the form of prosecutorial procedures. The decision whether to prosecute, 
enter plea negotiations or DPAs is made taking the corporation’s cooperation into account. It 
could also be in the form of mitigated sentences and reduced financial penalties. Oded 
(2016) Yale L & Pol’y Rev 55-61. 
654 Oded (2016) Yale L & Pol’y Rev 78-80. 
655 Oded (2016) Yale L & Pol’y Rev 78; JR Copland & RA Mangual “Justice Out of the 
Shadows Federal Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the Political Order” Manhattan 
Institute 13-14. 
656 However, compare Nasar (2017) NYUJL & Liberty 860-862 who argues that an increased 
focus on individual wrongdoers may have a positive effect.  
657 Dep AG RJ Rosenstein announced these changes in an address in late November 2018. 
See “Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the American 
Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” 
DOJ; sub-sec 4-3.100 of the Justice Manual available at <https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-4-
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company seeking cooperation credit in criminal cases must identify every individual 
who was substantially involved in or responsible for the criminal conduct” (writer’s 
emphasis).658 Focus is now only on individuals who were “substantially involved” or 
who “played significant roles” in the wrongdoing.659 Regarding civil enforcement, the 
DOJ acknowledged that their binary “all or nothing” policy was less successful at 
recovering monies and discretion has been restored to civil litigators, subject to 
supervisory review.660 These revisions to the DOJ policy reflect that the DOJ has 
responded to the concerns raised and acknowledged that due to the complexity of 
corporate crime, it may not to be practical or possible to identify every individual 
involved in violations. In addition, such an “all or nothing” policy had practical 
implications in that it led to time delays and high costs due to the length and 
complexity of investigations. The revised policy allows for recognition and 
appropriate credit cooperation to be given to companies who engage in “full and 
frank discussions”;661 but those who dishonestly withhold information will not receive 
the offered cooperation credit.662 It is not disputed that individual wrongdoers need to 
                                            
3000-compromising-and-closing?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery#4-3.100> 
(accessed 02-02-2019). 
658 “Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the American 
Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” 
DOJ. 
659 Dep AG Rosenstein Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the 
American Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act” DOJ. Also see Shearman & Sterling “FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and 
Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (January 2019) 23-24 for 
an analysis of these changes. 
660 In addition, it was acknowledged that the “all or nothing” policy had only been partially 
applied in some instances and that corporations were given partial credit cooperation. 
“Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the American Conference 
Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” DOJ.  
661 Dep AG Rosenstein Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the 
American Conference Institute’s 35th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act” DOJ.  
662 Twenty-five percent discount of penalties is offered for full cooperation credit, but in 
recent cases this has been less, ranging between 15% and 20%. Dep AG Rosenstein’s 
concluding remarks were: “In God we trust; all others must bring data.” Deputy Attorney 
General Rod J. Rosenstein Delivers Remarks at the American Conference Institute’s 35th 
International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” DOJ. Separate 
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be held accountable. Nevertheless, the matter remains complex and consequently 
the reviewed nuanced approach is commended.  
The nature of economic crime and the various obstacles to its detection and 
holding individual persons and corporations accountable remain challenging. 
Consequently, a menu of alternative mechanisms to address contraventions is 
preferable. The non-regulated and broad use of NPAs and DPAs in the United 
States over the past two decades has raised various issues in addition to those 
discussed above relating to the powers of the prosecution to adjudicate and punish 
corporations or persons that have not been convicted in open court.663 Criticism has 
also been raised against the intrusive power which the executive has exercised in 
the governance of corporations.664 
This dissertation submits that the regulated use of DPAs in England is a 
commendable mechanism in the broader context of addressing economic crime, 
particularly with regard to large corporations. However, the Tesco debacle is a timely 
reminder of the complexity of economic corporate statutory crime and the risks of the 
DPA mechanism. The complexity of economic crime is starkly illustrated in the Tesco 
                                            
commentators give an analysis of the cases where partial cooperation credit was granted: 
Shearman & Sterling “FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (January 2019); Wilmer Hale “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Alert: Global Anti-Bribery Year-in-Review: 2017 Developments and Predictions for 2018” 
(accessed 02-02-2019). 
663 For example, the standard term in a DPA is that it is in the sole discretion of the 
prosecution to decide whether a defendant has breached a DPA or not. In some instances, 
the prosecution has simply decided that a defendant had not properly fulfilled the terms and 
unilaterally extended the period of a DPA. For details of the unilateral extension of the DPA 
between DOJ and Standard Chartered Bank and other cases see Copland & Gorodetski 
“Without Law or Limits The Continued Growth of the Shadow Regulatory State” Manhattan 
Institute 10-12. Other concerning issues are the so-called “muzzle” clauses that silence 
corporations and the integrity and status of the statement of facts, particularly with regard to 
possible civil actions. See Copland & Mangual “Justice out of the Shadows” Manhattan 
Institute 12-13; Koehler (2015) UCDL Rev 547-548. 
664 For example, common terms in a DPA are that a company needs to dismiss certain 
employees, restructure its organisation, change its business strategy, appoint and pay 
external monitors, chosen by the DOJ and who report to it. In some instances, a company 
has even had to report on the actions of competitors and third parties. For illustrations, see 
Copland & Gorodetski “Without Law or Limits: The Continued Growth of the Shadow 
Regulatory State” Manhattan Institute 7-14. 
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matter. The overstatement of approximately £250 million665 of profit relating to 
commercial income for a short half-year period, covered more than 2,600 stores and 
arose over several years.666 The overstatement of commercial income arose from 
standard accounting practices, some lawful, others constituting possible false 
accounting.667 The magnitude and cost668 of the investigation and consequent DPA 
and criminal trial are mind-boggling. The case spans a period of more than four 
years.669 The criminal case involved 30 witnesses and more than 400 documents 
covering 3000 pages.670 In addition, the intricacy of the structure of a large 
corporation is well portrayed.671 So too the nature and scope of the responsibility and 
                                            
665 Revised to £284 million and again to £326 million. See SFO v Tesco para 3; I Quinn “Carl 
Rogberg cleared in Tesco fraud case” (23-01-2019) The Grocer (accessed 06-02-2019). 
666 The estimated profit, as published, was £1,1 billion. The overstatement arose from the 
financial year 2013/2014 and the first half of 2014/2015. As a consequence of announcing 
the overstatement to the market, Tesco’s share price fell by 11,59% equating to a reduction 
of £2,16 billion in share value. See SFO v Tesco paras 1-4, 14. 
667 There were a number of ways in which commercial income was accounted for. For 
example, credits and discounts from suppliers could be accounted for upfront, although the 
supply contract was for a year. Some of the accounting procedures required accounting 
judgement. This meant that some accountants would find a certain accounting practice 
acceptable, others less so. Also, some of the overstatement was due to fraudulent 
documents furnished by buyers. See R v Bush, Scoular (Appeal) paras 21-24; SFO v Tesco 
paras 27-34.  
668 The cost of the SFO’s investigation related to the DPA is reckoned to be £3 million, as 
this is the amount Tesco was ordered to pay the SFO with regard to costs (SFO v Tesco 
para 103); while the SFO’s costs related to the criminal case are estimated to be £10 million. 
669 The disclosure by Tesco was made in September 2014, whilst the DPA was concluded in 
April 2017 and the criminal trials in January 2019. The obligations in the DPA continue until 
April 2020. Furthermore, Tesco still faces several legal claims relating to the loss incurred by 
shareholders and unlawful dismissal from former employees. See SFO v Tesco paras 42; 
the DPA para 4.  
670 R v Bush, Scoular para 4. Royce J who presided over the criminal trial court reportedly 
declared that the jurors who sat in on the trial and had to hear all the evidence were relieved 
from jury duty for 20 years! See Z Wood & S Butler “Two Tesco Directors Cleared of Fraud 
as Judge Labels Case ‘weak’” (06-12-2018) The Guardian (accessed 08-02-2019). 
671 Leveson P discusses the leadership structure of Tesco plc and Tesco Stores Limited in 
SFO v Tesco paras 53-58. The governance of Tesco plc and Tesco Stores Limited is 
recorded in the Tesco statement of facts paras 19-32. 
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liabilities of individuals show the complexity of executive positions.672 Furthermore, to 
succeed in proving criminal liability against an individual in composite corporate 
misconduct is highly unlikely. The acquittal of the three identified employees for lack 
of evidence shows how difficult this is.673 
Moreover the difficulty in identifying the authors and implementers of a corporate 
culture is shown. For example, in the Tesco matter who was truly accountable for the 
corporate culture of meeting financial targets in a difficult economic climate by 
overstating income through unlawful accounting practices? Was it the board or CEO 
that set the targets, or was it the managing director and the finance director, as 
assumed in the Statement of Facts and alleged in the criminal trial?674 As rightfully 
pointed out by Leveson P stripping a company of human beings means it can no 
longer have a will or ability to decide how it should behave.675 However, it is 
suggested that identifying the human being who is the controlling mind of a 
corporation and what behaviour may have given rise to such a culture is very 
complex and probably impossible in a large corporation such as Tesco. It is 
                                            
672 For example, the Finance Director of Tesco had up to 300 persons reporting to him and 
was responsible for considering more than 2,000 reports a month. See Quinn “Carl Rogberg 
cleared in Tesco fraud case” The Grocer (23-01-2019). 
673 This is illustrated by the facts of the Tesco trial. It was disclosed that not even Mr Soni, 
the whistle-blower, who was a senior financial officer and gatekeeper knew earlier of the 
unlawful accounting practices before warning the accused, his managers. The question 
consequently arose how were the managers were to know as they were further removed 
from the hundreds and thousands of invoices generated by the relevant department in 
Tesco. In addition, Mr Soni in discussions with the managers, believed the overstatement of 
income was a commercial problem and not an unlawful practice and could be traded out of 
in the coming months. Indeed, it was not the prosecution’s case that the accused 
participated in the unlawful accounting practices, but that after they became aware of the 
improperly recognised income, they did nothing to correct the figures, but insisted on targets 
being met even if it meant such unlawful practices had to continue. See R v Bush, Scoular 
(Appeal) paras 24, 26-41; 51-55, 62-68; also R v Bush, Scoular (Trial) para 5 and an 
analysis of the evidence in paras 16-33. It is evident that to hold senior managers criminally 
liable for accounting practices, which were not fully known or understood to be unlawful, is 
extremely difficult.  
674 See paras 54-60 of Statement of Facts; paras 32-34 of SFO v Tesco; paras 21-24 of R v 
Bush, Scouler. The prosecution’s case was that h three defendants were generals who 
coerced and bullied employees into meeting financial targets. 
675 SFO v Tesco para 53. 
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submitted elsewhere in this dissertation that a corporate body is more than the sum 
of the human beings representing it and acting on its behalf.676 So too, the 
development and promotion of a corporate culture is a dynamic and complicated 
process.677 The concept “corporate culture” is itself elastic and awkward to define 
and delineate.678 Consequently to hold certain individuals responsible for a large 
corporation’s corporate culture developed over a period of time may be imprudent.  
The nature of economic crime, in particular the complexity of statutory economic 
crime, is highlighted by the Tesco matter. The company was charged with false 
accounting;679 and the three executives with fraud and false accounting.680 To secure 
a criminal conviction the requirements of the criminal offences need to be proved, 
probably an unsurmountable task in a matter such as Tesco.681 It is submitted that 
this case underscores not only the complexity of corporate crime, but also the 
difficulty of holding individuals accountable. Indeed, there may not necessarily be 
any responsible individuals, but the wrongdoing may be due to a corporate culture 
and corporate practices practiced by departments over a period of time. It is not 
denied that there was corporate wrongdoing. The existence of corporate wrongdoing 
was validated by the court-approved DPA.682 However, it is suggested that in this 
case, and likely in other corporate economic crime cases, attributing such 
                                            
676 See ch 4, para 4 2 1, 163ff. 
677 W Scobie (“Questions of Corporate Responsibility: Can Hannah Arendt’s 
‘thoughtlessness’ Apply to Companies and their Actors?” (2017) 42 Alt LJl (2017)) 55 57 
argues persuasively that laws and corporate policies have the power to influence and shape 
corporate culture and behaviour. 
678 Compare the definition of “corporate culture” in the Australian Criminal Code Act 12 of 
1995 s 12.3(6): “an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the 
organisation generally or in the part of the organisation in which the relevant activity takes 
place”. Also see, a discussion on corporate criminal liability in K Griffiths “Criminalising 
Bribery in a Corporate World” (2016) 27 Current Issues Crim Just 251 257-262. 
679 S 17 of the Theft Act 1968. See SFO v Tesco paras 7 & 106. 
680 S 4 of the Fraud Act 2006 and also s 17 of the Theft Act 1968. See R v Bush, Scoular 
paras 14 & 15. 
681 See paras 16, 43-50 recording the requirements and the evidence of the prosecution. 
682 See the comments by Hallet VP in R v Bush, Scouler para 144; Leveson P in SFO v 
Tesco (2019) para 4; Lisa Osofsky, Director of the SFO stating in news release “Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement between the SFO and Tesco Published” (23-01-2019) SFO. 
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wrongfulness to individual persons by way of a criminal conviction will seldom be 
possible.683 
The Tesco saga also identifies the vulnerability of the relationship between a 
company and its executives. The risks and shortcomings of the DPA mechanism are 
also cruelly portrayed. As was shown above, the invidious situation is that three 
persons are simultaneously damned in a court-approved DPA, whilst been acquitted 
in a criminal court.684 This casts doubt on the credibility of the DPA scheme,685 as 
well as on the investigations and operations of the SFO.686 It also calls for reform of 
the DPA scheme to protect the rights of individuals more explicitly.687 The fact that a 
document, such as a statement of facts being prepared, for example, by the SFO 
and Tesco, which explicitly points to identified individuals as being responsible for 
corporate misconduct, without such individuals being given an opportunity to state 
their case, can be interpreted as infringing their basic rights.688 
This dissertation emphasises the position of the victim. Notably, the Tesco matter 
also portrays how difficult the identification of victims can be. Although the court in 
approving the DPA acknowledges shareholders as being victims, it continues to 
state that no victims had come forward to submit claims to the SFO.689 Subsequent 
to the publication of the DPA and supporting documents and the illustration of 
Tesco’s corporate culture of meeting financial targets, the question may be asked 
whether investors were the true victims? Was the pressure on financial targets not 
                                            
683 See illustration in fn 673. 
684 The assumptions upon which the DPA was approved were not supported by the evidence 
in the criminal court. See R Dixon “Tesco Trial Shows the Dangers of Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements” (31-01-2019) The Grocer (accessed 08-02-2019). 
685 J Dimmock & T Crawford “Tesco Trial Collapse Highlights Dangers of an Early Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement” (01-02-2019) White & Case. 
686 R Dixon “Tesco Trial Shows the Dangers of Deferred Prosecution Agreements” (31-01-
2019) The Grocer; I Quinn “Tesco Directors Acquitted of Fraud Charges due to Lack of 
Evidence” (06-12-2018) The Grocer; P Rappo & L Bullock “Failed Tesco Trial Shows that 
When it Comes to Evidence, Every Little Helps” (13-12-2018) DLA Piper (accessed 08-02-
2019). 
687 R Dixon “Tesco Trial Shows the Dangers of Deferred Prosecution Agreements” (31-01-
2019) The Grocer.  
688 Limited protection can be given by withholding the identity of the alleged wrongdoers as 
was done in SFO v Rolls-Royce (paras 31-32). 
689 SFO v Rolls-Royce paras 41-42; 76. 
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for the benefit of the shareholders? The executives have been acquitted, but with 
their reputation and lives irreparably harmed from the charges, it may well be said 
that they are victims.690 Perhaps, Tesco too can claim to be a victim. It is paying 
dearly, first the penalties and other amounts in terms of the DPA,691 and it is likely to 
be paying more money in other civil claims instituted against it.692  
The recent developments in the regime of DPAs in England and the United States 
reflect that tensions will continue to exist with the use of alternative dispute 
mechanisms. Koehler is particularly scathing about the development of alternative 
dispute resolution methods within the criminal justice system, contending that they 
are developing due to the rhetoric of enforcement agencies claiming efficiency and 
certainly for resolution of criminal disputes. Pragmatic reasons dominate at the cost 
of the true rule of law.693 Mixed mechanisms that cloud the clear lines of 
conventional criminal justice are likely to continue to give rise to wrestling bouts 
between the various role-players. However, this does not mean that such alternative 
mechanisms are to be rejected. It is suggested that the introduction of specific 
legislation, as recently happened in a number of jurisdictions with regard to DPAs, is 
well suited to guide ADR mechanisms and to manage the tensions naturally arising 
between the prosecution, the defendants and the public. Judicial review is a critical 
guardian of the DPA system, its interpretation and application. Transparency is also 
important in inviting and securing the trust of not only corporations, but also that of 
the public in the use of DPAs. Debatable issues remain regarding the power and 
discretion of the prosecutor, the availability of a DPA for natural persons and the 
identification of victims and compensation or restitution for victims. The courts and 
public officers need to be mindful of the thorny relationship between a company and 
its employees. Notwithstanding these criticisms and risks, DPAs have become part 
of the legal landscape in addressing instances of economic crime in the United 
                                            
690 For example, Rogberg suffered a heart-attack and describes the ordeal as lost years in 
his life and that of his family. See Wood & Butler “Former Tesco Executive Carl Rogberg 
Cleared of Fraud” The Guardian (23-01-2019). 
691 In excess of £200 million. See SFO v Tesco para 105. 
692 See fn 669 above. 
693 Koehler (2015) UCD L Rev 560-565. 
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States and England.694 As stated above, DPAs have also been introduced into 
several other countries. It is submitted in this dissertation that the proposal of using 
mediation as an ADR mechanism will, in addition to building upon the use and 
application of plea agreements, also build on the principles of DPAs and contribute 
to this growing field of additional mechanisms to address economic crime.  
4 4 2 Mechanism of plea and sentencing agreements in the United States and 
South Africa  
“There is no glory in plea bargaining. In place of a noble clash for truth, plea 
bargaining gives us a skulking truce. Opposing lawyers shrink from battle, and 
the jury’s empty box signals the system’s disappointment. But though its victory 
merits no fanfare, plea bargaining has triumphed. Bloodlessly and clandestinely, 
it has swept across the penal landscape and driven our vanquished jury into 
small pockets of resistance. Plea bargaining may be, as some chroniclers claim, 
the invading barbarian. But it has won all the same.”695 
In this section the mechanism of plea and sentencing agreements is discussed to 
illustrate an alternative mechanism through which instances of economic crime may 
be addressed. Emphasis is on the nature of the mechanism, that it is a negotiation 
process, involving a give and take on both sides of the dispute.696 As is shown 
below, it is a process of concessions made and benefits gained by the prosecutor 
and the defendant.697 However, it is to be noted that although plea and sentence 
agreements involve negotiation between the prosecutor and the defence, it remains 
                                            
694 Morgan, Joint Head of Bribery and Corruption at the SFO remarked “you should know 
that work on DPAs is now part of business as usual at the SFO”. See Morgan “Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements (DPA): A Practical Guide by Defence and Prosecution” SFO 
Speeches. Osofsky, the Director of the SFO, also affirms DPAs as being an “important tool 
in changing corporate culture for the better”. See SFO “UK’s first Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, between the SFO and Standard Bank, successfully ends” SFO News Releases. 
Though the Tesco matter has dented the efficacy of DPAs and resulted in much criticism 
and concern, DPAs are likely to be continue to be used in England. See M Walters “’Jury 
Still Out’ on DPAs Following Tesco Failure (25-02-2019) The Law Society Gazette 
(accessed 25-02-2019).  
695 G Fisher “Plea Bargaining’s Triumph” (2000) 109 Yale LJ 857 859.  
696 S v Esterhuizen 2005 1 SACR 490 (T) 493J. 
697 Discussed below 314-316; and again 322-323. 
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a negotiation process between two adversaries within an adversarial system.698 The 
purpose of discussing plea and sentence agreements is to demonstrate the 
development in the criminal justice system from the classical binary model of either a 
declination699 to prosecute, or a trial between two opponents before a presiding 
officer or jury within the confinements of strict formal rules of evidence and 
procedure. In this dissertation it is submitted that using the process of mediation in 
addressing instances of economic crime is a natural legal evolution of plea and 
sentencing agreements. Plea and sentencing agreements have laid a foundation 
upon which mediated agreements in the criminal justice system can be built.  
Plea and sentencing agreements700 are entrenched in the criminal justice system 
of the United States of America (“the United States”). Remarkably, more than 90% of 
                                            
698 S v Esterhuizen 493J. 
699 A technical term used in practice by the DOJ and courts in the United States.  
700 In this dissertation, the terms “plea and sentencing agreement” and “plea negotiation” are 
intentionally used in preference to the common term “plea bargaining”. This is because of 
the negative connotations attached to the word “bargaining” and the impression that justice 
is an object over which persons can bargain. A “plea and sentence agreement” is not a 
single act, and the process may involve negotiating a “plea agreement” and subsequently a 
“sentence agreement”. Kerscher also highlights issues that arise from the use of the term 
“plea bargaining”, particularly with the word “bargaining” in criminal jurisprudence, and refers 
to alternative terms such as “plea settlements” or “plea agreements”. In addition, Kerscher 
identifies the contradictions in the words “plea” and “bargaining” in the term “plea 
bargaining”. The negative connotations which the word “plea bargaining” raises are 
illustrated by Bennun’s comparison of plea and sentence negotiations to bargaining in a 
marketplace. There is also some support for the use of “negotiation” in preference to 
“bargaining” in the South African case law in the context of s 105A. See S v Esterhuizen 
2005 1 SACR 490 (T) at 493I-J and 494E-G and Jansen v S 2016 1 SACR 377 (SCA) para 
16 in which emphasis is placed on the negotiation-based nature of the process, though the 
term “plea bargaining” is indirectly used. Compare, however, S v Armugga 2005 2 SACR 
259 (N) at 265A-C, where the term “plea bargaining” is primarily used. Also see M Kerscher 
Plea Bargaining in South Africa and Germany LLM thesis, Stellenbosch University (2013) 2-
4; MB Rodgers The Role of the Victim in the South African System of Plea and Sentence 
Agreements: A Critique of Section 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act LLM thesis, 
University of the Western Cape (2009) 14-15; MB Rodgers “The Development and 
Operation of Negotiated Justice in the South African Criminal Justice System (2010) 23 
SACJ 239 239; PM Bekker “American Plea Bargaining in Statutory Form in South Africa” 
(2001) 34 CILSA 310 310-311; ME Bennun “Negotiated Pleas: Policy and Purposes” (2007) 
20 SAJC 17 29. CT Clarke (“Message in a Bottle for Unknowing Defenders: Strategic Plea 
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criminal matters brought to court are resolved through guilty pleas, of which the 
majority are consequent to plea and sentence negotiation.701 Few guilty pleas relate 
to economic crime, but this is not due to such cases rather going to trial, but due to 
the fact that economic crime makes out a relatively small portion of all crime in the 
United States.702 Several high profile cases of economic crime have enjoyed not only 
high publicity but political attention, pertinently after the Enron implosion at the turn 
of the century.703 In this section, the phenomenon of plea and sentence negotiation 
is briefly discussed, with particular reference to the United States federal criminal 
justice system.704 Attention will focus primarily on plea and sentence negotiation in 
relation to economic crime, and some of the issues arising from it such as the thorny 
issue of sentencing, the power of the prosecution and the precarious position of the 
defendants. A comparative view of the relatively young plea and sentence 
negotiation mechanism in the South African criminal jurisprudence is also provided. 
                                            
Negotiations Persist in South African Criminal Courts” (1999) 32 CILSA 141 142-143) also 
prefers the term “plea negotiation” or “plea agreement” because of the negative connotations 
of “bargain-basement justice”. 
701 LE Dervan “Plea Bargaining’s Survival: Financial Crimes Plea Bargaining, a Continued 
Triumph in a Post-Enron World” (2007) 60 Okla L Rev 451 452; see too PM Bekker “Plea 
Bargaining in the United States of America and South Africa” (1996) 29 CILSA 168 168-170. 
702 USSC “Quick Facts Theft, Destruction of Property and Fraud Offences” USSC 
<https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-
facts/Theft_Property_Destruction_Fraud_FY15.pdf> (accessed 31-08-2019). 
703 Enron was a huge company dealing in energy, gas, electricity and communications. It 
collapsed in October 2001, causing thousands to lose their investments and jobs. The 
collapse revealed substantial corporate fraud and misrepresentation. A further casualty in 
the Enron scandal was its accounting firm Arthur Andersen. The highly publicised Enron 
saga moved government to promulgate additional laws and regulations and establish new 
units in its war against corporate and financial crime. Notable are the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 signed into law by President Bush on 30 July 2002, and the establishment of the 
Corporate Fraud Task Force, also in July 2002. See Dervan (2007) Okla L Rev 453-454; R 
Peavler “Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Enron Scandal – Why Are They Important?” (18-10-
2016) the balance <https://www.thebalance.com/sarbanes-oxley-act-and-the-enron-scandal-
393497> (accessed 25-05-2017). 
704 The United States criminal justice system is vast and complex, and the discussion in this 
dissertation is not comprehensive, but merely focuses on certain federal legislation, and 
attempts to sketch broad strokes of plea negotiation within the United States criminal justice 
system.  
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The origins of plea and sentence negotiation are difficult to trace.705 Abdullahi 
begins the story with Galileo who in 1633 was charged with heresy, and in exchange 
for agreeing to renounce the Copernican theory that the earth revolved around the 
sun, received a sentence of life-long house arrest and reciting penitential psalms for 
three years instead of the death sentence.706 A well-known illustration of plea and 
sentence negotiation is the failed plea negotiation of Al Capone who had entered into 
a plea and sentence agreement with the prosecution regarding charges of tax 
evasion and violations of the prohibition legislation in the 1930s. When the judge 
rejected the sentence proposal, Capone changed his plea to a plea of not guilty. The 
case continued to trial707 and Capone was finally convicted and sentenced to eleven 
years’ imprisonment, then the longest sentence yet handed down for an economic 
crime.708  
Researching the development of plea negotiation in the city of Boston’s 
jurisdiction mainly from a socio-political perspective, Vogel attributes the origin of 
plea and sentence negotiation to matters relating to violations of property and 
personal security in the 1830s and 1840s. In one decade alone guilty pleas grew 
                                            
705 For a brief discussion on the origins of and reasons for plea negotiation in the United 
States see Bekker (1996) CILSA 178-181. 
706 I Abdullahi “Plea Bargaining in the United States of America: A Model for Nigeria’s 
Criminal Justice System?” (2014) 2 4 IJBLR 99 103. On 22 June 1633 the Catholic Church 
decreed: “We order that by a public edict the book of Dialogues of Galileo Galilei be 
prohibited, and We condemn thee to the prison of this Holy Office during Our will and 
pleasure; and as a salutary penance We enjoin on thee that for the space of three years 
thou shalt recite once a week the Seven Penitential Psalms.” History.com Staff “Galileo is 
convicted of heresy” (2009) History.com <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/galileo-
is-convicted-of-heresy> (accessed 14-06-2017). 
707 DO Linder “Al Capone Trial (1931): An Account” famous-trials <http://famous-
trials.com/alcapone/1474-home> (accessed 14-06-2017).  
708 On 30 July 1931 Judge Wilkerson rejected the sentence agreement of 2½ years. The full 
sentence was: 11 years’ imprisonment, the payment of a fine of $50,000, and the court costs 
of $30,000. Additionally, Capone was ordered to pay $215,000 plus interest in respect of 
back taxes. DO Linder “Al Capone Trial (1931): An Account” famous-trials <http://famous-
trials.com/alcapone/1474-home> and “Al Capone Trial (1931): A Chronology” 
<http://famous-trials.com/alcapone/1475-chronology> (accessed 14-06-2017). 
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from 15% of all pleas in 1830 to 28,6% in 1840.709 The remarkable phenomenon is 
that approximately 90% of convictions in the United States criminal justice system 
are due to guilty pleas, of which the majority represent guilty pleas arising from plea 
and sentence negotiation. This illustrates that plea and sentence agreements are the 
essence of the United States criminal justice system.710 Vogel attributes the 
extraordinary growth and entrenchment of plea negotiation in the nineteenth century 
in the United States criminal justice system to various social and political factors, 
such as common-law leniency granted by the judicial officers, and the influence of 
the religious practices of admonition and pardon.711 Vogel further argues that in the 
1830s and the decade thereafter, Boston experienced a substantial growth in 
industrialisation, which together with the inflow of immigrants from Europe and the 
consequent turbulence in society, caused a rise in crime and criminal charges. 
These elements required legal reform and consequently the lower courts were 
introduced, judges became more influential and plea negotiation, building upon the 
practice of leniency, was granted an opportunity as “a unique innovation in lawyerly 
practice”.712 Moreover, plea negotiation also granted benefits to the different actors 
in the legal process. The discretionary powers of the judiciary, particularly with 
regard to sentencing, were endorsed713 and gradually the negotiating powers of the 
prosecution were strengthened.714 Meanwhile, the defendant had the benefits of the 
finality of a case, lower court costs and concessions in sentencing.715 It may be 
concluded that the evolution and remarkable growth of plea and sentence 
negotiation in the United States is due to various factors, including political, social, 
economic and legal factors. Today plea and sentence negotiation is absolutely 
                                            
709 ME Vogel Coercion to Compromise: Plea Bargaining the Courts and the Making of 
Political Authority (2007) 93 and 95. 
710 Vogel Coercion to Compromise 3. 
711 Vogel Coercion to Compromise 133-140, 140-145. 
712 Vogel Coercion to Compromise 170, also 147-173. Vogel also argues that a weak central 
government system that led to strong local administration of courts and politically partisan 
appointed officers of the court were also factors that contributed to the rise in plea 
negotiation. Vogel Coercion to Compromise 179-183. 
713 Vogel Coercion to Compromise 176, 184-185. 
714 Vogel Coercion to Compromise 185. 
715 Vogel Coercion to Compromise 186-187. Defendants were usually ordered to pay the 
costs of the court and such costs were invariably far more than the fine imposed. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
298 
 
entrenched in the United States criminal justice system, and it prevails as the 
dominantly used but still complex phenomenon. But what is plea and sentence 
negotiation? 
A comprehensive legal definition of plea negotiation is elusive.716 In the 
operational context plea negotiation extends to sentence negotiation as well, and is 
also subject to the decision of the court.717 This is understandable as plea 
negotiation is a compound. As a composite concept, it includes charge negotiation 
and sentence negotiation. This is underlined in United States v Hyde718 when the 
Supreme Court held that the plea by the defendant and the plea agreement are not a 
single unit, but are two separate aspects in the criminal justice process.  
                                            
716 Various definitions are given in the SALRC Project 73 Discussion Paper 94 Simplification 
of Criminal Procedure (Sentence Agreements) (2001) paras 2.3-2.6. Kerscher in his thesis 
illustrates this difficulty and provides several definitions used in South Africa, the United 
States and Canada. Kerscher Plea Bargaining 2-4. Also see Rodgers The Role of the Victim 
14-15; Bekker (2001) 34 CILSA 310-311. In an earlier paper, Bekker gave a more detailed 
discussion of the various meanings of plea bargaining, and what is understood by “charge 
bargaining”, “sentence bargaining” and “concessions” and concluded with this helpful 
description: “The typical plea bargaining situation is, therefore, that the prosecutor initiates 
the agreement with an offer to drop some of the charges against the defendant or to make a 
favourable sentence recommendation to the court in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea 
to a lesser offence.” Bekker (1996) CILSA 172-177.  
717 In this dissertation the terms “plea negotiation” and “plea and sentencing negotiation”, as 
well as “plea agreement” and “plea and sentencing agreement” are used interchangeably. 
However, a distinction is specifically highlighted in section 4 4 2 2 when discussing plea 
negotiation and plea and sentencing negotiation in South Africa as two different procedures.  
718 520 US 670 (1997). In this case the defendant who was charged with several fraud 
charges, had consequent to plea negotiations, agreed to enter a plea of guilty to four 
charges whilst the state agreed to drop the remaining charges and not to pursue additional 
fraud charges against him. After an intensive enquiry into the circumstances, the court 
accepted the defendant’s plea of guilty on the four charges. However, when the matter came 
before the court again a month later for the court to consider the plea agreement the 
defendant applied to have his pleas of guilty withdrawn as he maintained they were made 
under duress. The Supreme Court found that the different parts of Rule 11 do not suggest 
that the pleas of guilty and the plea agreements are a single unit, but that they are distinct 
and separate steps in the criminal justice process (at 674-678).  
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From another angle, plea negotiation involves a waiver of multiple rights by the 
defendant and the making of multiple concessions by the prosecution, 719 and may 
simply be described as: 
“the process where the prosecution makes certain concessions (either with 
regard to the charge or sentence) in return for the accused pleading guilty to a 
charge (often a “lesser” or included offence)”.720 
Importantly, plea negotiation requires the involvement of the court in the process 
as the court needs to approve the plea and sentence agreements reached between 
the prosecution and the defence. The court also needs to ensure the integrity of the 
process and, as will be shown, the court needs to satisfy itself of a number of issues, 
including the fact that the defendant understands the process and has given her or 
his consent voluntarily. The complexity of this process is illustrated by the amount of 
litigation and the number of academic articles that have been written over the past 
number of decades on the interpretation of the law of plea negotiation, including 
topics such as the waiver of the defendant’s rights, the power of the prosecutor and 
the discretion of the court.  
Interestingly, neither in the United States or South African legislation dealing with 
“plea bargaining” does the word “bargain” appear.721 However, it has been used by 
the courts. Msimang J used the following definition in S v Armugga:722 
“[P]lea bargaining can be defined as the procedure whereby the accused person 
relinquishes his right to go to trial in exchange for a reduction in sentence. As the 
term itself connotes, the system involves bargaining on both sides, the accused 
bargaining away his right to go to trial, in exchange for a reduced sentence and 
the prosecutor bargaining away the possibility of a conviction [on a more serious 
charge], in exchange for a punishment which he or she feels would be 
retributively just and cost the least in terms of the allocation of resources.” 
                                            
719 Bekker (2001) CILSA 313-314. 
720 AM Anderson “Alternative Disposal of Criminal Cases by the Prosecutor: Comparing the 
Netherlands and South Africa” UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) (2014) 100 116.  
721 In s 105A of the CPA, the words “plea and sentence agreement”, the verb “negotiate” and 
the nouns “negotiation(s)” and “agreement” are used. Compare, Rule 11(C) of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure of the United States, in which the words “plea agreement” are 
used, together with words such as “discuss” and “reach plea agreement”.  
722 2005 2 SACR 259 (N) 265A-B; followed by S v Nel 2008 JDR 0170 (W) para 10(b). 
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It is helpful to distinguish between formal and informal plea negotiation.723 Formal 
plea negotiation is an institutionalised and legislated process, like the complex plea 
negotiation regulations, read together with the US Sentencing Guidelines of the 
United States federal criminal justice system. Informal plea negotiation involves 
informal discussions, primarily between the accused or the accused’s legal 
representative and the prosecutor, with the purpose of the accused entering a guilty 
plea in exchange for some form of concession. Both formal and informal plea 
negotiations thus share characteristics such as concessions related to lesser 
charges and smaller sentences against the accused, withdrawal of charges against a 
third party or agreement by the accused to testify as a state witness against another 
party. Formal plea negotiation happens strictly in accordance with the prescribed 
legislation, rules and guidelines. Therefore, the difference lies not so much in the 
“what” as in the “how”. The “what” that may be negotiated is expansive and as Uijs 
AJ noted in North Western Dense Concrete CC v Director of Public Prosecutions 
(Western Cape)(“North Western Dense Concrete”): “the permutations of what may 
be negotiated and ultimately agreed on are virtually infinite.”724 The complexity and 
nature of plea negotiation will be discussed below, with reference to formal plea 
negotiation in the United States and then to plea negotiation in South Africa.  
4 4 2 1 Mechanism of plea and sentencing agreements in the United States federal 
criminal justice system 
Plea negotiation is provided for in Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure of the United States,725 which makes provision for three types of plea 
                                            
723 Andersen (2014) UvA-DARE 117. 
724 1999 2 SACR 699 (C) 673 I. For a list of possible types of agreements see E Steyn “Plea 
Bargaining in South Africa: Current Concerns and Future Prospects” (2008) 20 SACJ 206 
211. 
725 This is not the only provision relating to plea negotiation in the United States, which has a 
complex federal criminal legal system, but it may be said to be the primary federal provision. 
Rule 11(c) provides as follows: “Plea Agreement Procedure. 
(1) In General. An Attorney for the government and the defendant’s attorney, or the 
defendant when proceeding pro se, may discuss and reach [a] plea agreement. The court 
must not participate in these discussions. If the defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to 
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agreement.726 Rule 11(c)(1)(A) provides for so-called Type A agreements727 whereby 
the prosecution and the defence negotiate regarding the charges the defendant was 
charged with at arraignment. The negotiation process involves the defendant 
pleading guilty to a lesser or related charge, or the prosecution undertaking to apply 
for the dismissal of some of the charges on condition that the accused pleads guilty 
to others. Rule 11(c)(1)(B) provides for Type B agreements which represent cases 
where the prosecution and defence negotiate and present the court with a 
sentencing agreement recommended by the prosecution or requested by the 
defendant. The court has the discretion to accept, reject or amend the sentencing 
agreement. In terms of a Type B recommended sentence the court is obliged to 
inform defendants that they will have no right to withdraw their pleas, should the 
court not accept the sentence.728 Rule 11(c)(1)(C) provides for a fixed sentencing 
agreement, a Type C Agreement, which the court has to accept or reject, but cannot 
alter. The court has to advise the defendant whether it accepts or rejects the plea 
and sentencing agreement of a Type A or Type C agreement.729 In the event of the 
                                            
either a charged offense or a lesser or related offense, the plea agreement may specify that 
an attorney for the government will:  
(A) not bring, or will move to dismiss, other charges; 
(B) recommend, or agree not to oppose the defendant’s request, that a particular sentence 
or sentencing range is appropriate or that a particular provision of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a 
recommendation or request does not bind the court); or  
(C) agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the 
case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or 
sentencing factor does not apply (such a recommendation or request binds the court once 
the court accepts the plea agreement).”  
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure > Title IV. > Arraignment and Preparation for Trial > 
Rule 11. Pleas <https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_11> (accessed 23-05-2017). 
726 It is to be noted that “plea agreement” is the term used by the United States legislature 
and may include agreements regarding both the plea and sentencing of an accused. 
727 The technical terms Type A, Type B and Type C are used in practice by the DOJ and 
courts.  
728 Rule 11(c)(3)(B). For a brief discussion of these different types of sentence agreements, 
see Bekker (1996) CILSA 194. 
729 Rule 11(c)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Title IV “Arraignment and 
Preparation for Trial and Notes”. The court may also defer a decision until it has reviewed 
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court rejecting the plea and sentence agreement, the court also has to advise the 
defendant that she or he has an opportunity to withdraw her or his plea, and further 
to warn the defendant that such withdrawal may lead to a less favourable outcome 
than that agreed on in the plea and sentencing agreement.730 
Notably, in the United States, a plea agreement may be negotiated and entered 
into with the defendant directly,731 whilst section 105A(1)(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act, South Africa provides that such an agreement may only be 
concluded with a legally represented defendant.732  
                                            
the pre-sentence report. Indeed, the practice is that such a report is first reviewed before a 
court makes its final decision. 
730 Rule 11(c)(5) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Title IV “Arraignment and 
Preparation for Trial”. For example, the accused may be charged with five counts of fraud. 
The plea agreement provides that the accused pleads guilty to one charge of fraud and the 
prosecution agrees to withdraw the other charges. In a Type A plea agreement, the court 
may not accept the plea of guilty to one charge of fraud, and the agreed withdrawal of the 
other charges of fraud and consequently reject the plea agreement. The court needs to 
inform the accused that it rejects the plea agreement and to warn the accused that a court 
may find him or her guilty of more than one count. The same provision applies if the court 
rejects the sentence that the parties agreed to in a Type A or Type C agreement.  
731 Rule 11(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Title IV “Arraignment and 
Preparation for Trial”. In South Africa, the draft plea and sentencing agreement provisions 
contained in the SALRC Project 73: Fourth Interim Report Simplification of Criminal 
Procedure (Sentence Agreements) provided for plea negotiation to occur with an 
unrepresented or represented accused (proposed s 111A(1)(a)), but ultimately the 
legislature stipulated that plea and sentence negotiations can only occur with represented 
accused persons See too Bekker (2001) CILSA 319-320. For a brief discussion on 
representation of defendants in the United States see Bekker (1996) CILSA 202-205. 
732 However, several rules in the United States help to protect the defendant: Rule 11(b)(1) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title IV, ensure that the court places the 
defendant under oath and advises her or him of various issues. Furthermore, Rule 11(b)(2) 
mandates a court to ensure that the plea has been made voluntarily. Rule 11(b)(1)(D) 
mandates a court to inform a defendant that she or he has a right to legal representation and 
further to enquire specifically if an unrepresented accused entering a plea of guilty does so 
in terms of a plea agreement or not. The rule further mandates the court to ensure that the 
plea is in the best interests not only of the defendant but also of the administration of justice. 
In practice, most defendants are legally represented. See Notes on Rule 11 
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_11> (accessed 23-05-2017). For a brief 
discussion on the representation of the accused in plea negotiations in South Africa, see 
Bekker (2001) CILSA 318-320.  
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The constitutionality of plea negotiation was confirmed in Brady v United States:733  
“But the plea is more than an admission of past conduct; it is the defendant's 
consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial — a waiver of 
his right to trial before a jury or a judge. Waivers of constitutional rights not only 
must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”734 
The essence of the constitutionality of plea negotiation in the United States is 
waiver. The defendant waives her or his right “to a trial before a jury or a judge”.735 
This right and other related rights are primarily codified in the Fifth736 and Sixth 
Amendments737 of the Constitution of the United States. Importantly, through such 
                                            
733 397 US 742 (1970). In this case the appellant Brady had been charged with kidnapping 
and not releasing the victim unharmed. The maximum penalty for this charge in terms of the 
law was the death penalty. Upon hearing that his co-accused was pleading guilty, Brady 
changed his original plea of not guilty to guilty. Thereafter, Brady appealed to the Supreme 
Court on the basis that he had been coerced into a plea of guilty by the sentencing statute 
providing that the court may impose the death penalty. The issue was thus whether his plea 
of guilty had been given voluntarily or not.  
734 Brady v United States 397 US 742 748 (1970). Similarly, a South African High Court in 
S v De Goede WCC 30-11-2012 case no. 121151 held: “The mandatory provisions 
contained in section 105A provide protection to the accused person who has, by virtue of 
entering into a plea and sentence agreement, waived his or her rights in terms of section 
35(3) of the Constitution to a public trial before an ordinary court and to be presumed 
innocent[,] in return for agreeing to both plea and sentence. Consequently adherence to the 
provisions of section 105A provides an appropriate check and balance against the abuse of 
the plea bargain process in the context of the waiver of the accused’s constitutional rights.” 
(para 12). Also see S v Solomons 2005 2 SACR 432 (C) para 7. 
735 Brady v United States 397 US 742 748 (1970). 
736 Amendment V reads: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”<https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/fifth_amendment> (accessed 7-06-
2017). 
737 Amendment VI reads: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to 
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waivers of their constitutional trial rights, defendants do not waive a single right, but a 
number of constitutional rights.738 In addition to the waiver of the right to a trial before 
a jury or judge, the defendant has other constitutional rights, such as the right to 
confront the prosecution’s witnesses, including through cross-examination, which is 
waived, as is the right to have the prosecution prove its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.739 In United States v Andrades740 Pooler J held: 
“A criminal defendant’s plea of guilty is perhaps the law’s most significant waiver 
of constitutional rights, and district courts must not accept this waiver lightly.” 
The importance of constitutional rights prevails after the proper acceptance of a 
guilty plea, and also applies during the sentencing of a defendant. For example, the 
significance of the right to have the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts 
upon which a sentence is based, is the subject matter of the law-changing Booker 
case, discussed below.741 Santobello v New York742 (“Santobello case”) is a 
                                            
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense.” 
<https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/sixth_amendment> (accessed 7-06-2017). 
738 Interestingly, the waiving of rights is the foundation upon which Gilchrist proposes “trial 
bargaining”. Trial bargaining is a modification of plea bargaining, that retains some form of 
adjudicative trial. Trial bargaining, Gilchrist describes, is the limited and gradual waiver of 
rights by the defendant. This includes, the waiving of the right to a maximum number of 
jurors, waiving the right to remain silent and waiving the privilege not to self-incriminate. It 
may also include negotiating the change in prescribed time limits, agreeing on the number of 
witnesses and making evidentiary concessions. GM Gilchrist “Trial Bargaining” (2016) 101 
Iowa L Rev 609 617-628. 
739 Gilchrist (2016) Iowa L Rev 614, 617-618. 
740 169 Fed 3d 131 (2d Cir 1999). In this case the defendant had pleaded guilty to a charge 
of conspiracy regarding the distribution of cocaine. The court found that the district court had 
not complied with Rule 11(f), which requires that the court must ensure that the defendant 
understands the nature of the plea (writer’s emphasis). Accordingly, the guilty plea was set 
aside.  
741 United States v Booker 543 US 220 (2005). See fn 764. 
742 404 US 257 92 S Ct 495 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971). This case reached the United States 
Supreme Court as the defendant, subsequent to plea negotiations, agreed to plead guilty to 
a lesser charge on the basis that the prosecutor would make no recommendation regarding 
sentence. There were several delays in the prosecutorial process and in bringing the plea 
agreement before the court. A subsequent prosecutor reneged on the former undertaking by 
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significant case in the plea agreement system of the United States as it 
acknowledges that plea agreements are an integral part of the criminal justice 
system and should be encouraged on condition plea discussions and consequent 
plea agreements are done properly and in fairly.743 This case shows that the issue of 
plea negotiation and consequent plea agreements is complex and that the nature of 
plea agreements in the criminal justice system is not only an expedient to lighten the 
load of the prosecution and the courts’ timetable, but, according to Chief Justice 
Burger, also “highly desirable” as it serves justice in that criminal cases are disposed 
of promptly, protects the public from criminals, spares criminals from lengthy pre-trial 
confinement and augments the rehabilitative prospects of the convicted.744 
Plea negotiation, although undertaken by nine out of ten defendants, is said to be 
coercive.745 It results in many controversies and complexities: particularly with regard 
to the powerful position of the prosecution, and concomitantly the weaker position of 
the jury and judge; the inconsistencies regarding sentencing and the subsequent 
risks the defendant faces. Gilchrist categorises the issues related to plea negotiation 
under “the innocence problem, the jury problem, and the narrative problem”.746 
The innocence problem is a systemic problem. In short, the institutional system of 
plea negotiation is an incentive to plead guilty, and is offered to both the guilty and 
the innocent.747 In the light of the difficulties of exercising one’s constitutional right of 
being held to be innocent until proven otherwise, the innocent are coerced into 
entering a plea of guilty. Consequently, the guilty are at an advantage as they can 
negotiate to plead guilty to lesser charges. The innocence problem is primarily due to 
the power of the prosecution to negotiate the charges to be brought or not to be 
                                            
the prosecution and recommended the maximum permissible sentence of one year’s 
imprisonment on this charge. In the best interests of justice, the Supreme Court remanded 
the case back to the state courts for further consideration.  
743 Notably, however, the statement that plea negotiation plays an invaluable role in the 
criminal justice system was made in the context of Chief Justice Burger highlighting the fact 
that a prosecutorial lapse, due to the heavy workload and understaffing of prosecutors, 
although understandable, is inexcusable. Properly administered, plea negotiations are to be 
encouraged: Santobello case 404 US 207 260. 
744 Santobello case 404 US 207 261. 
745 Gilchrist (2016) Iowa L Rev 631.  
746 Gilchrist (2016) Iowa L Rev 629. 
747 Gilchrist (2016) Iowa L Rev 629-630. 
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brought against the defendants.748 It is also due to the risks the defendant faces in 
going to trial, particularly with regard to sentencing.  
With regard to the jury problem, Gilchrist contends: “plea bargaining has very 
nearly killed the jury trial”.749 The deeper impact of the consequence of plea 
negotiation is the move from an adjudicative criminal justice system to a confessional 
system; and concurrent with this, the transfer of discretionary power from the judge 
and jury to the prosecutor. Gilchrist further maintains that plea negotiation silences 
defendants and that this precludes the stories of defendants from being heard, and 
consequently, the criminal justice system is weakened and undermined.750 This is 
what he calls the narrative problem.751 Gilchrist illustrates this by showing how little a 
defendant is required to speak in an open court during the presentation to the court 
of the plea agreement. This silencing of the defendant’s voice he argues challenges 
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, and further erodes compliance with the 
law.752 
In the ensuing paragraphs, further attention will be given to two controversial 
issues innate to plea negotiation: the issue of sentencing and the position and role of 
the public prosecutor. 
Sentencing, particularly with regard to white-collar crimes, has been the subject of 
criticism. Disparities between so-called soft sentences for persons convicted of 
white-collar crimes, which usually include brief imprisonment with substantial fines, in 
contrast to other crimes, such as theft by a blue-collar person, which will more often 
result in longer sentences of imprisonment. These discrepancies, pointedly those 
arising from the bias or leniency of judges, have been addressed by the United 
States legislature, and the sentencing guidelines on mandatory minimum or 
maximum sentences for white-collar crime have been systematically increased by 
                                            
748 “The real impact of plea bargaining is not, however, that defendants who would likely be 
acquitted will nonetheless plead guilty; the real impact is in who gets charged.” Gilchrist 
(2016) Iowa L Rev 634. 
749 Gilchrist (2016) Iowa L Rev 638.  
750 Gilchrist (2016) Iowa L Rev 642. 
751 Akin to this description is what Kemp calls the “didactic value” of a trial. As a didactic tool 
trials tell a story and contributes to the public conversation and debate, and subsequently 
enriches the criminal jurisprudence and the public welfare. Kemp (2014) Stell LR 436. 
752 Gilchrist (2016) Iowa L Rev 642-645. 
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the legislature in the United States over the past thirty years or so.753 Sentencing in 
the United States is notoriously very complex and the Sentencing Commission has 
over the past three decades developed a complex table of sentencing, including 
different levels of charges, different criteria that need to be taken into account, such 
as the monetary value of the crime, the number of victims, and the skills and position 
of the defendant.754 For the purposes of understanding the pivotal and influential role 
                                            
753 The Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines introduced in 1984, became mandatory in 
1987, and are regularly reviewed. For example, the Sentencing Commission raised 
sentences for theft and fraud in 1998 (Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 
63 Fed Reg 65,982, 65,982-92 (Nov 30, 1998)); whilst in 2001 the Economic Crime 
Packages increased them further [Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 66 
Fed Reg 30,512, 30,540 (06-06-2001)]; and subsequent to the ENRON saga the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 was promulgated on 30 July 2002, and mandated the Sentencing 
Commission to review the sentencing guidelines for white-collar crime. As a result the 
sentences were made heavier and more levels of economic crime were introduced regarding 
violations by corporate officers and directors relating to shares and securities (US 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual s 2B1.1(a), (b)(14) (2003) and Supplement to the 2002 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual s 2B1.1(b)(1)(O), (P)(2003)). Also see Bibas “White-collar 
Crime and Plea Bargaining and Sentencing after Booker” (2005) 47 Wm & Mary L Rev 721 
726-727; W Sloane “‘Booker’ After a Year: New Highs for Sentences, Guidelines Followed” 
(06-03-2006) Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP <https://www.clm.com/publication.cfm?ID=88> 
(accessed 22-10-2018); Dervan (2007) Okla L Rev 459-462; D Richman “Federal White 
Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress” (2013) 1 Law & Contemp Probs 
53-55. 
754 This may be illustrated by the trial judge in the United States v Olis matter taking various 
so-called enhancement factors into account when considering the sentencing of Olis after 
conviction: “During sentencing, the district court determined the following facts: (1) Olis was 
responsible for an approximately $105 million loss to UCRS, which enhanced his base 
offense by twenty-six levels under the Sentencing Guidelines; (2) Olis's offense involved 
sophisticated means, requiring a two-level enhancement; (3) Olis used a special skill, in a 
manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, resulting 
in another two-level enhancement; and (4) Olis's scheme included fifty or more victims, 
requiring a four-level sentencing enhancement.” None of these findings was proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt to the jury or admitted by Olis. Relying on these judge-found facts, and 
as mandated by the Sentencing Guidelines, the court calculated Olis's total offence level to 
be 40. Olis had no criminal history for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. These 
determinations yielded a sentencing range of 292 to 365 months in prison. The trial court, 
noting that it was "required to follow . . . the Federal Sentencing Guidelines," stated that it 
took "no pleasure in sentencing [Olis] to 292 months," but that it was the court's job "to follow 
the law." Notably, too the court's findings on the enhancements dramatically increased Olis's 
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of plea negotiation and the mechanism of sentencing in the United States for 
economic crime, a brief sketch of the development of sentencing in the United States 
is necessary.  
In view of the inconsistency in sentencing, including the leniency shown towards 
white-collar criminals and the rare imprisonment of such individuals, Congress was 
compelled to introduce the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984755 that established the 
United States Sentencing Commission (“USSC”) and the USSC in turn drafted and 
approved the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines (“US Sentencing 
Guidelines”) that are promulgated by Congress. The establishment of the USSC and 
the US Sentencing Guidelines heralded a new era for sentencing processes in the 
United States criminal justice system and initiated heavy regulation of sentencing 
parameters. The consequence of this complicated regulation was the limitation of the 
discretion of judges in the sentencing process. Ironically, it simultaneously 
strengthened the bargaining powers of prosecutors in the plea bargaining process.756 
The result of the increase in such prosecution power was also the diminishment of 
the bargaining power and consequently cognisance of the constitutional rights of the 
defendant. A substantive review of sentencing, including a review of the US 
Sentencing Guidelines, was undertaken by the USSC towards the end of the 
                                            
sentencing range beyond the maximum sentence permitted on the facts found by the jury. 
The case was taken on appeal and the Court of Appeals remanded the case for 
resentencing, whereupon Olis’ sentence of more than 24 years was reduced to 6 years. See 
United States v Olis, 429 F 3d 540, 541-545 (5th Cir 2005). Also see US Sentencing 
Guidelines Ch 5 Pt A; United States Sentencing Commission Departure and Variance Primer 
2014 
<www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/.../primers/2014_Primer_Departure_Variance.pdf> 
(accessed 27-5-2017). For brief critical discussion of the US Sentencing Guidelines see 
Bekker (1996) CILSA 196-200. Also see the discussion below (fn 774). 
755 This forms part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 signed by President 
Reagan on the 12 October 1984. The part relating to sentencing reform is known as the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. USSC “Introduction to the Sentencing Reform Act” (12-10-
1984) 5 <http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/chap1.pdf> (accessed 27-05-2017); 
Richman (2013) Law & Contemp Probs 55; Stappert (2004) Vill L Rev 695-697. 
756 Dervan (2007) Okla L Rev 465-467; Bekker (1996) CILSA 188-192, 198-199. 
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twentieth century and culminated in the 2001 Economic Crime Package.757 
Described as a milestone in the history of the USSC and the US Sentencing 
Guidelines, the 2001 Economic Crime Package substantially amended the prevailing 
US Sentencing Guidelines with regard to economic crime, by consolidating the 
sections on “theft” and “fraud”;758 revising the “loss table” and redefining “loss”.759 
Ironically, at the same time in late 2001 the Enron implosion occurred which led to 
Government hastily taken action and promulgating the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“SOX”) on 30 July 2002. It mandated the USSC to review the sentencing guidelines 
for white-collar crime within 180 days. Accordingly, the sentences were again 
increased and more levels of economic crime were introduced regarding violations 
by corporate officers and directors relating to shares and securities.760 In a further 
attempt to control the powers of both the judges and the prosecution, Congress 
introduced the so-called PROTECT Act and various policy documents.761 The 
                                            
757 Approved by the USSC in April 2001 and signed into law in November 2001 by President 
Bush. 
758 Now consolidated into s 2B1.1, which includes larceny, embezzlement, and other forms 
of theft; offences involving stolen property; property damage or destruction; fraud and deceit; 
forgery; offences involving altered or counterfeit instruments. US Sentencing Guidelines 
available at <http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-
facts/Theft_Property_Destruction_Fraud_FY15.pdf> (accessed 27-05-2017). 
759 FO Bowman III, “The 2001 Economic Crime Package: A Legislative History” (2000) 13 
Fed Sent R 3 3; Richman (2013) Law & Contemp Probs 56. 
760 Remarkably, the previous amendment, the so called Economic Crimes Package had only 
recently been approved by the USSC in April 2001 and promulgated in November 2001 after 
more than six years of intensive consultation between government, the prosecution services, 
the judiciary, business and the public. It brought about the first major reformation of 
sentencing of economic crimes in the history of the more than then 15 year old US 
Sentencing Guidelines. Scarcely seven months later, the USSC was obliged to decree a 
further amendment. See too FO Bowman III, “The 2001 Econ Crime Package: A Legislative 
History” (2000) 13 Fed Sent R 3 3; Dervan (2007) Okla L Rev 454-460; Richman (2013) Law 
& Contemp Probs 55-57. 
761 Prosecution Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 
2003. Title IV s 401 Sentencing Reform, which section is also known as the Feeney 
Amendment 2003, prohibited judges from departing downwards from sentence terms in the 
US Sentencing Guidelines, unless specifically permitted to do so in the US Sentencing 
Guidelines. Similarly, prosecutors were also prohibited from requesting or acceding to 
downward departures except in limited specifically authorised circumstances. See 
Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft “Department Policy Concerning 
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Feeney Amendment762 to the PROTECT Bill rightfully received much resistance and 
criticism and some prophesised that “(t)he Feeney Amendment is potentially a life 
sentence for judicial discretion and a death sentence for justice”.763 
Since then, the US Sentencing Guidelines have regularly been updated, but in 
2005 the United States Supreme Court struck a blow to the efforts by Congress. 
United States v Booker764 is a definitive case in the United States criminal justice 
system regarding sentencing and plea negotiation that effectively nullified the binding 
                                            
Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing” (22-09-2003) para D 
available at <https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm> 
(accessed 26-12-2018). See too Editor “Provisions of Original Feeney Amendment as 
Passed by House, March 27, 2003” (2003) 15 Fed Sent R 336-340 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/fsr.2003.15.5.336> (accessed 27-05-2017); Dervan 
(2007) Okla L Rev 255-258. 
762 Named after the person, Representative Thomas Feeney from Florida, who proposed the 
amendment to the PROTECT Bill to the effect that that there should be a restriction on all 
downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines. Stappert (2004) Vill L Rev 700-702. 
763 P Stappert “A Death Sentence for Justice: The Feeney Amendment Frustrates Federal 
Sentencing” (2004) 49 Vill L Rev 693 694. Stappert (2004) Vill L Rev 722 also records one 
judge, the Honourable John S Martin Jr, a federal district judge, resigning and lamenting his 
resignation: “For a judge to be deprived of the ability to consider all of the factors that go into 
formulating a just sentence is completely at odds with the sentencing philosophy that has 
been a hallmark of the American system of justice .... I no longer want to be part of our 
unjust criminal justice system.”  
764 543 US 220 (2005). In this case the defendant was convicted of possession of more than 
50g of cocaine; as the jury found that he had 92.5g in his duffel bag. The US Sentencing 
Guideline required the court to impose a sentence between 210 and 262 months. The 
District Court Judge held a post-trial sentencing proceeding and found on the preponderance 
of evidence that the defendant had 566gm of additional cocaine on him and that he had 
obstructed justice. In such circumstances, the US Sentencing Guidelines required a 
sentence of between 360 months and life. The judge imposed a sentence of 30 years. The 
defendant appealed to the Supreme Court on the basis that his Amendment VI 
Constitutional rights had been violated; and the Supreme Court had to answer the question: 
“Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge's determination of a 
fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the 
defendant.” See United States v Booker 543 US 220, 229 (2005). The Supreme Court 
confirmed that the statutory maximums a judge may apply are those that “solely relate to the 
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant”. See the Booker case 220, 
227-228, 236, 245.  
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force of the statutory US Sentencing Guidelines. The Supreme Court found that the 
US Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional as the guidelines were used to 
invoke the maximum sentences prescribed by the US Sentencing Guidelines based 
on facts, not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, nor admitted by a 
defendant. Effectually, therefore, the US Sentencing Guidelines since the Booker 
case carry an advisory, as opposed to a mandatory effect.765 Indeed, within three 
decades, the sentencing of white-collar crime offenders seems to have come full 
circle. The discretion has been handed back to the judiciary, who are now mandated 
by the general statutory sentencing provisions and only guided by the US 
Sentencing Guidelines.766 
A brief enquiry into the trends in the sentencing of economic crime show that 
neither the increased regulation, including higher sentences, nor the Booker case 
seem to have had a pointed effect upon the sentencing of economic crime, and as 
before over the past three decades, sentences are inclined to be significantly below 
the US Sentencing Guidelines. Dervan illustrates over the ten-year period between 
1995 and 2006 that actual sentences have not significantly increased for financial 
crime in the post-Enron era despite the increased prescribed sentences and the 
rhetoric of government.767 Recent statistics from the USSC also show that the 
departures from the US Sentencing Guidelines remain high, and that more than half 
of the sentences in the fiscal year 2015 departed downwards from the US 
                                            
765 “So modified, the federal sentencing statute, see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
(Sentencing Act), as amended, 18 USC s 3551et seq., 28 USC s 991 et seq., makes the US 
Sentencing Guidelines effectively advisory” (writer’s emphasis). It requires a sentencing 
court to consider US Sentencing Guidelines ranges, see 18 USC s 3553(a)(4)(Supp. IV), but 
it also permits the court to tailor the sentence in the light of other statutory concerns as well, 
see s 3553(a). United States v Booker 543 US 220, 245-46 (2005). Also see S Bibas “White-
collar Crime and Plea Bargaining and Sentencing after Booker” (2005) 47 Wm & Mary L Rev 
721, 722; W Sloane “’Booker’ After a Year: New Highs for Sentences, Guidelines Followed” 
(06-03-2006) Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP <http://www.clm.com/publication.cfm?ID=88> 
(accessed 24-05-2017). 
766 Richman (2013) Law & Contemp Probs 73. 
767 The average sentence for fraud increased slightly from 14 months to 14.85 months from 
2001 to 2003; while only the sentences for the crimes of mail and wire fraud increased 
significantly from an average of 22-24 months to 30 months for the same period. Dervan 
(2007) Okla L Rev 471-474. 
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Sentencing Guidelines.768 Neither has the length of imposed sentences increased 
notably.769 Departure due to government sponsorship770 is significant and this 
illustrates the plea negotiation power of the prosecution.771  
The disparity in sentencing increases when comparing sentences imposed as part 
of plea negotiation and those imposed after a successful conviction in a trial process. 
This is due to the coercive nature of plea bargaining, which some say may be 
attributed to the bargaining power of the prosecution.772 Others contend that it may 
be due to the so-called trial-penalty, the substantial difference between sentences 
imposed on persons convicted as part of the plea bargaining process, and those 
                                            
768 USSC “Quick Facts Theft, Destruction of Property and Fraud Offences” USSC 
<https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-
facts/Theft_Property_Destruction_Fraud_FY15.pdf> (accessed 07-01-2019). 
769 For example, in 2015 more than two-thirds (69.8%) of economic crime offenders were 
sentenced to an average of 24 months imprisonment, a slight increase from an average of 
22 months in 2011. This should be measured against the average of the US Sentencing 
Guideline’s minimum sentence for the same offences having increased from 27 months to 
34 months during the same period. In effect, during the five-year period, 2011-2015, the 
number of imposed sentences falling within the US Sentencing Guideline’s range of 
sentences thus declined from 54.4% in 2011 to 42.4% in 2015, with most falling below the 
minimum guideline. For a detailed summary see USSC “Quick Facts Theft, Destruction of 
Property and Fraud Offences” USSC <http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/quick-facts/Theft_Property_Destruction_Fraud_FY15.pdf> (accessed 27-
05-2017). 
770 This includes plea agreements, early plea, waiver of indictment or appeal and other 
government motions and savings. USSC Quarterly Report Fiscal Year 2016 A-3 (available at 
<https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/.../USSC-2016_Quarterly_Report_Final.pdf> (accessed 
5-09-2017). 
771 Although the majority of securities and investment fraud offenders (88.1%) were 
sentenced to imprisonment; the average sentence for such offenders decreased during the 
three years 2013 to 2015 to 57 months, despite the US Sentencing Guidelines average 
minimum sentence having increased to 107 months. Notably between one-fourth to one-third 
of securities and investment fraud offenders received a sentence below the applicable 
guideline range because the government sponsored the below range sentence, while 
offenders received an average reduction of 64.7% in their sentence during the same three-
year time period. Also see Dervan (2007) Okla L Rev 477-478 who attributes this trend to 
the increased leverage granted to the prosecutors by the Sentencing Guidelines, SOX and 
other regulations. The same trend is evident in the 2016 fiscal year. See USSC Quarterly 
Report Fiscal Year 2016 23, 25, 29. 
772 Dervan (2007) Okla L Rev 481-483. 
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convicted after trial.773 This disparity raises distinct problems in white-collar crime 
cases, not only for individuals charged, but also for the companies involved. This is 
illustrated by the different sentences received by individuals involved in the Dynegy 
saga774 and the consequences for the respective companies and their employees in 
the Arthur Andersen LLP775 and KPMG776 cases.  
                                            
773 Dervan argues that the legislative reforms have in fact not only increased the bargaining 
power of the prosecution in the plea negotiation process, but also their influence in 
determining post-trial sentences. Dervan (2007) Okla L Rev 483, 483-488. 
774 In the Dynegy scandal, senior management contrived “Project Alpha” which was to show 
a $300 million loan as money derived from business operations. Three persons were 
indicted, Jamie Olis, then Senior Director of Tax and Planning and International; his boss, 
Gene Foster, then Vice President Tax; and Helen Sharkey, an employee in the risk control 
and deal structure division. Foster and Sharkey entered into plea negotiations and plea 
agreements; while Olis exercised his constitutional right to go to trial. Subject to the then 
prevailing US Sentencing Guidelines, Foster and Sharkey were subject to sentences of a 
maximum of five years imprisonment for the charges to which they pleaded guilty. Yet Jamie 
Olis, who had been convicted after trial, faced imprisonment of more than 24 years. Foster 
was finally sentenced to 15 months imprisonment, three years’ probation and a $1,000 fine; 
while Sharkey was sentenced to 30 days imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. After going on 
appeal, Olis’ sentence was reduced to six years imprisonment. See Bibas (2005) Wm & 
Mary L Rev 721 727-728; W Sloane “’Booker’ After a Year: New Highs for Sentences, 
Guidelines Followed” (6-03- 2006) Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP 
<http://www.clm.com/publication.cfm?ID=88> (accessed 24-05-2017); S Taub “Ex-Dynegy 
Finance Pair Get Prison Terms” (06-01-2006) CFO <http://ww2.cfo.com/risk-
compliance/2006/01/ex-dynegy-finance-pair-get-prison-terms/> (accessed 24-05-2017); ES 
Podgor “White Collar Innocence: Irrelevant in the High Stakes Risk Game” (2010) 85 Chi 
Kent L Rev 77 81-82. 
775 Arthur Andersen LLP v United States 544 US 696 (2005). In this case, the company, an 
auditing and accounting firm, was initially found guilty by a jury after a trial of destroying 
documents (related to the infamous Enron case), and then fined $500,000 and placed on 
probation for 5 years. The conviction was finally reversed on appeal. However, consequent 
to the initial conviction, the firm lost the ability to audit public companies and subsequently 
became insolvent. As a consquence more than 28,000 employees in America lost their work. 
For a detailed discussion, see ES Podgor (2010) Chi Kent L Rev 79. 
776 KPMG faced charges relating to defrauding the US government, tax evasion and fraud. 
KPMG chose to enter into plea negotiations with the prosecution and concluded a deferred 
prosecution agreement. In terms of this, their prosecution was deferred and they paid $458 
million, including a fine, restitution and penalties to the IRS. Compliance with the terms of the 
agreement meant KPMG were not prosecuted as originally charged. Significantly, however, 
the firm could continue to work and audit public companies (the deferred prosecution 
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The powerful influence prosecutors have over economic crime and plea 
negotiation is illustrated by Dervan, who argued that statistics showed that several 
years after the Enron saga and substantial legislative and policy reform, the number 
of defendants that pleaded guilty with regard to economic crime, as part of plea 
negotiation, remained above 95%.777 Dervan argued that this was because the 
legislative and policy reforms had actually increased the bargaining power of the 
prosecutors; and also their influence over sentences. Thus they are able to forcibly 
bargain and secure guilty pleas from defendants.778 Interestingly, Richman argues 
that this leverage for prosecutors is necessary to secure the cooperation of 
defendants and, accordingly, to obtain information about offences relating to 
economic crime.779  
Furthermore, it is to be remembered that the prevalence of plea negotiations are 
due to a number of benefits. Almost 50 years ago, in the Brady case when the 
constitutionality of plea negotiation was confirmed, the court acknowledged that one 
of the benefits of plea negotiation for the defendant was the probability of a lesser 
penalty.780 Moreover, the court touched upon the mutuality of benefits for the state 
and for the defendant. Benefits for the defendant include not only the likely reduction 
in sentence, but also the limitation of exposure, the elimination of the burden of a trial 
and the immediate commencement of correctional processes.781 Benefits for the 
state include prompt conviction and sentencing that may be more effective in 
achieving the objectives of sentencing, while the resources saved can be applied to 
                                            
agreement specifically provided that they could continue to audit the Department of Justice’s 
financial statements!), enabling KPMG to remain viable and its employees to retain their 
jobs. The DPA between KPMG and the US Dep Jus (NYSD) is available at 
<http://fs.monadnockresearch.com/pubfiles/KPMG_2005_Deferred_Prosecution_Agreement
.pdf>; ES Podgor” (2010) Chi Kent L Rev 80. 
777 Dervan (2007) Okla L Rev 477-478; Dervan (2010) Ga St U L Rev 244-245. Bekker 
reminds his readers that the position of the public prosecutor in the United States is a 
political position, and needs to be distinguished from the positon of the public prosecutor in 
South Africa. Bekker (1996) CILSA 185-187. 
778 As Dervan ((2007) Okla L Rev 478, 483-488) says: “The history of plea bargaining’s 
growth is the history of prosecutors gaining increased leverage to bargain.” Also see 
Stappert (2004) Vill L Rev 700-701. 
779 Richman (2013) Law & Contemp Probs 67-68. 
780 Brady v United States 397 US 742 751 & 752 (1970). 
781 Brady v United States 397 US 742 751-752 (1970). 
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other cases.782 Interestingly, economic crime does not constitute a high proportion of 
prosecuted crime in the United States, but has consistently been around a tenth of 
the total of all prosecuted crime.783 Nevertheless, economic crime remains an issue 
of high political relevance and public concern and it is likely that Congress will 
continue to regulate the sentencing of convictions by regularly increasing the 
guideline sentences of the US Sentencing Guidelines, despite the departures from it. 
Moreover, the sentencing of economic crime in practice is likely to remain 
inconsistent and unstable.784 The disparities in sentences, particular with regard to 
persons convicted after a plea negotiation process compared to those convicted 
after a trial, remain cause for concern.  
Podgor785 rightfully warns against the consequences for the corporate world and 
the high risk in pleading innocent and going to trial. The dire consequences, for both 
employees and for the company, of proceeding to trial are simply not worth the risk. 
Consequently, companies and individuals may enter into plea negotiation and plea 
agreements, despite being innocent, as this is the path of least risk. This, of course, 
impacts upon the integrity of the criminal justice system. As Podgor states “[t]his 
                                            
782 Brady v United States 397 US 742 751-752 (1970). 
783 In the fiscal year 2015, 7,543 of 71,003 offenders were economic offenders (primarily 
fraud), whilst in the fiscal year 2016, 6,517 fraud cases accounted for 9.6% of the total 
federal caseload of 67,742 cases, and other white-collar crime accounted for 3,3%. See 
USSC “Quick Facts Theft, Destruction of Property and Fraud Offences” USSC. In the fiscal 
year 2015, there were 218 securities and investment fraud offenders, who accounted for 
only 0.3% of all offenders sentenced under the Guidelines. The number of securities and 
investment fraud offenders decreased by 22.7% from fiscal years 2013 to 2015. The median 
loss for these offenses was $3,454,756, of which 2.6% involved loss amounts greater than 
$7 million; and 21.1% of involved loss amounts of $400,000 or less. See USSC “Quick Facts 
on Securities and Investment Fraud Offences” USSC 
<http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-
facts/Securities_Fraud_FY15.pdf> (accessed 27-05-2017); USSC Quarterly Report Fiscal 
Year 2016 1. Also see D Richman “Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A 
Work in Progress” (2013) 1 Law & Contemp Probs 53. Others like Bowman state the ratio of 
economic offenders to be about a quarter, probably due to the different application of 
statistics. FO Bowman III, “The 2001 Econ. Crime Package: A Legislative History” (2000) 13 
Fed Sent Rep 3. 
784 Richman (2013) Law & Contemp Probs 61. 
785 ES Podgor (2010) Chi Kent L Rev 88-87; Dervan LE (2007) 60 Okla L Rev 451 489. 
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means that innocence or guilt does not frame the judicial process in white-collar 
cases”.786 
The Booker case highlighted the complex relationship between the different role-
players in the United States criminal justice system, including judges, the jury, 
Congress and, centrally, prosecutors. Bibas787 discusses these intricate relationships 
and the convoluted operation of the United States prosecution and sentencing 
mechanism, illustrating the discretionary and negotiating powers that the various 
role-players and prosecutors, in particular, have. Under the United States criminal 
justice system, in which plea negotiation plays an integral and substantial role, 
prosecutors have incredible power as they can decide at which sentencing level a 
defendant is to be charged. They are able to decline or defer charges if the 
defendant offers restitution or civil settlement to the victims, and they can enter into 
non-prosecution and cooperation agreements. Notwithstanding the US Sentencing 
Guidelines, which before the Brooker case bound judges, prosecutors have always 
been able to manipulate the complex system.788 Indeed, Bibas, himself a past 
prosecutor, states: “All of these avenues leave prosecutors with keys to the 
prison.”789 
The inordinate power and very broad discretion granted to the prosecutor during 
the plea negotiation process, which relate not only to the offences that the defendant 
is finally charged with, but also to the sentences that may be imposed upon the 
defendant, are controversial. It could be argued that the prosecutor in the 
conventional trial process has a wide discretion in any event, particularly with regard 
to the decision whether to prosecute or not. Prosecutorial power is by its very nature 
susceptible to abuse. It can also be argued that the courts inherently retain their 
discretion regarding sentencing; but this is only true up to a point and in some legal 
systems, such as the United States and South African criminal justice systems, the 
                                            
786 ES Podgor (2010) Chi Kent L Rev 87. 
787 S Bibas “White-collar Crime and Plea Bargaining and Sentencing after Booker” (2005) 47 
3 Wm & Mary L Rev 721-741.  
788 Bibas (2005) Wm & Mary L Rev 729. 
789 Bibas (2005) Wm & Mary L Rev 729. 
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legislature has imposed minimum or maximum sentences in relation to certain 
crimes.790 
The success or so-called triumph of plea negotiation is attributed to different 
causes. The administrative theory places such success at the door of the 
prosecution, and pertinently the prosecutorial power, in the plea negotiation process, 
as well as the prosecution’s powerful influence over the actual sentence, whether it 
be with a plea of guilty or a guilty conviction after trial.791 In short, the defendant has 
little, if any choice, but is coerced into accepting the plea negotiation process, as the 
alternative to proceeding to trial poses such high risks that it would simply be foolish 
to do so. A further theory is the shadow-of-trial theory, which postulates that both the 
prosecutor and defendant have power and influence, in that each of them computes 
the likely outcome of the case regarding conviction and sentence, should it proceed 
to trial. Such computations will determine whether or not the negotiation process will 
take place.792 This theory is based on both parties, the defendant and the 
prosecution, realising that a guilty verdict is likely and thus entering plea negotiation 
secures benefits for each, primarily in reducing the time and costs involved in going 
to a lengthy trial. This shadow-of-trial theory is similar to the mutuality of benefits 
recognised by the court in the Brady case.793 Dervan illustrates that the nature of 
plea negotiation is more complex, and that the different stages in the process, as 
well as some of the inherent and institutional benefits of the process, should be 
acknowledged and distinguished.794 Dervan refers to what he calls “the unilateral 
bargain benefits” that are benefits inherent to the institution, and thus outside the 
power of the prosecution.795 For example, the costs and shame avoided by the 
defendant by not going to trial, but choosing plea negotiation lie outside the domain 
of the prosecution. The possible leniency that may be given by the court to the 
defendant consequent to the cooperation given by the defendant in pleading 
                                            
790 For example, the US Sentencing Guidelines, and s 51 of the South African of the Criminal 
Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
791 LE Dervan "The Surprising Lessons from Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Terror" 
(2010) 27 Ga St U L Rev 239 242, 246-250. 
792 Dervan (2010) Ga St U L Rev 242, 250-253. 
793 Brady v United States 397 US 742 751-752 (1970). 
794 Dervan (2010) Ga St U L Rev 253,  
795 Dervan (2010) Ga St U L Rev 257-259. 
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guilty.796 The so-called bilateral plea bargaining benefits arise when plea 
negotiations between the prosecution and the defence commence. The benefits for 
and the bargaining power of the parties vary, depending on the nature of the 
charges, and the defendants themselves.797 However, the prosecution does retain 
the power to make the ultimate decision regarding what charges will be brought and 
whether plea agreements are to be concluded or not.798 Dervan proposes a benefit 
distribution theory.799 This incorporates and modifies aspects of the opposing 
administrative and shadow-of-trial theories, highlighting the benefits available to 
each party and the process through which each party goes to weigh up and consider 
such benefits. Dervan concludes: 
“This is not a process where defendants are subjected to the whims of the 
government without any voice or participation, but rather a complex evaluation of 
the barriers to success at trial and the barriers to success of the plea bargain 
itself. Plea bargaining has triumphed, therefore, because the process effectively 
captures both parties' interests and resolves the conflict in a manner appealing 
to all but a handful of defendants.”800 
Plea negotiation is essential for the functioning of the United States criminal 
justice system due to its efficiency. Moreover, as acknowledged recently by the 
Supreme Court, it composes the central and major part of it: 
“Because ours ‘is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials’, ... to 
a large extent . . . horse trading [between prosecutor and defense counsel] 
determines who goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It 
                                            
796 Dervan (2010) Ga St U L Rev 257-258, 292-295. 
797 Dervan (2010) Ga St U L Rev 266-267. For example, in the KPMG case, KPMG could 
bargain for the deferment of prosecution and the provision that it continue to audit public 
companies, including the Department of Justice’s finances; whilst the prosecution negotiated 
a heavy financial payment related to restitution and penalties. Similarly, Sharkey negotiated 
for a higher fine to be paid immediately and a lesser sentence, which was later, pending her 
giving birth to twins, suspended and converted to home confinement. [Reference.]  
798 Dervan (2010) Ga St U L Rev 274. 
799 Dervan (2010) Ga St U L Rev 274. 
800 Dervan (2010) Ga St U L Rev 297. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
319 
 
is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system.”801  
Plea negotiation will thus seemingly continue to triumph in the United States 
criminal justice system, despite the controversies and criticisms. Indeed, controversy 
is likely to continue, and whilst plea negotiation prevails as a model for effective and 
true justice, criticism too will endure, especially against the power and discretion of 
the prosecution and the disparity and inconsistency regarding sentencing. The so-
called utilitarian arguments in support of plea negotiation as it is a cheaper and a 
faster system are likely to continue to be criticised for being against the principles of 
true justice. At worst, plea negotiation can be said to be a coercive confessional 
system that negates the pivotal principle of criminal justice – the innocence of the 
accused until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. At best it is a model that 
grants benefits to all the parties, the accused, the prosecution, the courts and, 
consequently, also to the criminal justice system. 
4 4 2 2 Mechanism of plea and sentencing agreements in the South African criminal 
justice system 
In comparison, South Africa’s use of plea negotiation is minimal. This may be 
because formal plea and sentencing negotiation is still a comparatively recent 
innovation, only having been incorporated into the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977 (“the CPA”) at the end of 2001.802 The mechanism of formal plea and 
sentencing negotiation has thus formed part of the South African criminal justice 
system for the past 17 years. Although mooted as a “fundamental departure”803 from 
the adversarial criminal justice system in South Africa, plea negotiation still plays a 
relatively small role in South Africa with a mere 0,08% of cases finalised in the 
                                            
801 Justice Kennedy in Missouri v Frye 132 SCT 1399 1407 (2012), after confirming more 
than 95% of pleas of guilty are decided through plea bargaining. In this case the Supreme 
Court held that a defendant’s 6th Amendment right to effective counsel assistance extends to 
the consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected. Also see Gilchrist (2016) Iowa L 
Rev 646. 
802 14 December 2001 in terms of s 2 of the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 62 
of 2001. 
803 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure15-5; Rodgers (2010) SACJ 239. 
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criminal courts being concluded through plea agreements.804 This compares poorly 
with other countries, such as the United States, where plea-negotiations and 
agreements constitute approximately 97% of the federal cases resolved.805 
Some argue that informal plea negotiation has always been part of the South 
African criminal jurisprudence, and will remain so.806 Indeed, a robust discussion of 
the reality of informal plea negotiation, before the incorporation of section 105(A) of 
the CPA is given by Uijs AJ in the North Western Dense Concrete case.807 The 
primary instrument for informal plea negotiations is section 112 of the CPA dealing 
with guilty pleas, in particular sub-sections 112(2) and 112(3) of the CPA.808 Thus, 
according to the NDPP’s 2010 directive, section 105A is complementary to and is not 
an alternative to or a substitution for the established practice of the acceptance of a 
plea of guilty in terms of section 112 of the CPA.809 Recently, the continued co-
existence of the informal or common-law plea negotiation mechanism, alongside the 
formal section 105A plea negotiation structure, was confirmed by the court in S v 
Phillips810 and Van Heerden v Regional Court Magistrate, Paarl.811 Moreover the 
                                            
804 Being 2,587 plea agreements representing 0,8% out of a total of 317,475 cases finalised 
in the 2017/2018 period. This was an increase of more than 30% from the previous year that 
recorded 1,988 agreements (NDPP Annual Report 2017/2018 37-38). In 2015/2016 there 
were 1,901 plea and sentence agreements out of a total of 310,850 cases finalised (NDPP 
Annual Report 2015/2016 33). 
805 JS Rakoff. “Why Innocent People Plead Guilty” 20-11- 2014. The New York Review of 
Books http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ 
(accessed 10-10-2016). 
806 W de Villiers “Section 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act: A Step Forward?” (2004) 37 
De Jure 244 253; ME Bennun “Negotiated Pleas: Policy and Purposes” (2007) 20 SAJC 17 
17; SALRC (2001) Discussion Paper 94 para 3.13; Bekker (2001) CILSA 315, 321, 324; 
Bekker (1996) CILSA 218; Clarke (1999) CILSA 141, 152-156. 
807 1999 2 SACR 699 (C) 672H-678E. Also see S v Yengeni 2006 1 SACR 405 (T) para 65; 
S v Armugga 2005 2 SACR 259 (N) 262F-G. 
808 North West Dense Concrete 677C. For general discussion of informal plea discussions 
and negotiations, see Bekker (2001) CILSA 315-318. 
809 Directive 2 reads: “The procedure enacted in section 105A of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
1977 does not supplant the standard procedure for pleas of guilty in terms of section 112 of 
the Act. The established practice of accepting pleas of guilty on the basis of bona fide 
consensus reached, remains applicable. Section 105A of the Act is a complementary 
disposal mechanism.”  
810 2018 1 SACR 284 (WCC) paras 32-33 & 42. 
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courts have declared that section 112(2) of the Criminal Procedure should not be 
rendered nugatory, whilst section 105A plea and sentence agreements are 
encouraged.812 A primary distinction between the two is that under section 112 the 
sentencing remains wholly at the discretion of the court, and the prosecutor only 
“undertakes to recommend that a reduced sentence be imposed or undertakes not to 
motivate for a harsher sentence” (court’s emphasis). 813 In contrast, under section 
105A, the court and the prosecutor are bound to facts agreed upon, and in the event 
the court does not agree that the sentence is just, there is a due process that needs 
to be followed.814 Rodgers emphasises that the recognition of sentence agreements 
in the South African criminal justice system is the effective consequence of the 
introduction of section 105A.815 Rodgers makes a further distinction between 
informal plea negotiation and agreement and formal plea agreements.816 Rodgers 
                                            
811 (883/2015) [2016] ZASCA 137 (29-09-2016) SAFLII 
<http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2016/137.html> (accessed 17-01-2019) para 17. 
812 S v Streak 2009 JDR 0931 (NCK) case nr CA&R 21/2009 delivered on 18-09-2009 and 
extensively considered in S v Asele 2016 1 SACR 13 (NCK) para 13. In the latter case, the 
court clearly understood the need for the co-existence of plea negotiations in terms of s 
112(2) and plea and sentence agreements in terms of s 105A of the CPA: “The State must 
therefore be vigilant not to render the provisions of s 112(3) of the Criminal Code nugatory or 
to tie the court’s hands behind its back. … When the State and the defence intend to enter 
into plea-bargain proceedings in terms of s 105A of the Criminal Code they must go all the 
way to the sentencing phase and not stop at the verdict. Plea-bargaining is a specifically 
designed plea and sentence agreement to do justice and facilitate the disposal of cases, 
which must be encouraged” (para 13[6]). See also Rodgers (2010) SACJ 254. 
813 S v Phillips paras 40-41. The court stated in para 40: “And therein lies the fundamental 
principle which underpins s 105A: an accused is able to strike a bargain with the state 
regarding the sentence to be imposed and, once the court has sanctioned that sentence, 
he/she can tender a plea of guilty, safe in the knowledge that that very sentence will be 
imposed.” See also Van Heerden v Regional Magistrate, Paarl para 17. 
814 S 105A(9)(a). Also see S v Phillips paras 40-41; Van Heerden v Regional Magistrate, 
Paarl para 17. 
815 Rodgers (2010) SACJ 255-257; Steyn (2007) SACJ 207; HJ Lubbe & GM Ferreira “The 
National Prosecuting Authority’s Policy and Directives Relating to Post-Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Prosecutions” (2008) 21 SACJ 151 158. 
816 Rodgers (2010) SACJ 240-244. In addition Rodgers (240) describes a number of different 
types of informal plea agreements, including an agreement on a lesser charge, for example 
pleading guilty to contravening a statutory regulation under the Banks Act, instead of fraud. 
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contends that section 112 regulates guilty pleas and not plea agreements.817 There 
is no obligation upon the prosecution or the defence to advise the court of a plea 
agreement, like there is, for example, in terms of section 105A(4)(a) an obligation 
upon the prosecution to advise the court that there is a plea and sentence 
agreement. Plea negotiation in terms of section 112 remains largely unregulated and 
unmonitored. The prosecution and defence negotiate and agree on the facts to be 
placed before the court. There are no procedural rules that prescribe the process, 
and consequently no supervision or transparency of the process. The court does, 
however, retain the discretion to convict or not to convict on those facts, and to 
sentence accordingly.818 Additional differences between informal and statutory plea 
negotiations are that the latter are more transparent due to the duty to disclose the 
conclusion819 and the contents820 of such an agreement to the court; neither of which 
are necessary under section 112. Furthermore, the process under section 105A is 
subject to the scrutiny and supervision of the court;821 and this lends legitimacy to 
plea and sentence negotiation, but is not obligatory in informal plea negotiation.822  
The proposals of the SALRC Discussion Paper 94 (Project 73) “Simplification of 
Criminal Procedure (Sentence agreements) (2001) (“SALRC Project 73”) led to 
further studies and interim reports, and ultimately resulted in the amendment to the 
                                            
Another type could be where there are two accused, the plea agreement could be that one 
accused pleads guilty, whilst charges are withdrawn against the other. 
817 North Western Dense Concrete CC is judicial authority for the recognition of informal plea 
agreements, as the State was held bound to its agreement. Also see Rodgers (2010) SACJ 
256. 
818 Rodgers (2010) SACJ 240, 243. Rodgers contends, for example, that the court would not 
have become aware of the agreement in North Western Dense Concrete CC had the state 
not reneged on its informal agreement. 
819 S 105A(4). 
820 S 105A(5).  
821 Including verification before the accused pleads that such agreement does indeed exist (s 
105A(4)(a)(i)), and that the prosecutor has fulfilled the obligation of consultation with the 
investigating officer and afforded the victim an opportunity to make representations 
(s105(4)(a)(ii). The court also needs to scrutinise the plea agreement and ensure that the 
accused understands the admissions made and terms agreed upon, admits the charges and 
that she or he has done so freely and voluntarily (s 105(6)(a)(i)-(iii)). The court also needs to 
consider the sentence agreement and satisfy itself that it contains a just sentence (s 105A(7) 
and 105A(8). Also see Rodgers (2010) SACJ 250-254. 
822 Lubbe & Ferreira (2008) 21 SACJ 158. 
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CPA and the introduction by the legislature of section 105A in the CPA in December 
2001.823 Presently, the CPA makes provision for formal plea and sentence 
agreements in terms of section 105A,824 which needs to be read together with the 
current directives issued by the NDPP in terms of section 105(A)(11).825 
The positive position, purpose and an illustrative description of formal plea and 
sentencing process in South Africa is given by the Supreme Court in S v DJ:826  
“The purpose of the plea bargaining process is to afford the parties, in advance, 
an opportunity to make an informed decision regarding whether to agree to and 
abide by the agreement. This process entails consultation with all the people 
involved in the offence, the accused, the complainant, the victim and 
stakeholders which the prosecution deem relevant for the proper determination 
of the sentence. Evidently, once plea negotiations are entered into and, in the 
spirit of transparency, the accused will make his defence known to the State 
which will, in turn, make available the contents of its dockets to the accused. In 
that way both parties will have a fair idea of each other’s case. The negotiations 
are conducted in the spirit of give and take[:] the accused will make certain 
concessions and if the State is satisfied with his explanation, it will then accept 
the negotiated plea on the basis of the available facts. There is no doubt that a 
properly negotiated plea will yield a result which is transparent to all the 
stakeholders and one that is in the interests of justice.” 
De Villiers827 splits the process of plea negotiation in terms of section 105(A) into 
five stages. The first stage entails the negotiations between the parties regarding a 
plea and sentence agreement. The following three stages involve the court, which 
initially has to verify that all the requirements for a valid plea and sentencing 
agreement have been met; and which subsequently first considers the plea 
agreement and thereafter the sentencing agreement. The fifth stage covers the 
reporting and recordkeeping of pleas and sentencing agreements.  
                                            
823 Rodgers (2010) SACJ 243-244.  
824 For a summary of the s 105A plea and sentence agreement process, see De Villiers 
(2004) DJ 244. Also see Rodgers (2010) SACJ 245-255; Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 15-3-
15-10. 
825 The current directives were tabled in parliament on 22 October 2010. 
826 2016 1 SACR 377 (SCA) para 16. 
827 De Villiers (2004) DJ 245. 
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The first stage of negotiation has to be between a duly authorised prosecutor828 
and a represented accused and involves reaching an agreement with regard to both 
the plea and sentence in terms of section 105A(1)(a) of the CPA.829 There are three 
specific obligations upon the prosecutor.830 The prosecutor needs to consult with the 
investigating officer,831 exercise her or his discretion with regard to the 
appropriateness of a plea and sentence agreement in the light of certain factors,832 
and afford the complainant an opportunity to make representations.833 Significantly 
the prosecutor’s discretion in terms of the obligation to consult with the investigating 
                                            
828 A prosecutor authorised in writing by the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(“NDPP”) (s 105A(1)(a)). This provision must be read with Directive 6 which provides that an 
unauthorised prosecutor who receives a request for plea and sentence negotiations should 
refer the matter to an authorised prosecutor. Directive 7 further provides that a s 105A 
agreement may not be considered in cases which the NDPP or DPP has instructed should 
be prosecuted without the specific authorisation of the NDPP or relevant DPP. Directive 13 
provides that only a DPP or a Deputy DPP may authorise a plea and sentence agreement 
which deviates from a prescribed minimum sentence. Also see S v Sassin (para 10) holding 
that such “proof of authority is an essential prerequisite for a plea agreement under sec. 
105A”; followed by S v Knight 2017 2 SACR 583 (GP) where no certificate of authorisation 
by the NDPP had been handed in to the court, which constitutes an irregularity (paras 6-8 
and 13-14). Also see Du Toit Commentary on the CPA 15-22 regarding the compliance with 
directives from the NDPP. 
829 Du Toit Commentary on the CPA emphasises that s 105A is only activated with regard to 
a plea and sentence agreement, not one or the other, but both. Also see Rodgers (2010) 
SACJ 256-257. One of the requirements that needs to be met during this stage of 
negotiation and concluding an agreement is that the agreement reached needs to be 
reduced to writing and signed by all the parties under s 105(A)(2). For examples of such plea 
and sentencing agreements, see Maddock v S WCHC 26-11-2010 case no. A641/2010, 
Exhibit A and S v Madisha 2016 JDR 0049 (GP) (para 22). In terms of directive 8 an 
agreement cannot be finalised before a report on the accused’s previous convictions has 
been obtained. In terms of directive 9, special care needs to be taken in negotiating 
agreements in cases where there are multi-accused. For a detailed discussion of the 
process, see De Villiers (2004) DJ 245-248. 
830 For a discussion of these obligations, see Rodgers (2010) SACJ 245-247. 
831 S 105A(b)(i) read with s 105A(c). 
832 S 105A9b)(ii) includes the nature and circumstances of the offence, the personal 
circumstances of the accused, previous convictions and the interests of the community. This 
is not an exhaustive list of factors. See Du Toit Commentary on the CPA 15-10. 
833 S 105A(b)(iii). 
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officer and afford a complainant an opportunity to make representations is subject to 
the scrutiny of the court under section 105A(4)(a)(ii).834 
The status of negotiations between the prosecutor and a represented accused 
was the subject of an application in S v Phillips.835 In this the defence applied to hold 
the state bound to section 105A plea and sentencing negotiations before the 
finalisation of a section 105A plea and sentence agreement. The court recognised 
the co-existence of common law or pre-section 105A negotiations, but with regard to 
section 105A emphasised compliance with the structure of section 105A.836 The 
court stated that the structure of the section 105A “reflects that the legislature 
contemplated an incremental approach as those negotiations proceeded, safe in the 
knowledge that s 105A guarantees the parties an opportunity to resile from 
negotiations at the appropriate stage if either is dissatisfied with the outcome thereof” 
(writer’s emphasis). The court added that in terms of section 105A the contract 
needs to be in writing and “in accordance with the general principles of contract, the 
written agreement will be the parties’ ‘exclusive memorial’. Accordingly, any pre-
contractual discussions will be of no force and effect once the written agreement is 
concluded in light of the parol evidence rule.”837  
The court went further and considered plea and sentence agreements in the light 
of public policy considerations, describing the nature of plea and sentence 
agreements, that it is a matter of give and take, an exercise in seeking consensus, of 
placing the plea and sentence agreement before the court for approval, and being 
afforded the opportunity to resile should the court not approve it.838 The court 
declared that public policy considerations that underpin statutory plea and sentence 
                                            
834 This point is discussed in more detail below. 
835 2018 1 SACR 284 (WCC). In this case, there were negotiations between the prosecutor 
and the defence but no agreement had been reached for a number of reasons, including that 
the State was not satisfied with the admission by the defence and neither had the authorised 
DPP authorised the draft plea and sentence agreement. The defence applied to hold the 
State bound to the draft agreement arguing that it was a multi-phased process. The first 
phase being that the accused would plead guilty to culpable homicide, the second that the 
state and defence had agreed on a non-custodial sentence and the third that the charges of 
rape and murder would be withdrawn (para 29). 
836 S v Phillips paras 42 and 43. 
837 S v Phillips para 44. 
838 S v Phillips paras 45 to 46. 
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agreements would be offended should an accused, in a case where no final 
consensus was reached, be permitted to “hold the state to its initial willingness to 
explore a plea bargain, and so secure a partial concession by the state made during 
the negotiation process, is to permit the accused to choose those parts of the 
negotiations that are favourable to him in the absence of an adequate quid pro quo 
from his side.”839 S v Phillips clarifies that the status of negotiations under a section 
105A mechanism is simply that negotiations have no force and effect unless reduced 
to writing as prescribed by section 105A(2).  
An important feature of sub-section 105(A)(3) is that it precludes the court from 
participating in the negotiations. The court becomes involved in the second stage, 
that requires the verification of the negotiation and agreement process by the court in 
terms of sub-sections 105(A)(4) and (5). Specifically excluding the court from the 
negotiation stage ensures that the court will be able to give an independent and 
objective evaluation of the plea and sentencing agreement.840 The court needs to 
find that the agreement is just and such “decision is made by the court independently 
of the parties to the agreement”.841 Importantly, the prosecutor has to inform the 
court before the accused is asked to plead that an agreement in terms of section 
105(A) has been reached between the parties.842 The court needs to confirm this 
with the accused and verify that the negotiation process and requirements of section 
105A have been met.843 The court must then grant the parties an opportunity to 
rectify any non-compliance with the negotiation process and agreement.844  
It is to be noted that in terms of sections 105A(1)(b)(i) the prosecutor may enter 
into a section 105A plea and sentence agreement after consultation with the 
investigating officer. This requirement may be interpreted to ensure the involvement 
of other role players in the criminal justice system as well; and it is submitted that this 
may also be a prudent safeguard against the autonomy of the prosecution’s 
                                            
839 S v Phillips para 47. 
840 Lubbe & Ferreira (2008) SACJ 165. 
841 S v Yengeni para 25.  
842 S 105A(4)(a). 
843 S 105A(4)(a)(i)-)ii). 
844 S 105A(4)(b)(i)-(ii). 
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authority.845 In addition, it is submitted that the prosecutor’s power is countered by 
the fact that an offender needs to be represented by a legal representative. On the 
other hand, it may be argued that the prosecution retains its discretion, as section 
105A(1)(c) provides that prosecutors may dispense with such consultation if they 
deem it will delay the process to a prejudicial extent. As demonstrated above, this 
obligation is subject to the scrutiny of the court846 and the court will need to satisfy 
itself that prosecutors have exercised their discretion properly.847 Should the court 
not be satisfied that these obligations have been met, the court must notify the 
parties of this and grant them an opportunity to comply with the obligations.848 
One of the objectives of the reform of the criminal procedure was increased victim 
participation in the criminal justice system; and this has to an extent been achieved 
in plea and sentencing agreements.849 This objective is formalised in section 
105A(1)(b)(iii) which reads: 
“[A]fter affording the complainant850 or his or her representative, where it is 
reasonable to do so and taking into account the nature of and circumstances 
                                            
845 Directive 10 provides that in the absence of an investigating officer, her or his superior 
must be consulted. In general, regarding this requirement of consultation with the 
investigating officer, see M Watney “Judicial Scrutiny of Plea and Sentence Agreements” 
(2006) TSAR 224 225-226; De Villiers (2004) DJ 247. With regard to the extraordinary 
powers of the prosecution in South Africa and the exercise of such powers under s 105A, 
see Steyn (2007) SACJ 206-207, 218-219. 
846 S 105A(4)(a)(ii). 
847 Du Toit Commentary on the CPA 15 contends that the prosecutor will need to advance 
sufficient reasons for compliance, part-compliance or non-compliance. Also see Rodgers 
(2010) SACJ 251-252. 
848 S 105A(4)(b). 
849 De Villiers (2004) DJ 247; Watney (2006) TSAR 226; SALRC (2000) Project 82 Report 
Sentencing (A New Sentencing Framework) paras 6-7, 15, 20. Steyn ((2007) SACJ 212-213, 
217) rightfully points out that there is no similar obligation upon the prosecution to consult 
with victims under s 112 of the CPA. 
850 Though a complainant may not necessarily be the victim, the interpretation of s 105A 
(1)(b)(iii) is that the complainant is the victim. Mujuzi notes that the terms “complainant” and 
“victim of a crime” are used interchangeably by the High Court and the Constitutional Court 
in Wickham v Magistrate, Stellenbosch 2016 1 SACR 273 (WCC) (“Wickham 2016 (WCC)”) 
and Wickham v Magistrate, Stellenbosch 2017 1 SACR 209 (CC) (“Wickham 2017 (CC)”), 
respectively, and by the legislators in the drafting of s 105A(1)(b)(iii). See JD Mujuzi “Victim 
Participation in Plea and Sentence Agreements in South Africa as a ‘right’: Analysing 
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relating to the offence and the interests of the complainant, the opportunity to 
make representations to the prosecutor regarding- 
(aa) the contents of the agreement; and 
(bb) the inclusion in the agreement of a condition relating to compensation or the 
rendering to the complainant of some specific benefit or service in lieu of 
compensation for damage or pecuniary loss.” 
“Complainant” is also given a broad interpretation and has been declared to 
include not only the interests of the victim, but also “the broader interests of the 
criminal justice system and society.”851 Though the prosecutor is not bound to follow 
the representations or requests by the complainant, the importance of victim 
participation in the plea and sentencing procedures was emphasised in S v Sassin: 
“This particular provision has as its objective victim participation in the plea 
bargaining process. To my mind this is an absolutely essential cog in the 
machinery of plea bargaining and plea agreements – it lends legitimacy and 
credibility to the process.”852 
Moreover, the Constitutional Court in Wickham v Magistrate, 
Stellenbosch853referred to a victim’s right to participate in proceedings relating to 
plea and sentencing agreement in terms of section 105A, including the right to be 
make representations to the prosecutor.854 This is notable as it is argued by Mujuzi 
that section 105A does not expressly place such an obligation on the prosecutor or 
grant such a right to a victim. The Constitutional Court did not give any explanation 
                                            
Wickham v Magistrate, Stellenbosch & Others 2017 (1) SACR 209 (CC)” (2016) 31 SAPL 1 
4. 
851 S v Sassin paras 11.3 & 11; Wickham 2016 (WCC) para 52. Also see Du Toit 
Commentary on the CPA 15-12 to 15-13; Bekker (1996) CILSA 209. 
852 Para 11.4. 
853 2017 1 SACR 209 (CC). This was an application for leave to appeal regarding the 
judgment in Wickham v Magistrate, Stellenbosch 2016 1 SACR 273 (WCC). In this matter 
the accused, in terms of a s105A plea and sentence agreement, was convicted of culpable 
homicide and sentenced to correctional supervision and ordered to pay a fine relating to the 
death of a young man in a vehicle accident. The parents of the deceased objected to the 
charge and sentence, and applied to participate in the s105A plea and sentence agreement 
and to give evidence in court with regard to the charge and sentence of the accused.  
854 Wickham 2017 (CC) para 27. 
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for this declaration.855 On a close reading, the High Court ruled that the victim does 
not have “a right” to be make representations to the prosecutor, but has “an 
opportunity” to do so. The High Court held “the prosecutor seeking to enter into a 
plea and sentence agreement with an accused person must afford the complainant 
or his representative an opportunity to make representations but only where it is 
reasonable to do so and taking into account the circumstances relating to the offence 
and the interests of the complainant” (writer’s emphasis).856 The High Court found 
this provision peremptory based on the reading of sections 105A(4)(b), together with 
section 105A(1)(b);857 concluding that should there be non-compliance with section 
105A(1)(b)(iii) the accused shall not be required to plead.858 The court emphasised 
the “purpose of this provision [section 105A(1)(b)(iii)] is to ensure that the prosecutor 
has given the complainant an opportunity to make representations”.859 In addition, 
the High Court found that in negotiating and concluding plea and sentence 
agreements in terms of section 105A, a prosecutor is performing an administrative 
function, exercising her or his public power and authority, as prescribed by section 
179(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, any failure to do so as prescribed by 
section 105A, including the failure to afford a complainant an opportunity to make 
representations, where it would be reasonable to do so, would be unlawful and the 
complainant would be able to take the matter on review under the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.860 
The obligation to afford a complainant an opportunity is qualified by the 
requirement of reasonableness;861 and this, it is submitted, is a further indication of 
the discretionary nature of section 105A(1)(b)(iii). In addition, as succinctly put by the 
                                            
855 Mujuzi regrets that the Constitutional Court did not give reasons for the expression that a 
victim has a right as opposed to an opportunity. Mujuzi raises the question whether the basis 
for such right may be a statutory right, a common-law right or perhaps a customary-law right. 
See Mujuzi (2016) SAPL 4,10-13.  
856 Wickham 2016 (WCC) para 54.  
857 Wickham 2016 (WCC) para 54. 
858 Wickham 2016 (WCC) para 55D. 
859 Wickham 2016 (WCC) para 55D. 
860 Wickham 2016 (WCC) paras 56-58. 
861 “Reasonable in the context” relates to the situation in the light of the nature and 
circumstances of the offence and the interests of the complainant. See Du Toit Commentary 
on the CPA 15-13. 
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Constitutional Court “the prosecutor is obliged to give the victim an opportunity to 
make representations, but the prosecutor is not obliged to agree with the victim”.862 
In Wickham v Magistrate, Stellenbosch the Constitutional Court held that a victim’s 
right to place evidence before the court during sentencing proceedings in terms of 
section 105A(7)(b)(i)(bb) is “wholly within the court’s discretion”;863 and cannot be 
acceded to should such representation infringe upon the rights of the accused.864  
The provision for the voice of the victim to be heard in section 105A plea and 
sentencing negotiations and agreement is an encouraging institutionalisation of 
these elements in the criminal justice system.865 Indeed, Rodgers contends that a 
“fundamental difference between informal and statutory negotiated justice lies in the 
victim’s participation in the negotiation process”.866 In the informal plea negotiation 
process the victim has no recognised rights and little is known about victim 
participation due to the non-transparent nature of the process. It is considered that 
                                            
862 Wickham 2017 (CC) para 28F; Mujuzi (2016) SAPL 7-8.  
863 Wickham 2017 (CC) para 31. The Constitutional Court also considered a victim’s rights 
under s 2 of the Victims’ Charter, and found these to be general and not absolute (paras 25-
26). In the light of this it is clear that Steyn’s interpretation that a victim has the right to 
request that a matter go to trial is incorrect (Steyn (2007) SACJ 213). 
864 Wickham 2017 (CC) para 34. Also see Mujuzi (2016) SAPL 14-15. 
865 Watney (2006) J S Afr L 226. Rodgers provides an in-depth discussion of the 
participation of the victim in the negotiated plea process. See Rodgers The Role of the 
Victim 76-88. Rodgers 92-103 also argues that s 105A(1)(b) has not gone far enough and 
proposes an amendment to s 105A(1)(b) to give proper legal and practical effect to the 
participation of victims in the plea and sentencing agreement process. Also see Bekker 
(2001) CILSA 321 and 323 regarding the reference by the SALRC to plea negotiations 
helping to protect a victim from having to give evidence and the input of victims in the 
negotiation process. Earlier Bekker discussed the interests of victims, and although 
recognising the need to acknowledge victims and their interests, reduced such interests 
simply to “restitution” and “retribution”. Bekker (1996) CILSA 207-210. Consequent to the 
puzzling decision of the Constitutional Court in Wickham 2017 (CC) Mujuzi also calls for the 
legislature to amend section 105(1)()(iii) and clearly prescribe the right of the victim to make 
representations. See Mujuzi (2016) SAPL 13. 
866 (2010) SACJ 257. Rodgers 258 contends further that the lack of statutorily protected 
victim participation under s 112 plea agreements presents a basis for a constitutional 
challenge as victims in informal plea agreements are treated differently to victims in s 105A 
plea and sentence agreements. 
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any victim participation is likely to be limited.867 The benefits of victim participation 
are not confined to the psychological and financial interests of the victim alone, but 
extend to the interests of the criminal justice system and broader society.868 Victim 
participation grants legitimacy to the criminal justice system and substantiates plea 
and sentencing negotiation. It also ensures that more information is provided to the 
prosecutor and the court. Lubbe and Ferreira correctly state that section 
105A(1)(b)(iii) can “play a vital role in … the transformation South Africa is facing”.869 
Once the court is satisfied that the requirements of a section 105A agreement 
have been met, the third stage, the considering of the plea agreement by the court 
commences,870 and the accused will be asked to plead to the charges. After 
pleading, the contents of the agreement, as opposed to its existence, will be 
disclosed to the court.871  
The court now has to consider and confirm that the accused is indeed guilty of the 
charges to which the accused pleaded guilty. This involves the following steps: 
confirming with the accused the terms of the agreement, including the admissions 
made by the accused;872 and considering and confirming that the facts disclosed and 
admitted support such plea873 and that “the agreement was entered into freely and 
voluntarily [by the accused] in his or her sound and sober senses and without having 
been unduly influenced”.874 Once these matters have been considered and 
confirmed the second part of stage three can follow and the court has to enter a plea 
of guilty or not guilty. Though the accused offered a plea of guilty this can only be 
entered by the court once the court has made the necessary enquiries and satisfied 
itself that the accused is indeed guilty of the offences charged with and the 
allegations admitted in the section 105A agreement.875 However, the court is 
                                            
867 Steyn (2007) SACJ 217; Lubbe & Ferreira (2008) SACJ 163. 
868 Lubbe & Ferreira (2008) SACJ 160. 
869 (2008) SACJ 160. This was said in the context of post-Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission prosecutions, but it is submitted that it is no less true today. 
870 De Villiers (2004) DJ 245, 248. 
871 S 105A(5). 
872 S 105A(6)(a)(i). 
873 S 105A(6)(a)(ii). 
874 S 105A(6)(a)(iii). 
875 S 105A(7)(a). 
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compelled to enter a plea of not guilty if the court is not satisfied that the accused is 
guilty of the agreed offence;876 or if the court finds that the admissions were not 
made or are incorrect;877 or for any other reason, the court may decide that the plea 
of guilty cannot stand.878  
It is clear that there is a heavy responsibility on the court to ensure that the guilty 
plea is proper and correct in terms of the law. In the event of the court having 
entered a plea of not guilty, it needs to provide reasons for this,879 and the trial needs 
to start afresh before another presiding officer.880 It is significant that the legislature 
provides that the accused may waive her or his right to the new trial being conducted 
by a different presiding officer.881 
In the event of a guilty plea being accepted and recorded, the fourth stage is the 
consideration of the sentence by the court.882 In terms of section 150A(7) the court 
has both discretionary883 and mandatory884 factors to consider in determining 
whether the sentence in terms of a sentence agreement is a “just sentence”.885 As in 
the United States, the issue of sentencing is a thorny issue, and although formal plea 
negotiation in terms of section 105A has only been part of the South African criminal 
jurisprudence for fewer than two decades, several cases have helped to crystallise 
criteria that may be used to determine what a “just sentence” is. Obviously, in 
considering the sentence agreement, the courts have built upon earlier principles 
relevant to sentencing. 
                                            
876 S 105A(6)(b)(i). 
877 S 105A(6)(b)(ii). 
878 S 105A(6)(a)(iii). 
879 S 105A(6)(b). 
880 S 105A(6)(c). 
881 S 105A(6)(c). 
882 De Villiers (2004) DJ 245, 249. 
883 S 105A(7)(b)(i) prescribes that the court may ask questions regarding previous 
convictions and hear evidence by or on behalf of the accused or the complainant. For a 
discussion on stage four, see De Villiers (2004) DJ 249. 
884 S 105A(7)(b)(ii) prescribes that a court must have due regard to any minimum penalty 
prescribed by law. For example, see S v Sassin, where the court deviated from the minimum 
penalty in considering a just sentence (493 B-J), and S v Madisha where the court did not 
deviate from the minimum sentences (para 34). 
885 S 105A(1)(a)(ii). 
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One of the first decisions regarding a section 105A plea and sentence agreement 
was S v Sassin886 (“Sassin case”); which endorsed the court’s supervisory role to 
ensure that the sentence is “just”.887 In the Sassin case, when required to decide 
whether a deviation from a minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment was “just”, 
Majiedt J noted that it is important that the statutory provision use the word “just” and 
not “appropriate” and further reasoned that this means that the court “retains its 
judicial discretion in sentencing, albeit in fettered form”.888 In exploring what “just” 
means, he said that it does not demand that the court be asked to agree with the 
sentence, but the court needs to be satisfied that the sentence is an appropriate (not 
necessarily the most appropriate) one with regard to the circumstances of the case, 
the accused, the interests of society and the victims.889 Importantly, the court 
continued by holding that it must be borne in mind that it is a plea negotiation matter 
and thus, when considering whether the sentence is just, it must do so within the 
parameters of plea negotiation. This may involve, in addition to the traditional factors 
relating to the offence and accused, also the voice of the victim and the needs of 
society “within the confines of the plea bargaining framework”.890 The court 
                                            
886 2003 4 All SA 506 (NC) (“S v Sassin”). This case involved a pyramid scheme run by 
accused involving amounts of over R29 million. The accused had originally been charged, 
together with two of his children, with fraud and contraventions of various financial 
regulations, including the Banks Act 94 of 1990, the Stock Exchange Control Act 1 of 1985, 
and the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (para 3-8). In terms of a plea and sentence agreement 
under s 105A of the CPA it was agreed that the first accused plead guilty to 1,527 counts of 
fraud and contraventions of the aforementioned acts (para 14.1 to 14.3). Approximately R3 
million spent on himself or the family had been recovered (para 15.11), and other monies of 
approximately R18 million were in the process of being recovered by the liquidators (para 
15.12). The charges against his children, the second and third accused, be withdrawn.  
887 S v Sassin para 15.1. In terms of sub-section 105A(1)(a)(ii) a sentence in terms of a 
sentence agreement needs to be a “just sentence”; while section 105A(8) provides that the 
court needs to satisfy itself that “the sentence agreement is just”. 
888 S v Sassin para 15.5. 
889 S v Sassin para 15.5; also see Watney (2006) JS Afr L 226-227.  
890 S v Sassin para 15.7 and 18.1. In para 18.1 the court suggests that it would not have 
usually considered a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment, of which six years is suspended 
for five years, appropriate for the fraud offences, but that it is called to decide whether the 
sentence is just within the plea bargaining framework: “(t)he test here is different – the 
question is simply whether I consider the sentence on the fraud charges to be just. 
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importantantly in holds: “[a] sentencing court must, in my view, in such a case 
consider whether the proposed sentence is just in respect of the offender and the 
victim, bearing in mind the gravity of the offence” (writer’s emphasis).891  
The probability that a sentence may be lighter in a plea negotiation matter, in the 
light of the nature of plea negotiation and concessions made by either or all of the 
parties is echoed in S v Esterhuizen:892 “(t)he price may be that the sentence which 
would normally flow from the commission of such a crime is lower than might 
otherwise have been imposed. This does not mean that justice has not been 
achieved.”893 
Bennun seems to hold the contrary viewpoint that a plea of guilty in terms of 
section 105A should not result in any sentence other than a sentence that would 
have resulted after a full trial.894 Bennun also makes the point that this is the 
intention of subsections 105A(6)-(9) and cites the court’s decision in S v Yengeni895 
to support this view.896 However, it is suggested that Bennun’s viewpoint conflicts 
with the traditional viewpoint that plea negotiation, and plea and sentencing 
agreements, as provided for in terms of section 105A, may very well result in a 
                                            
Moreover, I must be mindful of the fact that this is a plea bargain matter” (writer’s emphasis). 
Also see S v Esterhuizen 494-495; Steyn (2007) SACJ 214. 
891 S v Sassin para 15.7. 
892 2005 1 SACR 490 (T). 
893 494H. 
894 Bennun (2007) SACJ, 29, 35-36. 
895 2006 1 SACR 405 (T). 
896 Bennun (2007) SACJ 34-36. It is submitted that S v Yengeni can be distinguished as it 
was clearly not an agreement in terms of s 105A and did not purport to be. At most it could 
be said to be informal plea negotiation which was unwisely undertaken by the prosecution 
and the accused, together with the then Minister of Justice (see the facts in para 10(z)gg-
10(z)hh). The comments made by the court in paras 66 and 67 relating to s105A plea and 
sentencing agreements are obiter, but important as they set out the purposes of s105A plea 
and sentence agreements. Moreover, it is submitted that the court does not support what 
Bennun claims it supports, namely that a sentence in terms of s 105A should be the same as 
a sentence after a full blown trial. Indeed, it is argued that paras 66 and 67, where the court 
follows S v Esterhuizen, is an endorsement of the contours drawn by the court in S v 
Esterhuizen, including the confirmation of the judicial discretion of the presiding officer 
regarding sentencing.  
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sentence that may be lighter than one handed down after a full trial.897 It would, in 
any event, be difficult to speculate what a sentence after a trial would have been. It is 
significant that the court retains a supervisory role and is not precluded by section 
105A from inquiring into the circumstances of the accused and any laws relating to 
the particular offence. This was stated clearly in S v Yengeni which held that “the trial 
court had the power to enquire into all relevant circumstances relating to the 
sentence proposed in the agreement”.898 Moreover, the court in S v Yengeni called 
upon courts to be vigilant, in instances of crimes of dishonesty perpetrated by 
elected officials and officials in positions of trust, to ensure “that appropriate 
retribution is exacted from the criminal concerned”.899 This emphasises that although 
sentences in plea and sentence agreements may usually be lighter because of the 
confessions and concessions made by the parties, any such sentences still need to 
be just, reflecting the principles of retribution and deterrence in the light of each 
offender’s individual circumstances. 
Furthermore, Els J in S v Esterhuizen, drew more contours regarding the test of a 
“just sentence”, as prescribed by section 105A and held that a court cannot decide 
for itself in a vacuum what sentence it would have imposed. He also held that there 
were several considerations to be taken into account when assessing whether the 
sentence is just. He emphasised the role which the state representatives played900 
and the discretion they had, while also noting that there was “substantial room left in 
the negotiation process for both the state and the defence to achieve a settled 
result”.901 Els J further determined that “[a]s long as the sentence bears an adequate 
relationship to the crime and the moral blameworthiness content of the crime,… , the 
sentence should be found to be ‘just’ for the purposes of s105A.”902  
Section 105A(7)(b)(ii) provides that the court, with respect to offences that carry a 
minimum sentence, needs to give due regard to this.903 The NDPP has also issued a 
                                            
897 Lubbe & Ferreira (2008) SACJ 162. 
898 S v Yengeni para 72. 
899 S v Yengeni para 71.  
900 S v Esterhuizen 494C-E. 
901 S v Esterhuizen 494G. 
902 S v Esterhuizen 494I-J. 
903 This was the position in the S v Sassin case. Also see Watney (2006) J S Afr L 227-229. 
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directive that only a DPP or Deputy Director may authorise any deviation from a 
prescribed minimum sentence in a sentencing agreement.904 
In the event that the court is satisfied that the sentence is just, the court needs to 
inform the prosecutor and the accused, whereupon the court shall convict the 
accused of the offence charged and sentence the accused in terms of the plea and 
sentence agreement.905 
An important part of the sentencing stage is the obligation on the court in terms of 
section 105A(9) to inform the accused and the prosecution if it is not satisfied that 
the sentence is just.906 Furthermore it must advise them what the court deems will be 
a just sentence. This stage of the process will allow the accused or the prosecutor to 
withdraw from the plea agreement,907 or to abide by the plea agreement and to 
accept the court’s sentence.908 In both S v Solomons909 and S v DJ910 the court 
found that the provisions of section 105A(9)(a) are peremptory.911 Thus, in the event 
that presiding officers did not inform the parties that they did not consider the 
                                            
904 Directive 13 of the 2010 Directives. 
905 S 105A(8). In S v Knight 2017 2 SACR 583 (GP) the court found that the provisions of s 
105A(8) are peremptory and the omission of the trial court to convict the accused of the 
offences charged was a fatal irregularity. Thus the sentence was set aside and the matter 
referred back to the trial court to be heard de novo (paras 18-20 & 24). Also see Du Toit 
Commentary on the CPA 15-22. 
906 S 105A(9)(a). 
907 S 105A(9)(b)(ii). Also see S v DJ 2016 1 SACR 377 (SCA) para 19. 
908 S 105A(9)(b)(i). Also see De Villiers (2004) DJ 249; S v Solomons 2005 2 SACR 432 (C) 
para 6-7 and 11; S v DJ 2016 1 SACR 377 (SCA) paras 18-20 & 22. 
909 2005 2 SACR 432 (C) para 11. 
910 2016 1 SACR 377 (SCA) paras 19-20. 
911 The decision in S v DJ 2016 1 SACR 377 (SCA) paras 18-22 was followed by S v Muller 
2018 JDR 2007 (WCC) paras 9-10. Interestingly, in the S v Muller case, the magistrate 
interfered with the agreed sentence in terms of the s105A plea and sentence agreement as 
he considered he had to do a post-sentence inquiry in terms of s 35 of the National Road 
Traffic Act “NRTA”). The s105A plea and sentence agreement made provision for the 
defendant’s driver’s licence to be suspended for a period of six months, while the NRTA 
prescribed that a licence should be suspended automatically for five years in certain 
instances. The appeal court found, however, that the s 35 NRTA inquiry forms “an integral 
part of the determination of an appropriate sentence”. Consequently, the magistrate’s 
interference with the agreed sentences was an irregularity: the magistrate should have 
followed the procedure in terms of s 105A(9) if he deemed the sentence “unjust” (para 15). 
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sentence to be just and did not afford them the opportunity to make a decision in 
terms of section 105A(9)(b), the convictions and sentences were set aside and the 
matter was ordered to be tried anew.912 
In S v Armugga913 the court stated that sentencing is not an “exact science” with 
no “precise formulas” and in properly exercising their discretion different courts may 
arrive at different sentences on the same facts.914 Similar to the Sassin and 
Esterhuizen cases, the court found that “the very nature and essence of plea 
bargaining needs to be taken into account”915 and defines plea bargaining or plea 
negotiation916 as a “procedure whereby the accused person relinquishes his right to 
go to trial in exchange for a reduction in sentence.”917  
In both the Sassin and Esterhuizen cases, the plea and sentencing agreements 
included direct imprisonment, although there was a deviation from the minimum 
period prescribed. Attention was also given to the plea negotiation framework and 
the authority and negotiating room given to the prosecutor and the accused. In 
addition, in the Sassin case, particular emphasis was placed on the voices of the 
victims918 and the interests of society919 in the criminal justice system.  
The issue of review and appealing a conviction and sentence in terms of a section 
105A agreement has been the subject of several cases.920 In S v Nel, Moshidi J 
significantly depicted the position as follows: 
“Indeed, the whole purpose of the provisions of s 105A of the Act will be 
defeated at great expense and wastage of resources, if accused persons who 
                                            
912 S v Solomons 2005 2 SACR 432 (C) para 13; Jansen v S 2016 1 SACR 377 (SCA) paras 
22-23; S v DJ para 384; S v Muller para16. 
913 2005 2 SACR 259 (N) (“S v Armugga”). 
914S v Armugga paras 264G-H. 
915 S v Armugga para 265A. 
916 See fn 700 above regarding the terms plea bargaining and plea negotiation. 
917 S v Armugga paras 265A-B. 
918 Affidavits were obtained from 31 victims who had lost money in the scheme in which they 
set out their claims, the recovery of part of the monies and agreement to the plea bargaining 
agreement, which included the cooperation of the accused. S v Sassin para 11.5. 
919 Represented by the affidavits of the liquidators which were held to be representative of all 
the creditors. S v Sassin para 11.6. 
920 S v De Goede WCC 30-11-2012 case no. 121151; S v Armugga 2005 (2) SACR 259 (N); 
S v Nel 2008 ZAGPHC case no. A352/07; De Koker v S 2010 2 SACR 196 (WCC). 
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enter into procedurally faultless plea and sentence agreements were 
subsequently allowed to resile from such agreements at will, and not on any 
legal or constitutional basis.”921 
In De Koker v S,922 the court clearly stated “(b)y following the process created by 
section 105A, the appellant settled the lis between the state and him once and for 
all.”923 This confirms that in the event of the peremptory provisions of sections 105A 
being complied with, parties will be bound by the section 105A agreement and an 
appeal is not possible.924 This finality is contrary to the possibilities mooted in S v 
Armugga. In S v Armugga,925 the court held that any appeal in respect of an agreed 
sentence in terms of a section 105A agreement is a limited appeal and will only 
succeed in “exceptional circumstances”.926 In S v Nel,927 the court, with reference to 
                                            
921 2008 JDR 0170 (W) para 15. 
922 2010 2 SACR 196 (WCC). 
923 De Koker v S para 5. See too Hiemstra 15-10. 
924 “I cannot think of a clearer case of peremption than one where an accused duly 
concludes a plea and sentence agreement with the state in term of s 105A of the CPA, 
confirms the agreement to the court before which he is arraigned, asks the court to convict 
and sentence him in accordance with the agreement and is thereupon duly convicted and 
sentenced in accordance with the agreement.” De Koker v S para 5. Also see Hiemstra 
Criminal Procedure 15-10. 
925 This case also involved fraud and the accused were found guilty and sentenced in terms 
of a plea and sentence agreement in terms of s 105A. The agreed sentence involved fines 
and a term of imprisonment and fourteen of the accused subsequently appealed against the 
sentence alone, arguing that the presiding officer had not made sufficient inquiries into the 
circumstances of the accused as required in terms of s 105A(8) in determining that the 
sentence agreement was just. An important issue is whether parties to such an agreement 
can appeal: can the accused in this case “unilaterally resile” from the contract? The court 
found that in the omission by the legislature of the draft s 105A(10), that prohibited either 
party subsequent to a s105A agreement to appeal, from the enacted amendment to the 
CPA, that such a right does, therefore, exist (263C-G). Importantly, both in S v Solomons 
2005 2 SACR 432 (C) (paras 1 and 12) and S v De Goede WCC 30-11-2012 case no 
121151 (paras 3-5 and 12) plea and sentence agreements were taken on review in terms of 
s 302 or s 304 of the CPA. This is further evidence of the supervisory role which the courts 
have over s105A agreements. Also see Maddock v S [2015] ZAWCHC 575 WCHC 26-11-
2010 case no A641/2010, being an appeal against a refusal to reconsider a sentence 
agreed in terms of a s105A plea and sentence agreement. 
926 S v Armugga 264E. The court based its finding on the decision of the Canadian Court in 
Attorney General of Canada v Roy (1972) 18 CRNS 89 (Que QB). It also relied on the 
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S v Armugga, held that a Court of Appeal would be reluctant to interfere with a 
matter if the procedure was strictly complied with “unless there are glaring or 
ascertainable gross irregularities or a violation of the accused’s constitutional rights 
to a fair trial”.928 
It is submitted that the definitive consequence of a plea and sentence agreement 
in terms of section 105A means there is no appeal available to the convicted person, 
unless there are gross irregularities in the procedure or constitutional challenges.929 
There are sufficient safeguards built into the plea negotiation procedure of sections 
105A930 and it is constitutionally sound. This conclusion is logically correct, as 
allowing either the state or the accused to easily resile from such an agreement 
would bring about much uncertainty.  
There have also been a number of cases regarding the review of a plea and 
sentence agreement in terms on section 105A. In S v Taylor,931 Yekiso J examined 
                                            
Canadian Law Commission and SALRC that considered that the prosecution could only 
appeal, in the event of either the prosecutor or the court being “wilfully misled in some 
material aspect” (263E-264H). S v Armugga was followed in S v Nel 2008 ZAGPHC 43 case 
no. A352/07 (para 4) where Moshidi J held: “a Court of Appeal will be reluctant to interfere in 
the outcome unless there are glaring or ascertainable gross irregularities or a violation of the 
accused’s constitutional rights to a fair trial”. Watney (2006) J S Afr L 229-230 argues that 
the appeal need not be limited, and that any appeal or review should be in the ordinary 
course of the relevant provisions and principles. Maddock v S [2015] ZAWCHC 575 supports 
the latter viewpoint as the appeal related to the reconsideration of a sentence after a portion 
of the sentence had been served and application was made to reconsider part of the 
sentence and convert it to house arrest. The High Court found that s 276A(3) can be applied 
in the case of a plea and sentence agreement should the an appropriate situation arise 
(Maddock v S at 9). 
927 2008 JDR 0170 (W) (“S v Nel”).  
928 S v Nel para 5. Also see paras 10-11 where the court follows S v Armugga. 
929 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 15-10. Also see S v Masemola 2009 JDR 1345 (GNP) 
paras 13-18 where the court declined to intervene in the sentence agreed upon between the 
parties themselves, even though the sentence was, on one count, the maximum sentence.  
930 Also see Kemp (2014) SLR 434-435. 
931 2006 1 SACR 51 (C). Taylor was followed by S v Salie 2007 1 SACR 55 (C) paras 12-13. 
Interestingly, the Salie matter concerned a s105A plea and sentence agreement in terms of 
which the defendant pleaded guilty to robbery with aggravating circumstances and also 
agreed to testify against his co-accused. In terms of the agreement, he was sentenced to 
four years’ imprisonment. In the trial of the co-accused, the trial court found them guilty of 
robbery with aggravating circumstances and sentenced them to eight years’ imprisonment. 
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several grounds for review,932 and found that the only grounds for a possible review 
are the Court’s inherent power in terms of section 173 of the Constitution.933 
Significantly, the court stated that an accused “cannot now, once the shoe starts 
pinching, begin to complain about the procedure followed at trial”.934 The inherent 
power of the courts, in considering the interests of justice, is confirmed as being 
comprehensive and applicable, also to section 105A sentence agreements, further 
safeguarding the process and the parties to such agreements.935 An obiter dictum 
made in Wickham v Magistrate, Stellenbosch stated that in entering into and 
concluding a plea and sentence agreement in terms of section 105A, prosecutors 
execute an administrative function. Thus, any exercise of their public power or 
performance of their public function that may adversely affect the rights of any 
                                            
On appeal however, the conviction was altered to robbery and the sentences reduced to 4 
years. The issue before the court was should the Salie matter be reviewed as the defendant 
was convicted of a more serious offence than his co-accused, arising from the same facts, 
and thus it could be argued he was not treated equally before the law. However, the court 
found that the uncertainty regarding the presence of aggravating circumstance in the trial of 
the co-accused is not a basis to fault the s105A plea and sentence agreement (para 16). 
Van der Merwe emphasises that a s105A plea and sentence agreement is based on the 
“formal or procedural truth” entailing agreed facts between the prosecution and defence. 
This is in contrast to a trial which “is a contest or dispute that must be settled in accordance 
with adversarial principles which require, amongst others, that the prosecution must prove its 
case beyond a reasonable doubt”. See SE van der Merwe “January to March 2007(1)” JQR 
Criminal Procedure 2007 (1) para 2.6. 
932 The matter was not automatically reviewable in terms of s 302 of the CPA as the accused 
was legally represented (para 5). As a s105A plea and sentence agreement can only be 
concluded between a represented accused at present, an automatic review in terms of s 302 
is highly improbable. See too S v Salie para 12. Neither was it reviewable under s 304(1) as 
the review was not at the instance of the magistrate (para 5). Neither was it reviewable 
under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, because the judicial functions of 
a judicial officer do not fall under that act (para 14). Also see SE van der Merwe “January to 
July 2006 (1)” JQR Criminal Procedure 2006 (1) para 2.24; Van der Merwe JQR Criminal 
Procedure 2007 (1) para 2.6. 
933 S v Taylor paras 16-17. In terms of s 173 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Courts have “the inherent power to protect and 
regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into account the interests 
of justice”. Also see S v Salie para 13. 
934 S v Taylor para 20. Followed by S v Nel para 15. 
935 S v Nel 2008 JDR 0170 (W) paras 12-14; S v Armugga 2005 2 SACR 259 (N) 263E-
264H; S v Taylor paras 16-17; S v Salie para XXX. 
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person is subject to review under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000.936  
Maddock v S illustrates that the sentence part of a section 105A plea and 
sentence agreement can be reconsidered in terms of section 276A(3)(a) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act.937 The court held that section 276A(3)(a) enjoins the court to 
“reconsider the sentence in view of all the facts, not only those facts that existed at 
the time of the trial.”938 It is submitted that section 276A which relates to correctional 
supervision demonstrates the characteristics of restorative justice that have been 
integrated into the South African criminal justice system.939 
Caution needs to be exercised in a case where there are multi-accused.940 It is 
common practice to enter into a plea and sentence agreement with one or more of 
the co-accused on the condition that such accused will testify against the other co-
accused. Entering into a plea and sentence agreement may not necessarily mean 
that the accused is convicted of a lesser charge or receives a lesser sentence.941 
Indeed, in Van Heerden v National Director of Public Prosecutions942 a number of 
the co-accused were granted a stay of prosecution, notwithstanding that one of the 
                                            
936 Wickham 2016 (WCC) paras 56-58. Mujuzi ((2016) SAPL 13-14) points out that the 
Constitutional Court did not disagree with this obiter dictum, and this raises the issue of the 
relationship between s 105A(1)(b)(iii) and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act s 1 
“administrative action” (ff), which specifically provides that the decision to institute or 
continue a prosecution is not administrative action. It is argued by Mujuzi correctly, it is 
submitted, that the execution by a prosecutor of her or his powers under s 105A to decide 
whether to allow a complainant to make representations or not is surely part of the decision 
whether to institute prosecution. 
937 On appeal the High Court converted the remaining portion of the appellant’s agreed 
imprisonment to correctional service, including house arrest and community service, 
programme supervision and the prohibition of the use of alcohol and non-prescribed drugs 
(Maddock v S 14-16).  
938 Maddock v S 9. 
939 Correctional supervision is discussed below in section 4 4 3 345ff. 
940 Directive 9. 
941 As illustrated above in S v Salie 2007 1 SACR 55 (C). 
942 2017 2 SACR 695 (SCA) (“Van Heerden v NDPP”). It is submitted that this case is 
extraordinary as the delay in finalising the charge sheet and the behaviour of the prosecution 
was unusual, and as the court stressed, applications for stay of prosecution are fact-specific 
and to be determined on a case-by-case basis (para 69). 
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other accused had entered into a plea and sentence agreement and had agreed to 
testify against the other accused.943 
The fifth stage of the plea and sentence agreement process in terms of section 
105A of the CPA is administrative and stipulates that the NPA needs to keep proper 
records and statistics regarding any section 105A agreements944 and to submit these 
to parliament at least once a year.945 This administrative procedure ensures 
accountability by the NPA and serves as a safeguard to oversee the correct use of 
section 105A. It is difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the number or nature of 
section 105A agreements in the South African criminal justice system, and the only 
statistics available are those in the annual reports of the DNPP, which are either in 
narrative form, or figures in a table format.946 
Plea negotiation in South Africa appears to be a permanent feature.947 In 
considering the advantages and disadvantages of plea negotiation in South Africa, 
only a few issues will be highlighted.948 A restricting factor regarding plea and 
sentence agreements is the requirement that an accused has to be legally 
represented. As only a few accused are legally represented in South Africa this lack 
of representation is probably a contributory factor to the relatively little use of plea 
negotiation in terms of section 105A of the CPA.949 De Villiers questions the validity 
of this requirement, particularly as unrepresented accused may enter guilty pleas 
and be sentenced via the conventional route of section 112 of the CPA or via the 
                                            
943 Van Heerden v NDPP para 14. 
944 S 105A(11)(b)(iv) and Directive 17. For a discussion on stage five see De Villiers (2004) 
DJ 249-250. 
945 S 105A(12). 
946 See fn 189. See also Kemp (2014) Stell LR 433-434; Kerscher Plea bargaining in South 
Africa and Germany 10-11. 
947 Indeed, there is a call by the judiciary for it to be encouraged: DJ v S 2016 1 SACR 377 
(SCA) para 17. 
948 For more detailed advantages of plea negotiation see the executive summary of the 
SALRC interim fourth interim report. See too a discussion of the advantages and 
disadvantages by De Villiers (2004) DJ 249–255. 
949 Steyn (2007) SACJ 218 points out that plea negotiation may be perceived to be a 
mechanism for the rich who can afford legal representation. See also Lubbe & Ferreira 
(2008) SACJ 159 fn 34 for further discussion on this issue. 
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traditional informal plea agreements.950 It may be argued that in terms of section 
35(3)(g) of the Constitution, the accused is entitled to legal representation at state 
expense, as part of her or his right to a fair trial “if substantial injustice would 
otherwise result”.951 Interestingly, De Villiers argues that the failure of section 105A 
of the CPA to grant an unrepresented accused the opportunity to enter into a plea 
and sentence agreement is not sustainable and may be unconstitutional.952 In 
contrast Lubbe and Ferreira contend that the provision that offenders have to be 
legally presented when entering a plea and sentence agreement ensures that they 
understand the nature and consequences of the process.953 The assumption is that 
the offenders have been so informed and advised by their legal representatives. 
Equally, however, as pointed out above, legal representation is not prescribed for 
plea negotiations under section 112 of the CPA, and it may be argued that an 
unrepresented offender may not understand the nature or consequences of a plea 
under such provision. 
As in the United States, the South African judiciary954 and authors955 concede that 
plea negotiation will assist the efficacy of the criminal justice system and that the 
exclusion of the mechanism may very well contribute towards the opposite effect and 
result in a breakdown due to the heavy caseload and clogging up of the criminal 
courts.956 However, there are also several warnings. De Villiers warns that plea 
negotiation cannot provide an effective response to the problem of an inefficient and 
incompetent criminal justice system.957 Indeed, he argues that the success of plea 
                                            
950 De Villiers (2004) DJ 253–254. 
951 Lubbe & Ferreira (2008) SACJ 159. 
952 De Villiers (2004) DJ 254. 
953 (2008) SACJ 160. 
954 Uijs AJ in North Western Dense Concrete 676G. This is comparable to Burger CJ in 
Santobello v New York 404 US 527 260 (see fn 744 above). 
955 De Villiers (2004) DJ 255; Lubbe & Ferreira (2008) SACJ 163. Steyn (2007) SACJ 207-
208, 211-212 specifically promotes plea and sentencing agreements under s 105A on the 
basis of pragmatism. 
956 Reference has already been made to criticism of this pragmatic motive, the objective of 
efficiency, including the lightening of caseloads. Also see Kemp (2014) Stell LR 430, 433-
434. 
957 De Villiers (2004) DJ 252-253. 
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negotiation rests on competent and trustworthy prosecutors.958 More importantly, De 
Villiers argues that one of the disadvantages of plea negotiation is that it may 
undermine a primary purpose of a criminal justice system, namely deterrence.959 A 
further core value in criminal jurisprudence that is at risk is the burden of proof: plea 
negotiation results in waiver of the constitutional right of the accused to remain 
silent960 and to have the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.961 Kemp, in 
turn, warns that plea negotiation, particularly in relation to economic crime, which 
entails individual autonomy and participation by an accused, may allow potential 
offenders to calculate the cost-benefits of certain economic crimes and to conclude 
that crime does indeed pay.962 
As in the United States, the issue of just sentencing in plea and sentencing 
agreements remains problematic. Although there have only been a relatively small 
number of cases since the formalisation of plea negotiation in South Africa: the 
courts have laid down sound principles and the reported cases illustrate that the 
courts will be robust in their application of their traditional discretionary authority in 
supervising just and proper sentences.  
The powerful position of the prosecutor, as dominus litis, endowed with 
independent discretionary powers, remains entrenched. Bekker forecast that in the 
                                            
958 De Villiers (2004) DJ 254. 
959 De Villiers (2004) DJ 251. 
960 S 35(3)(h) of the Constitution. Also see S v De Goede WCC 30-11-2012 case no. 121151 
para 12. 
961 De Villiers (2004) DJ 251; Bennun (2007) SACJ 20. By way of illustration, Bennun 
discusses the S v Thatcher case, in which in terms of a s 105A agreement, Thatcher was 
found guilty of a contravention of the Regulation of the Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 
1998 and sentenced, despite Thatcher only admitting to have been “unwittingly” involved, 
which would normally constitute a defence to a charge requiring the necessary mens rea to 
commit a crime. See Bennun (2007) SACJ 21-23. T Fisher “The Boundaries of Plea 
Bargaining: Negotiating the Standard of Proof” (2007) 97 J Crim L & Criminology 943 946-
947, 955-956 argues that plea negotiation results in the prosecution gaining total exemption 
from the standard burden of proof and calls for an alternative model that only results in 
partial exemption of the prosecution from its obligations regarding the burden of proof. Lubbe 
& Ferreira (2008) SACJ 164 contend, however, that the mechanism under s 105A has to 
present sufficient evidence to satisfy the court of the validity of the plea and that the 
sentence is just. In summary, a plea and sentence agreement has to be sound in law. 
962 Kemp (2014) Stell LR 425-426, 434-435. 
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plea negotiation process in South Africa, the public prosecutor will not play as 
dominant a role as in the United States.963 However, it is argued that the prosecutor 
retains a definitive role in the South African criminal justice system, also in terms of 
plea and sentence negotiations.964 Bennun965 highlights the problem that the NDPP 
directives may pose in relation to the discretionary powers of the prosecutor with 
regard to the criteria of “the demands of justice and/or the public interest” which are 
incorporated in Directives 3966 and 4.967 What is meant by the “demands of justice” 
and “the demands of public interest” and who has the discretion to determine that, 
the public prosecutor? If that is the case, what is the role of the courts and their 
statutory obligation to inquire into the sentencing agreement? And are the decisions 
of the public prosecutor reviewable or not?968 
It is to be noted, however, that in the plea negotiation process, the primary focus 
remains on the accused and the crime committed and that the main parties to the 
negotiation, namely the prosecutor and the represented accused remain 
                                            
963 Bekker (2001) CILSA 318. 
964 Steyn (2007) SACJ 207. The role and position of the prosecutor in the criminal justice 
system is discussed more fully in section 5 3 1 below. 
965 Bennun SACJ 27. 
966 Directive 3 (2010), formerly Directive 2 (2002) reads: “Section 105A of the Act is to be 
utilized for those matters of some substance, the disposal of which will actually serve the 
purpose of decongesting or reducing the court rolls without sacrificing the demands of justice 
and/or the public interest.” 
967 Directive 4 (2010) reads: “Negotiating a plea and sentence agreement is not meant to 
bargain away a sentence of imprisonment for a non-custodial sentence. Where justice 
and/or public interest require(s) a custodial sentence, this must be adhered to.” Formerly, the 
corresponding directive was Directive 3 (2002), which read: “Negotiating a plea and 
sentence agreement is not to be understood as meaning the bargaining away of a sentence 
of imprisonment for a noncustodial sentence. Where justice and/or the public interest 
require(s) an effective sentence of incarceration that is the stance to be taken. If those 
considerations dictate a shorter term of imprisonment or an alternative sentence, the position 
is different.” 
968 These issues are also raised by Kemp (2014) Stell LR 430-432 and he similarly warns of 
the “enhanced role” of prosecutors in plea negotiation matters that practically make them 
“judges before the courts”. As the actions of a prosecutor have been defined to be 
administrative, s 105A plea and sentence agreements are subject to review as discussed 
above. 
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adversaries.969 It is heartening that the interests of the community970 and, when it is 
reasonable to do so, the representations of the complainant,971 are specifically 
included in the list of factors that need to be taken into consideration by the 
prosecutor when negotiating section 105A plea and sentence agreements.  
The mechanism of plea negotiation has triumphed in the United States criminal 
justice system and is likely to play an ever larger role in the South African criminal 
justice system. 
4 4 3 Mechanisms of restitution in the South African criminal justice system  
“It seems to be eminently desirable that where it is possible for a complainant to 
be compensated in this manner and at the same time for an appropriate 
sentence to be imposed upon the wrongdoer, this course should be followed.”972 
A vexing matter is the issue of restitution in criminal jurisprudence. Can the 
restitution a criminal makes to a victim be considered when passing sentence, or 
does this allow persons with the means to do so to buy themselves a non-custodial 
sentence? Does ordering restitution as part of a criminal sentence blur the lines 
between civil and criminal systems of law? These are not new questions, but they 
have regained prominence with the rebirth of restorative justice policies and 
alternative mechanisms within criminal justice systems in recent times. Indeed, 
several criminal law mechanisms contain provisions allowing for restitution, but the 
prevailing question is how far may they be stretched?973 Limits may also be placed 
on the value of compensation that may be ordered.974 Ordering compensation may 
                                            
969 S v Esterhuizen 2005 (1) SACR 490 (T) at 493H. 
970 CPA s 105A(1)(b)(ii)(dd). 
971 CPA s 105A(1)(b)(iii). 
972 Corbett JA in S v Charlie 1976 2 SA 596 (A) 599A.  
973 There are different forms of restitution, normally divided into the following broad 
categories: administrative compensation funds, administrative compensation orders, 
criminal-court ordered restitution, and civil-court compensation orders. The rights for the 
latter arise from the common law, such as the principles of the law of delict or contract, or 
may be provided for in legislation. The rights to administrative or criminal compensation 
orders usually arise from statutes that generally also prescribe who qualifies as a victim. 
974 For example, the power of the FAIS Ombud to order compensation is currently limited to 
R800,000. Who qualifies as a victim and the nature of the claim are discussed in para 4 2 3, 
192ff above. 
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also form part of the general inherent discretion of a presiding officer regarding the 
imposition of a sentence.975 In this section specific mechanisms that afford an 
opportunity to order compensation to victims under the CPA are discussed. The 
focus is on sections 276 and 276A relating to compensation orders to victims as part 
of correctional supervision measures; section 297 regarding restitution as a condition 
of a suspended or postponed sentence, and section 300 providing for an order of 
compensation as a civil judgment.  
It is submitted in this dissertation that ordering restitution to a victim under the 
criminal justice system is important as it affords an opportunity for the victim’s loss to 
be recovered without costs, both financial and emotional, of an independent civil 
claim.976 Indeed, as Hiemstra observes, the opportunity to order compensation as a 
condition for a suspended sentence is not used enough.977 This is echoed by the 
courts. Claassen J has stated that “(c)ompensation as a condition of a suspended 
sentence is too often not considered.”978 In addition, the purpose of a compensation 
provision like section 300 is to help limit the administrative workload of the regional 
and high courts979 and thus its use is to be encouraged. The application of a 
restitution mechanism is an important factor in efforts not only to address economic 
crime, but also to mitigate the injury caused by such crime to victims. It is further 
submitted that the mechanisms for restitution and compensation, already in 
existence in the CPA, will complement the proposed mechanism of mediation.980  
Section 297 of the CPA provides that the passing of a sentence981 may be 
postponed982 or suspended983 on various conditions, including the payment of 
compensation,984 or the rendering to the victim of some specific benefit or service in 
                                            
975 See for example ss 297 and 276 of the CPA discussed below. 
976 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 29-3; Du Toit Commentary on the CPA 28-45. 
977 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 29-3. 
978 S v Khoza 2011 1 SACR 482 (GSJ) para 10.  
979 Terblanche Sentencing in SA 462. Du Toit Commentary on Criminal Procedure 29-2. 
980 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss these provisions in detail. However, it 
is important to describe the broad processes of these mechanisms. 
981 Offences that are legally subject to a minimum punishment are excluded. 
982 S 297(1)(a). 
983 S 297(1)(b). 
984 S 297(1)(a)(i)(aa). 
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lieu of compensation for damage or pecuniary loss.985 These are positive conditions 
and require an offender to pay an amount or render a service that will result in the 
sentence being postponed or suspended.986 The performance without remuneration 
outside the prison of some service for the benefit of the community that is commonly 
known as community service, is prescribed in section 297(1)(a)(i)(cc) of the CPA and 
must be distinguished from the condition of rendering a specific benefit or service to 
the aggrieved person.987 In this section a brief description of paying compensation as 
a condition for postponement or suspension of sentencing is provided. 
Although courts have strongly advocated the use of the payment of compensation 
as part of the sentence,988 this is not often done.989 The sentencing provision to pay 
compensation is indicative of restorative justice principles incorporated into the 
criminal statutory system.990 Gubbay JA in S v Zindoga991 held that the issue of 
restitution raises two competing public interests, restitution and deterrence, each of 
which needs to be weighed and balanced against another by the court. On the one 
hand it is in the public interest that victims receive restitution for their loss; while on 
the other hand it is also in the public interest that a sentence be imposed which will 
have a deterrent effect.992 The offer to make restitution is a mitigating factor that the 
court takes into consideration when exercising its discretion in the sentencing 
                                            
985 S 297(1)(a)(i)(bb). The application of this subsection is rare, probably as it is restricted to 
rendering a service to the “aggrieved person”. See Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-75. 
986 Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 404; Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-71. 
987 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-75; Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 420. 
988 S v Charlie 1976 2 SA 596 (A) 599 A-B. In S v Edward 1978 1 SA 317 (N) 318A-D the 
court emphasised that ordering the offender to pay compensation to the complainant for 
injuries sustained underscores to the offender the wrong she or he committed. S v Bepela 
1978 2 SA 22 (BH) 24E, 25A-B. See also S v Tlame 1982 4 SA 319 (B) 320H; R v Zindoga 
1980 2 SA 991 (RA) 992H. 
989 Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 417. 
990 Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 362, 417. McNally JA makes the profound statement in 
S v Mambo 1995 1 ZLR 50 (S)(54C): “It seems to me that it is also in the Zimbabwean 
tradition that compensation, restitution and restoration are at the heart of criminal justice, 
rather than mere punishment which benefits the victim not at all” (writer’s emphasis). 
991 1988 2 ZLR 86 (SC). 
992 S v Zindoga 89H-90A. 
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process.993 In order to ensure that restitution does not necessarily or habitually result 
in a non-custodial sentence, the offer of restitution and other mitigating factors need 
to be weighed up against the nature of the offence and other aggravating factors.994 
Another factor to consider is the impact the offence has on the victim.995 From these 
guiding principles it can be concluded that although the sentence needs to induce 
offenders to make restitution, wealthier offenders must not be able to buy 
themselves a stay-out-of-jail card.996  
The general purposes of a suspensive condition of sentencing such as prevention, 
mitigation, preservation of positive elements and rehabilitation remain applicable.997 
The more specific purposes of ordering compensation and suspend a term of 
imprisonment, wholly or in part, as part of a sentence has been justified by the court 
as being: “to keep the offender out of prison, to assist the offender to realise the 
consequences of her actions, and to compensate the victim for her loss”.998 The 
court in Zimbabwe added a fourth purpose, namely to induce compliance by the 
offender with the conditions of suspension.999 Offenders will know that if they do not 
make restitution in terms of the suspensive condition, they are likely to serve a 
longer term of imprisonment. Conversely, should they comply and pay 
compensation, they would “earn” a lesser sentence.1000  
                                            
993 S v Charlie 1976 2 SA 596 (A) 599A; S v Omar 1982 2 SA 367 (N) 360B-E; S v Zindoga 
89F; R v Zindoga 992E. 
994 S v Zindoga 90C. 
995 S v Mlala 291G-H. In this case the court found it a strong mitigating factor that the 
complainant, an uncle of the offender, did not want to press charges. Korsaj J (291A-B) held: 
“If the person directly prejudiced, in such circumstances, can show mercy, a court of law 
cannot ignore such magnanimity”. 
996 In R v Zindoga (292F) Macdonald CJ warns that if too much weight is given to restitution 
and courts habitually impose suspended sentences on condition restitution is made, crimes 
against property are likely to increase. For first offenders, the weight of restitution is 
generally considerable, depending also on the other circumstances of the offence (292E).   
997 Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 406-407; Du Toit Commentary on the CPA 28-15. 
998 Stow para 24 (quoting Terblanche Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 2 ed 364). Also 
see Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 418-419, based on S v Tshondeni 1971 4 SA 79 (T) 
82H-83F; S v Zumbika 1978 3 SA 155 (R) 156D-E; S v Mlala 1985 2 ZLR 287 (H) 289F-G; S 
v Mahlangu 2006 JDR 0852 (T) para 5. 
999 S v Mpfou 2 1985 1 ZLR 285 (H) 295A-C. 
1000 S v Mpfou 295A-C. 
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Another issue is whether the offender’s ability to pay compensation should be 
taken into account or not by the sentencing court. A court, in the specific context of 
partial suspension of sentence on condition of restitution, has stated: “whether or not 
the accused can pay does not always influence this decision”.1001 However, it 
remains a pertinent question and is answered differently by different courts. 
There are two different approaches by the Zimbabwean courts to the offender’s 
ability to pay in the context of a suspended sentence.1002 On the one hand some 
courts have stated that the condition of restitution must be “reasonably capable of 
fulfilment”.1003 If the condition is unlikely to be fulfilled, then the objective of 
preventing the offender from serving a prison term is nullified, as is the objective of 
compensating the victim.1004 As Gubbay J held “(t)he offender will then serve 
imprisonment on account of his poverty and not because of any mala fides or 
negligence on his part”.1005 In the light of this, there is an obligation upon the 
sentencing court when exercising its discretion to inquire into the offender’s ability to 
pay compensation.1006 Accordingly, an accused needs to be given an opportunity to 
address the court on the court’s proposal to suspend part of the sentence on 
                                            
1001 S v Mpfou 295C. 
1002 S v Mpfou 294 A; S v Mambo 1995 1 ZLR 50 (S) 54A.  
1003 S v Zumbika 156F. See also S v Mpofu 294B; S v Manzini 1984 1 ZLR 33 (H) 36A-G; S 
v Mukura 2003 1 ZLR 596 (H) 598B-600A. These Zimbabwean cases follow the 
Zimbabwean appellate division (as it was then) in R v Lamb 1969 3 SA 149 (A)(151) where 
Quenet ACJ stated “When a court considers that part of a sentence of imprisonment should 
be suspended, subject to stated conditions, it does so in the hope and expectation that the 
conditions will be fulfilled. If it is reasonably clear that the conditions are incapable of 
fulfilment, there is no point in granting a suspended sentence.” See also S v Kok 2015 2 
SACR 637 (WCC) para 15. 
1004 S v Zumbika 156F. 
1005 S v Zumbika 156F. Reynolds J in S v Mpofu (297F-298B), does not agree with this 
interpretation and maintains that the offender is not being penalised because she or he is 
poor, but because she or he is unable to earn the lesser sentence offered to her or him by 
making restitution. See also S v Mambo 54B.  
1006 S v Zumbika 155H; S Mukura 600B-C; S v Tawanda 2007 JDR 0321 (ZH) 6. 600B-C. 
Also see Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-75. 
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condition compensation is paid.1007 Subsequent to such inquiry, it may also, be 
appropriate to make an order providing that payment to be made in instalments.1008  
On the other hand, other courts have held that an order may be made, even if it is 
evident at the time of sentencing that the offender is not able to make payment.1009 
In R v Zindoga Macdonald CJ held: 
“A court, however, does not have to be satisfied of the ability of the accused 
person to make restitution before making appropriate provision in its sentence for 
such an eventuality. Nothing is lost by making appropriate provision for the 
possibility of restitution, even where the prospects of this appear to be 
remote.”1010 
A sentence, including part of a period of imprisonment which is suspended on 
condition that compensation be paid acts as an incentive to offenders to make 
payment.1011 It grants offenders an opportunity to serve a lesser sentence. To deny 
offenders such an opportunity on the basis that there is doubt whether they can pay 
the compensation at the time of sentencing, will be inequitable.1012 Such an offender 
                                            
1007 S v Manzini 36H-37C; S v Mahlangu para 5. 
1008 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-75. Also S v Khoza para 9. 
1009 R v Zindoga 1980 2 SA 991 (RA) 992G-H; S v Mpfou 2 1985 1 ZLR 285 (H). In S v 
Mpofu Reynolds J (294E-295C) having decided that he was bound by S v Zumbika, tries to 
reconcile the two opposing approaches with reference to the objective of inducement, 
namely that the courts convey a threat or a promise with the imposition of a suspensive 
condition. If the condition is complied with, the accused gets a lesser sentence. If not, she or 
he will not benefit from the suspensive condition. Consequently whether or not the accused 
can pay does not always influence the court’s decision. 
1010 R v Zindoga 992G-H. In this matter the offender at the trial indicated that he wished to 
make restitution but upon questioning from the magistrate it became evident that he would 
not be able to do so, and consequently the magistrate did not make an order of 
compensation as a suspensive condition. Subsequently, relatives offered to help him make 
restitution (992D), necessitating an appeal against the magistrate’s unconditional sentence.  
1011 Reynolds J in S v Mpofu (296A-H) cites the examples that family members may be 
willing to assist in the payment of the compensation; or the offender may experience a 
change of heart and use income derived from concealed stolen property to pay the 
compensation. It could also be added that the offender’s financial circumstances may 
change, for example, as a result of an inheritance. Also see S v Mambo 54C-D. 
1012 S v Mpofu 295H. It is submitted by the writer that this rationale is correct. Inequality 
would arise if only persons who are able to make restitution are granted a suspended 
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is no worse off for not being able to pay. On the contrary, should they manage to 
make payment their time of imprisonment can be reduced. As McNally JA succinctly 
put it: 
“If the inducement fails, the appellant is no worse off than he would otherwise be. 
If it succeeds, then both he and the complainant will be better off.”1013 
Both approaches have merit. In exercising discretion in sentencing, one of the 
cardinal principles is that the person and circumstances of an offender need to be 
considered by the sentencing court. This means the position of offenders, including 
their financial position will influence their ability to pay a fine or compensation and 
thus the amount to be paid. However, it is submitted that with regard to 
compensation as a suspensive condition, a broader perspective is appropriate. This 
broader perspective allows, for example, the reality that family or friends assist the 
offender with the restitution. The objective of inducement thus grants offenders an 
opportunity to earn a lesser term of imprisonment. It is further submitted that the 
proposed mechanism of mediation, during which restitution will be discussed and 
mediated, affords offenders an opportunity to discuss various possibilities of 
restitution, such as assistance from relatives or possible guarantors that could form 
part of a mediated agreement. Ways of restitution become broader than the single 
inquiry into the offender’s ability at the time of sentencing to make restitution.  
Under section 297 of the CPA, there is no express limit to the amount of 
compensation that can be ordered and care needs to be taken that the 
compensation relates to the victim’s loss, and is not seen as merely a fine paid to the 
victim instead of to the state.1014 The amount of compensation is generally 
determined by three factors, being “the extent of damages, the offender’s ability to 
pay and the blameworthiness of the offender”.1015 There also needs to be a rational 
and causal link between the offence of which the accused has been convicted and 
                                            
sentence. In other words, the wealthy offender will be able to buy her or his way out of prison 
by restitution, while a poor offender will not be given the opportunity to do so. 
1013 S v Mambo 55B. It is to be noted this was stated in a context where the offender said he 
had no money to make restitution, and any civil remedy was likely to be fruitless. The court 
found that the only possible way to recover the monies was the inducement of a suspended 
sentence.  
1014 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-74. 
1015 S v Mahlangu 2006 JDR 0852 (T) para 4. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
353 
 
the loss in respect of which the compensation order is being made.1016 The amount 
of compensation needs to be specific.1017 Compensation can relate to either 
patrimonial loss or pain and suffering, and in this regard the court exercises its 
discretion.1018 It must also be borne in mind that notwithstanding the imposition of a 
compensation order in terms of section 297, a victim does not lose her or his rights 
to a civil claim against the offender.1019 
The time period given within which to make restitution needs to be reasonable,1020 
and needs to take into account the time spent in prison.1021 
                                            
1016 S v Stanley 1996 (2) SACR 570 (A) 571B-E. In this case the accused was convicted of 
the theft of a motor vehicle and part of the sentence was suspended in terms of s 
297(1)(a)(i) on condition that he pay R10,000 compensation in respect of goods that were in 
the vehicle, specifically golf clubs, although he was not convicted of the theft of the goods in 
the motor vehicle. The court held that it was a question of fact whether or not there is such a 
link, and in this instance, there was a rational and causal link: for if the vehicle had not been 
stolen the goods would not have been lost. Also see S v Mahlangu para 5. 
1017 Terblanche Sentencing Guide 419; S v Tshondeni 84A-B. It is respectfully submitted that 
the order for compensation granted by the court in S v Pitout 2005 1 SACR 571 (B) para 33 
is strange. The court’s way of arriving at the sum of R20,000 compensation for the theft of 
cattle is puzzling. The court argued that the number of cattle would have increased because 
some of them were in calf, and inflation could have increased the amount of the loss. 
Consequently, the court increased the amount of compensation from R15,400 to R20,000. It 
is submitted that it could equally be argued that any number of the cattle may have died, or 
the price of cattle may have dropped. Compare the remarks of Goldin J on compensation 
linked to stolen cattle in S v Katevera 667H-668A. 
1018 S v Edward 318H; Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-75. In the Zimbabwean case of S v 
Tivafire 1999 1 ZLR 358 (H) 366A-H and 367C-H, the court interpreted s 358 of the Criminal 
Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9.07] narrowly. This provision is similar to s 297 that 
provides for a sentence to be suspended on condition “compensation for damage or 
pecuniary loss caused by the offence” is paid. The court’s interpretation was that a 
compensation order as a suspensive condition can only be made for “damage or loss which 
is not of a personal injury kind but loss or damage to property which is readily ascertainable” 
(365B-D). It is submitted that this interpretation is too narrow and that an order in terms of s 
358 may include non-patrimonial damages. Notwithstanding this narrow interpretation, it 
should be noted that all the Zimbabwean cases referred to in this section concern offences 
relating to property, for example, theft or fraud. 
1019 Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 418; S v Manzini 37H. 
1020 S v Katevera 1979 3 SA 666 (R) 667G. In S v Kok (para 17) the court held that a 
condition to pay compensation of a relatively large sum in a year was “unduly onerous and it 
was not reasonably possible for the accused to comply with this”. 
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Significantly, section 105A(1)(ii)(bb) and (cc) make provision for a sentence to be 
postponed in terms of section 297(1)(a), or suspended in terms of section 297(1)(b). 
Moreover, sub-section 105(1)(a)(ii)(dd) permits suspension of sentencing in the 
event of an award of compensation being contemplated in terms of section 300 of 
the CPA. This cross-reference demonstrates that the legislature envisaged that the 
payment of compensation as a suspensive condition of postponement or suspension 
in terms of section 297, or a compensation order in terms of section 300 could be 
part of a plea and sentence agreement in terms of section 105A. Accordingly, a 
statutory mechanism exists for paying compensation or rendering some benefit or 
service to a victim, to be ordered as part of a negotiated plea and sentence 
agreement. It is contended in this dissertation that these same statutory mechanisms 
can be incorporated into the proposed mediation process.  
Section 300 of the CPA provides for a court to hear evidence and make an order 
regarding compensation to be paid to the victim.1022 The significant difference 
between sections 297 and 300 is that an order regarding the payment of 
compensation in terms of section 300 is not conditional on the suspension or 
postponement of the sentence. An order in terms of section 300 is fully independent 
of the sentencing proceedings. Consequently, it is not a punishment.1023 Terblanche 
emphasises that the procedure under section 300 takes place after conviction,1024 
and is “totally apart from the sentence the sentencing court imposes”1025 and that the 
“court should rid itself of its role as criminal court and adopt the role of a civil 
                                            
1021 S v Katevera 667G. An order that an accused not be released until compensation has 
been paid to the complainant is not competent (667H). 
1022 At present, the maximum amount for a district magistrate’s court is R300,000 and for a 
regional court it is R1 million. There is no limit on the orders made in the High Court. GN R 
62 in GG 36111 of 30-01-2013. 
1023 S v Hendriks 21C; Du Toit Commentary on CPA 29-3. 
1024 In S v Tlame 1982 4 SA 319 (B) the court emphasised that the procedure to order 
compensation can only commence after a conviction, and, accordingly, any inquiry should 
only commence after conviction and not during the trial proceedings (320B-C). However, as 
evidence regarding the compensation is often led during the criminal proceedings the 
magistrate may under s 300(2) have regard to this evidence (320E).  
1025 Terblanche Guide to Sentencing in SA 462; Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 29-3. 
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court”.1026 It is necessary for the court to give the complainant an opportunity to 
present its case and the offender an opportunity to respond.1027 
Claassen J made a helpful distinction in the application of sections 297 and 300, 
concluding that an order in terms of section 300 should only be made when the 
offender has enough means to compensate the victim in full. If this is not the case, 
then a suspended sentences under section 297 to make restitution in periodic 
payments would be more suitable.1028 In Stow, it is argued that the absence of any 
statutory requirements for determining when a compensation order can be made in 
terms of section 297 in stead of section 300, rendered section 297 
unconstitutional.1029 It was contended that if a section 300 compensation order is 
made, there would be no threat of imprisonment for non-payment by the offender, as 
the effect of a section 300 order is that of a civil judgment.1030 Consequently, if an 
order to pay compensation is made as a suspensive condition under section 
297(1)(a), failure to pay will result in an offender having to serve the suspended 
sentence. This it was argued is discrimination.1031 The court in considering this 
argument made a helpful distinction, highlighting the fact that a compensation order 
under sections 297 or 300 related to a crime having been committed, and someone 
having a right to compensation arising from such crime. As such it must be 
differentiated from a civil judgment debt.1032 The court highlighted other distinctions 
between sections 297 and 300, emphasising that compensation as a condition of 
suspension under section 297 is an integral part of the sentence that includes the 
purpose of keeping an accused out of prison.1033 Moreover, it is a flexible condition 
                                            
1026 Terblanche Guide to Sentencing in SA 462. In S v Bepela Hiemstra CJ emphasised the 
need for the sentencing court to make an inquiry into the ability of the compensation order to 
be executed, stating “(i)t could be a useless order if the accused had no money or other 
assets” (24G). This was subsequently followed by S v Tlame 320E-F. 
1027 S v Tlame 320C-D. 
1028 S v Khoza para 9; S v Medell 686A-D; S v Bepela 24G; Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 29-
3. 
1029 Stow para 60. 
1030 The Constitutional Court in Coetzee v Government of RSA 1995 4 SA 631 (CC) para 19 
found imprisonment for a civil debt unconstitutional. Also see S v Medell 686E-G. 
1031 Stow para 61. 
1032 Stow para 63. 
1033 Stow para 64. 
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that can be used to shape a suitable sentence, taking into account the accused’s 
means and the time it will take to make restitution.1034 Section 300, on the other 
hand, although a “convenient means of recovering a debt”, is only available in 
restricted circumstances, upon the application of the victim or the state on behalf of 
the victim, and can be renounced by the victim. It is consequently not as effective a 
tool as a compensation order under section 297 in the sentencing process.1035  
In addition, the compensation order under section 300 can only be made by a 
court to a victim who has suffered economic loss;1036 while an order in terms of 
section 297 may include compensation for pain and suffering.1037 A compensation 
order in terms of section 300 is made at the request of the victim, or the public 
prosecutor acting upon the instructions of the victim.1038 The order has the same 
effect as a civil judgment.1039 Consequently, no time limit should be fixed by the court 
within which payment has to be made.1040 The victim has 60 days after the award 
has been made to renounce the award in writing.1041 This may occur in the event of 
the award being less than the victim believes she or he can recover by using civil 
litigation. The court has the discretion whether to award the compensation or not, 
and any such award is conditional upon a conviction. Importantly, the inquiry into 
compensation generally only begins after conviction. This has both advantages and 
disadvantages for the victim. On the one hand, a compensation order can only be 
                                            
1034 Stow para 64. 
1035 Stow para 64. In S v Bepela, the court highlights the distinction between the two 
procedures under s 297 and s 300, confirming that the latter is only possible upon the 
request of the complainant as it affects the complainant’s civil claim (24E-H). The court 
encouraged the sentencing court to consider a sentence suspended on condition of 
restitution in instalments (24G, 25A-B). 
1036 S v Edward 318G. 
1037 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 29-3; S v Bepela 24E; S v Edward 318H-319A. 
1038 S 300(1); S v Hendriks 2004 NR 20 (HC) 21D. In S v Panduleni 1995 NR 125 (HC) 
(126E-F) a mero motu order of compensation in terms of s 300 by the magistrate was set 
aside on review. Also see S v Smith 2009 JDR 0606 (GNO) para 9. 
1039 S 300(3)(a) of the CPA; S v Smith para 10. 
1040 S v Tlame 320H; S v Hendriks 21E. 
1041 S 300(5)(a) of the CPA. Interestingly, in S v Khoza (para 12), the court obliged the 
sentencing court to inquire whether the complainant was prepared to accept a smaller 
amount of compensation. No reference was made by the court to the complainant’s right to 
reject the order under s 300(5)(a).  
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made after a criminal conviction requiring a higher standard of proof, which is after 
an offence has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, such 
compensation could save the victim the time and costs of a civil claim. Moreover, 
after conviction, a compensation order cannot be abused for debt collecting, as the 
prosecution may otherwise complain if a charge is made but subsequently withdrawn 
after payment before conviction.1042 Importantly, as a compensation order under 
section 300 has the effect of a civil judgment, it is inappropriate and ineffective to 
make such an order if it is evident that the offender does not have the ability to pay 
and has no executable assets.1043  
In addition, it is important to note that consequent to Coetzee v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa1044 civil imprisonment for a debt is unconstitutional. It 
follows that any threat or order of imprisonment with regard to non-payment of a 
compensation order in terms of section 300 is improper.1045 A more appropriate 
order would be a sentence of imprisonment under section 297 suspended on 
condition of compensation, payable in instalments over a period of time.1046 It is 
equally important for the sentencing court to give the accused an opportunity to 
respond by making representations regarding the amount of damages claimed by 
the victim.1047 Also, the court needs to identify the beneficiary of any order under 
section 300 clearly,1048 both for the benefit of the creditor and the offender. 
In S v King1049 it seems that the sentencing court commingled sections 297 and 
300 of the CPA. The term of imprisonment imposed was suspended on condition 
                                            
1042 With reference to the complaint made by Adv M Govender DDPP, Regional Head, 
SCCU, Western Cape during an interview with the writer (16-09-2016). 
1043 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 29-3; S v Bepela 24G; S v Medell 1997 1 SACR 682 (C) 
686A-B; 
1044 1995 4 SA 631 (CC). 
1045 S v Medell 687H-J. 
1046 S v Medell 687G. See also Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 29-3.  
1047 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 29-5; S v Smith para 11. 
1048 S v Medell 686C-D. 
1049 2014 JDR 2727 (ECG). Similarly, in S v Pitout (579A-580E) the court discussed s 300, 
then the requirements of a suspended sentence without reference to s 297, and then 
ordered a suspended sentence on condition that the accused paid the complainant 
compensation by a certain date. It is submitted that the order made in S v Pitout is 
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that the accused reimburse the complainant in terms of section 300.1050 This part of 
the sentence was set aside, as the requirements in terms of sections 300, including 
the requirement that an application for compensation must be initiated by the 
victim,1051 that the prosecutor must make it clear that she or he is acting on behalf of 
the victim,1052 and that the accused be given an opportunity to address the court 
were not met.1053 
A requirement of a section 300 compensation order is that there needs to be a 
causal connection between the order for compensation and the loss sustained as a 
result of the offence of which the offender is convicted.1054 The amount of the 
compensation is determined by hearing evidence, including the evidence heard 
during the trial or additional evidence, whether verbal or on affidavit.1055 The 
entitlement to compensation and the amount need only be established on a balance 
of probabilities. Hiemstra1056 argues that proof of the quantum needs to be simple 
and swift and that these provisions are not appropriate for complex claims where 
there is still an unresolved dispute between the accused and the victim. In addition, 
the audi alteram partem rule applies and the accused needs to be given an 
opportunity to respond to the claim.1057 Once an award has been granted and 
accepted by the victim, the victim forfeits her or his civil claim, as the compensation 
                                            
confusing, and that a clear distinction needs to be maintained between s 297 and s 300, as 
illustrated by the review court in S v King.  
1050 S v King para 4. Similarly, in S v Tjisuta 1991 NR 146 (HC)(147D) the sentencing court 
ordered the accused to pay compensation in terms of s 300 or alternatively serve a custodial 
sentence. 
1051 S v King para 6.  
1052 S v King para 7. 
1053 S v King para 8; S v Tjisuta 148C. 
1054 S v Velaphi 2013 JDR 0127 (ECG) para 11; Du Toit Commentary on the CPA 29-2. 
1055 S 300(2) of the CPA. 
1056 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 29-2. See too Terblanche Sentencing Guidelines 462; S v 
Lombaard 1997 1 SACR 80 (T) at 83G-I. In this case the complainants applied for 
compensation after the accused had been convicted of fraud. The court found that s 300 
was not appropriate because the claim for compensation was complicated as it involved 
issues of misrepresentation, speculation with property, suretyship and determining the value 
of property and shares over time. The nature of the claim was such that it could only be 
decided upon proper and thorough civil litigation.  
1057 Terblanche Sentencing Guidelines 462; S v Lombaard 1997 1 SACR 80 (T) at 83G-H. 
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order is in lieu of such civil claim.1058 The compensation order, like other orders, is 
subject to appeal or review by the accused;1059 and this may be a risk the victim has 
to weigh up in choosing whether to request compensation through the criminal case 
or to lodge a claim in the civil courts.  
Another mechanism is the possibility to make compensation orders in terms of 
sections 276 and 276A of the CPA which relate to correctional supervision. S v 
Stanley confirmed that it is competent for an order of compensation to be made in 
conjunction with an order of correctional supervision.1060 Similarly, S v Maddock is 
authority for the reconsideration of a sentence in terms of section 276A, even should 
such sentence be in terms of a plea and sentence agreement under section 105A of 
the CPA.1061 Compensation, as an appropriate order, can serve as a term of 
correctional supervision under section 276; or as part of reconsidering sentences in 
terms of section 276A.1062 An order of compensation as a mechanism of restitution 
                                            
1058 S 300(5)(b) of the CPA. 
1059 It can be appealed because it is a “resultant order” in terms of s 309(1)(a). A 
compensation order is also subject to review in terms of s 304(2)(c)(ii). Also see Hiemstra 
Criminal Procedure 29-6.  
1060 575D-F. An order of compensation is possible under s 276(1)(h) or 276(1)(i). It is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation to discuss the differences between s 276(1)(h) that relates to 
direct correctional supervision ordered by the court, and s 276(1)(i) on indirect correctional 
supervision. This being a sentence of imprisonment allowing the offender to be placed under 
correctional supervision in the discretion of the commissioner of correctional services or the 
parole board. As pointed out in S v Stanley (575G-I) it is important to ensure that a sentence 
is in line with the time constraints of s 276(1)(i), namely 5 years; and that conditions of the 
sentence do not interfere with the discretion of the commissioner or parole board. (Since the 
judgment s 276(1)(i) was amended by s 20 of the Parole and Correctional Supervision 
Amendment Act 87 of 1997 to include a parole board.) It is also to be noted that in S v 
Stanley the order of compensation was a suspensive condition in terms of s 297 of the CPA 
and not an order of compensation in terms of s 52 of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 
1998. Compare a similar order of correctional supervision combined with a sentence 
suspended on condition of good behaviour and restitution in terms of s 297 in S v 
Kasselman 1995 1 SACR 429 (T) 434A-J. 
1061 Although an order for compensation was not one of the conditions for correctional 
supervision in S v Maddock, restitution was part of the approved plea and sentence 
agreement. The issue emphasised here is that the terms of a plea and sentence agreement 
can be amended under section 276A.  
1062 This would be possible in terms of s 52(1)(e) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 
1998. See Terblanche Sentencing Guidelines 334. 
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can thus be used by the courts when sentencing someone to correctional 
supervision. This additional sentencing option is briefly discussed, as a 
compensation order combined with a sentence of correctional supervision is one of 
the options that may be incorporated into the proposed mediated settlement 
agreement. 
Correctional supervision, “an innovative form of sentence”,1063 is not a soft 
option.1064 Correctional supervision does however demonstrate the shift in approach 
by the legislature that punishment, reformative and highly punitive, can be achieved 
through alternative ways, and not necessarily through imprisonment.1065 Sentencing 
courts are to be encouraged to use correctional supervision,1066 and the flexibility of 
the sentencing option has been emphasised,1067 as well as its rectification in the 
event of failure.1068 Recently the judiciary’s lack of trust in the Department of 
Correctional Services to properly implement correctional sentences has negatively 
impacted on their use and application by the sentencing courts.1069 
                                            
1063 S v M (Centre for Child law as Amicus Curiae) 2007 2 SACR 539 (CC) (“S v M”) para 61. 
1064 S v M 570C. Also see Terblanche Sentencing Guidelines 323. In S v Mtsi 1995 2 SACR 
296 (W) (209A-B) the court stated that “depending on the content of correctional supervision, 
this kind of sentence can constitute very severe punishment”. Also in S v Flanagan 1995 1 
SACR 13 (A)(16B-C) Smalberger JA said “(o)fskoon aanvaar kan word dat dit minder 
afskrikwaarde het as direkte tronkstraf, bly dit egter, indien behoorlik aangewend, ŉ 
gevoelige straf wat wesenlike en effektiewe bestraffing sonder gevangesetting kan 
bewerkstellig”. Compare the reference by Leveson J in S v Prinsloo 1998 2 SACR 669 (W) 
672J to the “somewhat softer choice of correctional supervision”. 
1065 S v R 1993 1 SACR 209 (A) translated paraphrase of statement at 221H-I; S v Kruger 
1995 (1) SACR 27 (A) 30E. Also see Du Toit Commentary on the CPA 28-10E; Terblanche 
Guide to Sentencing 318. These commentators describe S v R as the locus classicus and an 
outstanding decision on correctional supervision.  
1066 See the cases discussed by Du Toit Commentary on CPA 28-10E-10F. 
1067 S v R 221E, 222C-G; S v Omar 13C-D. 
1068 S v R 222G with reference to s 276A(4) providing, in the event of the failure of 
correctional supervision, that a matter can be referred back to the court for reconsideration 
of an appropriate sentence. 
1069 In Director of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu-Natal v P 2006 1 SACR 243 (SCA) (para 25) 
Mthiyane JA commented: “(w)hen correctional supervision was introduced, courts embraced 
it enthusiastically as a real sentencing option, something that would have a substantial effect 
on the prison population in this country. As time went on, courts became more sceptical but I 
am now completely disillusioned.” Also see the prudent warning in S v Schutte 1995 1 SACR 
 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
361 
 
A primary benefit of correctional supervision is that it can both serve to impose a 
sentence that is highly punitive1070 as well as enable and encourage the 
rehabilitation of an offender.1071 A most helpful distinction given by Kriegler AJA is 
that the option helps to differentiate between two types of offenders, namely 
offenders that need to be removed from society, and others that need not be 
removed from society, but need to be punished.1072 A useful yardstick for the 
sentencing court to use is whether any real purpose is served by sentencing an 
offender to a term of imprisonment.1073 The positive characteristics of rehabilitation 
and differentiation between different personalities of offenders may be well suited for 
some offenders and offences relating to instances of economic crime.1074  
The mechanism of being able to order compensation in terms of section 52(1)(e) 
of the Correctional Services Act as a condition of correctional service is relevant to 
                                            
344 (C) (350C-E) (echoed by Van den Heever JA in S v Sinden (708H-I)) that courts should 
be careful not to “debase the coinage of correctional supervision as a form of punishment” 
as its indiscriminate use will lead to it losing its credibility. For a discussion on the risk of 
losing trust in the system and on the perception of leniency of correctional supervision see 
Terblanche, Guide to Sentencing 348.  
1070 For a discussion on the severity of correctional supervision, see Terblanche Guide to 
Sentencing 323-324. 
1071 For a discussion on the rehabilitative characteristics of correctional supervision see 
Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 321-322. In S v R, Kriegler AJA (220G-J) underlined the 
fact that the legislature had introduced a new phase and that the focus has moved from 
incarceration to rehabilitation: “Ons straftoemeting het egter nou ŉ heel nuwe fase betree. … 
Die belangrikste aspek daarvan is die klemverskuiwing vanaf gevangenisstraf na 
hervorming.” Regarding general benefits of correctional supervision recognised by the courts 
see S v Kruger 1995 1 SACR 27 (A) 31B-E. 
1072 S v R 221H. Also see S v Omar 10H, 13E-F and Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 324-
325, 326. An illustrative example is found in S v Kasselman concerning two policemen who 
impulsively and recklessly stole part of police trap money. The court found (431J) “dat [die] 
beskuldiges nuttige lede van die gemeenskap is wat nie misdadigers in die ware sin van die 
woord is nie maar dit geword het deur impulsiewe onbesonneheid en die versoeking wat 
administratiewe nalatigheid en gebrek aan beheer vir hulle geskep het” (writer’s emphasis). 
1073 S v Kasselman 431J. 
1074 It is submitted that some offenders may not be a danger to society and the seriousness 
of the crime of such a nature that imprisonment may be avoidable. It is equally agreed that 
some offenders may not be suitable for rehabilitation, and also that incarceration is 
necessary as a deterrent or due to the nature of the crime. These criteria will be illustrated in 
the cases discussed below.  
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this dissertation. As, with other restorative sentence options, this mechanism to order 
compensation is underutilised.1075 This is regrettable, for the involvement of victims 
in the process of correctional supervision would help give credibility and validity to 
the process.1076 However, for purposes of this dissertation, it is important to note that 
correctional supervision, whether direct in terms of section 276(1)(h) or indirect in 
terms of section 276(1)(i), has been ordered by the courts for serious cases on 
economic crime, involving for example, theft or fraud.1077 The opposite is also true 
and in a number of cases the option of correctional supervision was refused by the 
courts.1078 The dilemma of sentencing courts in determining an appropriate sentence 
of having to weigh up the interests of society, and balance it with the interests of the 
offender, together with the seriousness of the offence, is voiced by Zietsman JP in S 
v Erasmus:  
                                            
1075 Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 334. 
1076 Terblanche Guide to Sentencing 334. 
1077 In S v Mtsi 1995 2 SACR 206 (W) (209A-J) an offender convicted of contravening the 
Corruption Act 94 of 1992 or alternatively fraud had his sentence of imprisonment converted 
to a sentence of correctional supervision. In S v Kruger (32F-G) Kriegler J referred a case 
involving the theft of meat by a first offender back to the sentencing court to reconsider 
sentencing in view of the appellate division’s proposal of correctional supervision. In S v 
Flanagan (17H) a sentence of imprisonment for fraud was replaced by a sentence of 
correctional supervision.  
1078 In S v Prinsloo (672A-J) a term of imprisonment was imposed on a first offender for theft 
of almost R450,000, despite the offender being a young mother who had repaid the monies. 
The court emphasised the vulnerability of employers and that theft from employers should be 
heavily punished. A request for an order of correctional supervision was also refused in S v 
Vorster 2007 2 SACR 283 (E) (291B-D) which involved theft of approximately R1,6 million by 
an attorney from trust accounts, none of which had been repaid. In S v Botha 1998 2 SACR 
206 (SCA) (211J-212H) an appeal against a sentence of imprisonment for offences of theft, 
fraud and forgery involving approximately R45,000 was dismissed. The magistrate held that 
correctional supervision was not appropriate as it could not prevent the offender from 
recidivism at a workplace. The court of appeal found that the sentence was not 
unreasonable and that the magistrate had not misdirected herself, although she referred to 
correctional supervision as a “half-hearted antidote” and an “inadequate response” to the 
crimes committed. In S v Sinden 1995 2 SACR 704 (A) (708J-709C) an appeal on the basis 
that the magistrate should have used correctional supervision was turned down on the 
ground that the interests of society outweighed those of the offender. Terblanche Guide to 
Sentencing 323-324 contends that the judgments by Van den Heever JA, like S v Sinden 
(708J-709C) regarding the perceived leniency of correctional supervision are too harsh. 
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“Because of the gravity of your offence I cannot accede to your counsel’s request 
that you be kept out of jail entirely. I will, however, impose a sentence which, 
depending upon your conduct and your cooperation with the authorities, could 
result in your sentence being changed to one of correctional supervision after 
you have spent [only part] of your sentence in jail.” 1079   
The cases discussed illustrate that sentencing is a complex responsibility and 
consistency amongst sentences and the application of correctional supervision is not 
easily achieved.1080 It is clear that each case has to be decided on its own facts and 
circumstances. It is also clear that despite the reservations and the disillusionment 
with correctional supervision it remains a flexible and innovative sentencing option, 
particularly when used in conjunction with a condition to pay compensation in 
instances of economic crime.  
S v Maddock identifies another opportunity, post-sentencing, for the mechanism of 
mediation to be used in instances of economic crime. Section 276A(3) is a “unique 
provision”1081 that detracts from the principle that courts give final and binding orders 
regarding sentencing. This section, like section 276(1)(i),1082 grants the 
commissioner of correctional services or the parole board the power to bring a 
matter before the courts to reconsider a sentence. It is important to note that in 
reconsidering the sentence, the court considers the circumstances of the matter 
anew, including events which have taken place after sentencing, that is post-
                                            
1079 1999 1 SACR 93 (SE) 99E-G (it is to be noted that this case is reported twice, also as S 
v Erasmus 1998 2 SACR 466 (SE)). In this case the offender was a first offender who was 
convicted of theft of almost R2 million over a period of two and a half years. The offender 
was clearly remorseful, co-operative, unlikely to repeat the offence, clearly no risk to society 
and had almost fully repaid the monies by selling all his assets. On the other hand economic 
crime had reached alarming proportions and the sum was significant and stolen over a 
period of time. The offender was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment in terms of s 
276(1)(i)(98A-99F). 
1080 Also see the concern of Leveson J in S v Prinsloo (672J-673B) regarding 
disproportionate sentences and his request to the Attorney-General to make his and other 
judgments available to magistrates. 
1081 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-42(1). 
1082 The main difference between s 276A(3) and 276(1)(i) is that a sentence brought before 
the court in terms of the former had no initial provision for conversion of a sentence, as s 
276(1)(i) does. 
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sentencing circumstances.1083 Moreover, section 276(A)(3)(e)(iii) grants the court the 
power to impose a suitable sentence, other than the initial sentence.1084 It is thus a 
two-stage process. Firstly, the commissioner brings the application before the court, 
and then the court reconsiders the sentence, and can decide not to interfere, or to 
interfere by granting an order of correctional supervision or another sentence.1085 It is 
submitted that mediation between the victim and offender, one of the correctional 
measures listed in section 52 of the Correctional Services Act,1086 could also be 
harnessed in a case where restitution may not yet have been made to the victim.1087 
The mechanism of mediation could help the offender in securing the second chance 
provided by section 276(3)(A).1088 
It has been demonstrated that the mechanism of an order of compensation, either 
as a suspensive condition of a sentence under section 297(1)(aa), or as a 
compensation order after conviction under section 300, is a restorative tool that has 
been applied successfully by the courts for the past 40 years. Indeed, the courts 
have encouraged more use of these mechanisms of restitution for victims. More 
recently, the legislature has introduced the opportunity to use the mechanism of 
compensation under an order of correctional supervision under section 276, or as a 
suspensive condition in the reconsideration of a sentence in terms of section 
276A(3). It is also clear that the legislature intended that the mechanism of 
compensation be used as part of a plea and sentencing agreement under section 
105A of the CPA. Such concurrent application of an order of compensation as part of 
sentencing options in the criminal justice system is used as a building block for 
                                            
1083 S v Maddock 9, 10; Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-42(2). 
1084 As was the case in S v Maddock converting the balance of the offender’s initials 
sentence to correctional supervision (14). Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-42(1). 
1085 S v Maddock 9-10. 
1086 S 52(1)(g). 
1087 For example, in a case where a person was sentenced to direct imprisonment and no 
order for compensation had been made, and less than 5 years’ of incarceration were 
remaining, a mediated order of compensation between the victim and offender could place 
the offender in a position to have her or his sentence converted or an alternative sentence 
imposed. It is noted that an offender has no right to bring an application in terms of s 
276A(3) and that the discretion to do so lies with the commissioner of correctional services 
or with the parole board. 
1088 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-42(2). 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
365 
 
restitution orders to be made under the proposed mechanism of mediation. 
Consequently, notwithstanding restrictions and reservations regarding these 
sections, provision already exists in the South African criminal justice system for the 
voice of the community and the complainant to be heard and for restitution to be 
made to the victim for loss suffered by the victim.  
4 5 Multi-faceted mechanisms in the justice systems 
It has been shown that in a highly regulated business sector, the combating of 
economic crime can no longer effectively be achieved through only the conventional 
adversarial criminal trial mechanism. Additional mechanisms are clearly necessary. 
The approach to combating economic crime is multi-faceted and rightly so. This has 
been demonstrated in this chapter by a description of mechanisms under civil and 
criminal law, as well as hybrid mechanisms that are applied to address economic 
crime. To illustrate this complex field of corporate regulation, the pyramid of 
responsive regulation approach of Ayres and Braithwaite was adapted to identify 
methods of regulation and mechanisms of enforcement.1089  
It is evident from the discussion above that the approval by a court of a mediated 
settlement agreement is imperative in the proposed mechanism. This is due to the 
importance attributed to the voice of the public and the critical value of transparency. 
It is submitted that these two considerations are particularly relevant to South Africa, 
where economic crime is disproportionately high and authorities have conceded that 
they are not winning the battle against it. In addition, the mistrust of the justice 
system is illustrated through the existence of vigilante courts and the establishment 
of parallel investigating and prosecuting bodies.1090 
The mechanism of a plea and sentencing agreement is critical to the proposal in 
this dissertation. It is submitted that several issues that arise in negotiating plea and 
sentencing agreements are similar to those that will arise in mediation. The 
constitutionality of waiver of an offender’s constitutional rights by using a process 
such as a plea and sentencing agreement has been assured.1091 It is suggested that 
the same assurance be given to the process of mediation. So too, the issue of a just 
                                            
1089 See the discussion in para 4 1, 153ff. 
1090 See the discussion in ch 3, para 3 3 4, 127-128, especially fns 145 and 148. 
1091 See the discussion of the waiver of constitutional rights in paras 4 3 2 1 and 4 3 2 2. 
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sentence within the context of plea and sentencing agreements will assist the 
determination of a just sentence in the context of mediation.  
Importantly, the recognition and inclusion of restorative justice principles, such as 
the specific requirements to grant a victim an opportunity to make representations 
and to consider restitution under section 105A, are critical to the proposed 
mechanism of mediation. It is suggested that developing these principles further in 
the proposed model will be a natural evolution under the CPA and criminal law in 
South Africa. 
Negotiated justice, including mechanisms like plea and sentencing agreements 
and DPAs, illustrate that alternative mechanisms to the conventional adversarial trial 
do exist in the criminal justice system. In addition, the elements of sentencing have 
become more integrated, with orders for compensation forming part of the 
conventional orders for incarceration. It is submitted that such integration should be 
promoted and developed further, particular with regard to economic crime.  
In this chapter various mechanisms of addressing economic crime have been 
discussed to illustrate that the approach to economic crime needs to be multi-
dimensional, encompassing voluntary, administrative, civil and criminal mechanisms. 
Undoubtedly, more ways of addressing economic crime, both in civil and criminal 
law, as well as hybrid models, will emerge. Consequently, it is proposed that 
mediation, conventionally used to resolve civil disputes, can also be harnessed as a 
mechanism to address instances of economic crime: 
“Scrap[ping] the plea-bargain: Mandatory mediation of criminal cases would 
further justice, at a lower social cost”.1092  
 
                                            
1092 The title of an article calling for mediation to be used expansively in the criminal justice 
system was made at the turn of the century. J Smith “Scrapping the Plea-bargain: Mandatory 
Mediation of Criminal Cases Would Further Justice, at a Lower Social Cost” (2000) 7 Disp 
Resol Mag 19. 
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5 1 Introduction 
“[C]riminal mediation does not replace traditional adjudication within the criminal 
justice system, it just makes the criminal justice system better.”1 
On 26 November 2010 a tragedy occurred. Seventy-one year old Cowan, a 
highly respected legal practitioner, took his own life soon after a suspicious bridging 
loan was detected in the financial records of the firm. After bringing various 
information together it appears that Cowan had been operating a Ponzi scheme for a 
number of years and that investors and other persons who had paid monies into the 
law firm for whom Cowan worked had lost between R150 and 200 million. His 
                                            
1 Simms (2007) Ohio St J on Disp Resol 797 fn 1. 
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deceased estate was declared insolvent. The extent of the losses, details of the 
Ponzi scheme and what had happened to the monies may never be known. Eight 
years later victims are still pursuing civil actions against the law firm in which Cowan 
had been a senior partner. In his suicide note to the law firm, Cowan wrote: “I have 
committed fraud and compromised the firm by doing so. I am deeply sorry that I 
breached the trust placed in me.”2 
This tragic incident illustrates the complexity of economic crime. The fraud is 
difficult to piece together, but it appears parts of the scheme involved early investors 
receiving very high returns of 30 to 48% interest on monies paid for bridging finance. 
Other monies received for normal commercial transactions were misappropriated 
and used to repay the lenders. The story also illustrates the complexity of identifying 
victims of an economic crime: are the early advancers who received extraordinary 
returns initially truly victims? The clients whose monies were entrusted to the law 
firm’s trust accounts for other purposes and whose funds were then misappropriated 
are victims. Likewise, the law firm itself identifies itself as a victim, saying it was 
totally unaware of Cowan’s fraudulent activities. The surviving widow and family 
members are also clearly victims. The legal and Jewish communities in which 
Cowan was well known and respected also suffered harm. None of the stakeholders: 
neither the state, nor the victims, including direct victims, close family and the 
broader public, nearly a decade later, have experienced a satisfactory resolution to 
the dispute. 
This incident has been used not only to demonstrate the complexity of the nature 
of economic crime, the difficulty of identifying victims and the complications in 
resolving the different disputes between the stakeholders, but also to suggest that 
mediation may serve as an effective way of resolving similar economic crimes and 
the disputes arising from them. It is submitted that the opportunity to participate in 
mediation and to reach a mediated settlement within the criminal justice system is a 
necessary additional mechanism through which economic crime may be addressed.  
                                            
2 For a more detailed account, see T Broughton “Ponzi Victims Pursue Law Firm After 
Attorney’s Suicide” (03-06-2018) Sunday Times <https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-
times/news/2018-06-02-ponzi-victims-pursue--law-firm-after-attorneys-suicide/> T Broughton 
“Cowan Fraud Battle Hots Up” 25-01-2011) IOL <https://www.iol.co.za/news/south-
africa/kwazulu-natal/cowan-fraud-battle-hots-up-1016660> (all accessed 11-07-2019). 
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5 2 Principles on which to build and integrate the mechanism of mediation 
into the criminal justice system 
“No one punishes a wrong-‐doer putting his mind on what they did and for the 
sake of this, unless one takes mindless vengeance like a wild beast. But he who 
undertakes to punish with reason does not avenge himself for the past offence, 
since he cannot make what was done as though it had not come to pass; he 
looks rather to the future, and aims at preventing that particular person and 
others who see him punished from doing wrong again."3  
In chapter 1, the magnitude, complexity and debilitating effect of economic crime 
was described. It is recognised that the present mechanisms in the criminal justice 
system to address economic crime are not succeeding. Accordingly, there is an 
opportunity and a need for an additional way in which to deal with economic crime. 
The submission in this dissertation is that mediation can make a contribution and will 
serve as an effective and resourceful alternative dispute method through which some 
instances of economic crime can be resolved. The characteristics and benefits of 
mediation were described in chapter two, including the relative informality and 
flexibility of the process and the establishment of a safer more engaged space within 
which participants can consider and attempt to resolve the disputes. Moreover, the 
dynamic nature of mediation and the uncovering of larger narratives through 
dialogical and experiential truth is fundamental for the negotiation about and 
resolution of disputes arising from complex economic crime. Significantly too, 
mediation is considered to be a restorative justice process and is rehabilitative and 
reformative. 
The foundation on which the proposed mediation dispute resolution model in the 
criminal justice system will rest is restorative justice. The core principles and 
characteristics of restorative justice were discussed in chapter 3. The importance of 
the different stakeholders in a restorative justice model, namely the state, the 
offender, the victims and the community were identified; and it was further 
demonstrated that their participation in the criminal justice system is a realisation of 
the policies and purposes of the reformation of the criminal justice system in South 
                                            
3 Plato, Protagoras 324 a—b <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/> (accessed 16-08-2016). 
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Africa.4 Significantly, the importance of the participatory roles of offenders and 
victims and the mainstreaming of restorative justice was recently endorsed by the 
new Minister of Justice and Correctional Services.5 
The basic requirements of a successful mediation are an offender and a victim 
willing to participate voluntarily.6 Implicitly, the offender is willing to take responsibility 
and accountability for her or his wrongs, whilst a victim is willing to participate to 
seek a resolution. In addition, it is suggested that a formal statutory opportunity for 
mediation, which robustly encourages, but does not force persons into mediation will 
be appropriate to persuade participants to engage in a mediation process.7 However, 
instances of economic crime involve other stakeholders too, including the police, the 
prosecution, the courts and the broader public.  
Primary stakeholders in addressing economic crime are the prosecution and the 
police. Section 179 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of the National 
                                            
4 The adoption and development of restorative justice in the South African criminal justice 
system was discussed in ch 3, para 3 2 1, 104ff. See also H Hargovan “Doing Justice 
Differently: A Community-based Restorative Justice Initiative in KwaZulu-Natal (2009) 22 AC 
63 66-68. 
5 In his recent address to parliament on 16 July 2019, minister Ronald Lamola indicated that 
the CPA is due to be amended to ensure that it is in line with the Integrated Criminal Justice 
System (“ICJS”) (2017), including the consideration of victims of crime and witnesses as 
being main beneficiaries of the system. See L Ensor “Justice Minister to Seek More 
Resources for Cash-strapped NPA” (16-07-2019) Business Live 
<https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/2019-07-16-justice-minister-to-seek-more-
resources-for-cash-strapped-npa/> (accessed 17-07-2019). The ICJS (2017) approved by 
cabinet on 29 March 2017 includes the promotion of ADRM as a focus area. This includes 
mediation in criminal matters and collaboration with the community. See DOC&CD “Focus 
Areas Integrated Criminal Justice System (ICJS) pmg 
<https://pmg.org.za/files/170531focusareas.ppt> (accessed 19-07-2019). Also see ch 3, 
para 3 2 1, 104ff. In a pilot project, H Hargovan (“Doing Justice Differently: Prosecutors as 
‘Gate-Keepers’ of Restorative Justice (2010) AC 18 33) found that the mainstreaming of 
restorative justice into the main criminal justice system is also supported by the prosecution. 
6 ZD Gabbay “Exploring the Limits of the Restorative Justice Paradigm: Restorative Justice 
and White-collar Crime” (2007) Cardozo J Conflict Resol 8 421 474-475. Notably, Gabbay 
contends that the victim has to be a natural person. However, in this dissertation it is 
submitted that a victim may be any person, including a company, because juristic persons 
are represented by natural persons.  
7 See discussion in ch 2, para 2 2 2, 41, 42-45. 
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Prosecuting Authority (“NPA”)8 and the establishment of the position of the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions (“the NDPP”).9 Section 179(2) grants the NPA the 
authority to institute criminal proceedings, and importantly section 179(4) provides 
that “national legislation must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its 
functions without fear, favour or prejudice”. The National Prosecuting Authority Act 
32 of 1998 (”NPA Act”) regulates the powers of the prosecution.10 The Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (“CPA”) underscores the discretionary power of the 
prosecutor as dominus litis, by prescribing the prosecution’s discretion to prosecute 
or not to prosecute.11 This discretionary power is further illustrated in various 
provisions describing the prosecution’s power in specific circumstances.12  
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the role and the powers of the 
prosecutor.13 However, throughout this dissertation concern has been raised about 
the very powerful discretionary position of the prosecutor, with little review and 
recourse for persons prejudiced by the decisions of a prosecutor. It has been 
                                            
8 As provided by s 179(1) of the Constitution, s 2 of the NPA Act established a single 
national prosecution authority, the NPA, as opposed to the former independent provincial 
prosecution agencies. 
9 S 179(5) grants the NDPP extensive powers to determine prosecution policy, issue policy 
directives, review decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute and to intervene in the event of 
prosecutorial policy directives not being followed. The position of the SDPP of the 
Specialised Commercial Crime Unit (“SCCU”) is also relevant for this dissertation. 
10 In S v Basson 2007 1 SACR 566 (CC) para 44 the Constitutional Court found that 
particular powers of an independent prosecution in terms of the NPA Act endorse the fact 
that “effective prosecution of crime is a constitutional objective”. See also Brown v National 
Director of Public Prosecutions Case no 1800/2011 I (“Brown v NDPP (2011)”) para 29. 
11 S 6(a) of the CPA. 
12 For example, s 112 of the CPA entitling the court to enter a plea of guilty based on 
acceptance by the prosecution of such plea; s 57A of the CPA enabling the prosecution to 
invite an accused to admit guilt and pay a fine. Also see Clarke (1999) CILSA 160-164.  
13 Compare Uijs AJ in North Western Dense Concrete CC v Director of Public Prosecutions 
(Western Cape) 1999 2 SACR 699 I paras 679H-I & 680A-E who emphasises the traditional 
discretionary and independent nature of a prosecutor’s power and authority to decide 
whether an accused should be prosecuted or not, even if a prima facie case has been made 
out against the accused (para 681B). The only time the court may interfere with the 
independent discretion of the prosecutor is in the event of mala fides (679I-J); or “if justice 
dictates that (it) should do so” (681G). Also see Brown v NDPP (2011) paras 26-32 
describing prosecutorial misconduct and the duties of a prosecutor, including the duty “to 
ensure that an accused’s right to a fair trial is protected and not to act arbitrarily”. 
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submitted that mediation may serve to mitigate some of the disproportionate power 
of the prosecution, particularly too with regard to plea and sentencing agreements. 
This is because the prosecutor will become one of the participants, together with the 
offender and victim, in the negotiation process facilitated by the mediator. This can 
be compared to prosecutors being the more powerful negotiators in negotiations 
seeking plea and sentencing agreements under section 105A of the CPA, or 
exercising their prosecutorial power in deciding whether to accept or decline a guilty 
plea under section 112 of the CPA, or whether to prosecute or not to prosecute. It 
can be said that prosecutors retain the power to decide whether to engage in 
mediation or not to engage in mediation, except in instances where the court refers a 
matter for mediation. 
The intention of this dissertation is to check the powers of prosecutors in the 
conclusion of plea and sentencing agreements, not to dilute their constitutional 
independence.14 A mediator assesses and manages the power relationships 
between the parties.15 By granting a stronger voice to the offender and the victim 
through the facilitation of a mediator in terms of the proposed section 105B of the 
CPA, the procedural power of the prosecutor under mechanisms like sections 112 
and 105A of the CPA is countered. In addition, the critical oversight of the court is 
necessary. Judicial supervision is required in section 105A plea and sentencing 
agreements and will similarly be provided for in the proposed section 105B mediated 
settlement agreements. 
It is also submitted that a model with more participation by the stakeholders in the 
criminal justice system will be more effective. The investigating officers play an 
integral role in the criminal justice system16 and effective and successful cooperation 
between the prosecution and police is a prerequisite for combating economic crime 
                                            
14 The power of the prosecutor is official, based on formal authority and consequently it can 
be said the prosecutor has immense procedural power. This issue was discussed in ch 4, 
para 4 4 2 1, 316-319. Also see R Lyster “Mediating Constitutionally Protected Rights 
Disputes: Some Caveats and Recommendations” (1996) SAJHR 230 241. 
15 Lyster (1996) SAJHR 242. 
16 The South African Police Services (“SAPS”) is responsible for the investigation of crime in 
South Africa. 
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successfully.17 It is envisaged that the police will also play an important role in the 
proposed model. This is based on police practices that demonstrate that 
investigating officers influence the negotiation of charges brought against a 
defendant.18 The cooperation of the police and prosecution will be vital in cases 
where assets already have or may be forfeited through steps taken by the Asset 
Forfeiture Unit (“AFU”).19 The forfeiture and realisation of assets may play a pivotal 
role in the resolution of a dispute, particularly with regard to restitution of loss 
suffered by the victims.20  
Similarly, the participation of the victim and the community influences the efficacy 
of the criminal justice system. The participation of the victim, the recognition of the 
legitimate interests of the victim and the benefits gained by such participation have 
been discussed throughout this dissertation, primarily the benefits of restoration.21 
The role the community can play, whether as collaborative partners in providing 
mediation services or in other correctional measures, has also been highlighted in 
                                            
17 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the operations of the police and the 
NPA. Notably, effective cooperation between the two bodies has been validated by the 
operations of the SCCU in the NPA. For a detailed discussion see A Altbeker Justice 
through Specialisation? The Case of the Specialised Commercial Crime Court: Institute for 
Security Studies Monographs 76 (2003). Cooperation and collaboration between the 
different state departments is a focus area of the ICJS (2017) and underscored by the NPA. 
See “Report of the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Correctional Services on Budget Vote 
21: Justice and Constitutional Development” (12-07-2019) pmg <https://pmg.org.za/tabled-
committee-report/3883/> (accessed 19-07-2019) emphasising the integration of different 
departments and the need to address the “silo” approach. The NDPP Annual Report 
2017/2018 18 19 also emphasises the close collaboration between the NPA and the Anti-
Corruption Task Team, the Special Investigating Unit, the South African Revenue Service 
and several other government stakeholders through concluding memoranda of 
understanding with one or another. Also see ch 3, para 3 3 1, 115ff. 
18 During her research in South Africa, CT Clarke (“Message in a Bottle for Unknowing 
Defenders: Strategic Plea Negotiations Persist in South African Criminal Courts” (1999) 32 
CILSA 141 153) found that the police have an influence on plea negotiations and that 
defence lawyers negotiate directly with the police before the matters are handed over to the 
NPA.  
19 A special unit in the NPA whose work is inextricably linked to that of the police. See the 
discussion in ch 4, para 4 3, 207ff. 
20 See the discussion in ch 4, para 4 3 4, 238-242. 
21 See the discussion in ch 3, para 3 3 3, 121ff. 
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chapter three.22 Such increased participation by the victim and community will 
contribute to the integration and mainstreaming of the principles and objectives of 
restorative justice which are in line with the macro-policy and aims of the criminal 
justice system in South Africa.23  
The role of the court is critical. It is not the intention of this dissertation to privatise 
or decriminalise offences relating to economic crime, but to ensure that they fall 
under the discretion of the court and come into the public domain. The role of the 
court is not only to receive and consider a mediated settlement agreement, but also, 
where appropriate, to direct and refer matters for mediation. In addition, this 
dissertation makes the case that judicial mediation is possible.24  
In chapter 4, different mechanisms available in the civil and criminal justice 
systems were discussed. It was shown that the law remains dynamic and that hybrid 
mechanisms such as asset forfeiture and DPAs have evolved, particularly in the field 
of economic crime.25 The particular significance of DPAs is to illustrate the 
development of additional alternative mechanisms to the adversarial trial court 
process in the realm of negotiation, but still under the wing of the court’s jurisdiction. 
Although it is not the proposal of this dissertation that DPAs be introduced in South 
Africa, it is submitted that certain of its guiding principles like legal privilege of 
information disclosed during negotiation,26 and protection of disclosure of identity of 
persons27 are both informative and formative28 for the proposed mechanism of 
mediation. The disclosure of a DPA, a confidentially negotiated agreement, in a 
public court to ensure critical judicial oversight has shown the potential utility of a 
                                            
22 See ch 3, para 3 3 4, 126ff. 
23 Acknowledgment by the prosecution of the importance of collaboration with the community 
and public organisations, like NICRO; and participation of victims and offenders in mediation 
and other restorative justice programmes has been shown in research done in KwaZulu-
Natal recently. See Hargovan (2010) AC 32 37-38. 
24 See ch 2, para 2 4 1, 81-86. 
25 See the discussion in ch 4, para 4 3, 207ff and para 4 4 1, 248. 
26 See the discussion in ch 4, para 4 4 1 2, 279-282. 
27 See the discussion in ch 4, para 4 4 1 2, 274-276. 
28 In the sense of giving shape or form. 
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hybrid model in the criminal justice system.29 Like DPAs, mediated settlement 
agreements can be negotiated outside the courtroom, but approved inside it.30  
This is in addition to the use of plea and sentencing agreements which has long 
been the primary way to resolve crime in the United States, and which is increasingly 
being used in South Africa. It is submitted that the recognised benefits of DPAs and 
plea and sentencing agreements, including the saving of legal costs and time, 
restitution for victims and continued existence of companies will be shared by the 
proposed negotiation model of mediation.31 In addition, it is acknowledged that 
mediation may increase the awareness of individuals and members of the 
community of the nature of economic crime and of their role in the prevention and 
response to economic crime, as well as in the resolution of disputes arising from 
such crimes.32 This, in turn, will encourage and promote “more constructive and less 
repressive criminal justice outcomes.”33 
The above principles of negotiated justice, restitution and judicial supervision 
already established in the criminal justice system present building blocks with which 
an additional mechanism, mediation, can be built on restorative justice, alongside 
section 105A plea and sentencing agreements. It is suggested that the proposed 
section 105B is a natural extension of section 105A plea and sentencing 
agreements. An understanding already exists in the jurisprudence of negotiated plea 
and sentencing agreements and the application of the “just sentence” criteria in 
terms of section 105A.34 In addition, more meaningful participation by the victim in 
the criminal justice system has been statutorily endorsed by section 105A, and the 
proposed section 105B will serve to entrench such participation further.35 Moreover, 
the mechanisms available in the CPA regarding restitution, like sections 297 and 
                                            
29 See discussion in ch 4, para 4 4 1 2, 263-272. 
30 This is clearly shown in the discussion of the publication of DPAs in ch 4, para 4 4 1 2, 
272-276 above. 
31 The benefits of mediation, DPAS and plea and sentencing agreements have been 
discussed in ch 2, para 2 4 1, 88-91; ch 4 para 4 4 1 2, 255-256; and ch 4, para 4 4 2 1, 316 
respectively. 
32 Compare the discussion in ch 2, para 2 4 1, 88-91. Also see CEPJ Mediation in Penal 
Matters, Recommendation R(99) 19. 
33 CEPJ Mediation in Penal Matters, Recommendation R(99) 19. 
34 See the discussion in ch 4, para 4 4 2 2, 334-338. 
35 See the discussion in ch 4, para 4 4 2 2, 329-333. 
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300, have been specifically incorporated into section 105A, and will be specifically 
borne in mind in the negotiation of plea and sentencing proposals during the 
proposed mediation.36 
In view of the above considerations, it is submitted that the proposal to introduce 
mediation in the criminal justice system as an appropriate dispute resolution 
mechanism to resolve instances of economic crime in the criminal justice system has 
been proven justified and necessary. 
5 3 Section 105B of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977: A 
proposed model for mediation in the context of economic crime in South 
Africa 
5 3 1 The legal context for the introduction of section 105B 
The supreme governing law in South Africa is the Constitution of South Africa,37 
and since its commencement all laws, statutory, common and otherwise are to be 
tested against the Constitution. Provisions relating to the prosecution of offenders of 
economic crime and the resolution of such disputes thus need to adhere to the 
provisions of the Constitution. Section 35(3) provides that every accused person has 
a right to a fair trial, including the right “to a public trial before an ordinary court.”38 
The public nature of any process used to prosecute an offender or resolve a dispute 
of a criminal nature is strongly emphasised in the South African criminal system; and 
rightly so. However, the question arises whether an adversarial trial process before 
an ordinary court is the only place where such a public process may take place?  
It is acknowledged by the NPA that the fulfilment of its constitutional mandate to 
prosecute matters successfully may include “resolving criminal matters outside of the 
formal trial processes through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.”39 The 
opportunity to resolve matters under the state’s mandate creates the possibility of 
                                            
36 See the discussion in ch 4, para 4 4 3, 353ff. 
37 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”). 
38 S 35(3)(c) of the Constitution. 
39 NDPP Annual Report 2015/2016 19. The possibility of using alternative mechanisms to 
the adversarial trial also forms part of the ICJS (2017) focus areas, especially the prospect of 
mediation. See DOC&CD “Focus Areas Integrated Criminal Justice System (ICJS) pmg  
<https://pmg.org.za/files/170531focusareas.ppt> (accessed 19-07-2019). 
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using mediation to negotiate plea and sentencing agreements to be approved by the 
court.  
It is submitted that this process will not infringe on the constitutional rights of the 
parties and that although mediation, like plea and sentencing agreements, may 
result in the voluntary waiver of certain constitutional rights necessary safeguards 
can be built into the process, as has been done in section 105A of the CPA.40  
Law is dynamic and ever evolving and accordingly there are undoubtedly grey 
areas in which the conventional delineation between civil and criminal law is blurred. 
This is particularly true in the realm of the response to economic crime and the use 
of administrative penalties to hold companies and persons responsible for corporate 
crime. 41 The prevailing international tendency to settle charges of economic crime 
on the perimeter of criminal law, yet not fully within the jurisdiction of criminal law 
through the use of NPAs and DPAs further blurs the borders between criminal and 
civil law. Hybridity prevails. This is evident in the erosion of the accusatorial and 
adversarial trial processes through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such 
as plea negotiations, DPAs and deferments.42 Similarly, the traditional duel between 
the prosecutor and defence attorney has become less adversarial with the 
recognition, albeit slowly, of the participatory roles of the public and the victim. So 
too, the elements of sentencing have become more integrative, with orders for 
compensation forming part of the conventional orders for incarceration. Current 
sentences in cases of economic crime show that restorative measures are now 
being integrated with retributive principles. The contemporary overlap of and blurring 
of the traditional boundaries between criminal and civil justice systems are 
recognised and acknowledged. It is submitted that this trend should be promoted 
and developed further, particularly in the realm of economic crime.  
It is in this context of hybridity and ever-evolving criminal justice that it is proposed 
that mediation be formally introduced into the criminal justice system to contribute to 
combating economic crime.  
                                            
40 See the discussion of the waiver of constitutional rights in paras 4 3 2 1 and 4 3 2 2. 
41 This is evidenced by the administrative actions and decisions of bodies such as the SEC 
in the United States, the ASIC in Australia and the FAIS Ombud in South Africa.  
42 Clarke (1999) CILSA 149-151. 
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5 3 2 The proposed section 105B 
Draft provisions of the proposed section 105B, including explananory notes, are in 
Annexure A, which need to be read together with the Principles of Best Practice for 
Mediation in the Criminal Justice System in Annexure B. 
5 3 3 The benefits and challenges of section 105B 
The benefits of mediation relate to its particularity. It is a particular process, in the 
sense that it is an informal and flexible process of which the nature is determined by 
the unique circumstances of the participants, the nature of the issues raised by them, 
and the mediation style of the mediator. Critiques of mediation argue that this 
informal nature is contrary to the formal due process afforded by the conventional 
procedural process with rules and regulations. Yet it has been shown that offenders 
and victims feel that the mediation process treated them fairly and culminated in a 
fair outcome.43 In this dissertation, it is asserted that the nature of the process and 
the participants themselves should be trusted, albeit in a dynamic way, and not 
rigidly cast into rules and regulations. Consequently, preference is given to principles 
of the practice of mediation, in contrast to legislated rules or regulations. However, it 
is proposed that a code of conduct be developed to protect the professionalism of 
the process.44 
The particularity of the participants in mediation is also definitive. Contrary to the 
conventional justice system, in which the prosecution and the offender appear as the 
main role players and as adversaries before a presiding officer, mediation includes 
more participants. These are notably the victim, and at times members of the 
community, who appear on an equal footing with the offender. At times, the 
prosecution is also a participant to discuss and negotiate a resolution for the dispute, 
with the assistance and facilitation of a mediator. This multi-party process has been 
criticised as involving too many persons, and that the focus on the interests of the 
persons clouds the real issues of justice of identifying and proving a particular 
offence and ordering a just sanction against an offender. It has also been criticised 
                                            
43 See the discussion in ch 3, para 3 5, 148ff. 
44 See Annexure B, Principles of Best Practice for Mediation in the Criminal Justice System, 
Principle 7. 
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as being cumbersome and time consuming. Yet research also shows that this is 
generally not so, and that mediation does save time and that a multi-party process 
does not necessarily hinder justice.45  
Mediation is also particular regarding punishment. Arising from the particular 
characteristic that mediation emphasises the parties’ interests and not their rights, 
punishment is particular to each case. Restoration, both economic and personal, is 
more readily achieved during mediation than in an adversarial process. Monetary 
restitution, although possible in the adversarial civil and criminal systems, is not 
readily awarded in a criminal trial and it is limited by rules of evidence and 
procedure. It has also been shown that offenders are more likely to pay restitution in 
terms of a mediated settlement than they are in terms of a court order.46 Moreover, 
restitution is particular and unique to each case.  
Restoration, of both the offender and the victim, is important. Mediation is only 
successful if there has been some admission and accountability by the offender. It 
has been shown that this accountability may serve the interests of justice better, as 
the offenders are less likely to be recidivists. Restoration for the victims is also 
distinct and it may be that simply hearing the truth or hearing answers to questions 
such as “why”? or “why me?” may help the victim to obtain closure and healing. 
Similarly, an offender, hearing the victim, and hearing the effect her or his action had 
on a victim, can lead to an offender recognising and acknowledging the magnitude 
and impact of her or his actions, and subsequently accepting accountability.47  
There are two primary challenges foreseen regarding the proposal. The first is 
reluctance, firstly by the prosecution, but also by defence counsel. As has been 
shown, prosecutors possess a very powerful broad discretion with regard to how 
instances of crime are dealt with and prosecutors may thus fear the relinquishment 
of their power. Akin to this may also be a general reluctance by defence counsel to 
use alternative dispute mechanisms as the complicated criminal justice system has 
been developed to protect the rights of an offender. It is submitted that mediation is a 
                                            
45 For a general discussion on the concerns and benefits of mediation in the criminal justice 
system see ME Laflin “Remarks on Case-management Criminal Mediation (2004) 40 Idaho L 
Rev 571 608-619; RN Koman “Balancing the Force in Criminal Mediation (2016) 7 Beijing L 
Rev 171 172-173. Also see the discussion in ch 2, para 2 4 1, 88ff. 
46 See the discussion in ch 2, para 2 4 1, 88ff. 
47 See the discussion in ch 3, para 3 5, 148ff. 
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natural extension of a plea and sentence agreement. Therefore it is not a radical 
proposal. The possibility of mediation, in fact, offers the parties an additional way to 
solve the disputes arising from economic crime. In addition, like the introduction of 
DPAs in other jurisdictions through specific legislation, the formal introduction of 
mediation illustrates the trend to introduce more alternative mechanisms to resolve 
instances of economic crime and to move beyond the binary option: to prosecute or 
not to prosecute.   
A further challenge is the public perception that mediated plea and sentence 
agreements may be considered “soft options”. Accordingly, the public may also be 
reluctant to participate in and support mediation. However, it is submitted that the 
involvement of the public in the mediation process will go towards changing such 
perceptions and grant them a more informed appreciation of the criminal justice 
process. Also, as repeatedly noted in this dissertation, education and awareness of 
the mechanism is vital to its success.48 
5 4 Different stages in the criminal justice process when a case may be 
referred to mediation  
It is submitted that mediation can be used in various stages of the criminal justice 
system: pre-charge, pre-plea, pre-conviction, pre-sentencing and post-sentencing.49 
5 4 1 Before a criminal charge is laid 
A serious inhibition to combating economic crime in South Africa is that it is not 
reported to the relevant authorities.50 It is understood that there is a practice in 
                                            
48 See the discussion in ch 3, para 3 3 4, 131. 
49 CEPJ Mediation in Penal Matters, Recommendation Appendix part II, art 4.  
50 Adv M Govender, Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions and Regional Head, SCCU, 
Western Cape (16-09-2016) in an interview explained that one of the NPA’s main problems 
is that complainants are not lodging charges against offenders. Consequently, the SCCU 
often finds that when it prosecutes an offender, it may technically be the offender’s first 
recorded offence, but investigations reveal she or he may have been dismissed for similar 
acts of wrongdoing at previous places of employment. Compare too, research by Statistics 
South Africa showing that more than 43% of households questioned believe there is no point 
in reporting corruption as nobody cares. Corruption News “South Africans’ Reasons for Not 
Reporting Corruption” (10-12-2014) Corruption Watch 
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corporate South Africa where upon detection of an offence, the complainant and the 
person alleged to be responsible for a wrongdoing agree to sign an acknowledgment 
of debt in terms of which the wrongdoer agrees to repay the monies.51 This is 
evidently problematic. On many occasions no criminal charges are laid and 
consequently much crime goes unreported. The reasons for this practice and the 
reluctance to lay criminal charges are diverse. However, one of the reasons is a lack 
of confidence in the police services and the courts to resolve the dispute effectively 
and speedily.52  
It is submitted that mediation of the dispute in the pre-charge stage can be 
appropriate upon detection of the wrongdoing. There may be instances where the 
complainant confronts the wrongdoer, or the wrongdoer confesses to the 
complainant. Alternatively, a professional body may have investigated a member for 
wrongful conduct.53 Whatever the case, a process, other than the standard laying a 
charge with the SAPS is needed.54  
In the event that the offender or victim is a company it is suggested that using 
chapter 7 of the Companies Act 2008 regarding resolution of disputes through ADR 
could be considered. The parties can either agree to mediation voluntarily in terms of 
section 187(2)(a) of the Companies Act 2008; or the complainant may apply directly 
for the dispute to be resolved by ADR.55 The matter can be resolved directly by 
                                            
<https://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/south-africans-reasons-for-not-reporting-corruption/> 
(accessed 11-07-2019); Statistics South Africa Victims of Crime Survey 2013/2014 P0341 
55. 
51 Compare the facts in Machanick Steel & Fencing v Transvaal Cold Rolling 1979 1 SA 265 
(W) 266G-268A; Hohne v Super Stone Mining (Pty) Ltd 2017 3 SA 45 (SCA) paras 6-12. 
These cases also dealt with the risk of having the acknowledgment of debt set aside on the 
grounds of duress or it being inadmissible evidence in a civil trial.  
52 The complainant may calculate that it is likely to lose more through wasted time and costs 
in lodging a charge with the police, so decides to cut its losses and not report the crime.  
53 For example, the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants (“SAICA”) may have 
investigated a case of fraud or incorrect accounting by a registered member of SAICA. 
54 The complexity of South African labour law is acknowledged when there is an 
employer/employee relationship between the victim and offender. It is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to discuss these issues. However, it is envisaged in such a case that the 
contractual employment relationship between the participants will also form part of the 
issues to be resolved during the mediation.  
55 S 166(1)I read with reg 132(1) and Form CTR 132.1. 
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CIPC,56 or be referred by CIPC for mediation by the Companies Tribunal or by a 
private accredited entity.57 The mediated settlement agreement can be made an 
order of the court.58 As suggested in chapter 4, CIPC can also be more proactive 
and initiate or refer such disputes for mediation.59 The suggested mediation process 
would not preclude involvement of a member from the public or from a body with a 
relevant interest in the matter.60 
The constitutional independence and powers of the NPA are acknowledged61 and 
this suggestion is made having considered the powers of the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) to cause prosecution to be instituted.62 The 
close collaboration between ASIC and the Director of Prosecutions in Australia is a 
further relevant consideration.63 Accordingly, the suggestion is that there should be 
closer collaboration between CIPC and the NPA in South Africa, and that an 
agreement be concluded between CIPC and the NPA regarding the mediation of 
instances of economic crime by CIPC, the Companies Tribunal or accredited entities 
                                            
56 S 170(1)(d) read together with reg 138 and Form CoR 138. 
57 S 169(1)(b) read with s 166(3) and reg 132(2) and Form 132.2. See discussion above in 
para 4 2 2 2. The proposed deletion of mediation by a private accredited entity in s 22 of the 
Companies Amendment Bill (draft) 983 in GG 41913 of 21-09-2018 is noted. 
58 It is submitted that s 167(2) which provides for a consent order, on application, to be made 
an order of the court, would extend to a mediated settlement agreement as proposed in this 
dissertation. The court retains its discretion to require changes (A 167(2)(b)). It is proposed 
that s 167 be amended to specifically include a court in the criminal justice system as the 
present provisions evidently refer to the High Court in the civil justice system (see s 156(c)).  
59 See ch 4, para 4 2 2 2, 181, 187-195.  
60 For example, fraud by a registered member of SAICA may involve not only the 
complainant, but also a representative of SAICA, who could make proposals regarding the 
corrective supervision or conditional suspension of the defendant as a member of SAICA.  
61 The NPA is an independent constitutional body established in terms of s 179 of the 
Constitution with the power in terms of s 179(2) of the Constitution read together with s 20 of 
the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998 to institute criminal proceedings. No other 
body may interfere with the authority and functioning of the NPA, and, consequently, no 
other body may institute criminal proceedings. 
62 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 51 of 2001 (“ASIC Act 2001”) 
(compilation no 64, 28-09-2017) Part 3, Division 5, s 49. In addition, the powers of ASIC to 
request disclosure and cooperation in terms of the ASIC Act 2001 and the Corporations Act 
50 of 2001 (compilation no 81, 28-09-2017) ch 9, Parts 9:4AA and 9:4B, ss 1317DAA-1317Q 
are important. 
63 See the discussion in ch 4, para 4 2 2 2, 181, 191-192. 
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as envisaged by section 188 of the Companies Act 2008.64 It is further suggested 
that such collaboration agreement make provision for the mediated settlement 
agreements to be referred to the NPA for further action in terms of the powers and 
functions of the NPA.65 
The primary proposal of this dissertation is that mediation should be developed 
alongside section 105A of the CPA, and consequently the NPA will be fully involved 
in terms of the CPA. The proposed section 105B would be used after a charge has 
been laid, and accordingly this is the triggering event upon which this proposal is 
focused.  
5 4 2 After a charge is laid, but before a plea 
In practice, the pre-trial period from the time the charge is laid and the trial is 
heard can be a frustratingly long and very costly period. During this time, the matter 
is being investigated and a case put together by the investigation units. It is 
envisaged that the proposed section 105B would be most used during this stage. 
After a charge has been laid but before the offender is asked to plead the different 
parties could reach settlement through mediation. As in the pre-charge stage, the 
primary persons involved would be the offender and the victim. A designated 
member of the NPA may also participate in the mediation process or may decline to 
do so and subsequently agree to accept the mediated settlement agreement and 
either formally defer the matter or present it to the court for approval. In addition, it is 
envisaged that mediation may assist to break an impasse between the prosecution 
and defence in plea and sentence negotiations.  
                                            
64 Compare the policy of the NDPP (Annual Report 2017/2018 18 19) to enter into and 
conclude collaboration agreements with the Anti-Corruption Task Team, the Special 
Investigating Unit, the South African Revenue Service and several other government 
stakeholders. Also see the discussion in ch 3, paras 3 3 1, 115, ch 4 para 4 2 2 2, 181, 191-
192. 
65 Notably, in the light of recent economc crime in South Africa and the wrongdoing by 
registered members of professional bodies, the CEO of an accounting professional body, the 
Independent Regulatory Body for Auditors (“Irba”), has made a call for collaboration and 
sharing of information between the relevant bodies and the NPA to ensure criminal 
prosecution of the offenders. See L Buthelezi “Change Needed to Jail Rogue Bean-
Counters” (13-08-2019) Business Day <https://tisobg.pressreader.com/> (accessed 14-08-
2019). 
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In practice, the police may also play an important role, including by suggesting 
that the matter be mediated.66 Again, it is envisaged that the mediation will resolve 
pertinent issues, including: an agreed statement of relevant facts, admissions of 
wrongdoing, restitution and a proposed sentence. 
5 4 3 After plea, but before conviction 
After the defendant has been asked to plead, the matter may also be referred to 
mediation by the court upon the request of either the prosecution or the defence, or 
on its own initiative, to resolve the matter, or to resolve any particular issue regarding 
the dispute.67  
5 4 4 After conviction, but before sentencing 
Mediation could also be appropriate after trial and conviction, but before 
sentencing. It is submitted in this dissertation that restorative justice is more than 
simply an alternative sentencing option. However, there is indisputably an 
opportunity for mediation between the state, the offender, the victims and relevant 
representatives of the community before sentencing. Provision is already made in 
the criminal justice system for compensation and for victim-impact statements, yet it 
is argued that these processes do not always hear the voice of the victim or the 
offender and thus true justice is tenuous. Mediated discussion between the offender 
and the victim at this stage will ensure direct participation of the stakeholders and 
consequently could culminate in a resolution of greater meaning and substance. 
Building on the use of victim-impact statements and victim-offender mediation it is 
proposed that mediation will better serve not only the aims of correctional measures 
for the offender but also restoration for the victims. As discussed above, the 
correctional measures may include the postponement or suspension, in whole or in 
part, of sentences of imprisonment on condition of payment of compensation or other 
forms of restitution. Terms may also be included regarding the integration of the 
offender into the community. Any sentence process could thus incorporate the 
                                            
66 Compare the practice in Kwazulu-Natal where the police refers matters for mediation. See 
Hargovan (2009) AC 66; fn 18. 
67 For example, an issue relating to evidence, like agreeing on an amount the offender 
admits to filching.  
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principles of restorative justice, not simply the objective goals of restitution and 
retribution, but also the subjective goals of the experience and satisfaction of the 
offender, victim and public of being heard and consequently justice being felt by 
them to have been done.68  
Sentencing by South African courts still follow more retributive than restorative 
measures.69 In a recent survey among South African magistrates and prosecutors 
regarding sentencing options, including diversion and restorative mediation, the 
authors concluded that South African magistrates and prosecutors seem to be more 
punitive in their sentencing options than their counterparts in other countries.70 The 
presence or absence of the voice of the victim during the sentencing procedure, 
including evidence before the court regarding the impact which the offence had on 
the victim and the victim’s expression of an opinion regarding the sentence to be 
imposed upon the offender also have an impact on the sentence granted.71  
Mellon argued more than a decade ago that South African courts should make 
more use of community service orders, instead of incarceration for instances of 
economic crime.72 Two hurdles were identified, namely the perception that 
community sentences are “soft” punishment and the practical implementation of such 
penalties.73 In South Africa, there are a number of conditions that can be imposed for 
                                            
68 See the discussion in ch 3, para 3 6, 149ff. 
69 Terblanche Sentencing in SA ch 12, Conclusion: the current core of sentencing, para 12, 
194-195 states that: “Retribution forms the current foundation of every sentence, and is 
present in this form in every sentence”. 
70 B Naude, J Prinsloo & A Ladikos “Magistrates’ and Prosecutors’ Sentencing Preferences 
Based on Crime Case Scenarios” (2003) 16 Acta Criminologica 67 68 and 71. 
71 De Klerk discusses different sentences granted by different presiding officers related to 
similar offences and illustrates that in the instances where the voice of the victim was heard 
through victim-impact statements or evidence the victim’s voice did have an impact. KL De 
Klerk The role of the victim in the criminal justice system: A specific focus on victim offender 
mediation and victim impact statements LLM Thesis, University of Pretoria (2012) 24-31.  
72 A Mellon “Sentencing White-collar Offenders: Beyond a One-dimensional Approach” 
(2009) SACJ 327 343-344. 
73 Mellon 2009 SACJ 347-348. She maintains that both the public and the judiciary perceive 
community penalties not to be severe enough and thus the latter are reluctant to use them. 
Furthermore, it is not only the practical implementation that is problematic, but also the 
theoretical understanding of such penalties. Like incarceration, community penalties can 
also be restrictive and limit the standard and freedom of a sentenced person’s life. Moreover, 
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correctional supervision, including house detention and community service.74 
Conditions of correctional supervision can be both positive and negative and may 
also be imposed in conjunction with suspended or limited sentences of 
imprisonment.75 It is submitted that South Africa needs to implement more hybrid 
forms of sentencing, including expanding the types of combination of sentences 
already possible in terms of the appropriate legislation. It is submitted further that an 
increase in a combination of sentences and conditions of sentence could significantly 
improve the effectiveness of sentences of persons convicted of economic crime. For 
example, a non-custodial sentence, suspended or postponed, but limiting the guilty 
person’s lifestyle, as well as ordering restitution and community service, is also likely 
to achieve the conventional objectives of sentencing. It is envisaged that a mediated 
settlement agreement will include provisions relating to a sentencing agreement, 
which, in turn, will comprise terms relating to a postponed or suspended 
imprisonment sentence, payment of compensation, and correctional supervision.  
In summary, with regard to sentencing in South Africa the judicial discretion of the 
presiding officer rightly prevails, guided by the Zinn triad of the offender, the crime 
and the interests of society. It is, however, submitted throughout this dissertation that 
                                            
community penalties can contribute positively to the community and consequently greater 
understanding and awareness of the nature of community penalties and correctional 
supervision needs to be promoted. See Terblanche Sentencing in SA 3 ed (2016) ch 11 
paras 1-7 317-329, for a discussion of the nature of correctional supervision and its 
reception and application in the criminal justice system. Also see ch 4 para 4 4 3. 
74 CPA s 276(1)(h), read together with s 276A and Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 
chapter VI, s 52(1) set out the structure in which conditions of correctional supervision may 
be imposed. Compare the types enumerated in s 177 of the United Kingdom Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 which includes orders that may impose geographical and activity limits 
upon convicted persons. For example, an unpaid work requirement [s 177(1)(a)]; a 
prohibited activity requirement (s 177(1)(d)); a curfew requirement (s 177(1)I); or a foreign 
travel requirement (s 177(1)(ga)). As an illustration, a qualified accountant convicted of fraud 
may be sentenced to teaching community members basic accounting, whilst also being 
prohibited from travelling abroad or participating in in relaxing or luxury activities. Also see 
Terblanche Sentencing in SA ch 11, Correctional Supervision, para 8, 331-341. 
75 CPA s 276(1)(h), read together with s 276A. For example, a sentence may comprise a 
term of imprisonment suspended on condition that compensation is paid to the victim, and a 
further period suspended on a correctional supervision condition, like the imposition of a 
geographical limit on an offender’s movement.  
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the triangle should be squared to grant equal weight to the voice of the victim.76 It is 
this pillar, a victim-orientated approach to the quadrangle, which is interwoven with 
the characteristic of restorative justice that will bring even better balance to the 
sentencing process, also with regard to economic crime.  
5 4 5 After sentence, but before parole 
Mediation could also be meaningful at the post-sentence stage, with a view to the 
rehabilitation and re-integration of the convicted persons and the possibility of parole. 
This is possible through sections 276A(3) and 276(1)(i) 77 of the CPA. Section 
276A(3) is a “unique provision”78 that detracts from the principle that courts give final 
and binding orders regarding sentencing. Section 276A(3) grants the Commissioner 
of Correctional Services or the Parole Board the power to bring a matter before the 
courts to reconsider a sentence. This restorative opportunity is demonstrated 
through Maddock v S.79 In that case the original sentence given by the court was 
bought before the court again for reconsideration.80 In reconsidering the sentence, 
the court considers the circumstances of the matter anew, including events which 
have taken place after sentencing, in other words post-sentencing circumstances.81 
Moreover, section 276(A)(3)(e)(iii) grants the court the power to impose a suitable 
                                            
76 KD Müller and IA van der Merwe “Squaring the Triad: The Story of the Victim in 
Sentencing” (2004) 6 Sexual Offences Bull 17-24. 
77 The main difference between s 276A(3) and 276(1)(i) is that a sentence brought before 
the court in terms of the former had no initial provision for conversion of a sentence in the 
discretion of the commissioner of the parole board as s 276(1)(i) provides. 
78 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-42(1). 
79 WCHC 26-11-2010 Case no A641/2010 (“S v Maddock 2010”). 
80 In this case Maddock appealed against a refusal to reconsider a sentence agreed in terms 
of a s105A plea and sentence agreement. Maddock was an accountant involved in a fraud 
scheme and entered into a plea and sentence agreement regarding his involvement in the 
fraud and was sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment of which 3 years was suspended on a 
number of conditions. Accordingly, Maddock fell under the provisions of s 276A(3) and the 
opportunity to have his sentence reconsidered by a court, if in the opinion of the 
commissioner or a parole board, the person is a fit subject for correctional supervision. 
81 S v Maddock 2010 9, 10; Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-42(2). For example, the 
offender showing remorse or offering to pay compensation. 
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sentence, other than the initial sentence.82 It is thus a two-stage process. Firstly, the 
commissioner brings the application before the court, and then the court reconsiders 
the sentence, and can decide not to interfere, or to interfere by granting an order of 
correctional supervision or another sentence.83 It is submitted that mediation 
between the victim and offender, a mechanism which already exists and is used as 
one of the correctional measures in terms of section 52 of the Correctional Services 
Act,84 could also be applied in a case where outstanding issues, like restitution for 
the victim, may be considered.85 The mechanism of mediation could help the 
offender in securing the second chance provided by section 276(3)(A).86 
It is acknowledged that the issue of parole is contentious87 and has been shown to 
be a vexatious issue in the United States. In the United States, the issue of parole 
was becoming problematic, as sentences carefully given in terms of the Sentencing 
Guidelines were altered in practice through a Parole Board granting prisoners earlier 
parole. This led to the policy of “truth in sentencing” first in Minneapolis and 
Minnesota, but eventually in most of the United States. 88 Similarly, in South Africa 
the powers of the Parole Board are questioned as it seems to nullify the prudent 
process of sentencing undertaken by the trial court and the conventional 
                                            
82 As was the case in S v Maddock 2010, converting the balance of the offender’s initial 
sentence to correctional supervision (14). See Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-42(1). 
83 S v Maddock 2010 9-10. 
84 S 52(g). 
85 For example, in a case where a person was sentenced to direct imprisonment and no 
order for compensation had been made, and fewer than five years of incarceration were 
remaining, a mediated order of compensation between the victim and offender could place 
the offender in a position to have her or his sentence converted or an alternative sentence 
imposed. It is noted that an offender has no right to an application in terms of section 
276A(3) and that the discretion lies with the commissioner of correctional services or with the 
parole board. 
86 Hiemstra Criminal Procedure 28-42(2). 
87 Parole is the function of the executive. In South Africa parole falls under the Department of 
Correctional Services and is governed by the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, read 
together with the Parole and Correctional Supervision Amendment Act 87 of 1997. Parole of 
course affects sentencing and the actual period a convicted offender spends incarcerated. 
88 For a discussion on these issues see M Lippman Contemporary Criminal Law 2nd ed 
(2010) 52, 60. The policy of “truth in sentencing” in various laws across the United States 
ensures that a significant part of imprisonment sentences is indeed served, and that fewer 
people are released early on parole. 
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discretionary powers regarding sentencing vested in the judiciary.89 Early release 
from prison can also have an adverse effect on the victims and the public as they 
may perceive that justice is being undermined. However, the legal position is that the 
issue whether anyone may be released on parole, though likely, is in fact not known 
beforehand.90 Consequently, the courts have held that a probable earlier release on 
parole may not be taken into consideration whilst sentencing a person.91 Whilst the 
distinction between the executive and the judiciary and the independence of both 
has been emphasised in South Africa,92 it is also true that South Africa has an 
integrated criminal justice system. In a sense a court’s order of imprisonment will 
always be indeterminate, because it cannot determine the maximum period actually 
to be served, as the integrated justice system grants offenders opportunities for 
rehabilitation and correctional supervision.  
5 5 Conclusion 
In a country overshadowed by economic crime, citizens look towards law for 
justice, but seemingly find little. This is evident in suspected and accused 
perpetrators who use the law to fend off investigations, inquiries and disclosure. It is 
also evident in the para-legal bodies established by civic society to address 
economic crime, or worse still in the bundu courts in the streets.93 Crime does indeed 
seem to pay.  
It has been submitted that a multi-dimensional and multi-layered approach is 
necessary to address economic crime. Braithwaite’s pyramid of responsive 
regulation and resolution is such an approach.94 It has been demonstrated that the 
foundational level of the pyramid includes instilling values and principles of honesty 
                                            
89 FW Kahn “Recommendations for Parole Reform” in JJ Henning (ed) Economic Crime in 
Southern Africa (1996) 95-96. 
90 Terblanche (2013) “Judgments on Sentencing: Leaving a Lasting Legacy” (2013) 76 
THRHR 95 102. 
91 Stewart CJ in S v Lebalo 1991 1 SACR 398 (BA) para 401D; S v Khumalo 1983 2 SA 540 
(N).  
92 S v Mhlakaza 1997 1 SACR 515 (SCA) para 521D-522E. Also see Terblanche’s 
discussion on parole in (2013) THRHR 101-103.  
93 See ch 4, para 4 5 fn 1090. 
94 See Figure 2, 158. 
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into children at primary school. This is effectively illustrated by education 
programmes run by corporations and administrative bodies.95 Another dimension is 
that of corporate self-regulation, like the King Codes that are widely accepted and 
applied by members and enforcers of the commercial sector in South Africa.96 
Together with peer monitoring bodies such the Nigerian CGRS, these mechanisms 
of self-regulation and evaluation help to reduce economic crime. 
At a higher level up the pyramid administrative bodies such as CIPC and the 
Companies Tribunal can and should provide fast, effective and efficient resolution to 
commercial disputes, including instances of contravention of regulations that 
constitute economic crime.97 Similarly, ombuds in various industries play a critical 
role in addressing and redressing the consequences of economic crime. This has 
been demonstrated by the functions and decisions of the FAIS Ombud.98 
Yet higher up the pyramid there are several mechanisms of diversion that operate 
in the courtyard of the criminal courts, including informal mediation and DPAs. These 
mechanisms have also been shown to effectively resolve economic crime disputes. 
On the threshold of the criminal court, informal and formal plea and plea and 
sentencing negotiations and agreements take place. Plea and sentence agreements 
have proved to be an alternative, yet highly effective, mechanism that has become 
the mainstay in the United States and is increasingly important in South Africa. At the 
pinnacle of the pyramid is the classical adversarial criminal trial.  
The submission of this dissertation is that there is room for an additional 
alternative mechanism alongside plea and sentencing agreements on the threshold 
of the criminal court: mediation. It has been shown that mediation is an appropriate 
dispute resolution mechanism that can be used at several levels of the pyramid of 
responsive regulation. However, the primary focus is on the proposed section 105B 
to be used in the precincts of the criminal court. In view of the prevalence of 
economic crime in South Africa and public expectation, the courts need to be 
involved and be a critical part of the process. Judicial oversight will validate the 
proposed model of negotiated justice.  
                                            
95 Like CIPC in South Africa or ASIC in Australia. See ch 4, para 4 2 2 2, fns 136 and 169. 
96 See the discussion in ch 4, para 4 2 1, 165ff. 
97 See the discussion in ch 4, para 4 2 2 2, 181ff. 
98 See the discussion in ch 4, para 4 2 3, 195ff. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
391 
 
Mediation has been chosen as it has proved to be a successful and satisfactory 
mechanism to resolve disputes, including disputes of a criminal nature. In particular, 
mediation presents an opportunity for the prosecutor, the offender, the victim and the 
community to meet in a facilitated process. The opportunity is created for the voice of 
each participant to be heard in a managed space. The voice of the victim is likely to 
relay the sounds of loss and injury. The voice of the offender may portray the picture 
of why and how, and express remorse and restitution. The voice of the prosecutor 
will proclaim justice and sanction. The voice of the community will lament the 
prevalence of crime, but it will also affirm rehabilitation and restoration. Mediation 
brings accountability and reconciliation, restitution and reform: better outcomes than 
retribution. 
Mediation has been chosen as it is embedded in and resonates with the unique 
South African jurisprudence. Mediation is traced back to both the traditional African 
justice system, as well as the English justice system, both of which form part of the 
South African justice system. Moreover, mediation embraces and embodies the 
principle and purpose of ubuntu and the purpose of the constitutional democracy of 
South Africa: 
“These can now be addressed on the basis that there is 
a need for understanding but not for vengeance, 
a need for reparation but not for retaliation, 
a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation.”99 
                                            
99 Epilogue of the Interim Constitution of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 para 50, with 
reference to the atrocities of the past. 
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ANNEXURE A: SECTION 105B: MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
 
To amend the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, to allow a prosecutor, an accused 
and a victim to enter into a mediated settlement agreement; and to provide for 
matters connected therewith. 
Section 105B(1) provides for specific definitions which are necessary as the 
mechanism of mediation is limited to economic crime. A definition of a victim is also 
required. 
Section 105B(2) provides for a matter, or part of it, to be referred to mediation, 
either by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, or by order of the 
court upon application of either the prosecutor or the accused, or in the discretion of 
the court. 
Mediation, whether by agreement or by application can only be initiated by the 
prosecutor, the accused or the court but cannot take place without the victim being 
given an opportunity to participate. The victim has the right to participate in the 
mediation but does not have the right to apply for mediation and may decline to 
participate. The right to engage or not to engage in mediation remains part of the 
independent prosecutorial power of the prosecutor, under the Constitution, but 
subject to the accused having the right to apply to court for mediation and the court’s 
discretion to order it. The court may also exercise this discretion on its own initiative. 
A party to a mediation can be, but need not be legally represented. Accordingly, it 
is possible for an unrepresented accused to participate in mediation.1 In a case with 
multiple accused or multiple victims, not all the accused or all the victims need to 
participate in the mediation.2 
Section 105B(3) provides that the appointment of an accredited mediator can be 
by agreement between the parties or by a body that has been authorised and 
accredited by the NDPP, or by the court. 
                                            
1 Compare the discussion in ch 4, para 4 4 1 2 and fns 731 & 732, 302-303. 
2 Compare Directive 9 and the discussion in ch 4, para 4 4 2 2, 341-342. 
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Section 105B(4) provides for the minimum conditions with which a MSA must 
comply. These prerequisites protect the constitutional rights of the accused and 
concern procedural formalities.3 
Section 105B(5) provides judicial oversight, which ensures that the constitutional 
rights of the accused have been properly protected and which validates the terms of 
the MSA, including that the agreed plea and sentence agreement are just. 
Section 105B(6) provides for instances when the court can enter a plea of not 
guilty if it is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offences in respect of which 
the MSA was entered into or admissions were made. 
Section 105B(7) provides for the trial to start de novo before another presiding 
officer if the court finds that the plea of guilty is inappropriate. Accordingly, the 
accused’s rights are protected.  
Section 105B(8) provides for the court to consider the proposed sentence in terms 
of the MSA if the court is satisfied that the plea of guilty is proper. The same criterion 
as in section 105A is used, namely that the court needs to consider that the 
sentence is “just”. Equal consideration by the court needs to be given to the interests 
of the accused and the victim.4  
Section 105B(9) provides for the instance when the court is satisfied that the 
sentence is just and then convicts the accused and sentences the accused in terms 
of the MSA. 
Section 105B(10) provides for the instance when the court is not satisfied that the 
sentence is just. 
Section 105B(11) provides for the situation when a MSA is null and void and a trial 
needs to start de novo. 
Section 105B(12) provides for the amendment of a MSA. The terms of a MSA 
may need to be amended in the event that the circumstances of the accused or the 
victim change, and may be necessary to avoid failure by the accused to comply with 
its terms in circumstances that were not, and could not have been, foreseen by the 
prosecutor, the accused or the victim at the time the MSA was agreed.5 
                                            
3 Compare the discussion on the waiver of rights by the accused in ch 4, para 4 4 1 2, 302ff. 
4 See the discussion on the rights of the victim in ch 4, para 4 4 2 2, 328-331. 
5 Compare the (English) Crime and Court Act 2013, Sch 17, para 10 regarding DPAs. 
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Section 105B(13) provides for the role of the mediator in the context of the 
criminal justice system. It is necessary to define the role of the mediator to clearly 
distinguish between the functions and role of the mediator and that of the court; and 
to make provision in the event that the mediator is a presiding officer.  
Section 105B(14) provides for the termination of the mediation for various 
reasons. 
Section 105B(15)and (16) provide for confidentiality, legal privilege and the status 
of and use of the material and information disclosed during the mediation in any 
other criminal proceedings. The accused and the victim also need to be protected 
and given the right to apply to the court to have any part of the information contained 
in the MSA or disclosed to the court not disclosed publicly. 
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The following section is hereby inserted into the principal Act after section 105A: 
Mediated Settlement Agreement 
Section 105B(1) In this section: 
“economic crime” means a non-violent illegal act committed by a person to gain 
economic profit or benefit”; 6 
“mediation” means a process in which parties to a dispute, with the assistance of a 
mediator, who facilitates communication and negotiation between the parties, 
endeavour to reach a voluntary resolution regarding their dispute; 
“mediator” includes a co-mediator and means an individual who conducts a 
mediation and who has been accredited in terms of the applicable rules; 
“mediation agreement” means an agreement by two or more persons to refer for 
mediation the whole or part of a dispute in connection with economic crime which 
has arisen, or which may arise between them, and may include an agreement 
entered into between the disputing parties and the mediator before the mediation 
process commences which sets out the terms of the mediation;  
“mediator’s report” means a report in terms of section 105B(13)(d); 
“mediated settlement agreement” (“MSA”) means an agreement, by some or all, of 
the parties to the mediation settling, the whole or part, of the dispute to which the 
mediation relates”; 
“prosecutor” means a prosecutor duly authorised and designated by the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions; 
“victim” means a person who has suffered direct harm as a result of economic 
crime.7 
 
(2) (a) In any criminal proceeding regarding economic crime, the prosecutor and 
the accused8 may, before the accused is asked to plead, negotiate and enter 
                                            
6 It is proposed that certain types of crime in respect of which s 105B will apply can be further 
provided for through directives issued by the NDPP. 
7 The term “victim” is preferred to the term “complainant” used in s 105A. However, as 
shown the term victim can be very widely interpreted. It is proposed that the term victim be 
specifically defined through directives issued by the NDPP. See the discussion in ch 3, para 
3 3 3, 119ff. 
8 The term “defendant” is preferred but because the term “accused” is used in the CPA, it is 
also used here. 
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into a mediation agreement; or the prosecutor or the accused may apply to 
court for an order, or the court may on its own initiative direct, that any issue 
with regard to the charge be referred to mediation for resolution. The victim 
must be given an opportunity to participate in any such mediation, but may 
decline to do so.  
(b) Subject to paragraph (a), participation in mediation is voluntary and will take 
place only upon agreement of the relevant parties. Not all accused persons in a 
case involving multiple accused need to join in the application for mediation.  
(c) A mediation agreement must be in writing. A mediation agreement is in writing 
if its content is recorded in any form, whether or not the mediation agreement 
has been concluded orally, by conduct or by other means. 
(d) Participants in a mediation may be legally represented.  
(3) An accredited mediator may be appointed by agreement, or by an accredited 
body or by the court.  
(4) A MSA shall 
(a) state that the accused, before entering into the agreement, has been informed 
that she or he has the right: 
(i) to be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt; and  
(ii) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence. 
(b) state fully the terms of the agreement, contain a statement of substantial facts, 
all other facts relevant to the proposed agreed sentence in the MSA and any 
admissions made by the accused. 
(c) A MSA is for an agreed period, but may not be for more than five years.   
(d) The MSA may impose time limits within which the parties must comply with the 
requirements imposed on them. 
(e) The MSA may include a term setting out the consequences of a failure by a 
party to comply with any of its terms. 
(f) The terms of the MSA  
(i) shall be in writing, and shall be signed by all the participants, including 
participating legal representatives; 
(ii) shall be approved by the Director of Public Prosecutions having 
jurisdiction or an official authorised to do so. 
(5) (a)  The prosecutor shall, before the accused is required to plead, inform the 
court that a MSA has been entered into and the court shall  
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(i) require the accused to confirm that an MSA has been entered into; and 
(ii) satisfy itself that the requirements for an MSA in subsection (4) have been 
complied with. 
(b) If the court is not satisfied that the MSA complies with the requirements of 
subsection (4), the court shall  
(i) inform the prosecutor and the accused of the reasons for non-compliance; 
and 
(ii) afford the prosecutor and the accused the opportunity to comply with the 
requirements concerned. 
(c) If the court is satisfied that the MSA complies with the requirements of 
subsection (4), the court shall require the accused to plead to the charge and 
order, subject to an application in terms of sub-section (14), that certain of the 
contents of the MSA not be disclosed in open court. 
(d) After the contents of the agreement have been disclosed, the court  
(i) shall question the accused to ascertain whether 
(aa) she or he confirms the terms of the MSA and the admissions made 
by her or him in the MSA; 
(bb) with reference to the alleged facts of the case, she or he admits the 
allegations in the charge to which she or he has agreed to plead 
guilty; and 
(cc) the MSA was entered into freely and voluntarily in her or his sound 
and sober senses and without having been unduly influenced; 
(ii) shall question the victim to ascertain whether the victim confirms the 
terms of the MSA;  
(iii) may consider the mediator’s report under subsection 13(d)(i). 
(6) After an inquiry has been conducted in terms of section105(B)(5), the court 
shall – 
(a) if the court is not satisfied that the accused is guilty of the offence in respect of 
which the MSA was entered into; or 
(b) it appears to the court that the accused does not admit an allegation in the 
charge or that the accused has incorrectly admitted any such allegation or that 
the accused has a valid defence to the charge; or 
(c) for any other reason, the court is of the opinion that the plea of guilty by the 
accused should not stand; 
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record a plea of not guilty and inform the prosecutor and the accused of the 
reasons therefor. 
(7) If the court has recorded a plea of not guilty, the trial shall start de novo before 
another presiding officer: Provided that the accused may waive her or his right 
to be tried before another presiding officer. 
(8)  (a) If the court is satisfied that the accused admits the allegations in the 
charge and that she or he is guilty of the offence in respect of which the MSA 
was entered into, the court shall proceed to consider the terms of the proposed 
agreed sentence in the MSA. 
(b) For the purposes of this paragraph, the court  
(i) may  
(aa) direct relevant questions, including questions about the previous 
convictions of the accused , to the prosecutor and the accused; and 
(bb) hear evidence, including evidence or a statement by or on behalf of 
the accused or the victim, or a mediator’s report; and 
(ii) shall, if the offence concerned is an offence  
(aa) referred to in the Schedule to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 
1997 (Act No. 105 of 1997); or 
(bb) for which a minimum penalty is prescribed in the law creating the 
offence, have due regard to the provisions of that Act or law. 
(9) If the court is satisfied that the proposed agreed sentence in the MSA is just, 
the court shall inform the prosecutor and the accused that the court is so 
satisfied, whereupon the court shall convict the accused of the offence charged 
and sentence the accused in accordance with the proposed sentence in the 
MSA. 
(10) (a)  If the court is of the opinion that the sentence agreement is unjust, the 
court shall inform the prosecutor, the accused and the victim of the sentence 
which it considers just. 
(b) Upon being informed of the sentence which the court considers just, the 
prosecutor, the accused and the victim may  
(i) abide by the agreement with reference to the charge and inform the court 
that, subject to the right to lead evidence and to present argument 
relevant to sentencing, the court may proceed with the imposition of 
sentence; or 
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(ii) withdraw from the agreement. 
(c) If the prosecutor, the accused and the victim abide by the agreement as 
contemplated in paragraph (c)(i), the court shall convict the accused of the 
offence charged and impose the sentence which it considers just. 
(d) If the prosecutor, the accused or the victim withdraws from the agreement as 
contemplated in paragraph (c)(ii), the trial shall start de novo before another 
presiding officer: Provided that the accused may waive her or his right to be 
tried before another presiding officer. 
(11) Where a trial starts de novo the agreement shall be null and void and no regard 
shall be had and no reference made to – 
(a) any negotiations which preceded the entering into the MSA; 
(b) the MSA; or 
(c) any record of the agreement in any proceedings relating thereto, unless the 
accused consents to the recording of all or certain admissions made by her or 
him in the agreement or during any proceedings relating thereto and any such 
admission so recorded shall stand as proof of such admission; 
(d) the prosecutor, the accused and the victim may not enter into another MSA in 
respect of a charge arising out of the same facts; and 
(e) the prosecutor may proceed on any charge. 
(12) The terms of a MSA may be amended on good cause shown, with consent of 
all the participants,9 subject to compliance with subsection 2(c) and the 
approval of the court.  
(13) (a)  The role of the mediator is limited to facilitating the mediation process. 
(b) The mediator shall subsequently not accept a guilty plea nor sentence the 
accused. 
(c) The mediator shall not preside over any future aspect of the case, other than 
further facilitation of the matter. 
(d) The mediator and the court shall have no contact or communication except that 
the mediator may report to court – 
(i) that a MSA has been concluded; 
(ii) that the parties are at an impasse; 
                                            
9 The mediator is not considered to be a participant.  
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(iii) that meaningful mediation is ongoing; 
(iv) that the mediator withdraws from the mediation; 
(v) that the mediation has been terminated. 
(14) (a) The mediator or any participant may withdraw from the mediation at any 
time and the mediation is thereby automatically terminated. 
(b) The court may terminate the mediation at any time if further progress towards a 
fair and just agreement is unlikely or issues arise which make mediation no 
longer appropriate. 
(c) Upon termination of the mediation the prosecutor may proceed on any charge. 
(15) Mediation proceedings are in all respects confidential and not to be reported or 
used by any participant including the mediator, except for the concluded MSA, 
which is presented to court, subject to the court, upon application by any one of 
the parties or on its own initiative, having the discretion to order on good cause 
that any part of the MSA not to be published or disclosed in open court. 
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ANNEXURE B: PRINCIPLES OF BEST PRACTICE FOR MEDIATION IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The Principles of Best Practice1 are intentionally drafted as principles  in contrast 
to rules and regulations. 2  This is because of the growing jurisprudence arising from 
making some of these characteristics part of statutory provisions.  
Principle 1 relates to the key characteristic of voluntariness of mediation.  
Principle 2 relates to the full and fair participation by the parties in the mediation. 
Principles 3 relates to the need for proper understanding of the process of 
mediation. The outcome and consequences of the procedure within the criminal 
justice system are critical and accordingly the need for a pre-mediation meeting is a 
pre-requisite.3  
Principle 4 relates to accountability which is a core characteristic of mediation and 
is necessary for an effective and meaningful resolution of economic crime disputes. 
Principle 5 relates to the connection between the process of mediation and the 
process before the court. 
Principle 6 relates to the nature of the mediation, including the key characteristics 
of flexibility and informality. 
Principle 7 relates to the professionalism of mediation and the need for a code of 
conduct to be drafted for mediation in the criminal justice system, a sui generis type 
of mediation. Although core characteristics of mediation are flexibility and informality, 
                                            
1 These principles are primarily based on the Principles of Best Practice for Restorative 
Justice Processes in Criminal Cases in New Zealand available at 
<https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/RJ-Best-practice.pdf>. Also see 
Restorative Justice Best Practice Framework 2017 
<https://www.justice.govt.nz/assets/Documents/Publications/restorative-justice-best-
practice-framework-2017.pdf>; Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005) 
<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute_resolution/mod
el_standards_conduct_april2007.pdf>. 
2 Compare L Love & E Waldman (“The Hopes and Fears of All the Years: 30 Years Behind 
and the Road Ahead for the Widespread Use of Mediation” (2016) 31 Ohio St J on Disp 
Resol) 123 128-129 who disucss the need for a profession, such as mediators to self-
regulate and adopt principles to “improve practice and protect the public”.  
3 Compare CEPEJ (1999) Part II, art 10: “Before agreeing to mediation, the parties should 
be fully informed of their rights, the nature of the mediation process, and the possible 
consequence of their decision,” (writer’s emphasis). 
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it is submitted that standards of conduct will ensure a uniform and effective 
mediation model.4 It is submitted that this can be done through appropriate training 
and accreditation and the establishment of a professional and ethical code of 
conduct.5 
Principle 8 relates to the suitability of mediation. Although, it is not submitted that 
the criterion, the public interest, be a formal requirement for mediation it is suggested 
that the application of the criterion, the public interest, can meaningfully assist in 
determining whether a certain matter is appropriate for mediation or not.6 It is 
envisaged that criteria for determining which matters may be suitable for mediation 
will be provide for through directives issued by the NDPP. 
Principle 9 relates to the appointment process of a mediator. It is foreseen that the 
appointment of a mediator will take place in primarily two ways: by the court or by an 
authority authorised and accredited to do so in terms of a directive.7 The subject of 
collaboration by the NPA with various role players in the state and in the public has 
been emphasised in this dissertation.8 It is strongly suggested that the proposed sui 
generis form of mediation will usually be most effective when using co-mediation.9 
                                            
4 In CEPEJ, Mediation in Penal Matters (1999) Part V, The Operation of Mediation Services, 
the principles concerning the standards, qualifications, training and conduct of mediators are 
underscored. 
5 For a discussion of these issues and the regulation of mediators and mediation see Lyster 
(1996) SAJHR 243-245; R Feehily “Cost Sanctions: The Critical Instrument in the 
Development of Commercial Mediation in South Africa” (2009) 126 SALJ 291 305-311. 
6 Compare the second stage test of the Full Code Test of the Code for Crown Prosecutors 
7th ed 2013 paras 4.7-4.12, 7-10 available at <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-
crown-prosecutors>. Also see the discussion of the criterion the “public interest” for the 
approval of DPAs in ch 4, para 4 4 1 2, 261ff. 
7 The appointing authority could be a body like South African Association of Mediators 
(“SAAM”) or the South African Dispute Resolution Accreditation Council (“DiSAC”). 
8 See ch 3, para 3 3 4 and ch 2, para 2 4 1. 
9 See the discussion in ch 2, para 2 2 3, 64. 
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Voluntariness: Mediation is essentially consensual 
1.1 Participation must be voluntary throughout the mediation process. 
1.1.1 Mediation can only take place with the informed consent of the victim and 
offender (see Principle 3). 
1.1.2 Participants should not feel coerced into giving their consent or to 
participating in a mediation.  
1.1.3 Participants may at any time withdraw from the mediation. 
1.1.4 Mediators may at any time end the mediation should either party be 
unwilling or the mediator is of the opinion that any party experiences 
coercion. 
1.1.5 Any party may seek independent advice before agreeing to participate.  
1.1.6 Any party may be legally represented at a mediation. 
1.2 Resolutions and the mediated agreement must be arrived at voluntarily. 
1.2.1 Resolutions need to be discussed, developed and agreed between the 
parties, primarily the victim and the offender. 
1.2.2 Mediators need to ensure that all parties understand the requirements of 
the resolution, particularly the agreed obligations upon any party. 
 
2 Participation: Full participation by the victim and the offender should be 
encouraged 
2.1 The victim and the offender are the primary participants in the mediation. 
2.1.1 The victim and the offender should be encouraged to participate at a level 
that they feel comfortable. 
2.1.2 The mediator should ensure that the participation from each party is fair 
to the other parties. 
2.1.3 Although, there may be other parties present,10 the interaction between 
the victim and the offender are central, as is that of the prosecutor in the 
process. 
2.2 Victims must determine their own level of involvement 
2.2.1 While the offender always needs to be present, the victim needs to 
determine her or his own level of involvement. 
                                            
10 For example, members of the prosecution or community, or experts. 
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2.2.2 The victim needs to be present in person and may participate through 
indirect means (for example behind protective measures or through video 
conferencing). 
2.2.3 The victim may participate through a representative.  
2.2.4 Where there are multiple victims, each victim needs to be given the 
choice whether to participate or not, and whether to participate in a joint 
or separate conference. 
2.2.5 Principles regarding participation should be discussed at the pre-
mediation stage (see Principle 3). 
2.3 The community may be represented during the mediation. 
2.3.1 Representatives may include those providing support for the victim or the 
offender, and/or other interested11 representatives from the public.  
2.3.2 The presence and participation of members of the community should be 
discussed with the victim and the offender at the pre-mediation stage. 
2.4 Professionals12 may be present during the mediation 
2.4.1 Professionals may attend, and give advice but are not to dominate the 
discussions. 
2.4.2 Consent to the presence of professionals by the victim and the offender is 
necessary. Their presence and level of participation should be discussed 
at the pre-mediation stage or during the mediation.  
2.4.3 Any further contact between the parties should only be on the terms 
discussed and agreed upon during the mediation. 
 
3 Pre-mediation: Participants need to be well-informed of the process of 
mediation to ensure effective participation. 
3.1 Participants in a mediation need to be well prepared. 
3.1.1 Pre-mediation meetings should be held by the mediator with all 
participants, particularly with the victim and the offender.  The information 
that needs to be given and discussed, includes: 
3.1.1.1 the nature and legal status of the mediation;  
                                            
11 “Interested” means persons that may be affected by the offence (for example, parents of a 
school whom the offender has defrauded). 
12 “Professionals” may include investigating officers and legal representatives. 
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3.1.1.2 the role and rights and obligations of each of the parties; 
3.1.1.3 confidentiality of the process and of the outcome; 
3.1.1.4 the procedure to be followed, including who will be present and the 
ground rules; 
3.1.1.5 the expectations of the parties and the realistic options of dealing with 
the offence; 
3.1.1.6 the benefits and risks of participation. 
3.1.2 Community members and professionals who may attend also need to be 
informed of the nature of the process and the extent of their participation. 
3.1.3 The role of the court and the processes before the courts, in the event of 
a successful or failed mediated outcome, need to be discussed.  
 
4 Accountability: The offender must be held accountable 
4.1 The offender must acknowledge responsibility and culpability before a matter 
can be mediated. 
4.1.1 This may be an admission of guilt. 
4.1.2 The provision of a provisional statement of facts by the offender should 
be encouraged. 
4.2 Agreed resolutions need to be fair, realistic and achievable. Parties need to 
be aware that an agreed outcome needs the ultimate approval of the court. 
4.3 Any agreed resolution needs to be monitored and this should be clearly 
provided for in the mediated settlement agreement.13  
4.4 Non-compliance with a mediated settled agreement should be discussed and 
the remedy included in the mediated settlement. 
4.5 The mediation should be limited to the offence that is the subject of the 
original referral. 
4.6 Should further offences become known during the mediation process, the 
offender needs to be made aware that the police may be informed of such 
further offence. 
 
 
                                            
13 For example, time-frames and details of payments should be set out clearly. 
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5 Court approval: Validation of the mediated agreement. 
5.1 The court needs to be informed of the outcome of the mediation. 
5.1.1 The outcome may include  
5.1.1.1 a formal report written and signed by the mediator; 
5.1.1.2 a joint report drawn up by all the parties and signed by all the parties; 
5.1.1.3 a mediated settlement agreement signed by all the parties in respect 
of the issues agreed upon.14  
5.2 The process and proceedings during the mediation remain confidential and 
may not be used as evidence. 
5.3 The outcome becomes public once presented before a court, subject to the 
court’s discretion to order any part of the outcome to remain confidential.15  
 
6 Flexibility and Informality: Flexibility and responsiveness are inherent 
characteristics of mediation 
6.1 Mediation should be guided by the inherent characteristics and values of 
mediation, including: 
6.1.1 Flexibility of the process, notwithstanding the particular style of the 
mediator; 
6.1.2 Honesty and full discourse by the participants; 
6.1.3 Respect for the dignity of each party and the process; 
6.1.4 Impartiality and independence of the mediator(s); 
6.1.5 Transparency of the nature of the process and the outcomes; 
6.1.6 Enablement of the participants. 
6.2 Costs of mediation should be responsive to each particular case.16  
 
7 Professional Mediation: Establishment of a professional and efficient 
mediation 
7.1 Robust and transparent mediation practices are required. 
                                            
14 This may not include all the issues. 
15 For example, the names of any beneficiaries of any compensation agreement may remain 
confidential. 
16 It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss the complex issue of the costs of 
mediation. 
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7.1.1 Mediators need to be properly trained and accredited. 
7.1.2 Mediators should possess the necessary skills and knowledge. 
7.1.3 Mediators should possess the personal qualities of honesty, integrity, and 
accountability. 
7.1.4 Mediators should possess the ability to be impartial and objective.17 
7.2 Co-mediation of offences involving economic crime is encouraged, with one 
mediator being an expert in law. 
7.3 Formal accreditation of training programmes is necessary. 
 
8 Mediation should only be undertaken when appropriate 
8.1 Mediation needs to be appropriate. 
8.1.1 Careful screening of matters for referral for mediation is necessary. 
8.1.2 Sensitivity for cultural differences needs to be accommodated. This may 
include: 
8.1.2.1 language sensitivity (for example, mediation needs to be in the 
language of the participants or with sensitive use of an interpreter); 
8.1.2.2 mediator(s) of the same cultural background as participants; and 
ensuring the participants are aware of the cultural differences that 
may exist between them; 
8.1.2.3 locality of the venue; 
8.1.2.4 seeking advice from community members, if applicable (for example, 
elders, restorative justice organisations); 
8.1.3 Arrangements for mediations should be responsive to the participants’ 
needs and preferences. Usually, the victim’s preference will prevail, but 
the mediator needs to try and resolve conflicts about these issues 
through discussion and negotiation. 
8.2 Mediation is an additional, not a substitutional mechanism. 
8.2.1 Careful consideration is necessary before a matter is referred to 
mediation. Factors to be considered may include:18 
                                            
17 This includes the ability to be culturally sensitive, as the victim and offender may be from 
different cultures. Also see Lyster (1996) SAJHR 241-242. 
18 In considering the public interest, the factors raised in the (English) Code for Crown 
Prosecutors are helpful, namely: seriousness of the offence, level of culpability of the 
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8.2.1.1 the type and seriousness of the economic offence; 
8.2.1.2 the willingness of the victim and offender to participate; 
8.2.1.3 the suitability of the participants; including their ability and maturity to 
participate in mediation; 
8.2.1.4 level of culpability of the offender; 
8.2.1.5 any prior convictions; 
8.2.1.6 power imbalances between the parties; 
8.2.1.7 the nature and extent of the harm caused and the possibility of 
restitution through compensation or other correctional measures; 
8.2.1.8 impact on the community; 
8.2.1.9 whether mediation, in contrast to other available mechanisms,19 is a 
proportionate response to the offence; 
8.2.1.10 generally, whether mediation is in the public interest.20 
 
8.3 Matters can be referred to mediation at various stages: 
8.3.1 Pre-charge; 
8.3.2 Pre-plea; 
8.3.3 Pre-conviction; 
8.3.4 Pre-sentencing; 
8.3.5 Post-sentencing. 
 
9 Appointment of a mediator21 
9.1 The parties shall endeavour to appoint a mediator by agreement. 
9.2 The parties may agree to replace a mediator.  
                                            
offender, circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim, impact on the community and 
whether prosecution is a proportionate response to the offence. 
19 Such as a plea in terms of s 112 of the CPA, a s105A plea and sentencing agreement or 
an adversarial trial. 
20 In considering the public interest, compare the factors raised in the (English) Code for 
Crown Prosecutors are helpful, namely: seriousness of the offence, level of culpability of the 
offender, circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim, impact on the community and 
whether prosecution is a proportionate response to the offence. 
21 This section closely follows draft arts 3.2-3.4 of the UNCITRAL Mediation Rules (2018). In 
the context of The Principles, “mediator” includes a co-mediator, where applicable. 
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9.3 The parties may seek the assistance of an appointing authority for appointing 
a mediator. In particular:  
9.3.1 A party may request an appointing authority to recommend suitable 
candidates; or  
9.3.2 The parties may agree that the appointment shall be made directly by the 
appointing authority.  
9.4  In recommending or appointing, by consent or recommendation, individuals to 
act as mediator, regard shall be given to:  
9.3.3 The professional expertise and qualifications of the prospective mediator, 
including expertise in the subject matter in controversy, experience as a 
mediator and ability to conduct the mediation;  
9.3.4 The availability of the mediator; and  
9.3.5 Such considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an 
independent and impartial mediator. 
 
10 Termination of mediation  
The mediation shall be terminated: 22  
10.1 By the signing of the MSA by the parties, on the date of the agreement;  
10.2 By a declaration of the parties to the mediator to the effect that the mediation 
is terminated, on the date of the declaration;  
10.3 By a declaration of a party to the other party and the mediator, if 
appointed/selected, to the effect that it no longer wishes to pursue mediation, 
on the date of the declaration, unless the parties are prohibited by the 
applicable international instrument, court order or mandatory statutory 
provision from unilaterally terminating the mediation before the expiration of a 
defined period;  
10.4 By a declaration of the mediator, after consultation with the parties, to the 
effect that further efforts at mediation are no longer justified, on the date of 
the declaration; or  
10.5 At the expiration of a defined period in the mediation agreement, statutory 
provision or court order.  
                                            
22 This section closely follows draft art 10 of the UNCITRAL Mediation Rules (2018). 
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11 Arbitral, judicial or other dispute resolution proceedings  
11.1 Mediation may take place any time regardless of whether arbitral, judicial or 
other dispute resolution proceedings have been already initiated. 23 
11.2 Mediation may take place with regard to any issue, or part issue with regard 
to the dispute.24 
                                            
23 This section closely follows draft art 11 of the UNCITRAL Mediation Rules (2018). 
Although arbitration is typically not permitted regarding matters relating to criminal liability, a 
related dispute regarding civil liability in relation to the same facts may have been referred to 
arbitration. 
24 For example, mediation may take place with regard to the charge, or the sentence or both, 
or simply with regard to the quantum of the harm or compensation. 
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